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Learning2vest

03/02/05 9:59 AM

#96608 RE: osoesq #96602

oso, like your description. Good summary of the situation in the time frame from just before Ericsson and InterDigital settled until Nokia launched their temper tantrum campaign in the courts after they settled. Judge Lynn had things pretty much in order before Nokia sent a wild bunch into her court with guns blazing.

Gonna give you a layman's perspective of what happened next since I'm not a lawyer. My take is that what Judge Lynn decided to do with Nokia's too late motion to intervene had a lot more to do with subjective judgment than a strict reading of the law. IMO her alternatives were to either deny Nokia's motion and watch them appeal her decision, or to allow the motion and retain control. Simple as that IMO, and she took the control road.

If she sent Nokia into an appeals process in opposition to her ruling to grant their intervention on the vacated litigation it could open up all kinds of nasty possibilities. On the other hand, by granting Nokia's motion she was able to effectively retain control over that wild bunch and to shunt them off onto a side track while the more rational folks from IDCC and Ericsson appealed her ruling.

I think Judge Lynn was brilliant given the circumstances. She threw a blanket over the wild bunch from Nokia and rendered their purpose moot for at least a year while the IDCC/Ericsson appeal process AND the Nokia vs InterDigital 2G arbitration proceeded. Let's consider the timing on those two procedures.

Betting that Nokia ain't gonna care much about what happened in Ericsson vs InterDigital after the ICC arbitration court delivers THEIR rulings in the next few weeks. Nokia is gonna have some other tipping dominoes to worry about at that point, i.e., SONY/Ericsson and Ericsson triggering Nokia's 3G license.

Sitting over here in the IDCC peanut gallery this layman's call on Judge Lynn's granting of Nokia's motion to intervene with certain restrictions attached is "no harm/no foul". Nice work up there on the Federal bench.




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Corp_Buyer

03/02/05 10:40 AM

#96614 RE: osoesq #96602

OSO- your analysis and disctinction (between interlocutory ruling vs final judgment) are exactly what many thought pre-reinstatement by Judge Lynn. The flaw in this view seems to be the issue of "forfeit"ing one's right to appeal.

The forfeit occurs if a party chooses to settle instead of appealing. The choice to settle is a deliberate action whether the ruling is interlocutory or final.

Now, if the settlement is effected with only a request for the court to vacate, then the parties are communicating that they are indifferent to the court's action to vacate, which may or may not be true, but according to Bancorp, this is what has been communicated by the parties. If the parties and the settlement are NOT indifferent to the court's action, then the appropriate way to communicate this is to make the settlement dependent on the court's action to vacate the adverse ruling i.e. make the vacatur an integral, rather than an incidental, part of the settlement.

Unfortunately, IDCC and E, in effecting the settlement, did not make the court's action part of the settlement, since they only REQUESTED the vacatur post settlement. Accordingly, it seems IDCC and F&J took the wrong approach and specifically, by their actions, told the court and the world that the settlement is indifferent to the vacatur, which made the vacatur not permanent, and opened the door for the reinstatment.

Of course, IDCC clearly chose to settle, according to Bancorp regardless of the court's action to vacate, and IDCC chose the settlement instead of pursuing its right to appeal the PSJ. Accordingly, IDCC's right to appeal the PSJs on the merits was forfeit, according to Judge Lynn and Nok, citing Bancorp and it's progeny.

As I recall my reading at the time, while Bancorp dealt with a final judgment, Judge Lynn (and perhaps other cases) dealt specifically with interlocutory rulings in applying the Bancorp principles of "forfeit", "juducial efficiency", and integral v. incidental actions (my words) of the Court in effecting the settlement.

Of course, as a practical matter, and IMO, parties are not always indifferent to the court's action in connection with a settlement, whether or not the court's action is integral or incidental to the settlement. Nevertheless, there is logic and precedence for Judge Lynn's ruling and that is why I am so livid at IDCC and F&J for making this perhaps negligent mistake.

If our settlement was effected properly, then the PSJ vacatur would have been made permanent, Nok could not have achieved the reinstatement, and we would not be in this risky situation involving some of our most valuable company assets, not to mention the extra expenses incurred trying to correct this monumental mistake.

I do think there is a reasonable chance (50% MO) that the Court of Appeal will reverse Nok's intervention, with the direct result of reversing the reinstatement, in which case the Court will not need to review and rule on the merits of the reinstatement. Fortunately, Judge Lynn explicitly stated in her ruling that the reinstatement is based on Nok's intervention.

For the sake of considering all the possibilities (however remote), a truly bizzare outcome could be if the Court of Appeal reverses Nok's intervention, but then on its own motion, allows the reinstatement to stand, since the trial court properly corrected it's error in granting the original vacatur. Without a moving party such as Nok, it seems exceedingly unlikely and illogical that the court would review and allow the reinstatement to stand.

I have sent Pacer 776, Judge Lynn's ruling to reinstate, to JimL in case you want to review it.

All MO,

Cheers,
Corp_Buyer























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JimLur

03/02/05 11:44 AM

#96624 RE: osoesq #96602

To all here's Pacer 776 that Corp sent me.

http://wirelessledger.com/ORDER-REINSTATE-GRANT-NOK-776.pdf


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loophole73

03/02/05 12:38 PM

#96630 RE: osoesq #96602

osoesq

Exactly, this case not only did not involve a verdict, it failed to even reach the consent judgment category. The end result was purely a withdrawal of all claims of the parties and the dismissal of their respective causes of action. Thus, a real question exists regarding the intervention because Nok is literally stepping into a non-existent case. The BanCorp case is clearly distinguishable in this fact situation.

MO
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