Get Osama - but where, and when? By Pepe Escobar Mar 5, 2004 Asia Times Online has learned from tribal-connected sources in Peshawar in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden is believed to have left southeastern Afghanistan late last week for South Waziristan in Pakistan. According to the sources, and as has been reported in sections of the Pakistani Urdu Press, bin Laden is said to be under the protection of concentric rings formed by dozens of al-Qaeda fighters and more than 1,200 Taliban - all easily blended in as local Pashtun tribals.
This means that bin Laden and his entourage were previously hiding in Paktika province in Afghanistan, and may have crossed to South Waziristan via the Khand pass - in the easternmost flank of the rugged Toba Kakar mountain range, where the weather is unforgiving and the desolation extreme: the nearest town is Wana, in the Pakistani tribal area of South Waziristan.
This article puts bin Laden in the Fed. Admin. Tribal Areas.
This information, if confirmed, also contradicts reports of a previous bin Laden sighting, already reported in Asia Times Online, according to which the fugitives - in much smaller number - were placed further south, between the tiny villages of Khanozai and Murgha Faqirzai, in Balochistan province. So bin Laden was not in Kunar province in Afghanistan or in Pakistani Balochistan, but in an Afghan province, Paktika, where every day there are clashes between Taliban and US forces.
The Peshawar sources confirm numerous local reports that bin Laden and his close entourage have come practically face-to-face with US patrols on several occasions in the past few weeks in Paktika - so they had to find a safer refuge.
But it could be a case of out of the frying pan into the fire. US Commando 121, headed by General William Boykin, with input from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is preparing to pounce. According to the ISI version currently circulating in Peshawar, the bin Laden group was located through an intercepted satellite phone call. Al-Qaeda has not used satphones in the Pak-Afghan border since December 2001, but Taliban commanders still frequently do.
What the ISI rumor mill is actually disseminating in the axis of Islamabad-Peshawar is that now they seem to know exactly where bin Laden and his group of fugitives are hiding. The ISI has even laid out the overall strategy: apply maximum pressure on Pashtun tribals in the Wana area, squeeze the fugitives out of access to food, water and crucial supplies, and then attack them en masse by about mid-March.
Pashtun ISI operatives are supposed to be blending in with the tribals to gather local intelligence before the final assault. The ISI-concocted endgame would be to capture bin Laden inside Pakistani territory, and then move him to Afghanistan - where the big news would be announced by Commando 121, or by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, or by both.
Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman Masood Khan has admitted on the record that "a special operation" will soon begin in Wana to capture al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. But he has vehemently denied that at least 11,000 US troops and Special Forces will be fighting along with the Pakistani army. "If they come, they will remain on the other side of the border in Afghanistan and only Pakistani troops will take part in the 'special operation' on our side." Pakistan has already deployed more than 70,000 troops to the Pak-Afghan border, and more are planned.
Independent sources in Peshawar tell Asia Times Online that the whole arrangement may be part of a secret deal discussed face-to-face last week between US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and President General Pervez Musharraf. The Pakistanis do the hard work to capture bin Laden in the volatile, tribal Pakistani side - helping Commando 121 and other Special Forces. But the big news will come from Afghanistan. Understandably, the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, Major-General Shaukat Sultan, vehemently denied on Pakistani TV any suggestion of a deal.
Interior Minister Syed Saleh Hayat admits that a huge operation is already going on in Wana, saying: "We have secured our borders as far as it is possible. On the other side of the border, in Afghanistan ... US government and coalition forces and even NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] are increasing their forces." But the interior minister regards the tribal whereabouts of bin Laden as "mere speculation ... According to intelligence reports and our own assessment, it seems that Osama and his chief lieutenant may be present in this area. But this is not the final word."
Which begs the question: Does anybody really know where Osama is hiding? As to the final word, the whole point is to determine when the Pentagon and the White House want bin Laden captured: now - eight months before the US presidential election - or in October, just before the polls.
On February 18, Musharraf while addressing a convention of ulama in Islamabad, again warned that "extremist elements" must be weeded out, otherwise the Americans are likely to attack Pakistan.
Under pressure from the Americans, the Pakistan army has adopted harsh colonial-era tactics of collective punishment against Waziri tribesmen, who are told that they must hand over Taliban and al-Qa’ida suspects, or their houses will be blown up. Tribal elders of the Ahmedzai and Utmanzai tribes in South Waziristan have been handed lists of suspects whom the army wants. Failure to comply invites harsh collective punishments against the entire tribe, in the manner of Israel’s tactics in Occupied Palestine. The army has also threatened to take hostages if suspects are not surrendered. http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/5410/
Adhering to this ruthless strategy Pakistan authorities have arrested 16 tribal chiefs in South Waziristan who they say were not cooperating in rounding up al-Qaeda and Taliban elements hiding in the region. #msg-2520880
In addition there are unconfirmed reports that US soldiers had been involved in the killing of 11 tribals and were being given a free run in the tribal areas. #msg-2517443
The harsh colonial-era tactics employed against the tribesmen could be the catalyst for a tribal war and probably are one reason for the US repetitively and vehemently denying that US troops are operating in Pakistan. Another reason could be that we are going into China and the only Afghanistan route by way of the Wakhan corridor is too narrow a strip of land and that leaves Pakistan. #msg-2487990
Gen John Abizaid, commander-in-chief US Central Command, said that so far the US troops were only operating on the Afghan side of the border.
Musharraf struggles to satisfy volatile mix of constituencies Pakistani president wins praise from Washington, severe criticism at home
Los Angeles Times Originally published March 7, 2004 ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - President Pervez Musharraf, a decorated paratrooper who has survived fierce battles in war and politics, is waging the fight of his life. In the past two years, he has forsaken Pakistan's former Taliban allies, promised to end Islamic militancy, restarted delicate peace talks with India and admitted that a national hero ran a global black market in nuclear arms technology. Each risky step has won praise from Washington but drawn criticism from a volatile mix of constituencies at home, including members of the military that is crucial to his hold on power.
Nationalists accuse him of selling out Pakistan's prestige and territorial claims. Mainstream politicians say that despite his promise to crack down on Islamic militants, he has protected those he finds useful.
Yet many of the militants accuse him of betrayal, and some have even tried to kill him. In December, he survived two assassination attempts within 11 days.
Musharraf once enjoyed wide support at home for leading a coup against thieving politicians. He says he is winning the fight to transform Pakistan into a stable democracy that rejects any form of extremism, and he might yet bring many disparate strands together to save the country from itself.
But he might also turn out to be another failed military ruler who digs his country into a bigger hole. Critics say the president is turning into an angry strongman who will do anything to stay in power. His actions often contradict his words, and his policies sometimes push him into deeper trouble. At the heart of his strategy, critics maintain, is a Faustian bargain that aids the extremists he publicly opposes.
Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director for the International Crisis Group, a Brussels, Belgium-based think tank, said Musharraf has turned his back on millions of worldly, middle-class Pakistanis who practice a moderate Islam and is destroying the democracy he claims to be defending.
"His attention is focused on ensuring that he retains the support of the West, particularly the U.S., and the support of the religious right to neutralize his secular political opposition," Ahmed said. "It is this fault line that characterizes his rule."
Washington regards the 60-year-old Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and in the broader region. Two recent decisions illustrate Musharraf's importance to the United States and the dangers he faces.
Under U.S. pressure, Musharraf exposed Abdul Qadeer Khan, the widely popular father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, as a nuclear arms peddler last month. That angered many Pakistanis, and fed suspicions there and abroad that senior military officers approved the nuclear proliferation. So Musharraf also praised Khan as a national hero and quickly pardoned him.
Musharraf faces similar pressures over Kashmir. India claims the rights to all of Jammu and Kashmir, but Pakistan says Kashmiris ought to be able to vote on independence or union with either country. Peace talks between the rival nuclear powers are scheduled to start as early as May and aim to show progress by August.
If Musharraf compromises too much, Pakistanis will conclude that he is a failed pawn of the United States, which might break him, said Hamid Gul, a former head of the Pakistani military's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency who thinks Washington isn't pressing India hard enough.
"There should be no impression that America is trying to put Pakistan in a corner and bash it with a big stick," Gul said. "I think that impression is getting more firm in Pakistanis' collective mind, that Americans are no friends of ours, and if they are trying to support Pervez Musharraf, it is because they have a vested interest in him at this particular time."
A senior State Department official described Pakistan's behavior under Musharraf as "more cooperation than not" with U.S. objectives.
"You have to look at this in all its complexity," the official said. "There are good things going on. There are other things that should be happening that maybe aren't ... but it's an ongoing effort."
Musharraf faces difficult choices. "He's riding several tigers at the same time, occasionally hopping from one to the other," said Stephen Cohen, a Pakistan specialist at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
Despite his claims, human rights campaigners in Pakistan regard Musharraf as an enemy of democracy rather than its savior. They complain that police and military intelligence agents harass or arrest them. Judges allow the government to detain people for long periods without charging them. One of the country's leading pro-democracy campaigners, former Cabinet minister Javed Hashmi, is fighting charges in a closed trial.
"Stability comes from institution-building, and if anything, Musharraf and his people have eroded every institution that was there," Asma Jehangir, a top human rights lawyer who is also the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, said from Geneva. Political analysts say Musharraf undercut his popular support with a referendum in April 2002 aimed at legitimizing his rule. His name was the only one on the ballot, and the vote was widely dismissed as a fraud.
Later that year, he held parliamentary elections. Musharraf had forced the two most popular civilian politicians, former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, into exile. There was little public opposition because of rampant corruption in their administrations.
Musharraf disqualified many of their parties' candidates in 2002 because of alleged corruption or on other grounds, such as the lack of a university degree. But Islamic clerics were allowed to run even though their education was based mainly on the Quran. As a result, the elections strengthened the religious right, giving it its strongest electoral showing.
"Never before has Pakistan had such a strong presence in the parliament of religious extremist groups," Jehangir said. "And more than that, there is a political vacuum. Who is going to fill that vacuum?"
The mullahs hope they will.
If Musharraf is overthrown or killed, a pro-Western military officer probably will succeed him. But Muslim hard-liners appear to be in a stronger position to challenge the succession than they were before he seized power.
The military has had close ties with Islamic militants since Gen. Zia ul-Haq seized power in 1977. Two decades later, the ISI was a prime backer of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Musharraf had to choose between Washington and continued patronage of the Taliban, and made his strategic shift toward the United States.
The religious right denounced Musharraf and claims that its popular support started to grow after he made that decision. But when the general tried to consolidate his power, he ended up in a marriage of political convenience with those same Islamic parties.
In December, after a year of negotiations that paralyzed parliament, the religious parties provided the votes Musharraf needed to rewrite parts of the constitution and legally cement his hold on power until at least the end of 2007.
In exchange, they want Musharraf to make concessions that advance their agenda, such as dropping a reform plan for madrasas, religious schools, that foster Islamic extremism.
Critics of his cooperation with the religious parties say it is not too late for Musharraf to salvage Pakistan's democracy by restoring the old constitution and lifting the bans on Bhutto and Sharif.
"If the democratic transition is resumed, then the mullahs stand to lose," said Ahmed of the Brussels think tank. "In any free and fair election, absent state patronage, the religious right is politically marginalized - just as Pakistani moderates are marginalized by military governments."
The general seems determined to hold his ground. In interviews and speeches over the last two years, he has insisted that he has a vision of Pakistan, and the entire Islamic world, following a course of "enlightened moderation."
"I am firmly convinced that extremist forces do not - will not - rise in Pakistan and do not have a future in Pakistan," Musharraf told an international call-in show in September.
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