Replies to post #208436 on InterDigital Inc (IDCC)

[loophole73]

wow

Is this guy related to Professor Irwin Corey?

MO
loop

[habu]

Here is the text of the doc. Hope it turns out.


In the Matter of
CERTAIN 3G MOBILE HANDSETS AND
COMPONENTS THEREOF
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Before the Honorable Paul J. Luckern
Administrative Law Judge
)
)
) Investigation No. 337-TA-613
)
)
---------------)
RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF
PROFESSOR LAURENT AYNES REGARDING FRENCH CONTRACT LAW
Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.15, Respondents Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc.
(collectively, "Nokia") respectfully move for leave to file a supplemental expert report for
Professor Laurent Aynes regarding French contract law. This report is written in response to the
rebuttal report filed by Hugues Calvet on behalf of Complainants InterDigital Communications
Corporation and InterDigital Technology Corporation (collectively, "InterDigital").
This supplemental report is needed to address misstatements of law and
misrepresentations of Professor Aynes' opinion contained in Mr. Calvet's report. Because of
these misstatements and the authorities cited in Mr. Calvet's report that were not addressed in
Professor Aynes' report, there is good cause for filing a supplemental report to address these
arguments and authorities. Moreover, because Professor Aynes' report is being submitted much
in advance ofthe hearing in this case, there is no prejudice to InterDigital. In the event that Mr.
Calvet's report is accepted, Nokia submits Professor Aynes' report as a response thereto.
Professor Aynes' supplemental report is attached hereto.!
1 Nokia is serving, along with this official French version, an unofficial English version. In the interest
of providing this report to InterDigital's counsel as soon as possible and in advance of Professor Aynes'
(footnote continued)
Pursuant to Ground Rule 3(ii), counsel for Nokia contacted the Staff, counsel for
Samsung, and counsel for InterDigital regarding the subject matter of this motion. The Staff
and Samsung do not oppose. InterDigital did not provide its position before the motion was
filed.
Dated: February 29,2008
aul F. Br an
S. Alex Lasher
Jeffrey Schwartz
ALSTON & BIRD LLP
950 F Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
E-mail: [e-mail]
Patrick 1. Flinn
Mark A. McCarty
John D. Haynes
ALSTON & BIRD LLP
1201 West Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30309-3424
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
Lance A. Lawson
Ross R. Barton
Dwayne C. Norton
ALSTON & BIRD LLP
101 South Tryon Street, Suite 4000
Charlotte, NC 28280
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
deposition, Nokia includes an unofficial English translation as a courtesy, and will file an official English
translation as soon as it is available.
A. William Urquhart
Marshall M. Searcy III
Erica P. Taggart
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP
865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
Counsel for Respondents
Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc.
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE - 75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone]-FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
Observations sur la consultation (rebuttal expert report) de M. Rugues CALVET
1. EN GENERAL
1.1 La description que donne Mr. Calvet de mon opinion est inexacte (p. 4 et 5)
D'apres lui, je dis que la declaration de l'article 6.1 constitue une offre de License. Ie n'ai jamais dit
que l'engagement de 1'IPR owner en application de l'article 6.1. etait une offre de contrat. J'ai dit
expressement Ie contraire (reponse ala question 2). A mon avis, I'/PR owner prend un engagement
ferme et definitif envers ETSI, pour Ie benefice des manufacturers qui voudront mettre en reuvre Ie
STANDARD. L'offre est un acte unilateral. lei, nous avons au contraire un engagement
(undertaking) accepte par ETSI ou donne en rtponse it line demande d'ETSI.
1.2 La description de la stipulation pour autrui en droit fran9ais est inexacte (p. 5)
Dans la stipulation pour autrui, Ie promettant ne s'oblige pas a''faire que/que chose a
l'egard d'un tiers", il fait naitre un droit direct au profit du tiers beneficiaire, sur la base
de la promesse faite au stipulant.
M. Calvet ignore totalement Ie mecanisme de la stipulation de contrat pour autrui,
reconnu par la Cour de Cassation franyaise (Cass. Civ. 9 mars 1983, Bull. civ. I, no.
91; 7 juin 1989, Bull. civ. 1, no. 233).
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE - 75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX :
EMAIL: [e-mail]
1.3 Mr. Calvet ne tient aucun compte de l'existence et la fmalite de l'ETSI, dont Interdigital et
Nokia sont membres.
1.3.1 ETSI n'oblige pas ses membres a consentir des licences. Les licences sont
toujours Ie resultat d'un engagement volontaire de la part de I'lPR owner Les
membres doivent infonner ETSI de l'existence d'ESSENTIAL IPR, "in a timely
fashion" (art. 4.1., "Disclosure ofIPR's"). A partir de la, de deux choses l'une :
ou bien 1'[PR owner, "give .... an undertaking in writing that it is prepared to
grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms
and conditions ... to at least the following extent: ... " (art. 6.1.) les licences
deviennent alors "available" (art. 6 : "Availability oflicences")
ou bien l'IPR owner refuse de donner une licence : nous sommes alors en
presence d'un "non-availability oflicences" (art. 8)
II est donc inutile d'invoquer Ie mecanisme de la licence obligatoire, et Ie
caractere exceptionnel d'une telle licence en droit communautaire (Calvet, p. II
et 12). Aucun membre d'ETSI n'a l'obligation de souscrire "l'undertaking in
writing" de I'article 6.1. Tout membre peut refuser d'accorder une licence. Mais :
(A) Tout membre de l'ETSI doit prendre parti suffisamment tOt, pour
pennettre la progression ou l'abandon du processus de creation d'un
STANDARD;
(B) Une fois qu'il a pris parti en remettant "l'undertaking in writing" de l'art.
6.1., il ne peut evidemment revenir en arriere sous pretexte qu'il ne se met
pas d'accord avec tel ou tel manufacturer sur Ie montant de la redevance.
Le mecanisme ESTI est incompatible avec Ie droit pour les IPR owners
de decider de conelure ou de ne pas conclure une licence al'issue d'une
negociation individuelle ; car c'est alors la possibilite, pour Ie
manufacturer aqui un IPR owner refuse une ou des licences, de mettre en
reuvre Ie standard, et done de rester present sur Ie marche, qui d6pendrait
du bon vouloir de I'IPR owner (un refus abusif de contracter n'etant
sanctionne, en droit franyais, comme Ie reconnait M. Calvet, que par
l'octroi de dommages-interets). Precisement, Ie mecanisme collectif de
l'ETSI et de l'availability it travers l'engagement de l'article 6.1 - qui n'est
jamais obligatoire - pennet l'adoption de STANDARDs accessibles atous
les manufacturers sans discrimination.
1.3.2 II est exact que, comme Ie precise l'article 4.1 du ETSI Guide on [PR, les termes
specifiques des licences, et les negociations sont des "commercial issues",
exteneures aETSI. 11 va de soi que les FRAND terms and conditions devront etre
precises et que ce sera l'objet de negociations commerciales entre les interesses.
Mais cela ne veut pas dire que la licence n'est pas obtenue avant que ces
negociations aboutissent : il est frequent qu'un contrat soit conclu, et que Ie prix
2
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE -75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
soit ensuite I'objet d'une fixation par un procede quelconque. Depuis 1995, c'est Ie
principe en droit franyais (v. infra).
1.3.3 Le fait que toute entreprise en position dominante ait, en droit europeen antitrust,
l'obligation de pratiquer des conditions FRAND (Calvet, p. 10), n'empeche pas
une telle entreprise de conclure un contrat en s'engageant a respecter cette
condition De la meme maniere lorsqu'un contrat prevoit que Ie prix, ni determine,
ni determinable, sera fixe par l'une des parties, celle-ci it I'obligation de ne pas
abuser de son pouvoir. Le fait qu'elle s'y engage de maniere expresse, comme
dans l'undertaking de I'article 6.1, ne fait que confmner cette obligation. De la
meme maniere, I'abus est susceptible d'etre controle par les tribunaux ; si bien
qu'il importe peu que la conception qu'a 1'[PR owner_de ce qui est FRAND differe
de celle du manl1{acturer (Calvet, p.IO). II existe dans tous les cas un procede de
controle objectif.
2. SUR LA DETERMINATION DU PRIX
2.1 M. Calvet commet une confusion entre Ie caractere essentiel d'un element et sa
determination au moment de la conclusion du contrat. Le prix est un element essentiel dans
la plupart des contrats it titre onereux (vente, bail, entreprise, pret ainteret, ...). Et pourtant,
il n'est pas necessaire que son montant soit determine ou determinable au moment de la
conclusion du contrat. 2 exemples :
Contrat d'entre.prise : d'apres I'art. 1710 du Code civil, "un prix convenu" entre les parties
est un element essentiel. Pourtant, les tribunaux franyais decident constamment que ce prix
peut etre fixe apres la conclusion du contrat et meme apres I'execution du contrat.
Contrat d'approvisionnement : Ie prix auquel Ie franchise paiera les marchandises qu'il doit
acquerir aupres du franchiseur pendant la duree du contrat est evidemment essentiel. II y va
de la marge, done de la rentabilite de I'exploitation du franchise. Et pourtant, ce prix peut
dependre du tarif du franchiseur, futur et inconnu (cass. ass. plen., Ier decembre 1995
RA.P. n08 ; contrairement ace qu'ecrit M. Calvet, note 19, cet arret juge que I'engagement
d'acheter au tarif futur du franchiseur est valab1e ; il ne juge pas que Ie prix des ventes
futures n'est pas un element essentiel du contrat).
2.2 La presentation que fait M. Calvet du droit franyais est totalement depassee. En effet, de
I'avis de tout les auteurs, la question de la determination du prix a ete entierement
bouleversee par les quatre arrets rendus en Assemblee pleniere par la Cour de Cassation Ie
1er decembre 1995 (il y a eu quatre arrets, et non un seul, comme Ie suggere M. Calvet, note
18), et les arrets ulterleurs, sur lesquels M. Calvet est silencieux (v. notamment, Terre,
Simler, Lequette, Les obligations, ge edition distinguant, "les sanctions anterieures au r
decembre 1995" au nO 285 et "Ie revirement de jurisprudence opere par les arrets du 1"
0711464685_1 3
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNlVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE - 75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
decembre 1995", au nO 289; et aussi A Benabent, Les obligations, lIe ed. N° 149, qui
parle de "l'onde de choc" cree par les arrets du 1er decembre 1995 et les arrets suivants).
2.3 Deux des quatre arrets rendus Ie Ier decembre 1995 en Assemblee pleniere (B.AP. nO 7)
visent expressement l'article 1709 du Code civil, qui est Ie texte defmissant Ie louage de
choses, sur lequel M. Calvet s'appuie (p.5 et note 8). II ne les cite pas.
De nombreux arrets uIterieurs ont decide que l'article 1129 du Code civil, texte qui impose
la determination de l'objet de I'obligation, ne s'applique pas au prix (ex. : "l'article 1129 du
Code civil n'est pas applicable ala determination du prix en toute matiere": casso civ.l, 12
mai 2004; ROC 2004, p.925 n. D. Mazeaud). Meme les auteurs les plus conservateurs
admettent que ce bouleversement jurisprudentiel devrait entrainer l'abandon de l'exigence
de determination du prix meme pour Ie bail, en depit des termes de l'article 1709 (A
Benabent, 00. cit., nO 149). Le consensus actuel est que la regIe enoncee par les arrets de
1995 et les arrets ulterieurs est generale et s'applique a tous les contrats, sauf lorsqu'il
existe une regIe legale speciale exigeant la determination du prix. D'ailleurs, la solution
actuelle du droit franyais n'a rien d'extraordinaire : les Principes UNIDROIT relatifs aux
contrats du commerce international (art. 5.1.7) et les Principes du droit europeen du contrat
(art. 6 : 104) admettent clairement que Ie prix d'un contrat ne soit pas determine ni
determinable au moment de sa conclusion.
2.4 En matiere de licence de brevets, il n'existe aucun texte obligeant les parties adeterminer
ou Ii rendre determinable Ie montant de la redevance au moment de la conclusion du contrat.
Au contraire, des specialistes de cette discipline ecrivent : rICe prix ne doit pas etre
necessairement determine ou determinable lors de la conclusion". (J. Schmidt-Szalewski et
J.L. Pierre, Droit de la orooriete industrielle, ked. nO 270)
3. SUR L'EXIGENCE D'UN ECRIT
3.1 Les exigences de l'article L.613-8, al. 5 du CPI sont satisfaites : les contrats de licence sont
conclus via une stipulation pour autrui ; l'IPR owner est lie des qu'il a adresse aETSI son
undertaking. Et il ne fait pas de doute que celui-ci est ecrit. Mon analyse est fondee sur Ie
texte ecrit de l'undertaking qui doit justement etre donne in writing (article 6.1 de l'ETSI
IPR Policy) Ce qui compte, en efIet, est que l'existence et l'etendue du droit du licencie
soient "constates par ecrit" (art. L 613-8), ce qui est Ie cas. L'acceptation du manufacturer
o'a pas besoin d'&re ecrite des lors que son droit resulte d'une stipulation pour autrui.
3.2 Meme si la regIe de l'article L.613-8 n'etait pas respectee- ce qui n'est pas Ie cas - la nullite
qui en resulterait serait relative : Ie contrat aurait une pleine efficacite tant que la partie
protegee par la regIe de I'ecrit n'a pas exerce avec succes son droit de critique. La nullite
doit etre decidee en justice; et tant qu'elle n'a pas ete prononcee par Ie juge, et a fortiori
demandee par une partie, Ie contrat produit ses effets.
4
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
4. DIVERS
28, RUE RACINE - 75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
4.1 M. Calvet estime que la qualification de l'engagement de l'/PR owner pris en application de
l'article 6.1 de l'ETS/ /PR Policy est celle d'accord de principe (Calvet, P. 17-18).11 fait
reference aun arret rendu par la Cour de cassation (chambre sociaIe, 19 d6cembre 1989,
RT Dav. 1991, 330). D'apres lui, cet engagement obligerait Ie declarant, non pas aaccorder
des licences, mais anegocier de bonne foi et afaire ses meilleurs efforts pour parvenir it la
conclusion de contrats de licence.
Cette qualification est it mon avis incorrecte pour les raisons suivantes :
4.1.1 La notion d'accord de principe. n'est pas defmie dans la loi. 11 s'agit d'une
categorie de conventions, issue de la pratique et defmie par les auteurs de la
maniere suivante :
"Lorsque la negociation est longue et delicate, les interesses eprouvent paifois Ie
besoin de marquer une pause et de dresser Ie bilan des points sur lesquels ils sont
d'ores et deja d'accord. La terminologie employee pour designer cette pratique est
jlottante. Certains utilisent Ie terme allemand de "punctation", d'autres prefirent
parler "d'accord de principe" (Terre, Simler, Lequette, les obligations, ge ed., nO
187 ; voir aussi : Malaurie, Aynes, Stoffel-Munck, les obligations. 3e ed. 2007, 1°
nO 440).
Precisement, l'arret qu'invoque M. Calvet au soutien de son opinion dement son
analyse: dans l'affaire jugee par la Cour de cassation, un accord conclu Ie 4 janvier
1982 entre une societe (COGEMA) et plusieurs syndicats prevoyait une reduction
immediate de la duree du travail, et prevoyait aussi que"les partenaires sociaux se
rencontreraient ulterieurement pour examiner Ie bilan des dispositions deja
adoptees et rechercher les mesures qui pouvaient etre prises en matiere de duree
hebdomadaire du travail" .. "mais qu'en tout etat de cause, l'objectijdes 35 heures
sera atteint pour tous en 1985". L'accord du 4 janvier 1982 prevoyait donc luimeme
et de maniere expresse la tenue de negociations it venir ("rencontre",
"recherche de mesures".. .), en vue de parvenir it un accord contractuel. C'est
pourquoi la Cour de cassation souligne dans son arret que "les parties, en vue de
paifaire leur convention avaient, selon l'accord du 4 janvier 1982, contracte
l'obligation de negocier sur la duree hebdomadaire du travail"...
Cet arret n'a rien a voir avec l'undertaking de I'art. 6.1, qui ne prevoit pas qu'il
devra etre complete.
4.1.2 Les termes employes dans l'undertaking de l'article 6.1 ne sont pas ceux d'un
engagement de negocier de bonne foi un futur contrat :
- l'/PR owner declare qu'll est "prepared to grant irrevocable licences" ... ; et non
pas qu'il est ''prepared to negotiate", ou "to discuss", ou "to propose", ou "to
offer", ou "to examine a proposal" ...
5
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNlVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE - 75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX :
EMAIL: [e-mail]
- l'expression ''prepared to grant" s'explique par Ie fait que la declaration est
adressee it ETSI. Or, ce n'est pas avec ETSI que seront conclues les licences,
mais avec les manufacturers. A ETSI, un /PR owner peut seulement dire qu'il est
''prepared'' to grant.
4.1.3 Le contexte: l'undertaking de l'article 6.1 n'est pas souscrit spontanement par
l'/PR owner. nprend place dans un processus destine arendre les licenses portant
sur des Essentials /PR available; et par consequent, rendre les standards adoptes
par ETSI accessibles aux manufacturers.
Si les licences d6pendaient du resultat de negociations individuelles, donc si l'/PR
owner, apres avoir rendu la licence de son IPR available par la remise de
l'undertaking de l'art. 6.1, conservait Ie droit de conclure ou de na pas conclure de
licence avec tel ou tel manufacturer (quitte aengager sa responsabilite delictuelle
en cas de rupture fautive des negociations), Ie but meme de l'organisation ETSI ne
pourrait etre sfuement atteint. Et Ie risque d'abus de position dominante, par un
traitement discriminatoire des manufacturer - qui sont souvent concurrents de
l'/PR owner - serait tres intense.
4.2 M. Calvet croit bon de s'appuyer sur les r6ponses aux questions 6 et 7 figurant sur Ie site
Internet de ETSI (Calvet, pp 3 et 4). Ces references ne sont pas pertinentes pour les raisons
suivantes:
- il est manifeste que ces reponses exposent une maniere de faire pratique, et n'ont pas pour
objet de donner une r6ponse juridique.
- la question n° 6 est celIe de savoir si 1a permission d'utiliser les patents listes par ETSI
doit etre demandee aETSI. La r6ponse va de soi : c'est au patent holder qu'il faut s'adresser.
Et la question 7 a trait au paiement des royalties: la reponse confirme que celles-ci ne
dependent pas d'ETSI, mais d'une negociation directe avec les patent holders.
- Ces deux reponses ne font aucune distinction suivant qu'un undertaking de l'art. 6.1 a ete
au non souscrit par Ie patent holder.
- Ces deux rtponses se bornent arepeter ce qu'exprime l'article 4.1 de l'ETSI GUIDE:
"specific licensing terms and negotiations are commercial issues between the companies
and shall not be addressed within ETSf'.
4.3 Les arrets cites par M. Calvet et relatifs au loyer, dans Ie contrat de bail, sont :
- soit anterieurs aux arrets de la Cour de cassation du Ier decembre 1995 (Calvet, notes 9 et
10) ; ils ne sont donc pas significatifs.
07r146468Ll 6
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE-75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone]-FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
- soit sans pertinence: ainsi l'arret cite en note 9 : Casso Civ. 3, 28 mai 1997, Petites
Affiches 6 avril 1998, nO 41, p. 17. La Cour de cassation juge qu'un contrat de bail definitif
- et non une simple promesse de bail - avait ete conclu, parce que les partie etaient
tombees d'accord sur la chose et sur Ie prix. Ii ne juge pas qu'il faut que Ie prix du bail soit
determine, pour que Ie contrat soit conclu. Je constate que c'etait Ie cas en l'espece. Ii n'y
avait aucune dispute sur ce point.
- De meme, Casso Com, 29 juin 1993, cite en note 14 conceme les conditions dans
1esquelles une offre de contrat devient un contrat ; cela n'a rien it voir avec la question :
dans l'affaire jugee, l'offre etait precise, complete et ferme, ce qui a permis la conclusion du
contrat. Meme remarque, mais en sens inverse, pour l'arret de la Cour d'appel de Paris, cite
note 23 et Casso Com. 6 mars 1990, cite note 22.
4.4 Les citations que fait aux notes IS, 16, 20 M. Ca1vet de l'ouvrage de Flour, Aubert et
Savaux, les obligations, 12e edition, sont trompeuses. M. Calvet ornet de rnentionner qu'au
nO 133, ces auteurs ajoutent :
"ll faut, ace point. revenir sur la jurisprudence qui a decide que l'article 1129. awe termes
duquella chose qui fail l'objet de l'obligation doit etre determinee, n'est pas applicable au
prix. Il en resulte que, saufdes cas au la loi exige expressement que Ie prix soit determine
pour laformation du contrat, l'ojJre peut rester imprecise ace sujet"...
II omet egalement d'indiquer qu'au n° 237-1, ces auteurs, visant les exceptions it la regIe
selon laquelle Ie prix n'a pas besoin d'etre determine, depuis les arrets de 1995, ne
rnentionnent ni Ie bail, ni l'article 1709 du Code civil, ce qui dement l'interpretation qu'il
essaie de donner de ce texte.
4.5 L'ouvrage cite par M Calvet en notes 13 et 16 (Ghestin, Traite de droit civil, Laformation
du contrat, 2, LGDJ, 1993), n'est pas pertinent, car il est anterieur aux arrets rendus par la
Cour de cassation du 1er d<Scembre 1995.
4.6 La citation empruntee it M. Larroumet (p.6 et note 13) se borne it repeter une evidence:
une offre doit comporter tous les elements essentiels du futur contrat, car celui-ci sera
forme par la seule acceptation pure et simple du destinataire.
Mais M. Larroumet n'<Scrit pas que Ie quantum des elements essentiels, par exernple Ie
montant du prix, doit etre determine ou determinable dans l'offre de contral. II ne commet
pas une telle confusion entre caractere essentiel et determination.
7
Laurent AYNES
AGREGE DES FACULTES DE DROIT
01.45.00.19.40
PROFESSEUR A L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS I
(PANTHEON-SORBONNE)
28, RUE RACINE -75006 PARIS
TEL. [phone] - FAX:
EMAIL: [e-mail]
4.7 La question de savoir si les regles du Code civil relatives au bail (art. 1709 et suiv.)
s'appliquent automatiquement a la licence de brevet est contestee, contrairement a ce
qu'affirme M. Calvet (p.5).
La licence est un contrat special qui releve d'abord et avant tout du Code de fa propriete
intellectuelle. Comme celui-ci ne comporte que peu de regles relatives au contrat de licence,
il faut rattacher celui-ci aune categorie du Code civil, lorsque Ie besoin s'en fait sentir. Or,
c'est du louage de choses que la licence se rapproche Ie plus. La plupart des auteurs- mais
pas tous- considerent que la licence comporte les elements caracteristiques du contrat de
louage. On appliquera done les regles du louage de choses, par defaut et lorsque c'est
necessaire.
Mais pour l'application de la jurisprudence de 1995, la question est de savoir s'il existe un
texte special exigeant que, contrairement au principe general, Ie prix soit determine ou
determinable au momentde la formation du contrat. II suffit, pour repondre acette question,
de constater qu'aucun texte relatif it la licence de brevet ne pose une telle regie. (II n'en
existe pas davantage en matiere de bail, l'article 1709 Code Civ. n'imposant nullement que
Ie loyer soit determine ou determinable lors de la formation du contrat; ce que
reconnaissent, par exemple Flour, Aubert et Savaux (v. supra nO 4.4) ce qui rend la
discussion vaine.
Paris Ie 26 fevrier 2008. LLh--
8
Unofficial, uncertified English translation for information purposes only
Observations made in respect to M. Ungnes CALVET's report
1. GENERAL
1.1 The description presented by Mr. Calvet of my opinion is incorrect (pA & 5)
According to him, I am saying that an article 6.1 declaration is an offer to enter into a license
agreement. I never said that the undertaking of the IPR owner pursuant to article 6.1 was a contract
offer. I expressly stated the contrary (answer to question 2). In my opinion, the IPR owner makes a
firm and definite commitment towards ETSI for the benefit of manufacturers who would like to
implement the STANDARD. The offer is a unilateral act. Here, we have a commitment
(undertaking) accepted by ETSI or given in response to ETSI's request.
1.2 The description of the stipulation in favour of a third-party under French law is incorrect
(p.5)
Under a stipulation in favour of a third party, the promisor is not obliged to "carry out
an act in respect of a third party", it creates a direct right for the benefit of the thirdparty
beneficiary, on the basis of the promise made to the stipulator.
M. Calvet completely ignores the mechanism of the stipulation of a contract in favour
of a third party, recognised by the Cour de Cassation (Cass. Civ. 9th March 1983, Bull.
civ. I, no. 91; 7th June 1989, Bull. civ. 1, no. 233)
1.3 M. Calvet does not take into account the existence and the finality of ETSI, of which
Interdigital and Nokia are members.
1.3.1 ETSI does not oblige its members to grant licences. The conclusion of license
agreements is always the result of a voluntary commitment on the part of the IPR
owner. Members must inform ETSI of the existence of ESSENTIAL IPRs, "in a
timely fashion" (article 4.1, "Disclosure ofIPR's"). From this, either:
- The IPR owner "give[s] .... an undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant
irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and
conditions ... to at least the following extent: ... " (art. 6.1.) Therefore, the
licences become "available" (article 6 : "Availability of licences");
- Or the IPR owner refuses to grant the licence: which constitutes a "nonavailability
of licences" (article 8)
Therefore, it is pointless to invoke the mechanism of a mandatory license and its
exceptional character under European law (Calvet, p.ll & 12). No member of
ETSI is under the obligation give an "undertaking in writing" pursuant to article
6.1. Any member may refuse to grant a licence. However,
(A) Any member of ETSI must make a choice sufficiently early, to allow the
pr~gression or abandonment of the process of a STANDARD creation;
(B) Once it has chosen to submit the "undertaking in writing" pursuant to
article 6.1, it evidently cannot retract under the pretence that it is unable
to come to an agreement with such or such manufacturer on the price.
The ESTI mechanism is incompatible with a right of IPR owners to
decide to conclude or to not conclude a licence after individual
negotiations; it would mean that the possibility for the manufacturer who
has been refused a licence to implement the standard, and consequently,
to remain present on the market, would in turn depend on the good will of
the IPR owner (an abusive refusal to contract is only sanctioned by
damages under French law, as recognised by M. Calvet). On the contrary,
the ETSI and the availability collective mechanism via the undertaking
pursuant to article 6.1 - which is never mandatory - allows the adoption
of a STANDARD accessible to all manufacturers without discrimination.
1.3.2 It is true, as stated in article 4.1 of the ETSI GUIDE, that the specific terms of the
licences and the negotiations are "commercial issues", outside the scope of ETSI.
It goes without saying that the FRAND terms and conditions should be clarified
and that this will be at the centre of commercial negotiations between the parties.
However, this does not mean that the license is not obtained befo..re these
negotiations have been concluded: it is common that a contract is concluded, and
that afterwards, the price is negotiated or is fixed by some other method. Since
1995, this is the rule under French law (v. infra).
1.3.3 The fact that any company in a dominant position is under the obligation to
respect FRAND conditions under E.U. antitrust law (Calvet, p.10), does not
prevent such company from concluding a contract by undertaking to respect these
conditions. By the same token, when a contract stipulates that the price, neither
determined nor determinable, will be fixed by one of the parties, the latter is
under the obligation to not abuse its power. The fact that it expressly undertakes,
as in the undertaking pursuant to article 6.1, only confirms this obligation. Abuse
is open to control of the courts; so that it is of little importance that the IPR
owner's conception of what is FRAND differs from that of the manufacturer
(Calvet p.1 0). There is always a mechanism of objective control.
2. THE DETERMINAnON OF THE PRICE
2.1 M. Calvet confuses the essential character of an element and its determination at the time
of the conclusion of the contract. The price is an essential element in most onerous
contracts (sale, lease, company, loan on interest ....). Yet, it is not necessary that the amount
be determined or determinable at the time ofthe conclusion ofthe contract. 2 examples:
Enterprise contract: pursuant to article 1710 ofthe French Civil Code, "a convened price"
between the parties is an essential element. However, the French courts repeatedly hold
2
that the price may be fixed after the contract has been concluded, and even after it has been
performed.
Supply contract: the price that the franchisee will pay for the merchandise acquired from
the franchisor during the term of the contract is evidently essential. There is a margin - the
profitability of pursuing the franchise. Yet, this price can depend on the tariff of the future
and unknown franchisor (Cass. ass.plen., 1st December 1995 B.A.P. no. 8 ; contrary to
what M. Calvet has written (note 19), this case held that a commitment to buy at a price
fixed by the franchisor in the future is valid; it did not hold that the price of future sales
was not an essential element of the contract).
2.2 M. Calvet's presentation of French law is completely out of date. In effect, in the opinion of
all authors, the question of the determination of the price has been completely overturned
by four rulings of the Assemblee pteniere of the Cour de Cassation of December I, 1995
(there were four decisions, not one, as M. Calvet suggested, note 18), as well as subsequent
decisions, which M. Calvet has failed to mention (see notably, Terre, Sinels, Lequette, "Les
Obligations", 9th edition distinguishing "the sanctions before lSI December 1995" at no.
285 and "previous case law overruled by the judgments of the ]"1 December 1995" at no.
289; see also A. Benabent, "Les obligations", II ed. No. 149, who speaks of a "shock
wave" created by the cases of December I, 1995 and those that followed).
2.3 Two of the four cases of the Ist December 1995 in the Assembtee pteniere (RA.P. no. 7)
expressly cite article 1709 of the French Civil Code, which defines the contract for the
lease of things, which M. Calvet relies on (p.5 and note 8). He does not cite them.
Many following cases held that article 1129 of the French Civil Code, which imposes the
determination ofthe subject matter of the obligation, does not apply to the price (e.g.
"article 1129 ofthe Civil Code is not applicable to the determination ofthe price as a
general rule" : cass civ. 1, 12th May 2004; ROC 2004, p/925 note D. Mazeaud). Even the
more conservative authors admit that such overturning of caselaw should lead to the
abandonment of the obligation to determine the price, even for a lease, despite the terms of
article 1709 (A. Benabent, op.cit., no. 149). Today, conventional wisdom is that the rulings
ofthe 1995 cases as well as subsequent cases, is of a general nature and applies to all types
of contracts, except when a special legal provision provides that the price must be
determined. Moreover, the current state of French law is nothing extraordinary; the
UNIDROIT Principles relative to international commercial contracts (article 5.1.7) and the
Principles ofE.V. contract law (art. 6: 104) clearly admit that the price of a contract be not
determined or determinable at the time of its conclusion.
2.4 In respect to patent licence agreements, there is no legal provision that obliges the parties to
determine or to make determinable the price at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
To the contrary, specialists of this field write: "this price does not necessarily need to be
determined or determinable at the time of conclusion". (1. Schmidt- Szalewski and J.L.
Pierre, "Droit de la propriete industrielle", 3rd ed. No. 270).
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3. THE WRITING REQUIREMENT
3.1 The requirements of paragraph 5 of article 1. 613-8 of the French Intellectual Property
Code are satisfied: the licence agreements are concluded through a stipulation in favour of
a third-party; the IPR owner is obliged once he has addressed his undertaking to ETSI.
There is no doubt that this has been done in writing. My analysis is based on the written
nature of the undertaking, which must be given in writing (article 6.1 of the ETSI IPR
Policy). What matters in fact is that the existence and scope of the right of the licensee be
"executed in writing" (article 1. 613-8), which is the case. The manufacturer's acceptance
does not need to be in writing since his right results from a stipulation in favour of a third
party.
3.2 Even if the rule of article 1.613-8 was not respected - which is not the case - the resulting
nullity would be relative; the contract would have full effect as long as the party protected
by the rule requiring a writing has not successfully exercised its right to criticise. The
nullity must be pronounced by the courts; and as long as it has not been asked by a party
and pronounced by a judge, the contract continues to be in full force.
4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
4.1 M. Calvet believes that the undertaking given by the IPR owner pursuant to article 6.1 of
the ETSI IPR Policy qualifies as an agreement in principle (Calvet, p.17-18). He refers to a
judgment delivered by the Cour de cassation (Chamber for Social and Labour Matters, 19th
December 1989, RT Dav. 1991,330). According to him, this undertaking would oblige the
declarant, not to grant licences, but to negotiate in good faith and to endeavour to conclude
the licence agreements.
In my opinion, this qualification is incorrect for the following reasons:
4.1.1 The notion of an agreement in principle is not defined by law. It is a type of
agreement derived from practice and defined by authors in the following way:
"When negotiations are long and fragile, the parties sometimes need a break to
list the points on which they are already in agreement. The term used to describe
such a practice is loose. Saine people use the German word of ''punctuation'',
whilst others prefer to speak of"agreement ofprinciple" (Terre, Simler, Lequette,
"Les obligations", 9th edition, no 187; see also: Malaurie, Aynes, Stoffel-Munch,
"Les obligations", 3rd ed. 2007, 10 440).
Precisely, the judgment cited by M. Calvet to support his argument contradicts
his analysis: in the case judged by the Cour de cassation, an agreement
concluded on the 4th January 1982 between a company (COGEMA) and several
trade unions provided for an immediate reduction of working hours and also
stated that the "parties will convene afterwards to examine the statement of
provisions already adopted and to research measures that could be taken in
respect to the working day length" ; "but that in any case, the aim of 35 hours
will be achievedfor all in 1985". The agreement dated January 4, 1982 expressly
stated how future negotiations would be organised ("meeting", "research
measures" ... ) in order to agree on a contract. This explains why the Cour de
cassation highlights in its judgment that "the parties, in the view to perfect their
4
agreement, contracted the obligation to negotiate on the working day length
according to the agreement dated 4 January 1982"...
This case law has nothing in common with the undertaking of article 6.1, which
does not stipulate that it must be completed.
. 4.1.2 The terms used in the undertaking pursuant to article 6.1 are not those used for a
commitment to negotiate a future contract in good faith:
- The IPR owner declares that it is "prepared to grant irrevocable licences" .... ; and
not that it is "prepared to negotiate" or "to discuss" or "to propose", or "to offer",
or "to examine a proposal" ....
- The expression "prepared to grant" can be explained by the fact that the
declaration is addressed to ETSI. However, the licence agreements are not
concluded with ETSI, but with the manufacturers. To ETSI, the IPR owner can
only state that it is "prepared" to grant.
4.1.3 The context: the undertaking of article 6.1 is not spontaneously given by the IPR
owner. It is part of a process to make licences in respect to Essentials IPRs
available; and consequently, to make standards adopted by ETSI accessible to
manufacturers.
If the licences depended on the result of individual negotiations, and if the IPR
owner, after having made a licence on its IPR available through the undertaking
of article 6.1, retained the right to conclude 01' to not conclude the licence with
such or such manufacturer (subject to tort liability in the event of wrongful
termination of negotiations), the very aim of the ETSI organisation could surely
not be achieved. Additionally, the risk of abuse of dominant position, by way of
discriminatory treatment of manufacturers who are often competitors of the IPR
owner - would be intense.
4.2 M. Calvet believes that the answers to question 6 and 7 found on ETSI's website are
relevant (Calvet, p. 3 & 4). These references are not relevant for the following reasons:
These answers obviously constitute a practical guide and are not legal answers.
Question 6 addresses the issue of whether permission to use patents listed by ETSI should
be requested from ETSI. The answer goes without saying: it must be addressed to the
patent holder. Furthermore, question 7 relates to the payment of consideration: the answer
confirms that it does not depend on ETSI, but on direct negotiations with the patent holders.
These two answers do not distinguish between whether an undertaking of article 6.1 has
been entered into by the patent holder or not.
These two answers merely repeat article 4.1 of the ETSI GUIDE: "specific licensing terms
and negotiations are commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed
within ETSF'.
4.3 The cases cited by M. Calvet and related to the rent in a lease agreement are:
either prior the Cour de cassation cases dated December 1, 1995 (Calvet, notes 9 &10);
therefore, they are irrelevant.
07/1463020_' 5
or they are not pertinent, as the case cited in note 9: Cass Civ. 3, 28 May 1997, Petites
Affiches, 6 April 1998, no. 41, p17. The Cour de cassation found that a definite lease
agreement - and not just a promise to lease - had been concluded, because the parties had
agreed on the subject matter and on the price. It did not find that the rent had to be
determined in order for the contract to be concluded. In this particular instance, it had been
determined and there was no dispute in relation to this point.
Similarly, the judgment of Cass com. 29th June 1993, cited in note 14 relates to the
conditions in which a contractual offer becomes a contract; this is completely unrelated to
the issue of price determination: in this particular case, the offer was precise, complete and
firm, which allowed for the conclusion of the contract. This is the same remark but
opposite, for the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris, cited in note 23 and Cass Com.
6th March 1990, cited in noted 22.
4.4 The citations made by M. Calvet in notes 15, 16, 20, Flour, Aubert and Savaux, "Les
obligations" 12th ed. are erroneous. M. Calvet fails to mention that at no. 133, these authors
add that:
"We must now return to the case law which held that article 1129, providing that the thing
subject of the agreement must be determined, is not applicable to the price. As a result,
except for cases when the law expressly stipulates that the price must be determinedfor the
formation ofa contract, the offer may remain imprecise on this subject"...
He also omits to indicate that at no. 237-1, when describing the exceptions to the rule
providing that the price, since the 1995 cases, does not need to be determined, these
authors do not mention leases or article 1709 of the French Civil Code, which contradicts
the interpretation he makes ofthe citation.
4.5 The book cited by M. Calvet in notes 13 & 16, Ghestin, "Traite de droit civil, Laformation
du contrat, 2" LDDJ, 1993, is irrelevant as it was published before the 1st December 1995
cases delivered by the Cour de cassation.
4.6 The citation ofM. Larroumet (p.6 and note 13) merely repeats the obvious: an offer must
contain all the essential elements of a future contract, as the latter will be formed solely by
the acceptance ofthe offeree.
However, M. Larroumet does not write that the amount of the essential elements, such as
the price, must be determined or determinable in the contractual offer. He does not confuse
the essentiality with the determination of the price.
4.7 The question as to whether the provisions of the French Civil Code in respect to the lease
(article 1709 et seq.) apply automatically to patent licence agreements is contested,
contr~ to what M. Calvet has stated (p.5)
A licence agreement is a special contract which is governed firstly and most importantly by
the Intellectual Property Code. As it contains few rules relative to the licence agreement,
the latter must be attached to a category of the civil code, when it is felt to be necessary.
Now, the contract for lease of things is the closest thing to a licence agreement. Most
authors - but not all - consider that a licence agreement contains some characteristic
elements of a contract for the lease of things. Therefore, we will apply the rules of the lease
of things by default and when it is necessary.
6
However, for the application of the case law of 1995, the question is whether there is a
special legal provision that requires, contrary to the general rule, that the price be
determined or determinable at the time of the formation of the contract. To answer this
question, it is sufficient to state that there is no provision imposing such a rule to license
agreements. This is the same for a lease, article 1709 of the French Civil Code does not
require that the rent amount be determined or determinable at the time of formation of the
contract, which is acknowledged by many, including Flour, Aubert and Savaux (see 4.4)
and makes this discussion pointless.
Paris 26 February 2008
L. Aynes
7
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