Courting New Delhi: Washington and Beijing Compete for Influence
20 April 2005
Last month, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid a visit to India where she discussed Washington's desire to help India become a "major world power." Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao followed suit with Beijing's most recent wooing of New Delhi by announcing a "strategic partnership" between the world's two most populous countries. India has clearly become an object of desire for the major powers in Asian politics; how this courtship plays out will have global ramifications.
Several factors have coalesced in recent years to thrust India into a prominent role on the global stage. China and the United States are increasingly looking to New Delhi to secure the realization of their interests in the complex world of Asian geopolitics and energy security. Although Washington has thrown its support behind Pakistan since September 11, 2001, it is beginning to place more importance on India's potential to impede the expansion of China's influence to its west. Beijing sees New Delhi as a potential rival for energy resources and an obstacle to its "peaceful rise" strategy; naturally, bringing India within its sphere of influence will help it to clear these hurdles.
However, India's continued border dispute with Pakistan and its immature relations with several neighboring states have the potential to scuttle any gains for which the U.S. or China are looking from improved relations with India. New Delhi has been remarkably successful in encouraging the advances of Washington and Beijing without scaring off the competing suitor; in many ways, it has demonstrated a more "non-aligned" approach to its international relations than when this was official policy. India is likely to use its newly discovered desirability to increase its status as an economic and military power, ideally operating independently of Beijing's and Washington's influence; nevertheless, there are many roadblocks preventing any of these states from seeing gains from this triangular relationship.
China Looks West
Wen and his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, announced, "India-China relations have now acquired a global and strategic character. The leaders of the two countries have, therefore, agreed to establish an India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity." This partnership will be built on expanded bilateral trade, the resolution of border disputes dating back to the 1962 war between the two countries, military cooperation, coordination on energy security issues, cultural exchanges, water use agreements, and enhanced air and shipping links. [See: "Sino-Indian Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Challenges Ahead"]
The goals of this enhanced partnership were laid out in the joint statement as well: "The two sides are supportive of democratization of international relations and multilateralism, stand for the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair, rational, equal and mutually beneficial, and promote North-South Dialogue and South-South Cooperation." In this, both sides agree that Washington's dominance of international affairs poses a threat to the expected rise of each state.
An emphasis on multilateral organizations will continue to be a point of agreement for India and China at least until either country assumes its expected role as a major power. In fact, India claimed that Wen threw China's support behind New Delhi's bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, although this was not mentioned in the joint statement. Even though this appears not to be the case, the agreement does demonstrate China's willingness to support a greater role for India in global affairs, hoping that it will help to push the world towards multipolarism at the expense of Washington.
China's desired gains from a better relationship with India are largely tactical in nature, with a general objective of preventing an "encircling" of its western border. If China is to develop its western provinces, it will need to guarantee new energy sources and delivery routes, as well as resolve the long-standing disputes as to the geographic borders of its western territory. In both of these situations, India plays a pivotal role in ensuring Beijing's success.
The rapid expansion of China's and India's economies has had a dramatic effect on the energy markets worldwide. In order to secure the continued growth in their countries, India and China both must look abroad for energy resources in an environment of increased competition for new energy sources, largely found in difficult to access areas. Although this competition has the potential to push China and India further apart, the two countries have demonstrated that they prefer to cooperate on energy issues.
This can be seen in Sudan, where India has invested in a pipeline to deliver petroleum from a refinery in which China owns a stake. Central Asia and Russia have also been areas in which the two countries have acted as partners in securing energy resources. The most visible sign of Sino-Indian cooperation can be found in Iran, where the Yahavaran oilfield is being financed by India, China and Iran. This project demonstrates how geopolitics are being shifted by China's and India's need for energy.
Foreign investments in energy are rarely devoid of security issues, and with India and China they never are. Partly in order to secure a stake in the Yahavaran oilfield and the Jufeir oilfield, India is more closely cooperating with Iran on defense and intelligence issues. In 2003, Tehran and New Delhi conducted joint naval exercises, which spooked India's newly found allies in the U.S. and Israel. The dissimilarity between New Delhi's and Washington's allies may prove to be the most difficult sticking point in their budding relationship. For China, this is yet another reason to develop a closer relationship with India.
While in general India and China have seen cooperation as the optimal method to secure their future energy needs, there are some areas of concern for both states. China views the Andaman Sea off Myanmar's coast as an important source of oil to fuel the economic expansion of China's western provinces. Developing a port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar off the Andaman Sea, with significant investments to Myanmar's transportation infrastructure, would allow China to fuel the economic expansion of its western provinces while avoiding the pirate-rife Malacca Strait and ease the burden on its already strained eastern ports.
However, India is also looking to develop the Andaman Sea, without cooperation from China. India is unlikely to move towards cooperation with Beijing on this issue because New Delhi sees building a port at Dawei, Myanmar as a major component to its security strategy for the region. The port will support its Far Eastern Naval Command project at Port Blair, which is aimed at gaining "blue water" status for India's Navy, affording India the ability to launch military operations away from its coast.
While there will certainly be sticking points in energy security with China, it is India's relations with its neighboring states that will seriously complicate China's courtship. While China has largely resolved its territorial disputes with its neighbors, India has not. China has already established relationships with the states with which India must now negotiate. The challenge for China will be to remain above the fray in the negotiations, while maintaining a close relationship with both parties. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar will all have their flashpoints with India in the near future, but it is Pakistan that stands as the greatest threat to China's courtship of New Delhi.
Although India and Pakistan are moving toward a negotiated settlement on the Kashmir region, there is still a long road ahead. In the meantime, India will continue to seek the weakening of Pakistan's influence, and Pakistan will return the favor. The recent events in Nepal highlight this fact. When India announced that it would discontinue its military aid to Nepal's government after King Gyanendra sacked the government, Pakistan announced that it would fill the gap. This was clearly aimed at weakening India's influence in Kathmandu, and it is likely to be a common occurrence in the region for the near future. Although there is hope that the proposed natural gas pipeline from Iran, through Pakistan, to India will help to bind these countries to diplomatic skirmishes as opposed to direct conflict, there is little hope that a pipeline will diminish the desire of either side to weaken the reach of the other.
China's "all-weather" relationship with Pakistan will remain an important factor in its western relations; this will box in any future India-China partnership, making the prospect of a Sino-Indian power bloc less likely. China has historically supported Pakistan in an effort to contain India, but it is also aimed at containing the separatist threat it perceives in its western Xinjiang region. The current leadership in Beijing has placed a premium on integrating China's western regions into the booming economies of its east. Beijing clearly believes that Uighur militants and activists are a threat to this integration, and maintaining good relations with a neighboring Islamic nuclear-armed state on its western border will remain an important aspect of its efforts to contain this perceived threat.
For this reason, China will maintain close military ties with Pakistan, evidenced by China's recent cooperation with Pakistan on the FC-1 fighter jet development project. Also, China has financed 80 percent of a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, which will have potential uses for China's expanding navy in the future. India's objections to China's close military ties to Pakistan will limit any inroads that Beijing will gain from their proposed partnership.
While India and China are in the process of sorting out their differences and building a "strategic partnership," another suitor has come knocking on India's door. As the "war on terror" fades in importance to Washington's approach to southern Asia, the U.S. is looking to make India an important aspect of its strategy to contain China.
Washington's "Natural" Alliance
Shortly before Premier Wen arrived in India, Secretary of State Rice brought Washington's proposal to help New Delhi become a "major world power" to India. Many in Washington have long considered India a "natural partner" for the U.S. because both countries are multi-ethnic democracies. However, geopolitical concerns have historically limited their willingness to allow this partnership to bloom. There is hope that as Washington begins to turn its attention away from the "war on terror" and back to the traditional game of managing geopolitical alliances and the increasingly complicated world of energy security, India and Washington will finally be able to pursue their "natural" alliance.
To this end, Rice used her recent visit to India to promote expanded cooperation between Washington and New Delhi on a variety of issues, including civilian nuclear and space programs, bilateral trade and further military ties -- but most of all she touted India's democracy. By putting the emphasis on the U.S.' and India's similar political systems, Washington highlights the differences between China and India, as well as the reasons New Delhi should be suspicious of its eastern suitor.
Washington hopes to use its closer ties to New Delhi in order to help India become a major regional power. The objective is that where the U.S. military is impeded, India can act as a bulwark against China's expected rise in influence in South Asia. This has led to a very close relationship between the American and Indian navies. Their cooperation during the recent tsunami relief efforts in the region has deepened these ties. Washington would like to see India's navy acting in areas such as the Malacca Strait, where the local governments are suspicious of the world's only superpower patrolling their seas.
There are many obstacles to achieving these goals, and outside of the prospect of expanded economic ties, India is approaching the U.S. with more skepticism than it has China. Like China, the U.S.' support of Pakistan is the major issue of contention for India. Washington has complicated the problem through its recent policy decisions. It agreed to sell Pakistan several F-16 fighter jets, which Pakistan had paid for years in advance only to see U.S.-imposed sanctions scuttle the deal.
The fact that Washington agreed to sell India a greater number of F-16s, and even the more advanced F-18 jets, has done little to alleviate New Delhi's concern that Pakistan will be able to arm their new jets with nuclear weapons; Washington could not reasonably back away from the sale to Pakistan without fear of losing its support in Afghanistan and the larger "war on terror." However, India is likely to use this issue successfully to gain U.S. assistance for its civilian nuclear projects in the future.
India is even less pleased that Washington's policy of starving the government of Iran out of power through economic isolation has become a major sticking point in India's attempt to bind Pakistan's economy to its own. The U.S. is the most vocal opponent of the proposed natural gas pipeline from Iran, through Pakistan, to India. Given its hold over Pakistan's government, U.S. opposition may be enough to kill the proposal. This would greatly complicate India's and Pakistan's advances on a negotiated settlement -- New Delhi's number one foreign policy objective.
For Washington, the challenge ahead is to help facilitate the growth of India, and encourage it to look to the West for new alliances, without causing too much concern in Islamabad. Though this creates a very narrow framework in which Washington can work with India, there is unlikely to appear any flagging in its desire to make it work.
Conclusion
It is Beijing's and Washington's ties to Pakistan that remain the greatest obstacles to forming a greater partnership with India. However, both states have been able to maintain their good relations with New Delhi even after a change in India's government last year. India would like to continue the courtship from both countries, as long as it can remain noncommittal on hitching its future to either power. As long as Washington and Beijing continue on their current path of avoiding direct conflict, India will see gains from this strategy. As Washington and Beijing jockey for position in South Asia's geopolitics, India will be the main benefactor, something that it hopes to exploit in the future. Indeed, only its strained relations with its neighbors appear to be holding it back from achieving this aim.
INDIATIMES NEWS NETWORK[ MONDAY, MAY 16, 2005 01:59:21 PM ]
NEW DELHI: Hardly a month after India and China signed a landmark agreement to settle their border dispute, a Chinese Army patrol has intruded deep into Indian territory and stayed there for close to 24 hours before withdrawing last week.
The border violation took place in Asafila area of the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh.
This is the same area where on June 26, 2003, a Chinese Army team had intruded into India, stripped Indian intelligence officials of personal weapons and held them hostage for several hours.
The incident had coincided with the then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's official visit to China.
The issue was taken up by India with the Chinese government then.
The latest intrusion was carried out by a five-member team of the Chinese Army, sources say.
The patrol reached the border on May 10 and crossed over the next day, trekking some five kilometers into the Indian side.
They spent almost the entire day inside Indian side before retreating.
By May 12, the patrol team had fully withdrawn to their normal stated position beyond the Line of Actual Control.
"Our troops did not allow the situation to get out of hand," sources told Indiatimes News Network . There was no exchange of fire.
The government and Ministry of External Affairs are in the know of things, sources said.
But there was no immediate confirmation if the issue has been taken up with China through diplomatic channels.
When contacted by this website, Ministry of External Affairs spokesman, Navtej Sarna, said he had no information regarding the issue.
The Asafila area, one of the eight pockets of dispute in Arunachal Pradesh, is patrolled by Indo-Tibetan Border Police.
Newly-appointed Director General of ITBP S K Kains was not available for comments on the intrusion.
His office said the DG was away on tour to the "forward areas" in the eastern part of the country but there was no confirmation if his trip was to assess the situation in Asafila area.
What is baffling is that the intrusion came just a month after the highly successful visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to India.
Among the agreements concluded during his visit, the most noticeable one was the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question".
There have been occasional claims by India of intrusion by Peoples Liberation Army.
In 2000, Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Mukut Mithi claimed there have been repeated incursions by Chinese troops.
Then reports had pointed out that the Chinese had built a mule trail in Kaila Pass in Dibang Valley district.
China officially does not recognise Arunachal Pradesh as an Indian state.
Chinese Army had overrun most of Arunachal Pradesh during the 1962 war, but had vacated it after the war.
The Line of Actual Control is punctured at many pockets of dispute. In 1986-87 there was a serious flare up of the border stand off between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunachal.
In 1993, the two sides signed an accord to reduce tensions along the border and to respect the LAC.
In 1996 the two sides also put in place many Confidence Building Measures for improving the border peace.
Among the CBMs is an agreement of non-aggression, prior notification of large troop movements and a 10-km no-fly zone for combat aircraft.
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