The Prime Minister:
Before I come to describe the Agreement which was
signed at Munich in the small hours of Friday morning
last, I would like to remind the House of two things
which I think it very essential not to forget when
those terms are being considered. The first is this:
We did not go there to decide whether the
predominantly German areas in the Sudetenland should
be passed over to the German Reich. That had been
decided already. Czechoslovakia had accepted the
Anglo-French proposals. What we had to consider was
the method, the conditions and the time of the
transfer of the territory. The second point to
remember is that time was one of the essential
factors. All the elements were present on the spot for
the outbreak of a conflict which might have
precipitated the catastrophe. We had populations
inflamed to a high degree; we had extremists on both
sides ready to work up and provoke incidents; we had
considerable quantities of arms which were by no means
confined to regularly organised forces. Therefore, it
was essential that we should quickly reach a
conclusion, so that this painful and difficult
operation of transfer might be carried out at the
earliest possible moment and concluded as soon as was
consistent, with orderly procedure, in order that we
might avoid the possibility of something that might
have rendered all our attempts at peaceful solution
useless. . . .
. . . To those who dislike an ultimatum, but who were
anxious for a reasonable and orderly procedure, every
one of [the] modifications [of the Godesberg
Memorandum by the Munich Agreement] is a step in the
right direction. It is no longer an ultimatum, but is
a method which is carried out largely under the
supervision of an international body.
Before giving a verdict upon this arrangement, we
should do well to avoid describing it as a personal or
a national triumph for anyone. The real triumph is
that it has shown that representatives of four great
Powers can find it possible to agree on a way of
carrying out a difficult and delicate operation by
discussion instead of by force of arms, and thereby
they have averted a catastrophe which would have ended
civilisation as we have known it. The relief that our
escape from this great peril of war has, I think,
everywhere been mingled in this country with a
profound feeling of sympathy.
[Hon. Members: Shame.] I have nothing to be ashamed
of. Let those who have, hang their heads. We must feel
profound sympathy for a small and gallant nation in
the hour of their national grief and loss. Mr.
Bellenger: It is an insult to say it.
The Prime Minister: I say in the name of this House
and of the people of this country that Czechoslovakia
has earned our admiration and respect for her
restraint, for her dignity, for her magnificent
discipline in face of such a trial as few nations have
ever been called upon to meet.
The army, whose courage no man has ever questioned,
has obeyed the order of their president, as they would
equally have obeyed him if he had told them to march
into the trenches. It is my hope and my belief, that
under the new system of guarantees, the new
Czechoslovakia will find a greater security than she
has ever enjoyed in the past. . . .
I pass from that subject, and I would like to say a
few words in respect of the various other
participants, besides ourselves, in the Munich
Agreement. After everything that has been said about
the German Chancellor today and in the past, I do feel
that the House ought to recognise the difficulty for a
man in that position to take back such emphatic
declarations as he had already made amidst the
enthusiastic cheers of his supporters, and to
recognise that in consenting, even though it were only
at the last moment, to discuss with the
representatives of other Powers those things which he
had declared he had already decided once for all, was
a real and a substantial contribution on his part.
With regard to Signor Mussolini, . . . I think that
Europe and the world have reason to be grateful to the
head of the Italian government for his work in
contributing to a peaceful solution.
In my view the strongest force of all, one which grew
and took fresh shapes and forms every day war, the
force not of any one individual, but was that
unmistakable sense of unanimity among the peoples of
the world that war must somehow be averted. The
peoples of the British Empire were at one with those
of Germany, of France and of Italy, and their anxiety,
their intense desire for peace, pervaded the whole
atmosphere of the conference, and I believe that that,
and not threats, made possible the concessions that
were made. I know the House will want to hear what I
am sure it does not doubt, that throughout these
discussions the Dominions, the Governments of the
Dominions, have been kept in the closest touch with
the march of events by telegraph and by personal
contact, and I would like to say how greatly I was
encouraged on each of the journeys I made to Germany
by the knowledge that I went with the good wishes of
the Governments of the Dominions. They shared all our
anxieties and all our hopes. They rejoiced with us
that peace was preserved, and with us they look
forward to further efforts to consolidate what has
been done.
Ever since I assumed my present office my main purpose
has been to work for the pacification of Europe, for
the removal of those suspicions and those animosities
which have so long poisoned the air. The path which
leads to appeasement is long and bristles with
obstacles. The question of Czechoslovakia is the
latest and perhaps the most dangerous. Now that we
have got past it, I feel that it may be possible to
make further progress along the road to sanity.
From Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons,
Vol. 339 (October 3, 1938)
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