Replies to post #586353 on Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[ano]

Summary of REDACTIONS in Washington Federal’s (13-385) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.uscfc.28070/gov.uscourts.uscfc.28070.70.0_1.pdf

Page 7(4.) probably a report from MS that concludes 'Forgery And Fraud'
Page 8(6.) probably FHFA’s August 22, 2008 letters, that state FnF soundness
Page 11(11.) probably proofs FnF were solvent and because of false narrative of their financial distress the DTA needed reduced
Page 23(46.) probably a statement of Secretary Geithner approving or applauding an increase of their retained portfolio
Page 23(47.) probably a journal or financial result that shows OFHEO is flip flopping capital restraints
Page 26(54.) F) probably about a statement former speechwriter for President George W. Bush, made about What to Do about Them http://people.stern.nyu.edu/svnieuwe/econvoice_ARVNW.pdf
g) & h) unknown context but probably about the flip flopping of capitalization standard, that a week later FnF miraculously became under-capitalized
Page 28(57.) probably news coverage that the governments opinion is now indeed undercapitalized
Page 28(58) probably about https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-09-04%20FHFA%20Dickerson%20ltr%20to%20Fannie%20Mae%20Mudd%20-%20Mid-year%20letter.pdf
That proofs here is some serious flip flopping going on, “and we even put a confidential stamp on it” LOL
Page 29(59.) probably proof about (58.) that they openly stated the undercapitalization
Page 29(60.) probably a secondary proof of (58)
Page 29(61.) probably statement or report from MS that says FnF are undercapitalized while two other letters (to Mudd & Syron) proof the opposite just 13 days earlier
Page 30(62.) probably a statement from FHFA’s DeLeo that says FHFA concluded FnF are undercapitalized
Page 30(63.) probably the same statement as (62.) but a different part of it with her proving MS also confirmed her undercapitalization fabrication
Page 32(70.) probably excerpt of document or email from GT, that says the PSPA has nothing to do with the financial solvency, or is asking reasons as to why they think the PSPA has any meaning in financial solvency
Page 33(71.) probably a statement in a document after conservatorship that proves the old BOD thought the terms of the PSPA were too harch
Page 33(73.) probably several quotes from officials who at the time said FnF in the future will no longer exist in prior form and a wind down scenario is in place
Page 36(79.) probably something from treasury and FDIC admitting the decrease in value of the preferred and common stock value
Page 40(88.) the most important one. probably a script from a meeting between the BOD and FHFA/Treasury that proves they entered with Coercion/Duress into the conservatorship (UST00530714.) (later Judge Sweeney quotes this section as death grip)
Page 40(89.) probably breathtaking Script that proves ”the highly unusual provision in HERA, that immunized the Companies’ directors against liability for consenting to the appointment of the FHFA as conservator. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(6).”
Page 41(90.) probably an agency who has criticism on FnF management and board of directors, it later goes on with the (89.) script and ex Freddie CEO Syron “that the letter was there as a mechanism to bring about a result”. (later Judge Sweeney quotes this as either agree or you’re out”)
Page 42(92.) probably proof of a meeting quote or fraise that “Suddenly” the BOD agreed to the terms while all the other documents prove there is still uncertainty to approve
Page 43(93.) probably this is about the same meeting as (92.) but goes on with more quotes from either Paulson or Lockhart stating unconstitutional things
Page 45(100. &101. ) have no context and are 100% Redacted
Page 51(127.) probably a document from BlackRock that confirms Freddie’s core capital only decreased from $37.9B to 37.1B and was not depleted and fannie core capital increased from $45.4B to $47.0B
Page 54(135.) probably a document from BlackRock that proof solvency two weeks before conservatorship
Page 56(146.) probably proof of the government mantra “we are rescuing FnF because they are insolvent” (while they were not) and proof of all the Smoke and mirrors they used to prove their point
Page 62(156.) probably a BlackRock document that proves Freddie’s future condition would be solvent
Page 65(166.) probably documents that show FnF could pay the non-market conform 10% interest rate and simultaneously pay down the liquidation preference and be profitable in the foreseeable future
Page 65(167.) probably document(s) from discovery or document numbers that show treasury and FHFA know they would be profitable in the foreseeable future
Page 66(169 &170.) have no context
Page 67(174.) has no context

4. Specifically, shortly after HERA was passed, the Government designed and
implemented a secret plan to take over the Companies from their shareholders. Treasury hired Wall Street investment firm Morgan Stanley to provide a financial basis for taking over the Companies “Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted----------
.” Unsurprisingly, Morgan Stanley’s analysis concluded, as the Government
had asked it to conclude, that the Companies needed to be taken over.
Page 7(4.) probably a report from MS that concludes 'undercapitalisation'

6. The startling reversal of the Government’s position, on September 4, 2008, just thirteen days after the FHFA’s Notice of Proposed Capital Classification acknowledging that each of the Companies was adequately capitalized, when the FHFA suddenly changed course and sent letters to each of the Companies withdrawing its August 22, 2008 classifications, was not the result of real concerns with the Companies. Instead it was the beginning of the Government’s elaborate scheme to justify the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by suddenly raising “critical concerns” regarding purported capital shortfalls, mismanagement by the Companies’ officers and directors, and purported questions regarding Freddie Mac’s accounting. These purported “critical concerns” had no basis in fact and were directly contradicted by the FHFA’s August 22, 2008
letters, Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted----------
Page 8(6.) probably FHFA’s August 22, 2008 letters, that state FnF soundness

11. The FHFA, continuing the Government’s policy of eliminating all shareholder
value in the Companies and perpetuating the false narrative of their financial distress, forced
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to substantially increase their loan loss reserves and unnecessarily reduce the value of their applicable deferred tax assets. After the conservatorships were imposed, Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- See FHFA00057820. This was done largely to absorb the additional risk exposure caused by the
Government instructing the Companies to take on more subprime assets and guarantee more MBS
at the height of the financial crisis. It also created the appearance that the Companies were less
adequately capitalized than was actually the case, which further fostered the inaccurate perception
that the Companies needed large amounts of additional capital going forward—capital that the
Treasury was only too willing to provide in exchange for enormous, cumulative dividend payments
made pursuant to a predatory lending arrangement that benefited the Government and the public,
but destroyed the private property interests of the Companies’ outstanding preferred and common
shareholders. By 2012, after roughly four years of being under the Government imposed
Page 11(11.) probably proofs FnF were solvent and because of false narrative of their financial distress the DTA needed reduced

46. Faced with directives from Congress and agency regulators to accumulate subprime
and Alt-A holdings, the Companies did so, but they still remained adequately capitalized. As
Fannie Mae’s former CEO, Daniel Mudd, later explained, “Fannie Mae faced the danger that the
market would pass us by. . . . We were afraid that lenders would be selling products we weren’t
buying and Congress would feel like we weren’t fulfilling our mission. The market was changing,
and it’s our job to buy loans, so we had to change as well.” As Secretary Geithner acknowledged
in 2000, Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- UST00479918.
Page 23(46.) probably a statement of Secretary Geithner approving or applauding an increase of their retained portfolio


47. On March 19, 2008, OFHEO further exacerbated the Companies’ accumulation of
high risk holdings by easing their capital restraints from 30% to 20 in exchange for the Companies’
agreement to raise “significant capital” at an indeterminate point in the future. After Fannie Mae
raised $7.4 billion, OFHEO further lowered the capital surcharge from 20% to 15%. Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------UST00037193, at pg. 19, -37211.
Page 23(47.) probably a journal or financial result that shows OFHEO is flip flopping capital restraints



54. Much like the positive statements made by members of Congress with the passage
of HERA, in the months preceding the imposition of the Conservatorship, Government officials
acknowledged the adequate capitalization of the Companies on numerous occasions, including the
following:
a) a June 9, 2008 News Release issued by OFHEO stating that the Director
“classified Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as adequately capitalized as of March
31, 2008,” and that the Companies were maintaining “overall capital levels well
in excess of the requirements.” UST00037193.
b) the July 10, 2008 testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke before
the House Financial Services Committee that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
both “adequately capitalized.”
c) the July 10, 2008 testimony of Secretary Paulson to the House Banking
Committee that OFHEO “has made clear that [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] are
adequately capitalized.”
d) the July 10, 2008 News Release issued by the OFHEO Director in which he stated:
“As I have said before, they [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] are adequately
capitalized, holding capital well in excess of the OFHEO-directed requirement,
which exceeds the statutory minimums. They have large liquidity portfolios,
access to the debt market and over $1.5 trillion in unpledged assets.”
e) Secretary Paulson’s July 15, 2008 testimony to the Senate Banking Committee
confirming the adequacy of the Companies’ capitalization.
f) A July 15, 2008, message Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------that stated:

Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------
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FHFA00065630-65631 (emphasis added).

g) A July 22, 2008 email to Treasury officials Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------
Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------
Redacted --------Redacted---------Redacted---------- Redacted --------Redacted---------FHFA00064783. He repeated this in another message two days later, Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted -------- Redacted--------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted -------- Redacted--------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted -------- Redacted--------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted -------- Redacted--------- Redacted --------Redacted--------- Redacted -------- FHFA00065367 (emphasis added).

h) A July 30, 2008, conference call Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted UST00337442-373443.
Page 26(54.) F) probably about a statement former speechwriter for President George W. Bush, made about What to Do about Them http://people.stern.nyu.edu/svnieuwe/econvoice_ARVNW.pdf
g) & h) unknown context but probably about the flip flopping of capitalization standard, that a week later FnF miraculously became under-capitalized



57. As late as September 4, 2008, news reports acknowledged that --------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted----Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted- UST00497064.
Page 28(57.) probably news coverage that the governments opinion is now indeed undercapitalized


D. While Stating Publicly that the Criteria For Conservatorship Were Not Satisfied, the
Government Planned in Secret to Seize the Companies Regardless of Their Financial
Condition
58. While saying publicly, until just days before the sudden and dramatic reversal of
its position, that the Companies were adequately capitalized and that the “bazooka” of
conservatorship would not need to be used, behind the scenes the Government was secretly
creating a severely overstated record to justify seizing control of them. By September 1, 2008, the
Government had decided to impose the conservatorships imminently. But the purported
justification for its decision was significantly undermined by the recent, August 22, 2008 FHFA
letters opining that each of the Companies was adequately capitalized, which stood in stark contrast
to the grounds necessary to force the Companies into conservatorships under HERA. Recognizing
this serious contradiction, FHFA abruptly reversed course Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted---------
UST00528009, at UST00528143-44.
Page 28(58) probably about https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2008-09-04%20FHFA%20Dickerson%20ltr%20to%20Fannie%20Mae%20Mudd%20-%20Mid-year%20letter.pdf
That proofs here is some serious flip flopping going on, “and we even put a confidential stamp on it” LOL

59. Shortly thereafter Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted--------- Redacted ---- Redacted---------
Page 29(59.) probably proof about (58.) that they openly stated the undercapitalization
60. In addition Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted---------Redacted-----
Page 29(60.) probably a secondary proof of (58)
61. The financial basis for claiming capital deficits at each of the Companies had been
developed under highly secretive conditions with assistance from Wall Street investment firm
Morgan Stanley. Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- UST00530312 ). Morgan Stanley’s misleading calculations were directly contradicted by the FHFA’s letters of August 22, 2008 (just 13 days earlier) acknowledging that both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
“adequately capitalized.” Aug. 22, 2008 Letter to Mudd; Aug. 22, 2008 Letter to Syron. The
Morgan Stanley Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted--------- (Emphasis added.)
Page 29(61.) probably statement or report from MS that says FnF are undercapitalized while two other letters (to Mudd & Syron) proof the opposite just 13 days earlier
62. Perhaps most revealing, the truth of the Government’s pretext for imposition of the
conservatorships was disputed by FHFA’s own chief accountant, Wanda DeLeo, in a September
8, 2008, meeting with Freddie Mac’s auditor Price Waterhouse Cooper (“PwC”). At this meeting,
Ms. DeLeo Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----
Page 30(62.) probably a statement from FHFA’s DeLeo that says FHFA concluded FnF are undercapitalized

63. Ms. DeLeo further acknowledged that Morgan Stanley Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted--------- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted---------
Page 30(63.) probably the same statement as (62.) but a different part of it with her proving MS also confirmed her undercapitalization fabrication
E. The Government Seized Control of the Companies, Falsely Portraying the
Conservatorships as a Rescue Operation
70. In fact, Grant Thornton LLC, the financial consultant firm hired by Treasury after
the conservatorships were implemented to estimate a value for the preferred stock held by the
Government, had trouble valuing Treasury’s stake in the Companies because it found that the terms
of the PSPA actually had nothing to do with the Companies’ financial solvency:
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted
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FHFA00028624, at -28630.

Page 32(70.) probably excerpt of document or email from GT, that says the PSPA has nothing to do with the financial solvency, or is asking reasons as to why they think the PSPA has any meaning in financial solvency

71. Even after the conservatorship, Freddie Mac management met to discuss
amendments to the harsh terms of the PSPA Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- FHFA00091724, p. 3.
Page 33(71.) probably a statement in a document after conservatorship that proves the old BOD thought the terms of the PSPA were too harch

73. However, from the beginning of the conservatorships, the Government’s intention
and ultimate goal was never to restore the Companies to their shareholders, but rather to take a
first step to “wind down” (i.e., dissolve) the Companies, pending action by Congress:

-In an October 2008 speech, Chairman Bernanke agreed with
Paulson that the conservatorships “can usefully be viewed as a
“time out”--one that will give everyone involved, especially the
Congress, the opportunity to reconsider the appropriate roles of
Fannie and Freddie in the U.S. mortgage market.”
FHFA00005353, at -5354.
- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
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-In a March 8, 2011 speech, by FHFA Acting Director Edward J.
DeMarco, he admitted that:
As conservator, FHFA stands in the shoes of the Enterprises’
shareholders. Given the structure of Treasury’s preferred stock
purchase agreements with the Enterprises, the entity with the
greatest economic interest in the Enterprises today is the
taxpayer Thus, we are preserving and conserving the assets
principally for taxpayers so that they may realize the greatest
possible return from these assets, whatever the final form of the
companies’ transformation ends up being. We do this with a
clear expectation that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as we
have known them, will no longer exist. But we do not know
when, or in what fashion, this will happen. UST00531840, at -
531850 (emphasis added).

- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----


-December 11, 2011 testimony by Halderman where he stated
that “the terms of Freddie Mac’s Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement with Treasury were explicitly designed to make it
difficult if not impossible for [Freddie Mac] to emerge from
conservatorship and for shareholders to recoup any value from
their investments.” Haldeman explained that the ten-percent
dividend on funds received from the Treasury was “by design to
ensure that the [Companies] could not emerge from
conservatorship and that shareholders would not benefit from
federal support,” and “necessitate[ed] additional requests for
Treasury funds.”

- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----
Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted-----

On August 17, 2012, in announcing the execution of the Third
Amended Stock Agreements (the “Third Amendment”),
Director DeMarco stated that the amendment merely reaffirmed
the Government’s Strategic Plan for the conservatorships of the
Companies, including “gradually contracting their operations.”
FHFA Statement, Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (Aug. 17, 2017).


Page 33(73.) probably several quotes from officials who at the time said FnF in the future will no longer exist in prior form and a wind down scenario is in place

F. The Government’s Imposition of the Conservatorships Improperly Appropriated the Private Property of the Companies’ Preferred and Common Shareholders

79. The Treasury department, as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- Redacted----- FHFA00004508.
Page 36(79.) probably something from treasury and FDIC admitting the decrease in value of the preferred and common stock value
1. Neither of the Companies’ Shareholders or Boards of Directors Validly
Consented to the Conservatorships
a. Neither of the Companies’ Shareholders Consented to the
Conservatorships
b. Neither of the Companies’ Boards of Directors Validly Consented to
the Conservatorships

87. Even if the consent of the boards of directors of the Companies was sufficient, this
“consent” was legally invalid because it was obtained through misrepresentation and duress.
88. The coercive nature of the Government’s strategy to obtain board consent is clearly
Evident Redacted-------Redacted---------- Redacted-------Redacted---------- Redacted-------Redacted---------- Redacted-------Redacted----------

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UST00530714.

Page 40(88.) the most important one. probably a script from a meeting between the BOD and FHFA/Treasury that proves they entered with Coercion/Duress into the conservatorship (UST00530714.)

89. The extortionate nature of this “script” is breathtaking. Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted-------On the other hand, the Government had already cleared the decks with respect to any concerns the directors might have regarding a potential breach of their fiduciary duties by consenting when there was an insufficient basis to do so. The Government artfully avoided this potential issue when it included the highly unusual provision in HERA that immunized the Companies’ directors against liability for consenting to the appointment of the FHFA as conservator. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(6).

Page 40(89.) probably breathtaking Script that proves ”the highly unusual provision in HERA, that immunized the Companies’ directors against liability for consenting to the appointment of the FHFA as conservator. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(6).”

90. Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- the September 4, 2008 Letter to Fannie Mae also identified purported “failures
by the board and senior management” of the Company. FCIC Report 318-319; Sept. 4, 2008 letter
to Mudd. The September 4, 2008 Letter to Freddie Mac was even more severe in its criticism of
its management and board of directors, disclosing that FHFA had purportedly “lost confidence in
the Board of Directors and the executive management team,” holding them accountable for
purported losses stemming from “a series of ill-advised and poorly executed decisions and other
serious misjudgments.” FCIC Report 318-319; Sept. 4, 2008 Letter to Syron. These allegations
followed the Government’s “script” by Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- As Former Freddie Mac CEO Syron later told the FCIC, “there was a
very clear message that the [September 4] letter was there as a mechanism to bring about a result.”
Former Fannie Mae CEO Mudd agreed that “the purpose of the letter was really to force
conservatorship.” FCIC Report, p. 320.

Page 41(90.) probably an agency who has criticism on FnF management and board of directors, it later goes on with the (89.) script and ex Freddie CEO Syron “that the letter was there as a mechanism to bring about a result”. (later Judge Sweeney quotes this as either agree or you’re out”)

92. To implement the Government’s plan to force Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae into
conservatorship, Treasury decided to hold meetings with the Companies’ directors on September
5, 2008, in order to force them into consenting to the imposition of the conservatorships. Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted----------UST00496472 (emphasis added).

Page 42(92.) probably proof of a meeting quote or fraise that “Suddenly” the BOD agreed to the terms while all the other documents prove there is still uncertainty to approve

93. At these September 5, 2008 meetings, Director Lockhart and Secretary Paulson told
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s executives and directors, in no uncertain terms, that the
Companies would be placed in conservatorship, whether or not they consented. Secretary Paulson
and Director Lockhart emphasized that the Companies had no other option, and that they expected
the Companies’ boards of directors to comply. Paulson falsely told them: “We have the grounds
to do this on an involuntary basis, and we will go that course if needed.” Likewise, Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted----------

Page 43(93.) probably this is about the same meeting as (92.) but goes on with more quotes from either Paulson or Lockhart stating unconstitutional things

100. Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted-------8 lines
101. Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted-------6 lines

Page 45(100. &101. ) have no context and are 100% Redacted

Neither Company incurred or was likely to incur losses that would
deplete all or substantially all of its capital

126. From December 31, 2007, to June 30, 2008, Fannie Mae’s total capital increased
from $48.7 billion to $55.6 billion, and its core capital increased from $45.4 billion to
$47.0 billion. Thus, Fannie Mae’s capital had not been depleted.
127. Likewise, Freddie Mac’s capital had not been depleted. From June 30, 2007, to
June 30, 2008, Freddie Mac’s core capital decreased only slightly from $37.9 billion to $37.1 billion. Further, the BlackRock Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted-------

Page 51(127.) probably a document from BlackRock that confirms Freddie’s core capital only decreased from $37.9B to 37.1B and was not depleted and fannie core capital increased from $45.4B to $47.0B

135. On August 25, 2008, less than two weeks before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
placed into conservatorship, independent investment firm BlackRock Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted----------

Page 54(135.) probably a document from BlackRock that proof solvency two weeks before conservatorship

146. In order to support the false narrative put forth by the Government that the
conservatorships were necessary to “rescue” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from financial distress, Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- This created the illusion that the Companies needed to accept a massive capital infusion from the Treasury, when in fact they never needed to do so. Simply put, it was all smoke and mirrors. Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted-------

Page 56(146.) probably proof of the government mantra “we are rescuing FnF because they are insolvent” (while they were not) and proof of all the Smoke and mirrors they used to prove their point

Improper Write-Down of Deferred Tax Assets
156. Further, the contemporaneous analysis of Freddie Mac’s future financial condition
by BlackRock Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted----------

Page 62(156.) probably a BlackRock document that proves Freddie’s future condition would be solvent

Post Conservatorship Events: The Government Strengthens Its Grip on the
Companies By Creating The Third Amendment to the PSPAs

166. Even saddled with the Government’s improper accounting manipulations and
extortionate interest charges relating to the forced borrowing of money they did not need, the
Companies came roaring back to profitability. By 2010, the FHFA observed that the Companies’
financial results were Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted-------

Page 65(166.) probably documents that show FnF could pay the non-market conform 10% interest rate and simultaneously pay down the liquidation preference and be profitable in the foreseeable future

167. By late 2011, both Treasury and the FHFA Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted-------

Page 65(167.) probably document(s) from discovery or document numbers that show treasury and FHFA know they would be profitable in the foreseeable future

169. Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted--- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- 5 lines
170. Treasury officials Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- 2 lines
Page 66(169 &170.) have no context
174. ---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted------- Redacted---------- Redacted-------3 lines
Page 67(174.) has no context

[FOFreddie]

WoW!!! Thank You For All the Detail and WorK!!

Do you think SCOTUS will review the Sweeney Opinion in deciding Cert? If it does grant Cert will Sweeney be stayed until SCOTUS rules?

[kthomp19]

So What does Washington Federal want?

Reading the Prayer for Relief shows the answer: only money damages for common and preferred shareholders as of the day conservatorship was imposed (September 6 2008).

The "other relief as this Court may deem just and appropriate", if it even applies, won't even approach ending the conservatorships or changing anything from the original SPSPAs. Sweeney's court doesn't have the jurisdiction to do either of those things.

So now from the list above we can conclude:

We can only conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged these things. We cannot conclude that those violations actually occurred: that's Sweeney's job.

Then in the end I’m concluding this Washington Federal case is a total-loss for the government

This is jumping to a conclusion. Sweeney has not even ruled on the motion to dismiss yet, let alone conducted a trial. Unless she does so and finds in favor of the plaintiff, your conclusion is just a guess.

if plaintiff loses in this case all the above accusations need to be proven wrong, and that is something they cannot do as the proof contradicting the governments right is already presented(although Sealed)

Since the evidence is sealed, you cannot say that plaintiffs' points have been proven by it. Have you seen the sealed documents?

you will need a deep pockets to settle this case

Treasury has the deepest pockets out there.

[Guido2]

Wow! Thanks ano. Very grateful for the yoeman's service you continuously provide.