Foreign Correspondence

[Amaunet]

Good Analysis: Preemption Becomes a Reality in Russia
By Dale Herspring
Published on September 11, 2004


UT – ( MOSCOW) Moscow’s recent announcement that it is prepared to act “preemptively” marks a much more important change in policy than has been recognized by most in the media.

. It is true that the idea has been floated in the past, but in the aftermath of the slaughter in Beslan, there is an increasing possibility that Russia will do exactly that. Furthermore, the changes that recently occurred in the upper ranks of the Russian military will make implementing such a strategy considerably easier. First, the question of preemption. Just what do the Russians mean when they use that term. To begin with, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, the new Chief of the General Staff, explained as follows. “Our position on preemptive strikes has been stated before, but I will repeat it. We will take steps to liquidate terror bases in any region.” Baluyevsky made it clear that while Russia would use all means possible to deal with terrorism, the use of nuclear weapons is ruled out. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Russians are ready to ignore national boundaries if the fight against terrorism demands it. At present, there is concern that the Russian military will move into Georgia to destroy what some in the Kremlin claim is a sanctuary for Chechen guerillas. My own impression, however, is that this is a fundamental change and will have major implications for the military reform process in Russia. Why do I say that?

Several weeks ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin did what many had hoped he would do years ago. He fired General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who had been Chief of the General Staff. Kvashnin did everything possible to undermine both Putin and Defense Secretary Sergi Ivanovs’ efforts to reform the armed forces. Putin had repeatedly called for the military (and Ministry of Interior Forces) to pay greater attention it to the fight against terrorism. Kvashnin, however, was more interested in trying to resurrect the old Russian/Soviet mass Army ready to defend the Motherland against an attack – even though Moscow claims that it does not see an internatinal threat beyond that presented by terrorism.

In getting rid of Kvashnin, Putin also turned the relationship between the General Staff and the Defense Ministry up-side down. Instead of having the Chief of the General Staff report to the President (and thereby ignore orders from the Defense Minister he did not like), Putin’s reform made it clear that the Chief of the General Staff works for the Defense Minister – period. In addition, it was also made clear that the General Staff will become what Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov once called the “brain of the army.” It is out of the business of directing operations. It is now restricted to conceptualizing the problems facing Russia and coming up with answers on how to deal with them. In this sense, the Baluyevkiy is the perfect person to head the General Staff. While I was only in one meeting with him, he impressed me as a very bright, congenial, officer. He clearly understood the problems facing the Russian Army and came across as far less polemical and ideological than some of his colleagues. I have no doubt that in contrast to Kvashnin, he will not attempt to get involved in operational matters.

Then why was Baluyevskiy used as the “point person” for warning that Russia was ready to use preemptive force. First, it is important to keep in mind that the Defense Minister said the same thing. Second, it made it clear to everyone in the Russian military, that the General Staff is now working on measures to implement this new strategy.

The Russian military mind is different from the American or British mind. To begin with, one often gets the impression that the comments made by German officers during World War II to the effect that American strategy is “the ability to work in chaos” has some validity. The US has some general plans, but does not have the highly structured theoretical framework that the Russians rely on. What this means is that once Baluyevskiy and his colleagues have worked out a new approach for preemption, the defense ministry will implement it.

So what is coming? Sitting in the middle of Kansas it is difficult to predict what the Russians will do, but I think we have some hints. First, I would expect to see much greater emphasis on units such as Spetznatz (Russia’s Special Forces), the small, but very effective Naval Infantry, and airborne units. Russia does not have the kind of money to transform its million member military over night. So the money will probably go primarily to those fighting this kind of war – the war that Putin is determined to win.

Assuming he is serious about fighting terrorism at home and abroad, it is critical that Putin crack down on the corruption that is prevalent in the Ministry of Interior. He has fired several individuals, but the question is just how serious is he about cleaning house.

Finally, better organizational ties need to be established, especially between the military and the internal security forces. Moscow has begun to reorganize its forces in the area around Beslan. But more needs to be done.

Will we wake up tomorrow or the next day to learn that the Russians have hit a terrorist target outside of their borders? I have no doubt that the Russians are very serious about their willingness to act preemptively. I spent too much time around Russian military officers not to take them seriously on something this important to Russian security. When it comes to things of this nature, they generally mean what they say.

(Dale R. Herspring, a professor of political science at KSU, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a retired diplomat and naval officer).

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