Russia took Chechen rebels' relatives hostage By Kim Murphy in Znamenskoye, Russia September 8, 2004
It was 6am when Russian soldiers hoisted themselves over the wall, crashed through the window and broke down the front door.
Shouting, shoving and kicking, the soldiers pushed 67-year-old Khavazh Semiyev and his wife into a truck waiting outside, then went back for the others - his two sons and two nephews, his son's wife, his 52-year-old sister. Then - and Mr Semiyev could not believe his old eyes - they went back for his grandchildren: Mansur, 11, Malkhazni, 9, and Mamed, 7.
The family, all in their nightclothes, were driven through the empty streets of the small Chechen town of Znamenskoye to the Russian Army's command centre at Khankala. There, the men were forced to their knees. Sacks were pulled over their heads, and their hands tied behind their backs. For the next 24 hours, anyone who moved from that position got kicked.
One day into the seizure of more than 1000 hostages by suspected Chechen separatists in the town of Beslan, Russia now had its own hostages. About 40 family members of senior Chechen rebel leaders were assembled at Khankala on Thursday, a day after the hostage seizure in Beslan, until Saturday, the day after it ended.
Mr Semiyev's daughter, Kusama, is the wife of the Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov. Around him were assembled the extended families of Mr Maskhadov, the former Chechen president, and of the Chechen warlords Shamil Basayev and Doku Umarov.
"We figured they wanted to exchange us for the hostages in Beslan," Mr Semiyev said once back home.
The Russian Government says it was protecting the families' lives. A statement from operations headquarters in the Northern Caucasus said Russian forces obtained intelligence that rebel leaders planned to kill several of their own relatives and then accuse Russian law-enforcement agencies of murdering them.
Mr Maskhadov's spokesman in London, Akhmad Zakayev, said Russian authorities were trying to inspire terror in the terrorists. Mr Maskhadov has vigorously denied involvement in the siege and condemned the hostage-taking.
"They were following the standard practice developed almost a century ago by the Bolsheviks and carried on by Stalin, who believed that every single act of terror should be responded to by an even bigger, more horrendous, more terrifying terrorist act," Mr Zakayev said.
"According to this practice, it is necessary to shock terrorists, and let them know that under no condition will you agree to negotiate with them."
Across Chechnya, the reaction to the events in Beslan has been a mixture of pain on behalf of the victims, most of them children, and resentment that the victims of Chechnya's 10 years of war with Russia have fewer mourners.
"I was sitting watching it on TV, and I was going out of my mind. I was thinking, what kind of people could do that? What kind of people could treat children like that?" said Tabarik Gagayeva, who sells sunflower seeds in a market outside the Chechen capital of Grozny.
Mrs Gagayeva's husband disappeared in 1995. Her two brothers and one brother's sister-in-law died the same year after troops in a Russian armoured vehicle pulled them over.
"They killed them." she said. "They tortured them first. They cut off their legs at the knee and their arms. The girl they literally ripped from throat to bottom.
"So you can see that when I'm watching what happened in Beslan on TV, I remember what great pain happened in my own family. I remember this with great trepidation, and I cry."
In Chechnya, Russia faces a situation that is strikingly similar to the one that it encountered in Afghanistan in the 1980s when it tried unsuccessfully to preserve that country as a client state against nationalist and Islamic opposition aided by the United States.
Note: The United States has a history of aiding Islamic opposition groups. As noted in the following post Chechen terrorist attacks have been favorable to the U.S. agenda. #msg-3953878
Just as was the case in its intervention in Afghanistan, Russia faces the additional problem that the opposition to its policies is aided by the United States. Chechen businessman Malik Saydullayev, who would have been the only credible candidate contesting Alkhanov in the presidential election had he not been barred from running because of a technical problem with his passport, has said that "Russia has geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the Caucasus, the heart of which is Chechnya, and developed N.A.T.O. countries also have interests in the Caucasus. This war is over these interests."
From the American viewpoint, Russian failure in Chechnya is welcome, as long as it does not get to the point that Chechnya becomes a base for Islamic revolution worldwide.
The United States has granted asylum to Ilyas Akhmadov, the foreign minister of Maskhadov's opposition government, leaving him free to pursue diplomacy aimed at winning international support for Maskhadov's Republic of Ichkeria. The Putin regime has complained of an American "double standard" in the "war on terror," but has been powerless to stop the American support of the opposition.
Note: In an interview videotaped for Chechen Television, a transcript of which was distributed on the Kavkaz Center website, Maskhadov, Akhmadov’s benefactor, vowed there would be "massive operations" in Ingushetia and "an expansion of the theater of operations." Video footage has been displayed of Maskhadov standing next to Basayev, who had taken responsibility for terrorist attacks on civilians in Russia, including the 2002 seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow that ended in the deaths of dozens of hostage-takers and captives.
Given this relationship and the favorable timing of the Chechen attacks Bush is seemingly behind the terrorist incidents in Russia the last of which killed many Russian schoolchildren. #msg-3959917
-Am
Chechnya: Russia's Second Afghanistan
08 September, 2004
Russia's predicament in its rebellious republic of Chechnya is fast spinning out of control and is threatening to become Russia's second Afghanistan. After ten years of trying to control Chechnya primarily by military force, punctuated by a period of withdrawal from 1996 to 1999, Russia still has not been able to realize its aim of ruling the republic through a compliant local political leadership. At present, the situation in Chechnya is deteriorating so badly that Moscow is increasingly faced with a series of options, all of which are unfavorable to its strategic and security interests.
Located in the strategically significant Caucasus Mountains, Chechnya's predominantly Sunni Muslim population has never been reconciled to its incorporation into the Russian empire in 1859. Chechens declared an autonomous republic in 1920 in the wake of the Russian Revolution, but were later absorbed into the Soviet Union. In 1944, the Stalin regime accused the Chechens of cooperating with the Nazi forces and sent hundreds of thousands of them into forced exile in Kazakhstan, from which they were allowed to return in 1957. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechens again made a bid for independence under the leadership of air force general Dzhokar Dudayev. The Russian regime of Boris Yeltsin refused to acquiesce in Chechnya's separation and invaded the republic in 1994, setting off a two-year war that ended in Russian retreat and de facto independence for Chechnya without international recognition.
During its brief period of independence, Chechnya became a failed state. The elected government of Aslan Maskhadov was unable to contain rampant crime, corruption, warlordism and Islamic revolutionist tendencies, which spilled over into neighboring Russian republics and into the heart of Russia itself. After a series of apartment house bombings in Russia in 1999 that were blamed on Chechen radicals, the Putin regime chose to invade Chechnya once again, driving Maskhadov underground and triggering a second Chechen war that continues to fester and recently has erupted with suicide bombings of Russian airliners and the seizure and bombing of a school in the republic of North Ossetia, resulting in hundreds of deaths and casualties.
The recent upsurge of violence in the Chechnya conflict stems directly from the assassination of Chechnya's Russian-backed President Akhmad Kadyrov on May 9, 2004. Elected in October, 2003, Kadyrov had been Moscow's hope for achieving legitimacy for its control of Chechnya. The chief religious leader of Chechnya's Sunni Muslims, Kadyrov had backed the separatist forces in the first Chechen war, but became disenchanted with the failed experiment in independence and collaborated with the Russian occupiers after 1999, becoming head of a Russian-imposed governing authority. With the death of Kadyrov, Moscow lost the only local leader with sufficient support and prestige in the Chechen population to possibly secure legitimacy for Russian rule. Politically, Russia's situation in Chechnya has reverted to what it was in the first Chechen war, in which it was defeated.
Russia's Position in Chechnya
In Chechnya, Russia faces a situation that is strikingly similar to the one that it encountered in Afghanistan in the 1980s when it tried unsuccessfully to preserve that country as a client state against nationalist and Islamic opposition aided by the United States. Both Chechnya and Afghanistan are clan-based societies whose members share strong senses of national identity and independence, but do not have traditions of strong centralized political rule. When such societies function as effective polities, their governance is based on a fine balance of power among networks of clan alliances, which is easily disturbed and vulnerable to degenerating into fragmentation, localism and warlordism. Under the stress of war, Chechnya has fallen apart into an array of competing groups, some of which war against Russia and others of which cooperate with it to varying degrees out of expediency.
The one constant among Chechens is a fundamental opposition to Russian rule, which is sometimes superseded by calculations of group and individual expediency. Russia's only significant advantage in Chechnya is that a large proportion of the Chechen population is war weary and has become disabused of the separatists as well as of the Russians. After ten years of turmoil, many Chechens are willing to acquiesce reluctantly in Russian rule, so long as it brings them a modicum of security. The problem for Moscow is that it has not been able to suppress the militant Chechen resistance through force and political manipulation. The result has been chronic instability, the devastation of Chechnya's economy and infrastructure, an exodus of refugees to other Caucasian republics, waves of resistance strikes in Russia and a weakening of Moscow's power in the Caucasus.
During the ten years of struggle, Moscow has pursued a policy of imposing its rule by force and attempting to install compliant leaders, rejecting the option of negotiating with the opposition. Most public discourse about that policy concerns whether or not Moscow should shift gears and try to enter negotiations. Critics of the military option tend to blame Russian President Vladimir Putin's stubbornness for continued failures in Chechnya, but there are plausible reasons why Russia has not turned to negotiation.
Most importantly, Chechen society has become so politically fragmented that it is not clear that any deal that Russia might make, for example, with Maskhadov's exile government of Ichkeria, would be effective on the ground. The resistance is split between Chechen nationalists and far more uncompromising Islamists and warlords, particularly Shamil Basayev who is deemed responsible and has claimed responsibility for most of the terrorist acts committed outside Chechnya. Even if Moscow could bring some of the nationalists on board, that would not guarantee peace and security, at least in the short term, and would probably lead to more autonomy for Chechnya than the Russians are willing to permit on a lasting basis.
In addition, Russia has a vital security interest in maintaining its territorial integrity and discouraging bids for autonomy in republics where ethnic Russians are a minority, particularly in the Caucasus. Rebel movements have sprung up in neighboring Ingushetia, which has ethnic and religious ties to Chechnya. Inter-clan conflict has arisen in the republic of Dagestan and there have been recent reported incidents of armed confrontations with security forces in the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. A generous grant of autonomy by Moscow to Chechnya might not result in effective separatist movements elsewhere, but it would be highly likely to create instability in the region.
Finally, Russia has a vital strategic interest in maintaining control over the northern Caucasus region and expanding its influence into the southern Caucasus to break American encirclement through Georgia and Azerbaijan, and prevent the United States from monopolizing Caspian Sea oil. De jure or de facto separation of Chechnya from Russia would be a major setback to core Russian strategic aims.
The Election of Alu Alkhanov
Russia's severe predicament in Chechnya is illustrated by the election to Chechnya's presidency on August 29, 2004 of Alu Alkhanov to replace Kadyrov. Widely seen internationally and within Chechnya as a rigged vote, the election detracted from Russia's legitimacy in Chechnya. A former Chechen interior minister and security operative, Alkhanov has no ties to the opposition and has been ordered by Moscow not to negotiate with it. Unlike Kadyrov, he has no prestige or base of support in the population, although he is linked to the powerful clan, led by Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of the late president, who controls a formidable independent militia, and is too young to constitutionally assume the presidency.
Moscow has attempted to increase acceptance of Alkhanov by permitting him to pursue a policy of diverting all of Chechnya's oil revenues to reconstruction efforts in the republic. Yet with most of the fields depleted and most of the refining capacity impaired, this plan seems to be an effort by Moscow to avoid having to give direct reconstruction aid, which in the past has been frittered away by corruption.
By putting up as weak a figure as Alkhanov, Russia has shown the weakness of the hand it has to play in Chechnya. The resistance forces understand this, which is why they have launched their spectacular strikes. After the airliner and school bombings, Moscow is faced with a choice between trying to apply massive coercive power to crush the rebellion, letting conditions go on as they are or attempting to make some kind of bargain with segments of the opposition. Each of those options has more downside risk than upside potential, and each of them has benefits for the resistance. Massive force will further alienate the Chechens from Russia, continuation of chronic instability will do the same, and negotiation will spell a diminution of Russian power if a bargain is made, and will be a sign of weakness that will likely embolden the hard-line opposition. There is also the option of another Russian withdrawal from Chechnya, but that would mean a severe weakening of Russian influence in the Caucasus.
International Complications
Just as was the case in its intervention in Afghanistan, Russia faces the additional problem that the opposition to its policies is aided by the United States. Chechen businessman Malik Saydullayev, who would have been the only credible candidate contesting Alkhanov in the presidential election had he not been barred from running because of a technical problem with his passport, has said that "Russia has geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the Caucasus, the heart of which is Chechnya, and developed N.A.T.O. countries also have interests in the Caucasus. This war is over these interests."
The interest of the United States in the Caucasus is control over oil supplies from the Caspian Sea, which involves securing compliant regimes in the southern Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, where the oil is extracted, and Georgia, through which the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will pass. As a consequence of this dominant interest, the United States is also committed to thwarting any attempt by Russia to expand its influence in the Caucasus. From the American viewpoint, Russian failure in Chechnya is welcome, as long as it does not get to the point that Chechnya becomes a base for Islamic revolution worldwide.
In the current strategic environment, the United States is constrained to give public support to Russian efforts to curb terrorism, but that does not mean that it takes Russia's side in practice. Not only did the United States criticize the August 29 election as being "neither free nor fair," but it has granted asylum to Ilyas Akhmadov, the foreign minister of Maskhadov's opposition government, leaving him free to pursue diplomacy aimed at winning international support for Maskhadov's Republic of Ichkeria. The Putin regime has complained of an American "double standard" in the "war on terror," but has been powerless to stop the American support of the opposition.
Maskhadov is pursuing a novel strategy of sending his government ministers into exile in different countries so that they can gain maximum diplomatic leverage. Culture Minister Akhmed Zakayev has been granted asylum in Great Britain, Health Minister Umar Khanbiyev is in France, and Social Defense Minister Apti Bisultanov is based in Germany. Maskhadov's dispersion strategy has led to publicity for his proposal to internationalize the Chechen conflict through guarantees of the country's autonomy and to contacts with N.G.O.'s. Whether N.A.T.O. powers are formally involved with the Ichkerian exile government is unclear, but at the very least they are granting it a measure of legitimacy and sending a signal to Moscow that they are not supportive of its success in Chechnya.
The United States and the European Union have called for Russia to negotiate with the separatists. France and Germany have played both sides of the table, distancing themselves from the United States by endorsing the August 29 election, but also urging negotiation. Their ambivalence is based on their desire for stronger relations with Russia to counter American influence in Eastern Europe and to build economic relations, particularly in the oil sector. At the same time, they also want Caspian Sea oil free from Russian control.
Conclusion
With no apparent favorable options, it is likely that the conflict in Chechnya will result in a setback for Russia's geostrategic interests in the Caucasus. Faced with a population that remains ill disposed to Russian rule and is not organized coherently enough to make a bargain, and confronted by external powers that have an interest in diminishing Moscow's influence in the region, Putin's regime is in a bind from which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to extricate itself. Over time, Moscow will be tempted either to withdraw or to apply massive force. In the short term, it will probably continue its failed policies, possibly with additional shows of force that will not change the basic situation.
The most likely scenario of prolonged instability will weaken Putin's credibility and give him less leeway elsewhere in the Caucasus, providing an advantage to the N.A.T.O. powers.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
This is a dated article but reiterates what I believe. Russia is and has been under attack. Beyond the treasonous Khodorkoysky affair, being one way in which we were to cut a piece of the Russian pie, many signs point to the fact that the United States clandestinely supports the Chechen rebels who are reportedly related to al Qaeda and thus we are ultimately responsible for the deaths of the many Russian schoolchildren at Beslan. #msg-4382491
In the same light the pseudo democracies of Georgia and now Ukraine are but a few more pieces in the Grand Game meant to further the suffering of the Russian people through the rape of their energy reserves.
Putin, for his faults, stands against the neocons and the oligarchs of the world. See also: #msg-3977050
-Am
Russia: Richard Perle to the rescue in Russia Posted on Tuesday, January 13 @ 07:00:00 EST by balkanalysis
CDeliso writes "The last months have seen neocons, worst of all being Richard Perle, protest the growing power of Russian president Vladimir Putin. He sparked their ire by cracking down on the country’s oligarchs, especially Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The real outrage for the neocons was how this act sidelined a deal between Exxon-Mobil and Yukos, a deal which would have enormously enriched a professed political enemy of Putin while putting a large chunk of Russia’s energy supply under the control of an American company.
Yet it’s not just Exxon. Neocons fear that Russian oil might be diverted into pipeline projects to not only Japan but- most fearsome of all- China.
The capper- that event that really drove the neocons ballistic- was when the Russian people disagreed with them and strengthened Putin’s party hold on parliament in December’s elections. One can only imagine the inflammatory rhetoric we will be subjected to following the Russian presidential elections of March, which Putin will win.
Even these events beside, Vladimir Putin fundamentally represents what neocons hate most- a foreign politician who is actually a leader and who actually stands up to the US. In the neocon political universe, the word “leader” is synonymous with “evil dictator,” and opposing the US could only logically be done by “rogue states” and spiteful, impotent former allies. Foreign governments are respectfully asked to be caretakers, sycophants, “willing” to join coalitions and more besides. Anything less is tantamount to betrayal and roguery.
Yet there are solutions for insolence. On 31 October, following the arrest of Yukos boss Khodorkovsky, “Prince of Darkness” Richard Perle demanded that Russia be expelled from the G-8: “No (other) G-8 country is allowed to treat its leading businessmen the way Russia treated Khodorkovsky,” he spewed. “I believe Russia is moving fast in the wrong direction.”
As the neocons would have it, this was yet another example of Soviet-minded politicians crushing the valiant free-market reformers of the business class. On the same day, a very loaded commentary from the Neocon-dominated American Enterprise Institute bombastically declared that:
“… a scandal of Watergate proportions is rocking Moscow. It threatens Russia's economic revival and endangers President Vladimir Putin's long-term political survival. Russians are calling it a signal event in their country's history, comparable to Stalin's purges of the 1930s or the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968.”
The tacit absurdity of this statement is only reinforced by the failure to cite anyone- anyone- except “Russians” in general in defense of the comparison with Stalin or the invasion of Prague. Unfortunately for the neocons, when somebody did ask ordinary Russians for their opinion, they voiced it loud and clear at the ballot box, just over a month later. And that was the final straw for the neocons.
The parliamentary elections of 7 December saw a big victory for pro-Putin “United Russia” candidates. Rather than countenance the possibility that a majority of Russians might actually have voluntarily supported a president with 80 percent approval ratings, they instantly joined the chorus of outside voices charging electoral unfairness and corruption. That international cuckold, the OSCE, complained the election was a “regression in the democratization process.” And US media fretted that elections were “unfair” to the opposition parties. The San Francisco Chronicle offered this misleading description of the state of affairs in Russia today:
“…as parliament looked on, he (Putin) has turned Russia into what Kremlin insiders and analysts call ‘managed democracy’- a state where democratic institutions are too weak and the opposition is too vulnerable to make a difference, and where political elites, not voters, decide the country's future.”
The subtle implication of this approximation is that in other places (i.e., America) it is the voters and not “political elites” who decide the country’s future. However, the alternative to Putin’s “managed democracy” is not voter empowerment- rather, it is the rule of the financial elite, Russia’s oligarchs. And that, come to think of it, wouldn’t be too different from the political realities operative in today’s America.
The timing of Khodorkovsky’s arrest was politically significant, of course. A report from Reuters cited well-connected foreign investors as saying Khodorkovsky was planning to ‘buy’ 150 seats in the Duma:
“‘…he was trying to control 150 votes in the Duma,’ said one international banker who asked not to be identified. ‘He had at least 100 people lined up who would vote as he wanted.’
…Putin is known to have been infuriated when Khodorkovsky mobilized support in the Duma earlier in the year to vote down an increase in taxation of oil company profits. ‘They (the Kremlin) believe he was launching some initiative to take over the reins of power and that it was a very well thought out attempt,’ said a prominent investment banker in frequent contact with Kremlin insiders.”
While neocons portray the situation as one of a Soviet-style Putin versus champions of the “free market,” not a word is said about how Russia’s oligarchs were able to enrich themselves so much and so quickly. In fact, there is an entire website devoted to exposing the oligarchs. It begins with this summary:
“…using their links with the state and, sometimes, shadowy business connections made before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a small number of well-placed and ruthless men managed to thrive in the early days of Russia’s bandit capitalism. When the great Soviet enterprises, oil companies and fields, media outlets and mines worth billions of dollars were privatized, they used their inside positions to amass huge wealth, in the process acquiring the hatred of the Russian population and, often, the adulation of a Western press eager to find successful businessmen in the hub of the former communist empire.”
In 2000, there were no billionaires in Russia, whereas today there are 17. Antiwar.com’s Justin Raimondo recounted the oligarchs’ Soviet-style methods of enrichment, and notes the following irony in regards to Putin’s chief neocon accuser:
“…it is oh-so-appropriate that Richard Perle should become the chief Western defender of the crony capitalist Khodorkovsky: Perle's links to such companies as Trireme Partners, Boeing, and Hollinger International have paid off as a direct result of his high-level political connections.”
Indeed, the neocon affinity for dubious causes the world over is well attested in the story of Comrade Perle and his noble quest for international justice. When Perle decries Putin’s way of “treating their leading businessmen like that,” he is simply expressing his shock and confusion that now-capitalist Russia nevertheless fails to attain the same heights of state socialism so prevalent in the US today- the cozy cronyism at taxpayer expense that has made chickenhawks such as Richard Perle so fat and happy. Indeed, the innate contradictions so characteristic of Perle’s thought- attacking France while at the same time vacationing there, demanding a bloody war while having no intention of fighting in it, ordering the removal of political influence from capital in Russia while clearly not planning to play by the same rules in America- is symptomatic of all the bloated hypocrisies of neoconservative thought in general, one that is tiresome, oafish and increasingly untenable.
Khodorkovsky didn't receive severe sentence, guilty of treason
Pertinent facts are being omitted by the press.
Background: Putin referring to the United States said "Some would like to cut a juicy piece of our pie. Others help them," he said. "Terrorism is just one instrument they use."
One way in which we were to cut a piece of their pie may be glimpsed in the Khodorkoysky affair. A close scrutiny shows the Khodorkoysky case was in essence a means by which the United States could invade Russia by gaining not only control of Yukos but a foothold in their Duma.
Another problem connected to YUKOS—the issue of buying seats in the Duma—has been noticeably less discussed. YUKOS is accused of not limiting its lobbying to “one-time” deals, but generously “sponsoring” various parties to cobble together its own Duma “faction.” Other oligarchs do similar things, but not on the same scale as YUKOS. http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_164082.php
This is how generously they were sponsoring.
The Russian president and the former secret police members who now dominate his staff struck at Khodorkovsky when it became clear that the billionaire was preparing to spend $100 million to win a large bloc of seats in Duma elections next month and eventually to run for the presidency himself. http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/147219_hoagland7.html
Exxon Mobil originally meant to buy a controlling interest in Yukos, only later did they back down to 40%.
Therefore the merger in its original intent would have given Exxon Mobil, a foreign entity, seats in Duma.
The sale of Yukos shares to a U.S. company would entail that representatives of American big business would be sitting in the Russian parliament. Russia would cede its sovereignty if it allowed transfer of strategic assets to corporations that are, in turn, closely linked to foreign governments. This would be like having a representative of Russian business in the U.S. congress voting on or blocking key legislation relating to the national interest. Knowing that Khodorkovsky has been siphoning profits from the impoverished Russian people under the umbrella of privatization compliments of democracy and is associated with not only the Carlyle Group but the elder Bush and others it becomes painfully obvious that his allegiance is with the United States and not Russia yet he would be president. This is betrayal, he’s lucky Putin does not try him for treason.
The sovereignty of Russia was being challenged albeit in a small way but nevertheless a precedent Putin could not ignore. Khodorkovsky was plotting against his own country.
Our objective has always been to contain Russia, keeping them in abject poverty by controlling pipelines and limiting Russia’s ability to get their oil and gas to market.
-Am
Russia's Khodorkovsky jailed for 9 years Tue May 31, 2005 09:34 AM ET
By Christian Lowe and Dmitry Zhdannikov MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years in a prison camp on Tuesday after being found guilty in a tax evasion trial widely seen as orchestrated by the Kremlin to crush a political rival.
"My sentence has been decided in the Kremlin," an unrepentant Khodorkovsky, 41, said in a statement read to reporters by his lawyer.
The severity of the sentence -- a year short of the maximum demanded by the prosecution -- is certain to stoke concerns in the West and among investors about the high risk of doing business in President Vladimir Putin's Russia.
The central Moscow court found the billionaire guilty of six of seven charges of fraud and tax evasion in a verdict that took judges 12 days to read and which climaxed an 11-month trial.
Khodorkovsky's YUKOS business associate, Platon Lebedev, was handed the same sentence. Both plan to appeal.
"Khodorkovsky and Lebedev entered into an organized group with the aim of illegally appropriating other people's property and then selling the assets for their own gain," said chief judge Irina Kolesnikova.
"The court finds (the defense arguments) to be groundless."
A charge of repeated forgery of documents was dropped.
Standing to hear the sentence, Khodorkovsky looked straight ahead and showed no emotion as it was read out.
Outside the heavily guarded court, his supporters shouted "Shame!."
The verdict produced a gasp from Khodorkovsky's female relatives, one exclaiming: "How could you do that to a person?"
After the verdict, the prosecutor general's office said there would soon be new charges against him but gave no details.
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were both sentenced to a prison camp where inmates live in barracks with relative freedom to move around within the grounds of the jail. But they will stay in their Moscow jail until appeals have been exhausted.
LITTLE SYMPATHY IN RUSSIA
If the sentence stirs unease in the West, Khodorkovsky's plight is unlikely to elicit support from ordinary Russians.
They mostly view the hugely wealthy, and usually young, oligarchs like Khodorkovsky who emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union as little more than thieves of state wealth who left them even worse off than under communist rule.
Khodorkovsky has spent nearly 20 months in jail and Lebedev almost two years, time that will be taken off their sentences.
The billionaire, once Russia's richest man and founder of the YUKOS (YUKO.RTS: Quote, Profile, Research) oil company, and Lebedev had faced charges including fraud, theft and tax evasion.
The company has since been crushed under the weight of back tax claims and its core assets passed into state hands.
"(We) see this sentence as an incredible perversion of justice ... this system not only readily fulfilled the order to destroy Mikhail Khodorkovsky, but, it seems, wants to ruin YUKOS itself," YUKOS said in a statement.
After the verdict, the stricken oil firm said it would file a 324 billion rouble ($11.53 billion) suit against the Russian government in compensation for the enforced sale of its main asset, now in the hands of a state firm.
The judges had made clear from the start of their summing up that the accused would be found guilty.
VERDICT EXPECTED
"There was no reason to expect a soft sentence," said Masha Lipman, political analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center who said the judges had so taken the side of the prosecution they had reportedly even repeated its spelling and arithmetical errors.
"Nobody has any illusions the court was independent, not even the broader public. The sentence had to be long enough so Khodorkovsky was in jail in 2008, at the next presidential elections."
The United States had voiced its concerns earlier that the trial has undermined investor confidence in Russia.
"This political trial before a kangaroo court has come to a shameful conclusion," U.S. Democratic representative Tom Lantos said outside the court.
"The conclusion of the trial was pre-determined politically ... we will watch with great interest at the appeal process and what happens from here on."
Britain's ambassador to Russia, Tony Brenton, warned the outcome of the trial could have a major impact on business and investor confidence in Russia. (Additional reporting by Meg Clothier, Andrew Hurst, Darya Korsunskaya, Tom Miles and Elif Kaban)
Market Data 
Markets 
AI
