Replies to post #93922 on Tornado Alley (PROG)

[StephanieVanbryce]

US to conduct naval exercises with S Korea after attack

The US has confirmed it will hold naval exercises with South Korea, after a report blamed the North for the sinking of a Southern warship, officials say.


South Korea's president has vowed to punish those who carried out the attack

The Pentagon said the joint anti-submarine and other military exercises would start "in the near future".

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak earlier froze trade with Pyongyang, vowing to punish those who carried out the attack.

North Korea has said it will retaliate for any action taken against it.

The country's main newspaper called the investigation an "intolerable, grave provocation".

'Unequivocal support'

South Korea has said it will refer the North to the UN Security Council in response to the sinking of the Cheonan - and the resulting death of 46 sailors - in March.

In a move endorsed by the US, President Lee said in a televised address that Seoul would no longer tolerate "any provocative act by the North and will maintain a principle of proactive deterrence".

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said the decision to start joint naval exercises was "a result of the findings of this recent incident".

Analysts describe the joint exercises as a statement of US commitment to help Seoul rather than an attempt to intimidate Pyongyang.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said earlier that her country was working hard to avoid an escalation.

After talks in China, she urged countries in the region to contain "the highly precarious situation created by North Korea".

China - North Korea's closest trading partner and a permanent member of the Security Council - has urged "restraint".

Japan said it was contemplating its own sanctions on Pyongyang.

The North depends on South Korea and China for up to 80% of its trade and 35% of its GDP.

In 2009, inter-Korean trade stood at $1.68bn (£1.11bn) - 13% of the North's GDP.

The measures announced by South Korea included:

* Stopping inter-Korean trade

* Banning North Korean ships from using South Korean waterways or shortcuts

* Resuming "psychological warfare"

* Referring the case to the UN Security Council

The BBC's John Sudworth in Seoul says the measures are as tough a response as the South could take short of military action.

The measures came less than a week after experts from the US, the UK, Australia and Sweden said in a report that a torpedo had hit the Cheonan.

They reported that parts of the torpedo retrieved from the sea floor had lettering that matched a North Korean design.

Pyongyang denies any involvement in the sinking, calling the investigation a "fabrication" and threatening war if sanctions were imposed.

"If [South Korea] sets up new tools for psychological warfare such as loudspeakers and leaves slogans for psychological warfare intact, ignoring our demands, we will directly aim and open fire to destroy them," a statement by the military said on Monday.

"More powerful physical strikes will be taken to eradicate the root of provocation if [South Korea] challenges to our fair response," said a commander, according to official news agency KCNA.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia_pacific/10150379.stm

[fuagf]

Iran as a Nuclear Weapons Power
* By Anthony H. Cordesman
Dec 16, 2009

The latest discoveries regarding Iran’s nuclear program are simply the next development in a process that has been going on since the Iran-Iraq War, and Khomeini’s decision to resume nuclear research once Iran came under chemical weapons attack from Iraq. It is important to understand the “neutron initiator” document in this context, and to remember several key aspects of Iran’s efforts:

..... o Iran did not begin its efforts with a focus on Israel, and its anti-Israeli rhetoric may still be more of a cloak for actions that give Iran power and influence over its immediate neighbors, and the potential ability to deter the US, than any real focus on Israel either ideologically or in a warfighting sense.

..... o Iran is a declared chemical weapons power, although it has never complied with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), nor stated its holdings. It probably has the capability to manufacture persistent nerve gas. It could certainly put such gas in a unitary warhead and probably has some cluster weapon capability.

..... o Iran is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), but there are no firm data to indicate whether it does or does not have a biological weapons effort. It is clear, however, that Iran has the capability to develop and produce advanced biological weapons – and could do so as either a supplement or substitute for nuclear weapons. Iran should acquire the ability to develop even more advanced genetically engineered biological weapons in the 2010-2015 time frame. Roughly the same timeframe as it could deploy a major nuclear force.

..... o There is no inspection regime for the BWC, and US studies raise serious questions as to whether such a regime is possible. Accordingly, even if Iran did fully comply with all IAEA requirements, it could still develop and produce weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, there is no enforceable way a true weapons of mass destruction free zone can be established and enforced in the Middle East or any other area with advanced biotechnology.

..... o Iran’s missile programs represent a critical part of its military efforts and expenditures. They still, however, do not exhibit a test program that could give them the reliability and accuracy to be effective without using a weapon of mass destruction as a warhead. Even a chemical missile warhead, however, would be more a terror weapon than a true weapon of mass destruction. It would risk provoking a massive response that could be far more lethal to Iran even if it used precision conventional weapons.

..... o Iran’s conventional forces remain obsolescent and limited in capability. This is why its emphasis on missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric warfare both compensate for the limits of its conventional forces and act as a key substitute.

..... o Iran’s steadily advancing capabilities for asymmetric and proxy warfare still leave it vulnerable to US conventional forces and devastating precision attacks on its military and economic assets. Acquiring weapons of mass destruction acts as a potential deterrent to US conventional attacks on Iran.

..... o Accordingly, no analysis of Iran’s nuclear programs and intentions should be decoupled from an analysis of its overall military programs – although many discussions of Iran’s nuclear programs have that defect.

That said, it is still possible that Iran may not develop a nuclear weapons capability or deploy other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Diplomacy may change Iranian actions, the regime may change, sanctions and economic problems might halt or delay Iran’s efforts, and/or Iran may develop other security priorities. These options do, however, seem less probable with time.

Nearly two decades of sanctions, diplomacy, and dialog have had some impact in delaying Iran’s programs, in making it keep its programs more covert, and in highlighting the risks Iran runs in moving forward. It has not, however, prevented Iran from acquiring steadily more capable long-range missiles and the technology and production facilities needed to make nuclear weapons. Iran also has retained the technology and production base to make chemical weapons, and even if it does not have covert active programs, its civil sector is steadily improving its dual capabilities and ability to develop and deploy advanced biological weapons.

It is also far from clear that any power can carry out preventive attacks at this point that would do more than delay a determined Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons for several years. Israel and Iran’s neighbors do not have the capability to launch more than limited strikes. It might be militarily possible for the United States to carry out effective initial strikes, follow them up with immediate restrikes, and then maintain a restrike capability that it used to systematically deny Iran the ability to create new, dispersed facilities. This kind of U.S. posture, however, would pose major political challenges in terms of both the willingness of friendly powers such as the Gulf States and Turkey to support any phase of such operations, and it is clear that the United States would have major problems in obtaining broad international support.

These are not reasons to give up on diplomacy or dialog, or to abandon sanctions and efforts to develop military options to prevent or limit Iranian capabilities. They are, however, realities that indicate that the Gulf States, the region, and the world may have to learn how to live with Iranian proliferation, coupled with growing Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

If that happens, there are two major strategic alternatives: (1) accept a major increase in Iran’s ability to influence and intimidate key oil exporters and other states throughout the region; (2) create the capability to contain Iran through defense and deterrence. In both cases, the result may still be a regional nuclear arms race and at least the possibility of a devastating nuclear exchange.

CSIS has developed a report that examines these options in more detail. It is titled “Iran as a Nuclear Weapons Power” and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/091216_IrannuclearRpt.pdf

The reader should also be aware that it draws on work the author did with Adam Seitz in a CSIS book entitled Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in 2009. This book is available from Greenwood Publishing at: http://www.praeger.com/catalog/A2233C.aspx

In addition, the reader should be aware of other work coauthored with Abdullah Toukan. This includes the following:

“GCC - Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces” – found at:

http://csis.org/publication/gcc-iran

“Iran, Israel, and the Effects of Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East” – Found at:

http://csis.org/publication/iran-israel-and-effects-nuclear-conflict-middle-east

“Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Development Facilities” – Found at:

http://csis.org/publication/study-possible-israeli-strike-irans-nuclear-development-facilities

http://csis.org/publication/iran-nuclear-weapons-power

[fuagf]

IAEA turns its attention to Israel
By Alan Fisher


Israel's nuclear capability was forced on the IAEA's agenda by the 18 nation
Arab block, elevating Israel to the same status as Iran and Syria [EPA]

In a sprawling office complex on the edge of Vienna stands the headquarters
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world's nuclear watchdog.

It has a number of meetings throughout the year, when the 35 nation board of directors
get together to discuss the latest reports. It is normally a run-of-the mill affair.

But the meeting that got under way today is important for two reasons.

Firstly, for the first time in 19 years, the gathering will discuss "Israel's nuclear capability".

Coming clean?

The item has been forced onto the agenda by the 18 nation Arab block, elevating Israel to the same status as Iran and Syria.

Yukiya Amano, the new director general of the IAEA, is already drawing up a report discussing ways
to make Israel open up its facilities to international inspection and sign up to the international non-
proliferation treaty, which would commit it to disarmament. That should be delivered in September.

Israel, of course, employs a deliberate policy of ambiguity over its nuclear capabilities; never confirming, never denying.

But the decision to have it on the agenda is a set back not just for Israel but also for its supporters.

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA is Ali Asghar Soltanieh. He emerges from the closed door meeting to tell us: "US, Canada and European
Union, they preferred not to discuss Israel's nuclear capability, but they joined the consensus because they had no other choice."

A 'special case'

Syria is also on the agenda. Three years ago the Israelis bombed a remote site in the Syrian desert. It
was thought it was a North Korean inspired reactor complex. For the last two years Syria has refused
IAEA follow-up access, leaving the nuclear watchdog to wonder if there is another covert operation underway.

But it is Iran that will dominate discussions. Amano says it's a "special case" for his monitoring
teams because of suspicions it might be hiding experimental nuclear weapons programmes.

Iran freely admits it has a nuclear programme but insists it is for civilian purposes.

The IAEA report will echo far beyond this meeting. There are those at the United Nations who
are marshalling support in the Security Council for a fresh round of sanctions against Tehran.
They have now been handed some powerful words to help their campaign and boost their argument.

Israel has been the loudest in highlighting what it sees as the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran.

But if it wants the international community to take stern action against Tehran, there are a growing number of countries
who think that is a position it cannot pursue until it finally comes clean about its own nuclear capabilities.
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/2010/06/201067185820611286.html

Iran's ageing nuclear facility

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t15T4FNmjOU

The Tehran Research Reactor is an ageing nuclear facility located in the heart of the Iranian capital.

Built by the United States as a nuclear research facility 40 years ago, it is
now at the centre of Iran's claims that it needs nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes only.

The reactor makes radioactive materials for use in hospitals - for example in the treatment of cancer.

Al Jazeera's Alireza Ronaghi was given exclusive access inside the facility.
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/05/201052911553193252.html