BEIJING - The railway that is intended to bring the two Koreas together is taking Korea's two giant neighbors, China and Russia, farther apart, as they are divided about the route the new train from Seoul should take.
There is a controversy heating up in four capitals - Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow - on the route of the new railway once it leaves the Korean Peninsula. Seoul and Beijing would like it to go west, cross China's northeast and from there join a branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad passing through Mongolia. Pyongyang and Moscow, meanwhile, are pressing for a northern route that bypasses China completely, reaches Vladivostok and from there proceeds westward to Europe.
The western track would relink two economic powerhouses, one present and one potential - South Korea and northeastern China, which 60 years ago was the Japanese industrial base in China. Currently that region is cut off from easy transportation links to Japan and South Korea. The best route is from the port of Dalian, whence ships must sail around the Korean Peninsula to reach Japan. A direct train link though the two Koreas would once again connect this area, with its population of more than 100 million people and its old industrial tradition, with Japan and South Korea.
Northeastern China is currently in the throes of its worst crisis ever, with massive unemployment due to the closure of many old factories. A new rail/sea connection with Japan and Korea would free the region from its present geographical trap and make it a bridge for trade and development in Northeast of Asia, as it was during the Japanese occupation in the 1930s.
However, Vladivostok, the largest Russian city in Asia, would benefit only marginally from the development of increased direct trade among South Korea, Japan and northeastern China. As it is now, almost no one takes the longer route to Moscow via Vladivostok. In the case of a rail route through northeastern China, Vladivostok would become more dependent on the goodwill and good relations of its neighbors, mainly China. To a large extent this is already happening, as a growing crowd of Chinese pushes business in the city, but with the new westbound rail, the situation would become even worse.
The weakening of Vladivostok, with its 2 million inhabitants, raises the whole question of the Russian presence in eastern Siberia. The city has Asia's largest concentration of ethnic Russians. If its importance were to dwindle and it were to be absorbed more into the Chinese economic sphere, this could be the green light for a slow move into Siberia of Chinese and other Asian entrepreneurs, large and small, and loss of clout of Asian Russia. A weakening of the Russian presence in Asia would be an immense blow to the Russian identity itself, as the country lives on the idea of stretching across the Eurasian continent. Asia then would lose what has been for centuries a huge buffer area with Europe and will have the problem of confronting Europe directly.
But these distant geopolitical issues, while they are urgent and pressing for Russia, are distant and obscure for China, which is keen on developing its northeast and give bread and butter to the region's restive 100 million population.
For North Korea the calculus is less straightforward and more convoluted, as usual. Pyongyang favors the northern route to Vladivostok, thinking of the development of its special economic zone in Tumen, something that has been in a state of suspended animation for more than a decade. Furthermore, closer commercial links between China and South Korea, both market economies, could squeeze the North, accelerating beyond its wishes its economic transformation and pushing Russia out of the political and economic equation. Russia was for decades a necessary part of the political balance in the region, as Pyongyang would lean on either side of the socialist block, Beijing or Moscow, for support, thereby protecting its independence. Taking Vladivostok, and thus Moscow, out of the picture would leave Pyongyang at the mercy of Seoul and Beijing - an unwelcome perspective for North Korea.
The mutual disagreement seems huge, but the fact that these issues have been on the table proves on the other hand that the discussion on the relinking of the railway has moved from a theoretical area to a very concrete one. In other words all parties are truly interested in a land route through North Korea.
The decisive factor on the rail route could be Japan, which will become clear on Tuesday during the visit to Pyongyang by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Japan, the economic powerhouse of Asia, has the greatest interest in the railway, which would halve the time and the cost of transporting its goods to Europe. The Vladivostok route is two days longer than the China route, and this is without even considering that northeastern China is itself a market, never mind faraway Europe. Japan, moreover, is sentimentally attracted to China's northeast, and there are large Japanese investments in the area mainly because of historical links.
However, all parties have an interest in safeguarding the Russian presence in Asia and thus in guaranteeing the future of Vladivostok.
Two routes, one to Vladivostok and one to China's northeast, could be an option, but that might not solve the problem - who would want to take a two-day detour to Russia? The best option would be a concerted effort by China, South Korea and Japan (and possibly also the United States, to maintain its leverage with Moscow) to reassure Russia about the future of Siberia and of its city.
Money is the second issue. Russia has been pleading for Chinese, Korean and Japanese investment in its natural resources in eastern Siberia; the parties ought to throw this on the table to convince Moscow that it has only to gain and nothing to lose in having Vladivostok join in East Asian development and backing the China route. This would give new essence to Russia's status as a bridge between east and west.
The North Korean position is the most difficult one. Only very recently, in July, did Pyongyang launch timid economic reforms, the results of which are still uncertain. While nobody wants the sudden collapse of North Korea, nobody wants it to stay the way it is. The issue is: can anybody manage to convince the North Koreans they are better off with faster rather than slower changes and that the old balance game between Russia and China can't work anymore?
Analysis: Is Putin a Republican? By Peter Lavelle Published on October 19, 2004 This article was written for UPI - United Press International
MOSCOW, Oct. 19 (UPI) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin weighed into American domestic politics on Monday with words that unmistakably endorsed George W. Bush's re-election bid. With only a handful of world leaders willing to publicly praise the American president and even fewer willing to publicly support his campaign, Vladimir Putin is openly backing his American counterpart for another term. Does this make Putin a Republican or just a very savvy politician?
At a regional summit in Dushanbe, the Tajik capital, Putin made his feelings clear as to how he views Bush and his fight to keep his job with the statements, "Any objective observer understands that attacks by international terrorist organizations in Iraq, in today's circumstances, are aimed not so much at the international coalition forces as at President Bush personally."
Putin went to say, "International terrorism has as its goal the inflicting the biggest possible damage on President Bush, preventing him from being re-elected to a second term. If they achieve their goal, then that will give international terrorism a new impulse and extra power." Clearly these are words of strong support for Bush. However, read differently, Putin may actually be taking a long view of Russia's geopolitical position and where he wants his country to be in four years.
This is not the first time Putin has publicly supported Bush in the context of American domestic politics. Last June, Putin lashed out at Democrats, claiming they had "no moral right" to attack Bush on the issue of Iraq. Putin's outspokenness surprised many in Russia and the United States -- Russia, after all, was one of the major countries in the world that was strongly against the use of military force against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. However, this did not stop Putin from claiming, during the same June press conference, that Russia had intelligence that Saddam planned terrorist attacks against interests before the invasion of Iraq.
Since June and particularly after Monday's comments, many commentators have pondered what Putin gets in return for his support of Bush. The most common speculation is that Putin and Russia's political class would rather see a Republican in office -- not unlike the general party secretaries who rule the Soviet Communist Party. The common belief is that a Republican president has the same pragmatic stripe as the ruler in the Kremlin.
It is believed that Democratic administration under John Kerry would be much harder on Russia in the areas of human rights and, in particular, the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. Also, it is claimed that the Kremlin continues to harbor ill feelings toward Democrats for strong support of Boris Yeltsin as Russia plunged into disarray and poverty as well as Bill Clinton's decision to have NATO bomb Yugoslavia in 1999. Lastly, it is said that Putin appreciates Bush's muted approach when commenting on the Russian president's political reforms at home that centralizes all power within Kremlin walls.
These are all reasons for Putin to hope Bush will remain in the White House. However, countries have international interests, not friends. After five years of Putin, it is clear the Russian president is brutally pragmatic and unmoved by sentimentality. Putin most probably appreciates that George Bush has spoken out on his behalf when the world would not -- but this most certainly does not influence his overall foreign policy agenda.
Putin supports Bush because he sees four more years of this president as an opportunity to realize one of his primary agendas -- cementing Russia's return to great power status. This Bush administration has been consumed by preparing and later carrying out the ongoing military operation in Iraq. Most agree that this conflict as well as other conflicts in the region will not be resolved anytime soon. In many ways, this suits the Kremlin just fine. America's focus on Iraq creates room for Russia to move within the "coalitions of the willing and unwilling." A re-elected Bush will be a mandate for America's recent unilateralist foreign policy -- the same foreign policy that has helped Putin move adroitly on the international arena. Putin's trip to China last week demonstrates how America's unilateralism energizers Russia's multilateralism and its ability to play international energy politics well.
The Kremlin does not worry if a Kerry administration were come to pass. The "free pass" some have claimed the Bush administration has given Russia lacks substance. There is no "free pass" because the Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated that it will not tolerate criticisms of Russia's domestic policies -- Chechnya included. A Kerry administration, like the present administration, will have little, if any, leverage to make any public demands on how Putin rules at home.
The Kremlin also knows that whoever is elected in November will continue to work with Russia on the key areas of energy cooperation, anti-proliferation measures, the war on international terrorism and trade.
Putin has good reason to see Bush re-elected. Russia's foreign policy prospects have made a remarkable rebound during Bush's time in office. Yet, if Kerry is elected, the United States will still have to deal with the war in Iraq -- an area where Vladimir Putin just might provide a strong helping hand. Whether it is Bush or Kerry, Russia will remain a necessary ally -- warts and all.
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