Mission to get allies into united state for Long War
This text omits that the ‘long war’ has, in addition, the pentagon preparing for war with China, or a lengthy world war that includes combat with China. #msg-10051566
-Am
Mission to get allies into united state for Long War
uploaded 13 Apr 2006
By Alec Russell
(Filed: 10/04/2006)
In their mobile buildings in the beach-front car park at Central Command, the headquarters of the US-led fight against terrorism, representatives of America's allies are preparing for two significant changes.
The first is a welcome move from their untidy coalition village of trailer homes, each with a national flag fluttering overhead in the sultry Florida breeze, to more spacious quarters.
The prefabricated offices were never intended for the long haul and the space between them is shrinking now that 63 nations have liaison teams at Centcom.
The second change, deciding how to work with the United States as it plans a revamped long-term campaign against terrorism, requires more reflection.
With its balmy surroundings of palm trees, Tampa's beaches and golf courses, the Centcom HQ, MacDill Air Force Base, looks more like a holiday camp than a military camp.
The only obvious reminders of the base's role in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa are the desert fatigues worn by many of the soldiers.
But in this idyllic setting America is not only overseeing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and dusting off plans in the event of action again Iran, it is also planning the "Long War," as the fight against terrorism has been renamed.
Founded in 1983, Centcom is now the nerve centre of the war against terrorism and by far the most important of the five US regional military commands.
As Centcom tries to steer events in Iraq, it is also plotting a very different approach to terrorism, relying on "soft power" - diplomacy, finance and trade - to defeat al-Qa'eda and its affiliates. Centcom is keen to learn from arguments over Iraq and set up a broad coalition for the Long War.
But allies are unsure what influence coalition members will have. A representative of one European ally said: "They [the Americans] listen. They always listen. Do they act on the advice? That's a different story."
According to an American general working with the coalition, the aim is to refashion the loose-knit arrangement that emerged after September 2001 rather than form a new one.
"We want to make it a lasting organisation," he said. "We don't want it to dissolve like it did after Desert Shield and Desert Storm."
But America's awkward post-September 11 relationship with some allies suggests that this is a challenge. Its "coalition of the willing" for the war in Iraq had a far less illustrious roll call than the coalition for the Gulf War.
Adding to the complexity of the task, there is an a la carte feel to the Centcom coalition. France and Germany, for example, are involved in the campaign in Afghanistan but not in Iraq.
Rear Adml Jacques Mazars, the French representative at Centcom, said that on the ground French and American forces have co-operated more successfully than their politicians.
But, he said, running a coalition for a sustained period will be hard.
"On the conceptual level we can agree," he said. "There will be a long war to be won. But on the practical level it will be harder."
A regular source of tension among allies is over the sharing of intelligence and access to US information. "There are some things you wouldn't share with a neighbour and even an ally," one senior US officer said.
Another key issue for allies is whether their advice will be heeded.
Col Mark Bibbey, the chief of staff of the British mission at Centcom, said that Gen John Abizaid, the Centcom commander, regularly courted dissenting opinions.
"[But] you are still going to be in the business of national perspectives," he said.
"I can't see there ever being a completely homogenous coalition dealing with worldwide terror. The 63 nations are not signed up to the same view on anything."
He added: "You've got, however, to start somewhere. You have to plan ahead. You have to be driving in a particular direction.
"If we don't start driving now or soon we'll be behind the curve."
New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism Beyond War Zones Pentagon to Rely on Special Operations
Planet Earth, one big concentration camp, first the Muslims and then….
The catch, we can designate anyone we want a terrorist.
-Am
By Ann Scott Tyson Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, April 23, 2006; A01
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has approved the military's most ambitious plan yet to fight terrorism around the world and retaliate more rapidly and decisively in the case of another major terrorist attack on the United States, according to defense officials.
The long-awaited campaign plan for the global war on terrorism, as well as two subordinate plans also approved within the past month by Rumsfeld, are considered the Pentagon's highest priority, according to officials familiar with the three documents who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about them publicly.
Details of the plans are secret, but in general they envision a significantly expanded role for the military -- and, in particular, a growing force of elite Special Operations troops -- in continuous operations to combat terrorism outside of war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Developed over about three years by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Tampa, the plans reflect a beefing up of the Pentagon's involvement in domains traditionally handled by the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.
For example, SOCOM has dispatched small teams of Army Green Berets and other Special Operations troops to U.S. embassies in about 20 countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, where they do operational planning and intelligence gathering to enhance the ability to conduct military operations where the United States is not at war.
And in a subtle but important shift contained in a classified order last year, the Pentagon gained the leeway to inform -- rather than gain the approval of -- the U.S. ambassador before conducting military operations in a foreign country, according to several administration officials. "We do not need ambassador-level approval," said one defense official familiar with the order.
Overall, the plans underscore Rumsfeld's conviction since the September 2001 terrorist attacks that the U.S. military must expand its mission beyond 20th-century conventional warfare by infantry, tanks, ships and fighter jets to fighting non-state groups that are, above all, difficult to find.
The plans each run more than 100 pages and cover a wide range of overt and clandestine military activities -- such as man-hunting and intelligence gathering on terrorist networks; attacks on terrorist training camps and recruiting efforts; and partnering with foreign militaries to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. Together, they amount to an assignment of responsibilities to different military commands to conduct what the Pentagon envisions as a "long war" against terrorism.
The main campaign plan sets priorities, allocates resources such as manpower and funding, and coordinates operations among regional military commands to implement the Pentagon's broader National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, published in unclassified form in February. It lays out nine key goals, such as targeting terrorist leaders, safe havens, communications and other logistical support, and countering extremist ideology.
A second detailed plan is focused specifically on al-Qaeda and associated movements, including more than a dozen groups spread across the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. Such groups include the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Ansar al-Islam in the Middle East, Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Saharan Africa.
A third plan sets out how the military can both disrupt and respond to another major terrorist strike on the United States. It includes lengthy annexes that offer a menu of options for the military to retaliate quickly against specific terrorist groups, individuals or state sponsors depending on who is believed to be behind an attack. Another attack could create both a justification and an opportunity that is lacking today to retaliate against some known targets, according to current and former defense officials familiar with the plan.
This plan details "what terrorists or bad guys we would hit if the gloves came off. The gloves are not off," said one official, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject.
The Pentagon declined to comment on the counterterrorism plans or their approval, citing longstanding policy. "We do not discuss contingency plans or future operations," said Cmdr. Greg Hicks, a Defense Department spokesman. SOCOM's deputy commander, Vice Adm. Eric T. Olson, said earlier this month in Senate testimony that the plans had been approved.
Special Operations Command, led by Gen. Doug Brown, has been building up its headquarters and writing the plans since 2003, when Rumsfeld first designated it as the lead command for the war on terrorism. Its budget has grown 60 percent since 2003 to $8 billion in fiscal 2007. President Bush empowered the 53,000-strong command with coordinating the entire military's efforts in counterterrorism in 2004.
"SOCOM is, in fact, in charge of the global war on terror," Brown said in testimony before the House last month. In this role, SOCOM directs and coordinates actions by the military's regional combatant commands. SOCOM, if directed, can also command its own counterterrorist operations -- such as when a threat spans regional boundaries or the mission is highly sensitive -- but it has not done so yet, according to Olson, and other officials say that is likely to be the exception to the rule.
To extend its reach to more countries, SOCOM is increasing by 13,000 the number of Special Operations troops, including Special Forces soldiers skilled in language and working with indigenous militaries, and Delta Force operatives and Navy SEAL teams that form clandestine "special mission units" engaged in reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and man-hunting. Already, SOCOM is seeing its biggest deployments in history, with 7,000 troops overseas today, but the majority have been concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, with 85 percent last year in the Middle East, Central Asia or the Horn of Africa.
But SOCOM's more robust role -- while adding manpower, specialized skills and organization to the fight against terrorism -- has also led to some bureaucratic tensions, both inside the military with the joint staff and regional commands, as well as with the CIA and State Department. Such tensions are one reason SOCOM's plan took years.
When SOCOM first dispatched military liaison teams abroad starting in 2003, they were called "Operational Control Elements," a term changed last year because "it raised the hackles of regional commanders and ambassadors. It was a bad choice of language," said one defense official, adding: "Who can pick on Military Liaison Elements?"
State Department officials, meanwhile, said that although, for the most part, cooperation with the military teams has been good, they remain concerned over continued "gray areas" regarding their status. "Special Ops wants the flexibility and speed to go in there. . . . but there's understandably questions of how you do that and how you have clear lines of authority," one U.S. official said. There remains "continuing discussion, to put it politely, in terms of how this is going to work," the official said. SOCOM says the teams work for the regional commanders.
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