Tornado Alley (PROG)

[easymoney101]

cont....
Mohammad Naim’s brother told a similar story.54 Ahmaddullah and Amanullah, who
are brothers, were arrested in a house nearby. Another villager, Khoja Mohammad, was
arrested when he came out of his house to investigate what was happening in the other
houses.55 Amanullah described the arrests as follows:
I awoke, there were helicopters all around the house. And I looked out
and there were people in my house [in the compound]. There was a
man I could see, I thought he was a thief. He had a gun. But he spoke
English, and I realized he was an American. I don’t speak much
English, but I said, “How are you?” But then he said, “shut up” in
Pashto – “Chopsha.”
My brother was there too, and he was arrested. They tied his hands, and
they were pointing their guns at me all the time. Then they arrested me
too, and tied my hands.56
The five men were taken to Bagram. Mohammad Naim described what happened after
they landed:
They threw us in a room, face down. We were there for a while. Then
they stood me up and led me somewhere, and then they took off my
blindfold. I saw that I was alone. I saw that there were some other
people in the room, but I was the only prisoner.
I was on the ground, and a man stood over me, and he had a foot on my
back. An interpreter was there at this point. He asked me, “What is
your name?” and I told them.
They made me take off my clothes, so that I was naked. They took
pictures of us, naked. And then they gave us new clothes, which were
dark blue.
54 Human Rights Watch interview with Sherbat, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
55 Human Rights Watch interview with Khoja Mohammad, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
56 Human Rights Watch interview with Amanullah, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 26
A man came, and he had some plastic bag, and he ran his hands through
my hair, shaking my hair. And then he pulled out some of my hair,
some hair from my beard, and he put it in a bag. . . . The most awful
thing about the whole experience was how they were taking our pictures,
and we were completely naked. Completely naked. It was completely
humiliating.57
According to Mohammad Naim and Sherbat, the questioning at Bagram over the next
few days was exceedingly general, and indicated that the U.S. investigators had no idea
who the brothers were:
In the interrogations they asked us, “Who are you? What do you do?” I
told them, “I am butcher. I am just a butcher with a shop in the
village.” They showed me Khoja Mohammad’s picture [one of the other
villagers arrested] and asked me if I knew him. “Obviously I know
him—he is my neighbor,” I said.58
U.S. forces also asked very general questions of Ahmaddullah, Amanullah, and Khoja
Mohammad, suggesting the U.S. knew very little about them as well. Amanullah
described his interrogation at Bagram as follows:
During the interrogations, they were asking me, “Do you know
Jalaludid? [A suspected Taliban commander.] Do you know Mullah
Omar?” And they were asking about some other Taliban ministers. But
I was telling them, “I am only a laborer.” But then they would ask me
[again]: “Do you know Ali Jan, Jalaludin’s deputy?”
There was one Afghan translator, one American, and two others
[nationalities unknown].59
Khoja Mohammad, meanwhile, was asked about Sherbat, one of the brothers arrested in
another house. “During the interrogations, they showed me Sherbat’s picture, and they
asked me if I knew him. I said, laughing, ‘Of course I know him: he is a butcher in my
village. I buy my meat from him.’”
57 Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
58 Human Rights Watch interview with Sherbat (last name withheld), Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
59 Ibid.
27 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
After sixteen days of detention, including six days of interrogations, the U.S. released the
five men. Said Sherbat:
When they released us, an American came and said, through the
translator, “We apologize to you. We apologize on behalf of America
and even on behalf of President Bush. We apologize.” They said that
they would help us by giving us compensation for what they did. They
said we would receive assistance. But we never did.
They covered our heads again, and put us in the helicopter, and took us
to Gardez. We landed in Gardez, and they took us in truck. We told
them to stop before we got to our village, and that we would walk. The
interpreter gave us about thirty-thousand [old] Afghanis each
[approximately 70 cents U.S.], so that at least we could get some tea.60
The five men returned home to find that their houses had been looted and most of their
possessions of value gone. Said Mohammad Naim: “I think that night [of the raid] my
house was looted. . . . After that, no one helped us, no government, no NGO, no
one.”61 The brothers said that they were told later that the Afghan forces working with
the Americans had searched and looted their houses.
Ahmaddullah says he suffered mental health difficulties after the arrest:
When we were there [to Bagram], I was so afraid they were going to kill
me. Even now, having come back, I worry they will come and kill me.
We are innocent people, we have nothing. We were punished by the
Taliban: we were Persian speakers [i.e., not native Pashtuns like the
Taliban.] We thought they [the U.S. forces at Bagram] would kill us for
sure. I have to take medication now just to sleep. . . . Afghanistan has
had so many governments in the last thirty years, and under all of these
governments I have suffered. Under all of them I have been mistreated.
They all ask for forgiveness. What’s the good of forgiveness if they
don’t give you anything?62
60 Human Rights Watch interview with Sherbat, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
61 Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
62 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmaddullah, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 28
Human Rights Watch received information about various other persons detained for
extended periods by U.S. forces after being taken into custody.
Human Rights Watch interviewed two civilian men who were arrested in Paktia in early
2002 and held at Bagram for over a month before being flown to Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base in Cuba.63 Both were released in May 2003. The fact that the two were
released from Guantanamo and were not held by Afghan authorities after their release
makes it clear that insufficient evidence existed that they committed any crime. Neither
of them had any idea why they were arrested. One of the detainees said that a close
friend of his was still in custody, either in Bagram or Guantanamo. The detainee’s
family and residents of his village told the detainee that his friend was arrested when he
(the friend) approached a U.S. military base near Khost asking for information about
him.
Human Rights Watch received a report about two persons in Khost city, Paktia, arrested
by U.S. forces in August 2003.64 The two men were arrested after their brother was
killed in an explosion that local authorities believed was the result of a premature
detonation of a car bomb. According to the two men, who spoke with local journalists
in Khost, they were taken to Bagram airbase and interrogated by U.S. forces there. They
said they were released after two months, when U.S. forces determined that they were
not involved in the explosion or affiliated with anti-Coalition forces. During this whole
time, their family was unable to receive news of them. The two said they received
compensation from the United States and were flown back to Khost.
In Jalalabad in May 2003, four persons were taken into custody by U.S. forces operating
out of Jalalabad airport.65 After interrogation, the men were then turned over to Afghan
authorities. The detainees, who according to some residents were merely civilians, had
no criminal charges pending against them, and were being held seemingly at the request
63 The information here is gathered from interviews by Human Rights Watch with the two detainees
in July 2003 and several interviews with a journalist who interviewed these detainees earlier. For
security reasons, the names of the detainees are withheld. The two detainees were severely mistreated
by U.S. forces while at Bagram; their case is discussed in more detail in the Mistreatment in Detention
section, below.
64 Information about this case is based on a Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a local
journalist, Paktia province, November 4, 2003.
65 The information about this case is based on a Human Rights Watch interview with AIHRC official,
Jalalabad, May 7, 2003.
29 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
of the U.S. forces. They were released a few weeks later after AIHRC officials pressured
the local authorities.
One case discussed above involved the February 2003 arrest of Abdul Gehafouz
Akhundzada, a cleric from Zurmat district. After the arrest, described earlier,
Akhundzada was taken away in a helicopter, presumably to Bagram airbase, but his
family was not informed of the location or reason for his arrest over the following
months. As of late 2003, there was no response to appeals made through local
government officials to both the U.S. and the Afghan authorities for an explanation as to
his whereabouts. According to local residents, the U.S. government released no
information as to the reasons for Akhundzada’s arrest to his family or made such
information public. Local U.N. staff in Paktia suggested that coalition forces focused
operations in Zurmat district in 2003 in part because several senior Taliban officials were
born there.66 It is possible U.S. forces arrested Akhundzada in order to question him,
believing that since he is a cleric he might have information about the location of
Taliban officials. U.N. staff, however (as well as local officials), do not believe that
Akhundzada had any meaningful or high-level connections with the Taliban.67
Ahmed Khan and his two sons (discussed above) also told Human Rights Watch that
they were arrested in Zurmat and taken to Bagram airbase after their arrest. They said
they were questioned about their identities, and whether they knew certain people—
various names were given, people whom they did not know.68 They were held for over
two weeks, and then flown back to Zurmat. Ahmed Khan told Human Rights Watch
that U.S. officials at Bagram Air Base apologized to him before releasing him, and asked
him “for forgiveness.”
Naim Kuchi, an elder and tribal leader of nomads from Paktika province, was arrested in
late December 2002, while traveling on a road outside of Kabul.69 U.S. personnel in
civilian vehicles, accompanied by Afghan forces, reportedly took him into custody.
66 Human Rights Watch interviews with local U.N. staff, Gardez, March 11, 2003.
67 Human Rights Watch interviews with local U.N. staff, Gardez, March 11, 2003. Human Rights
Watch interview with Raz Mohammad Dalili, governor of Paktia, and other government officials,
Gardez, March 9, 2003.
68 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan and his sons, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
69 Information about this case is based on Human Rights Watch interviews with Naim Kuchi’s
brother, Kabul, March 8 and 29, 2003. See also Marc Kaufman, “Afghans Protest Clan Leader's
Detention,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003; Marc Kaufman, “Afghan Figure Sent to U.S. Facility
in Cuba,” Washington Post, March 29, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 30
Kuchi’s family told Human Rights Watch that Kuchi had no involvement with anti-
Coalition activities and said they had received no information about the basis for his
arrest, nor were they able to meet with him after his arrest. In March 2003, Kuchi was
transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, where he remains. A former U.N.
official told Human Rights Watch that Kuchi was allied with the Taliban and with the
former mujahidin government in Kabul from 1992-1996, and that he had represented
the Ahmadzai nomad tribe in meetings with the Karzai government and the United
Nations in 2002.70 In April 2003, U.S. Department of Defense officials told Human
Rights Watch that Kuchi was a former Taliban official and a “scumbag” involved in
smuggling arms over the Pakistani border.71 Whatever the case, Kuchi remains detained
without charge or trial.
Rohullah Wakil, a local leader from Kunar province who was elected to the 2002 loya
jirga in Kabul, was arrested in a raid in Kunar in August 2002 and remains in custody—
possibly at Bagram. Local representatives from Kunar have made repeated pleas to the
United States and U.N. in Kabul, complaining that Wakil should either be tried for a
crime or released. No charges have been filed against him.
Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 1,000 persons have been detained in the
course of coalition operations in Afghanistan from early 2002 to the present, most of
whom have been released within days or weeks of their capture. This estimate is based
on the average number of weekly new detainees who arrive at Bagram—approximately
ten—according to journalists and human rights monitors who have been following the
Bagram process. The number of new detainees obviously fluctuates: In December 2003,
according to a U.S. military spokesman in Kabul, U.S. forces detained over 100 people.72
CIA Detention Facilities
As noted above, CIA agents have operated throughout Afghanistan since soon after
September 11, 2001, conducting military and intelligence operations. The CIA maintains
a large heavily guarded compound in Kabul, in the Ariana Chowk neighborhood,
surrounded by forty foot walls, razor wire, and guard towers. The CIA also controls a
separate detention and interrogation facility at Bagram airbase, though this has never
70 E-mail correspondence with former U.N. official, February 2004.
71 Human Rights Watch meeting with U.S. Department of Defense officials, Washington D.C., April
24, 2003.
72 Stephen Graham, “U.S. Kills 10, Arrests 100 in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, December 30,
2003.
31 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
been officially acknowledged by the United States. Little is known about who is
detained there, for how long, conditions of detention, or grounds for release or transfer
to other U.S.-controlled facilities.
Human Rights Watch interviewed one former detainee, a former high-level Taliban
official, who was held in an unknown facility near Kabul for eight months, guarded by
Afghan troops but interrogated by U.S. personnel in plainclothes.73 Since all U.S.
military personnel are under orders to wear uniforms in Afghanistan, it is possible that
the government personnel in question were from the CIA. The former official said that
there were other detainees held in the same facility: he heard their voices and heard
guards discussing other prisoners in the hallway outside his cell. He said he cooperated
with the U.S. personnel and was not mistreated. He believes he was held in an Afghan
detention center in the Shashdarak area of Kabul or at the Ariana Chowk CIA facility.
There is also some evidence that the United States detains people in Afghanistan who
have been captured outside of the country. Pakistani officials told a reporter with Time
that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, an alleged al-Qaeda leader, was taken to Bagram air base
after his arrest in Pakistan in March 2003.74 Saifullah Paracha, a Pakistani man who was
alleged to have connections to Shaikh Mohammed, was also taken to Afghanistan after
he was arrested in Pakistan in July 2003, according to his wife, who received a letter
from him delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross.75 (His son was
also arrested by authorities in the United States.76) Part of the letter from Saifullah read:
I am in Kabul with U.S. authorities. My health is OK. My blood
pressure and sugar is controlled. Tell relatives about my welfare. . . .
The Red Cross people do visit me [every] seven to 10 days. Reply me
soon. You can send me fax. Get the number from Internet or ICRC.77
Saifullah reportedly remains in custody without charge.
73 The information presented here is based on a Human Rights Watch interview with a former
detainee on July 18, 2003, in Kabul. For security reasons, the person’s name is withheld here.
74 See “The Biggest Fish of Them All,” Time Magazine, March 17, 2003.
75 Zarar Khan, “Missing businessman in U.S. custody, wife says,” Associated Press, September 4,
2003.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 32
Legal standards applicable to detention of civilians and combatants in Afghanistan
International humanitarian law and human rights law provide protections to all persons
taken into custody during situations of armed conflict. As discussed in the section
“International Legal Context” below, since the establishment of the Karzai government,
the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan is considered to be a non-international (internal)
armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions. Persons arrested and detained during
internal armed conflicts must be treated in accordance with Article 3 common to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, customary international humanitarian law, and the due
process requirements of human rights law.
During an internal conflict, persons apprehended for taking part in armed conflict may
be prosecuted for taking up arms against the government. This is different from the
situation of an international armed conflict, where soldiers are normally entitled to the
“combatant’s privilege,” which protects them from being prosecuted for taking part in
the hostilities. This means that the Afghan government may prosecute persons
apprehended during the current fighting for violations of Afghan law. But such
prosecutions must be carried out by tribunals that meet international due process
standards.78
Persons taken into custody who have not taken a direct part in the hostilities must be
charged with a criminal offense or released. The protections of human rights law, in
particular the rights to be charged with a criminal offense, have access to legal counsel,
and be tried before an impartial and independent court, apply.79 In a declared state of
emergency, some due process requirements may be derogated, but such derogations
must be “limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”80 The
78 Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides that criminal sentences may not be
imposed except by regularly constituted courts that afford “all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized people.” Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 3. Customary
international humanitarian law incorporates many of the fair trial protections found in human rights
law. Persons must be presumed innocent, be prosecuted by an independent and impartial court, be
informed without delay of the charges against them, and they shall have the right and means of
defense. See Protocol I, art. 75. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), opened for signature December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23,
1976, and acceded to by Afghanistan January 24, 1983 and ratified by the United States on June 8,
1992), art. 14.
79 ICCPR, arts. 9 and 14.
80 The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the body that monitors compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states in its commentary to article 4 on states of emergency,
that limitations to derogation “relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the
state of emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to because of the emergency. . . . [T]he
33 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court, for instance, may never be
violated.81
Even if the United States maintains that an international armed conflict persists in
Afghanistan (see International Legal Context section below), U.S. actions with regard to
its detainees would remain contrary to international law. During international armed
conflict, civilians may be detained for “imperative reasons of security,” but they may not
be held indefinitely without review. The Fourth Geneva Convention permits detention
“only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”82 Even then,
the internee is entitled to have his internment reconsidered “as soon as possible” before
an appropriate court or administrative board set up by the Detaining Power for that
purpose. Thus, most of the standards applicable to non-international conflict are
applicable even to international conflicts. By flaunting these standards, the United States
is violating international law.
obligation to limit any derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation reflects
the principle of proportionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers. Moreover, the
mere fact that a permissible derogation from a specific provision may, of itself, be justified by the
exigencies of the situation does not obviate the requirement that specific measures taken pursuant to
the derogation must also be shown to be required by the exigencies of the situation.” Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (art. 4), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 4.
81 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, para. 11.
82 Fourth Geneva, art. 42.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 34
Mistreatment in Detention
Bagram airbase
Human Rights Watch has received credible and consistent information about
mistreatment of detainees at the Bagram detention facility. It also appears that during
the first months after the United States set up the Bagram facility in late 2001, the
treatment of detainees there was especially harsh.
Two detainees held in Bagram in March 2002 (who were later sent to the Guantanamo
facility and ultimately released and repatriated) described to Human Rights Watch being
held in a cell for several weeks, in a group, stripped to their undershirts and underwear.83
According to the two men, bright lights were set up outside their cells, shining in, and
U.S. military personnel took shifts, keeping the detainees awake by banging on the metal
walls of their cells with batons. The detainees said they were terrified and disoriented by
sleep deprivation, which they said lasted for several weeks. During interrogations, they
said, they were made to stand upright for lengthy periods of time with a bright spotlight
shining directly into their eyes. They were told that they would not be questioned until
they remained motionless for one hour, and that they were not entitled even to turn their
heads. If they did move, the interrogators said the “clock was reset.” U.S. personnel,
through interpreters, yelled at the detainees from behind the light, asking questions.84
Two more detainees held at Bagram in late 2002 told a New York Times reporter of being
painfully shackled in standing positions, naked, for weeks at a time, forcibly deprived of
sleep and occasionally beaten.85
A reporter with the Associated Press interviewed two detainees who were held in Bagram
in late 2002 and early 2003: Saif-ur Rahman and Abdul Qayyum.86 Qayyum was
83 The information here is gathered from interviews by Human Rights Watch with the two detainees
in July 2003 and several interviews with a journalist who interviewed these detainees earlier. For
security reasons, the names of the detainees are withheld.
84 A journalist with a British Broadcasting Corporation Panorama program interviewed these two
detainees in July 2003 about their experiences at Bagram and Guantanamo. See “Inside
Guantanamo,” BBC-One program broadcast on October 5, 2003, transcript available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/panorama/transcripts/insideguantanamo.txt
85 See Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody,” New York Times,
March 4, 2003.
86 Information about these cases is based on an article by an Associated Press journalist who
interviewed the two in March 2003. See Kathy Gannon, “Prisoners released from Bagram forced to
35 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
arrested in August 2002; Rahman in December 2002. Both were held for more than two
months. Interviewed separately, they described similar experiences in detention: sleep
deprivation, being forced to stand for long periods of time, and humiliating taunts from
women soldiers. Rahman said that on his first night of detention he was kept in a
freezing cell for part of his detention, stripped naked, and doused with cold water. He
believes he was at a military base in Jalalabad at this point. Later, at Bagram, he said U.S.
troops made him lie on the ground at one point, naked, and pinned him down with a
chair. He also said he was shackled continuously, even when sleeping, and forbidden
from talking with other detainees. Qayyum and Rahman were linked with a local
commander in Kunar province, Rohullah Wakil, a local and national leader who was
elected to the 2002 loya jirga in Kabul, and who was arrested in August 2002 and
remains in custody.
According to detainees who have been released, U.S. personnel punish detainees at
Bagram when they break rules—for instance, talking to another prisoner or yelling at
guards. Detainees are taken, in shackles, and made to hold their arms over their heads;
their shackles are then draped over the top of a door, so that they can not lower their
arms. They are ordered to stand with their hands up, in this manner, for two-hour
intervals. According to one detainee interviewed who was punished in this manner, the
punishment caused pain in the arms.87
In March 2003, Roger King, a U.S. military spokesman at Bagram, denied that
mistreatment had occurred, but admitted the following:
We do force people to stand for an extended period of time. . . .
Disruption of sleep has been reported as an effective way of reducing
people’s inhibition about talking or their resistance to questioning. . . .
They are not allowed to speak to each other. If they do, they can plan
together or rely on the comfort of one another. If they’re caught
speaking out of turn, they can be forced to do things, like stand for a
period of time—as payment for speaking out.88
strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to stand for hours,” Associated Press, March 14, 2003.
Human Rights Watch interviewed Gannon to confirm the accounts given here.
87 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
88 Gannon, “Prisoners released from Bagram forced to strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to
stand for hours,” March 14, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 36
King also said that a “common technique” for disrupting sleep was to keep the lights on
constantly or to wake detainees every fifteen minutes to disorient them.89
Several U.S. officials, speaking anonymously to the media, have admitted that U.S.
military and CIA interrogators use sleep deprivation as a technique, and that detainees
are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours in black hoods or spray-painted
goggles, and held in awkward, painful positions.90
In March 2003, a U.S. official told a New York Times reporter that Omar Faruq, a
detainee at Bagram who was allegedly close to Osama bin Laden, was subjected to
interrogations at Bagram that were “not quite torture, but about as close as you can get.”
The official said that Faruq was fed very little and subjected to sleep and light
deprivation and prolonged isolation and room temperatures ranging from 100 degrees to
10 degrees Fahrenheit (38 to -12 centigrade).91 The same month, U.S. officials told
another New York Times reporter about interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, allegedly a
senior al-Qaeda leader who was arrested in March 2003 and possibly held at Bagram.
Abu Zubaydah was shot in the chest, groin, and thigh when he was captured in Pakistan
in March, and, according to one official, interrogators later manipulated levels of pain
medication for Abu Zubaydah while they were interrogating him.92 Military
interrogators told the Wall Street Journal:
“Interrogators can also play on their prisoners’ phobias, such as fear of
rats or dogs, or disguise themselves as interrogators from a country
known to use torture or threaten to send the prisoners to such a place.
Prisoners can be stripped, forcibly shaved and deprived of religious
items and toiletries.”93
89 Ibid.
90 See, e.g., Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; ‘Stress
and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,” Washington
Post, December 26, 2002.; Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, “Questioning to Be Legal, Humane and
Aggressive the White House Says,” New York Times, March 4, 2003.
91 Don Van Natta Jr. “A dark jail for Qaeda suspects; captives are deprived of sleep and sometimes
chilled,” The New York Times, March 10, 2003.
92 Erich Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, “Questioning of Accused Expected to Be Humane, Legal and
Aggressive,” New York Times, March 4, 2003.
93 Jess Bravin and Gary Fields, “How do Interrogators Make A Captured Terrorist Talk?,” Wall Street
Journal, March 4, 2003.
37 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Mistreatment in other facilities
Human Rights Watch interviewed a Pakistani fighter with the Taliban who was held at
the Kandahar airport in early 2002 and later taken to Guantanamo. He said he was
beaten and kicked by U.S. troops in transport to Kandahar and while there.94 He was
released from Guantanamo in July 2003.
[On the plane to Kandahar:] We were shackled and our eyes were
covered so that we could not see anything. . . . [A]ll the handcuffed
prisoners were forced to sit with their legs stretched and hands behind
them and the whole body bent onto the legs all the way. [Demonstrates:
kneeling but essentially sitting on top of his calves and feet, with torso
bent down over the knees.]
It was very difficult to remain in that position and if we fell to the side
or moved, the armed men standing over our heads would beat us
mercilessly with their army boots, kicking us in our back and kidneys.
We were all beaten, without exception.
The man also said that he and other prisoners were beaten when they arrived in
Kandahar:
Our eyes were closed [blindfolded] while we were getting out of the
helicopter at the Kandahar airbase. One man pulled me up by my arm
and threw me down the stairs, and then made me to lie down on the
ground with my face upward.
We did not have the right to move, and if we did we were beaten. Other
people were beaten. . . .
When we were in Kandahar, we were not allowed to talk with each other
and if we did, we were beaten and we were not allowed to sleep. For
instance, if we were sleeping we were waken up or if we were covering
our head with our bed cover we were beaten strongly.
94 Human Rights Watch interview with M.S.M. (name withheld), Malakand district, Pakistan, January
3, 2004.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 38
They would kick and punch us. To tell you precisely they were behaving
rudely with us.
The man also said that he and other prisoners were occasionally taken outside and
forced to lie on the frozen ground until they were numb with cold.95
Another Pakistani man, who was arrested in Pakistan by U.S. forces and taken to
Kandahar in early 2002 (he was later sent to Guantanamo and was released in 2003), said
he was beaten during an interrogation at Kandahar:
My hands were handcuffed in my back. There I was beaten for the first
time by the Americans. They made me lie down on a table with my face
down, while two persons held me, one at my neck and the second at my
feet. Both pressed me down hard on the table, and two others beat me
on my back, my thighs and my arms with punches and their elbows.
The beating lasted five or six minutes. Then the interrogations started
and lasted for half an hour. I was standing the whole time.96
The man said he was beaten again at Kandahar in a holding cell, along with other
prisoners, before being taken to Guantanamo.
Persons taken into custody after a raid in January 2002 provided other details of
mistreatment at the Kandahar airbase. On the night of January 24, 2002, U.S. forces
attacked two government buildings in Khas Uruzgon, a small village in eastern Uruzgon
province, and mistakenly killed several anti-Taliban fighters who were assisting U.S.
forces.97 U.S. forces destroyed a school in the attack, killing 19 soldiers and Afghan
95 James Meek, a reporter with the Guardian (U.K.), interviewed this detainee and others held in
Kandahar at the same time. Their stories were consistent, including being beaten and forced to lie on
the frozen earth. See James Meek, “People The Law Forgot,” The Guardian, December 3, 2003. See
also Gannon, “Prisoners released from Bagram forced to strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to
stand for hours,” March 14, 2003 (including allegations by a detainee at Jalalabad who was forced to
lie outside in a puddle of frozen water).
96 Human Rights Watch interview with A.Z. (name withheld), North West Frontier Province,
Pakistan, February 6, 2004.
97 The information about this account is based on the following interviews: Human Rights Watch
interview with A.M.S., resident of Khas Uruzgon, Kabul, February 23, 2003. Human Rights Watch
interview with R.H.M., resident of Khas Uruzgon; Kabul, February 23, 2003; Human Rights Watch
telephone interview with an international journalist who visited Uruzgon village on January 27, 2002,
February 20, 2003; Human Rights Watch interview with international journalist who visited Uruzgon
39 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
government employees who were with them. U.S. forces took into custody twentyseven
anti-Taliban fighters and government workers and transferred them to Kandahar
airbase, where they were held for several days.
Several of these detainees said that they were kicked and punched repeatedly by U.S.
forces after they arrived, and suffered broken bones that went untreated. Several were
beaten until they were unconscious. Among those beaten was an elderly man, who had
his hand broken. Others reported being kicked in their ribs and heads.98
At the scene of the attack, local residents found two dead Afghan soldiers with their
hands bound with plastic ties similar to those commonly used by U.S. troops. They had
apparently died from gunshot wounds to the torso. Residents were unable to determine
whether they had been bound before they were killed or whether they were wounded,
bound, and then subsequently died. The deaths raise serious issues that the U.S. military
should fully investigate. If the men were intentionally killed after their capture, the
killing would amount to an extrajudicial execution and violation of the laws of war. If
the men received their injuries before being captured, then it may have been unlawful for
the U.S. forces to leave them bound without providing them proper medical attention.99
That the U.S. forces were able to take some two dozen persons into custody suggests
that they would have been fully capable of taking the other two for medical treatment.
After the Khas Uruzgon detainees were released, U.S. officials visited Uruzgon and
apologized to elders there, and gave out $1,000 to the families of persons who had been
killed in the raid. Those who were mistreated by U.S. forces received nothing.100
village in early February 2002, February 5, 2004. See also Craig Smith, “U.S. Account Of a Battle with
Taliban is Disputed,” New York Times, January 27, 2002; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S.
Releasing 27 Captured in Raid,” New York Times, February 7, 2002.
98 See preceding note. See also Carlotta Gall, “Released Afghans Tell of Beatings,” New York Times,
February 11, 2002; Ellen Knickmeyer, “Survivors of raid by U.S. forces say victims were among
America’s best friends,” Associated Press, February 6, 2002; Molly Moore, “Villagers Released by
American Troops Say They Were Beaten, Kept in ‘Cage,’” Washington Post, February 11, 2002; Eric
Slater, “U.S. Forces Beat Afghans After Deadly Assault, Ex-Prisoners Say,” Los Angeles Times,
February 11, 2002.
99 See Second Geneva Convention, art 3 (“The wounded . . . shall be collected and cared for”); art. 12
(Wounded belligerents who fall into enemy hands “shall be treated humanely and cared for . . . . Only
urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered”).
100 A CIA spokesman acknowledged to CNN that the agency sent its personnel to Uruzgon to
provide payment. See “CIA pays victims of commando raid,” February 6, 2002, available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/06/ret.detainees.released/
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 40
On March 17, 2002, U.S. forces raided a compound in Sangesar, a village near Kandahar,
and arrested more than thirty anti-Taliban fighters, apparently by mistake.101 The
detainees were taken to the Kandahar airport.102 According to the detainees, hoods were
placed over their heads and they were “thrown down,” face first, onto rocky ground.
Many said they were kicked in the back by U.S. forces. One witness, with a bruised arm,
said he was held by the feet and head and kicked repeatedly in the back. Another man,
who still had a black eye when he was interviewed three days after being released, said,
“They picked me up and threw me down on the rocks. It was painful. I couldn’t rest on
my chest. When I moved they kicked me.”103 The detainees also said they were
punished for talking to each other, by being made to kneel with their hands behind their
heads for extended periods, and were kicked when they moved.
A photojournalist who accompanied Special Forces and soldiers from the U.S. 82nd
Airborne during operations in eastern Afghanistan in July 2002 told Human Rights
Watch that Special Forces referred to the Kandahar airbase as “Camp Slappy,” and that
U.S. forces would threaten uncooperative persons encountered during raids, suggesting
that they might be sent there: “We tell them they can either cooperate or go to Camp
Slappy,” a Special Forces soldier told the journalist.104
Recent complaints received by the Gardez office of the AIHRC about U.S. forces in the
Gardez area include the following, from Zurmat district in Paktia province, alleging that
101 Information about this case is based on a telephone interview with a journalist who interviewed the
detained men, February 4, 2004, and the news story that journalist filed. See Charles J. Hanley,
“Finally freed, Afghans say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” Associated Press, March 23,
2002.
102 This case was discussed in a Department of Defense briefing on March 20, 2002 in Washington
D.C. At that briefing, a military spokesman, Brig. Gen. John W. Rosa Jr., said: “We went to the
compound—no shots were fired—found out who these folks were, temporarily detained them. We
never processed them and they never became detainees. But no shots were fired, and those folks were
released.” This statement was false. Several journalists were told by officials in Afghanistan that the
men were still in custody, and were not released until March 21. See Hanley, “Finally freed, Afghans
say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” March 23, 2002.
103 See Hanley, “Finally freed, Afghans say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” March 23,
2002.
104 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tomas van Houtryve, February 3, 2004. See also
Tomas van Houtryve, “Prisoners of America,” International Relations Journal, San Francisco State
University, Spring 2003.
41 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
five residents there were arrested and tortured by U.S. forces (this case is currently being
investigated by the AIHRC):
November 29, 2003, Ezzat Kheil village: “The compound was
bombarded by coalition forces from Bagram at 2 a.m., damaging the
compound and terrifying and frightening women and children in the
middle of the night . . . . Five residents of the village were arrested and
released after six days; they had been subjected to torture and two of
them were injured.”
Human Rights Watch has learned that U.S. forces routinely hold Afghans at the local
airport in the eastern city of Jalalabad. However, former detainees there refused to
speak in detail with Human Rights Watch about their experiences in U.S. detention.
One told Human Rights Watch:
We were treated absolutely terribly there. They did terrible things to us,
things we'll never forget. It was absolutely awful what they did. . . . We
absolutely cannot talk about it. We don’t want to talk about it with you.
We have made our agreements not to talk, and we won’t talk about it.105
* * * * *
The treatment of detainees at Bagram seems to have become more standardized and
professional since 2002, though the absence of access to detainees makes it difficult to
determine whether conditions have significantly improved. Human Rights Watch
interviewed several persons detained at the military facility at Bagram in 2003.
According to these accounts, persons arrested are usually blindfolded, hooded, and
shackled during the trip to Bagram, which is normally by helicopter.106 Once at Bagram,
detainees are taken to a room, separated from other persons who were detained with
them, and then stripped and photographed. Samples of hair and skin flakes are taken,
presumably to collect for a DNA database. Detainees are then instructed, through
interpreters, about the rules of Bagram, which include restrictions on talking with other
detainees. They are then shackled and taken to cells, where they are held during the
105 Human Rights Watch interview with two Afghan men (names withheld), Jalalabad, May 8, 2003.
106 International law permits security forces to use measures during transportation of arrested persons,
such as blindfolds and shackling, that would not normally be permitted once a detainee is at a
detention facility. However, these measures can amount to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment—
especially if they are used intentionally to cause pain or suffering.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 42
periods they are not being interrogated. They are given bottles of water and fed in the
cells. Except during interrogations, the detainees are shackled, even while sleeping.
Human Rights Watch has not been able to locate or interview anyone who has been held
at the Bagram CIA facility. Human Rights Watch researchers spoke with one detainee
held in Kabul city who was interrogated by U.S. officials who were likely CIA personnel
(as mentioned in the Arbitrary Detention section above).
Detainees held by Afghan forces
Human Rights Watch is extremely concerned about the treatment of the hundreds of
Afghans alleged to be from Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, or other anti-Coalition forces held
under the auspices of the Afghan military and intelligence authorities. In past reports
Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of torture, beatings, and other
mistreatment of persons in the custody of local Afghan military officials.107 Recently, for
instance, there have been credible reports from human rights monitors in Kandahar that
“Taliban prisoners” are repeatedly and severely beaten by the Afghan soldiers holding
them. A monitor who met with some prisoners there said: “We have come across this
repeatedly. It is an ordinary thing. We know about this. We visit the prisons.”108
In the northern city of Shiberghan, approximately one thousand detainees—alleged
Taliban combatants and foreign fighters captured with them—are being held at a facility
under the control of Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a member of the Karzai
government and the commander of a predominately Uzbek militia, Junbish-e Melli.
According to human rights monitors in Kabul, CIA and U.S. military interrogators have
access to these detainees and others held by Afghan forces across the country.109
According to officials in the Pakistan government, the United States has resisted efforts
by the Afghan and Pakistani governments to screen the detainees for release.
107 Human Rights Watch, “All Our Hopes are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western
Afghanistan,” A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 14, no. 7(C), October 2002, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/afghan3/herat1002-06.htm#P997_155129, section IV entitled
“Torture and Arbitrary Arrests”; Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing For Us:
Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan,” A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 15, no. 5(c),
July 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/.
108 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with human rights monitor in Kandahar, October 15,
2003.
109 Human Rights Watch interview with a human rights monitor, Kabul, December 17, 2003.
43 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Officials with UNAMA and the Afghan Human Rights Commission have visited Afghan
military detention facilities in several provinces and expressed concerns to Human
Rights Watch about the treatment of prisoners, including their belief that prisoners have,
in some cases, been subjected to torture.110 U.S. military and CIA in Afghanistan are
aware of these facilities’ existence: U.S. forces regularly work with local forces during
military operations that result in the arrests of persons who are put in Afghan military
custody.
Deaths in U.S. custody
Two Afghans died while in detention at Bagram airbase in December 2002.111 Both
deaths were ruled homicides by U.S. military doctors who performed autopsies.
One of the prisoners, Dilawar, aged 22 and from near Khost city in southeastern
Afghanistan, died on December 10, 2002 from “blunt force injuries to lower extremities
complicating coronary artery disease,” according to his death certificate prepared by a
military pathologist, which was obtained by the New York Times.112 The other detainee,
Mullah Habibullah, aged approximately 30 years and from the southern province of
Oruzgan, died earlier, on December 3, 2002. A military spokesman at Bagram
confirmed to reporters from the New York Times that Mullah Habibullah’s death was
ruled a homicide by a military pathologist, the cause being “pulmonary embolism [blood
clot in the lungs] due to blunt force injury to the legs.”113 Both military pathologists,
when contacted by Human Rights Watch in November and December 2003, turned
down requests to be interviewed.
110 These concerns have been cited in correspondence and telephone conversations between Human
Rights Watch and staff from the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan and the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission. For a more detailed description of military detention sites and ordinary
criminal jails and prisons in Afghanistan see Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing
For Us,” n. 9 and accompanying text.
111 See Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody,” New York Times,
March 4, 2003. Information about these cases is also based on extensive conversations with
journalists who have researched the cases and requested information from U.S. military spokespeople
in Kabul during 2003.
112 The death certificate was signed by a military pathologist named Dr. Elizabeth A. Rouse. Diliwar’s
family have insisted to reporters from the BBC and the New York Times that Diliwar was a civilian—
a taxi driver and farmer. See Gall, “U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody,” March
4, 2003; and “Inside Guantanamo,” BBC-One program, October 5, 2003.
113 The spokesman told reporters that the military pathologist who performed the autopsy was named
Dr. Kathleen Ingwersen.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 44
Military officials at Bagram said in March 2003 that the military had launched an
investigation into the deaths. But as of this writing in February 2004, they have not
announced any results.
In June 2003, another Afghan died at a detention site near Asadabad, in Kunar
province.114 U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and in the United States have refused
to provide any details about this death.
Human Rights Watch has written repeatedly in 2003 and 2004 to officials in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
(which CENTCOM officials have said is responsible for the Bagram investigation)
asking for information about all three of the detainee deaths. Officials from both offices
have replied and stated that the investigation into the Bagram deaths is ongoing and that
no information is available. As for the Asadabad death, both offices have refused to
release any information at all—not even a statement that an investigation is ongoing.
Legal standards applicable to physical treatment of detainees
The prohibition against the ill treatment and torture of detainees is fundamental to both
international humanitarian and human rights law. Common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions prohibits torture, cruel treatment, and “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” The “Fundamental Guarantees” under
Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, generally accepted as customary
international law in non-international as well as international armed conflicts, likewise
prohibit “at any time and in any place whatsoever . . . torture of all kinds, whether
physical or mental.”115 Human rights law similarly prohibits torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.116 The prohibition against torture and
other mistreatment is in effect at all times, and cannot be derogated from during a state
of emergency.117
114 April Witt, “U.S. Probes Death of Prisoner in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 24, 2003.
115 Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”), art. 75.
116 See generally the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (“Convention against Torture”), G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(entered into force June 26, 1987; ratified by Afghanistan April 1, 1987 and by the United States on
October 21, 1994). See also ICCPR, art. 7.
117 ICCPR, art. 4(2).
45 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
While international law permits the discipline and punishment of prisoners who break
reasonable rules, such punishment must be determined by law or imposed by a
competent administrative authority, and may not amount to torture or other
mistreatment.118
There is no clear line separating some types of permissible interrogation techniques from
unlawful mistreatment.119 Each case must be assessed on its own merits. To conform
to the letter and spirit of international law, detaining forces should err on the side of
caution and constantly evaluate their methods. A practice that is acceptable in one
context can be abusive in other circumstances; for instance, allowable day-long
questioning of a detainee, when continued overnight and into the following day, can
become impermissible sleep deprivation.
Prolonged shackling of detainees violates international law prohibitions against
mistreatment, and can amount to torture. The Special Rapporteur on Torture has
repeatedly and in various contexts identified shackling for lengthy periods as an example
of a torture practice.120 The U.N. Secretary General has also referred to shackling as an
example of a prohibited method of torture.121
118 ICCPR, art. 10 (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted August 30, 1955, by the First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res.
663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), paragraphs 28-32
119 See Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1999),
p. 105 (“[T]he borderline between ‘other ill-treatment’ and treatment falling outside the prohibition
altogether cannot be precisely drawn.”).
120 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, “Question of the Human
Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/38,
submitted 24 December 1997 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38,
(Yemen, para. 200) (“The methods of torture reported included…shackling for lengthy periods…”);
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, “Question of the Human Rights
of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.1, submitted 16 January 1996 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1995/37, (China, para. 104) (“The methods of… torture reportedly include handcuffing or
shackling for long periods….”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley,
“Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34, submitted 12 January 1995 pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 46
Prolonged sleep deprivation and exposure to cold may also violate international law
prohibitions against mistreatment, and can amount to torture. The U.S. State
Department, in its “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” has repeatedly listed
prolonged sleep deprivation and exposure to cold as examples of practices amounting to
mistreatment and torture. (See Appendix.)
Human Rights Resolution 1992/32, (China, para. 91) (“Among the most common methods of torture
reported were… shackling with handcuffs or leg-irons, often tightly and with the victim’s body in a
painful position.”).
121 See, e.g., United Nations Secretary-General, “Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations
and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, Situation of human rights in Myanmar; Note
by the Secretary-General,” (1994), A/49/594, para. 13 (“Numerous allegations . . . have been received
from various sources alleging that forces of the Myanmar military, intelligence and security services
and police continue to torture persons in detention or otherwise subject them to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatments and punishments. . . . Allegations include subjection to . . . shackling. . . .”).
47 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
IV. International Legal Context
International humanitarian law binds all of the parties to the military conflict in
Afghanistan, including non-state armed groups, Afghan government forces, and the
United States and coalition forces. Fundamentally, it imposes upon these warring parties
legal obligations to reduce unnecessary suffering and protect civilians and other noncombatants.
However, the specific legal context of conflict in Afghanistan and the
specific applicable rules of international humanitarian law have changed over time.
The war between the United States and Afghanistan started at least by October 6, 2001,
when U.S. air attacks on Afghanistan began. This war was an international armed
conflict—a conflict between opposing states. The law applicable to international
conflicts includes the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Afghanistan and the
United States are party,122 and the Hague Regulations of 1907, which are commonly
accepted as customary international law.123
On December 22, 2001, power was transferred to an Interim Authority as the sovereign
power of Afghanistan, chaired by Hamid Karzai and established by the December 5,
2001 Bonn Agreement, endorsed by U.N. Resolution 1383 (2001).124 Six months later,
Hamid Karzai was elected by an Afghan loya jirga to the presidency of the transitional
administration of Afghanistan; he was inaugurated on June 19, 2002.
As of June 19, 2002, and possibly as early as December 22, 2001, the international armed
conflict between the United States and Afghanistan concluded. Since the end of the
international conflict, hostilities have been part of a non-international (also referred to as an
122 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva
Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950.
123 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (Hague Regulations),
3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol. T.S. 227, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910.
124 According to the Bonn Agreement, art. 1: “An Interim Authority shall be established upon the
official transfer of power on 22 December 2001. . . .” Art. 3: “Upon the official transfer of power,
the Interim Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect.” See
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, Bonn, Germany, signed December 5, 2001.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 48
internal) armed conflict. U.S. forces in Afghanistan are now operating in the country
with the acquiescence of the Karzai government, and hostilities fall under provisions of
the Geneva Conventions applicable to non-international armed conflict. The primary law
applicable to non-international armed conflicts is article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, applicable to non-international
conflicts, has not been ratified by Afghanistan or the United States, but most if not all of
its provisions are recognized as customary international law and are therefore also
applicable.125 In addition, certain provisions of Protocol I, including many of those
concerned with the protection of the civilian population, are also recognized as reflective
of customary international law and are also applicable.126
During a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law as the lex
specialis (specialized law) takes precedence, but does not replace, human rights law.
Persons under the control of a party to an internal armed conflict must be treated in
accordance with international humanitarian law. But where that law is absent, vague, or
inapplicable, human rights law standards still apply. Human rights law includes, among
other things, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights127 and the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,128 both of which have been ratified by the United States and Afghanistan.
Human rights standards applicable to military and police forces who are carrying out law
enforcement or investigative operations—including arrests and searches—include the
U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.129 These standards
apply to military forces when they are operating in a law enforcement context.130
125 Protocol II (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol II”).
126 Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”).
127 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), opened for signature December 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976, and acceded to by Afghanistan January
24, 1983 and ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992).
128 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (entered into force June 26, 1987; ratified by
Afghanistan April 1, 1987 and by the United States on October 21, 1994).
129 U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. res.
34/169, annex, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1979.
130 Ibid. In accordance with the commentary to article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, in countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities. whether
49 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
V. Conclusions
This report raises serious concerns regarding the actions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
specifically with regard to the use of excessive force during arrests; arbitrary or mistaken
arrests and indefinite detention; and mistreatment in detention:

 U.S. forces regularly use military means and methods during arrest operations in
residential areas where law enforcement techniques would be more appropriate.
This has resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties and may in some cases have
involved indiscriminate or disproportionate force in violation of international
humanitarian law.

 Members of the U.S. armed forces have arrested numerous civilians not directly
participating in the hostilities and numerous persons whom U.S. authorities have no
legal basis for taking into custody. These cases raise serious questions about the
intelligence gathering and processing that leads to arrests and call into question the
practice of arresting any and sometimes all Afghan men found in the vicinity of U.S.
military operations.

 Persons detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan are held without regard to the
requirements of international humanitarian law or human rights law. They are not
provided reasons for their arrest or detention. They are held virtually
incommunicado without any legal basis for challenging their detention or seeking
their release. They are held at the apparent whim of U.S. authorities, in some cases
for more than a year.

 The general lack of due process within the U.S. detention system violates both
international humanitarian law and basic standards of human rights law. The United
States, as a detaining power in Afghanistan, is essentially applying no legal principles
to the persons whom they detain in Afghanistan. Simply put, the United States is
acting outside the rule of law. There are no judicial processes restraining their
actions in arresting persons in Afghanistan. The only real legal limits on their
activities are self-imposed, and there is little evidence that the Department of
Defense has seriously investigated allegations of abuses or mistreatment at Bagram,
and the department has most certainly not sought on its own to correct the legal
deficiencies of its detention regime.
uniformed or not, or by state security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be
regarded as including officers of such services.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 50

 There are serious concerns regarding the treatment of detainees at Bagram airbase,
particularly in light of the failure of the United States to investigate and publicly
report on several unexplained deaths in detention. There is credible evidence of
beatings and other physical assaults of detainees, as well as evidence that the United
States has used prolonged shackling, exposure to cold, and sleep deprivation
amounting to torture or other mistreatment in violation of international law.
Neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor the CIA has adequately responded to
allegations of mistreatment at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan.
51 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
VI. Recommendations
To the United States Government:
Detention

 Publicly identify all places in Afghanistan where the United States, including the
CIA, is holding persons in detention. The CIA should transfer all detainees under
its control to U.S. military or Afghan detention facilities or release them. In the
event that the International Committee of the Red Cross does not have access to all
detainees under U.S. control, permit full access immediately.

 Ensure that all detainees are treated in accordance with international human rights
law and international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed
conflicts. As the sovereign authority, the Afghan government is ultimately
responsible for protecting the legal rights of those detained by the United States.
The United States must take immediate measures in conjunction with the Afghan
Ministry of the Interior to ensure that detainees at Bagram airbase and other U.S.
detention sites are charged and prosecuted, or released, in accordance with
international due process standards. This includes access to counsel, and the right to
a fair and public trial before a competent, impartial, and independent court.

 Permit families of detainees, and those providing legal assistance, to visit detainees.

 Abide fully with U.S. obligations as a party to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Prohibit all
interrogation techniques that cause physical or mental suffering. Cease practices,
such as shackling and sleep deprivation, if they rise to the level of mistreatment.
End incommunicado detention practices that facilitate mistreatment.

 Fully and impartially investigation allegations of mistreatment of detainees in
detention at all U.S. facilities in Afghanistan and make public the results of those
investigations.

 In particular, release the results of investigations into detainee deaths at Bagram and
Asadabad military bases. Take disciplinary or criminal action as appropriate against
all personnel responsible for mistreating or otherwise violating the rights of
detainees.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 52
Military Operations and Law Enforcement

 In all circumstances comply with international humanitarian law standards to protect
civilians against the dangers arising from military operations. These include
prohibitions on attacks against civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate attacks,
and attacks that cause harm to civilians or civilian objects that are excessive in
relation to the anticipated military advantage.

 Take all precautionary measures during military operations, including: taking all
feasible steps to verify that objectives to be attacked are not civilian but military;
taking all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid
or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects; and canceling or postponing an
attack where it becomes apparent the objective or target is not a military one or
where civilian loss would be disproportionate. The United States must give
particular attention to these standards during operations carried out in residential
areas that have not been the scene of military action.

 Revise as necessary standing Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan to ensure that in
law enforcement situations, the U.S. armed forces and CIA forces abide by
international standards on the use of force by law enforcement officials. For
instance, indiscriminate suppressing fire should not be used in law-enforcement type
operations.

 In law enforcement situations, military forces should abide by the standards set forth
in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials. U.S. forces deployed in such situations must be provided with the
equipment and training necessary for this purpose. It is also necessary to have
sufficient and appropriate interpreters to communicate with the local population.
Applicable standards provide in part:
o In law enforcement operations, non-violent means shall be applied, as
far as possible, before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Force
and firearms may only be used if other means remain ineffective or
without any promise of achieving the intended result.
o Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, restraint
must be exercised in their use and in proportion to the seriousness of
the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved. Force used
53 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
must minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life.
Injured persons must receive medical aid and have their family notified
at the earliest possible moment.
o Firearms shall not be used against persons except: in self-defense or
defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury,
to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving
grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and
resisting their authority, or to prevent escape, and only when less
extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event,
intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly
unavoidable in order to protect life.
o It must be ensured that firearms are used only in appropriate
circumstances and in a manner likely to decrease the risk of unnecessary
harm. Prohibited are the use of those firearms and ammunition that
cause unwarranted injury or present an unwarranted risk.

 U.S. forces should, in all instances, take all appropriate steps to prevent or stop
Afghan forces deployed with or under the command of U.S. forces from committing
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Those who do
should be turned over to the proper Afghan authorities for disciplinary action or
criminal prosecution.
To President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan Government:

 Ensure, through the Ministry of the Interior, that the Afghan justice system applies
to all persons detained in the country, including those held by U.S. forces at Bagram
airbase and other detention facilities. Work with the United States to ensure that the
fundamental rights of all detainees are respected.

 Thoroughly and impartially investigate all allegations of criminal offenses and
violations of the laws of war by Afghan military forces and militias, and take
appropriate disciplinary and criminal action against those responsible.

 Pressure the United States government to ensure that all forces operating in
Afghanistan uphold international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 54
Appendix: U.S. Criticisms of Mistreatment and Torture Practices
The U.S. State Department has condemned as torture or other inhuman treatment many
of the treatments and techniques described in this report and used by U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan. Listed below are reports from 2000, 2001, and 2002 in the U.S. State
Department’s annual “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.”
Country Methods Used:
Burma
According to a State Department country report, the Burmese military “routinely
subjected detainees to harsh interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and
disorient.”131 Techniques listed include being forced to squat or remain in uncomfortable
periods for long periods of time, sleep and food deprivation, confinement in leg clamps,
and prolonged questioning under bright lights.132
Cambodia The State Department reported that “torture, beatings, and other forms of physical
mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continued to be a serious
problem throughout the country.”133 In particular, the State Department noted that
“there were credible reports that both military police and police officials used physical and
psychological torture and severely beat criminal detainees, particularly during
interrogation.”134 It also noted reports of shackling of prisoners.
Cameroon The State Department reported that “security forces continued to subject prisoners and
detainees to degrading treatment,” which included stripping of inmates.135
China The State Department reported that “police and other elements of the security apparatus
employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners”
including prolonged periods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, beatings,
and shackling.136 Reports noted that the practice of shackling hands and feet constituted
torture.137
131 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Burma), Sect. 1(c).
132 Ibid.
133 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Cambodia), Sect. 1(c).
134 Ibid.
135 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c); U.S.
State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c).
136 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (China (including Tibet,
Macau and Hong Kong), Sect. 1(c).
55 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Country Methods Used:
Egypt The State Department noted that “there were numerous, credible reports that security
forces tortured and mistreated citizens.”138 The country reports cite the stripping,
handcuffing, being doused with cold water, and blindfolding of prisoners among the
principal methods of torture used by Egyptian authorities.139
Greece In a 2002 report, the State Department described kicks, blows the hands, fists, batons or
other objects and excessive force at the time of arrest as “ill treatment.”140
Iran According to the State Department “there were numerous credible reports that security
forces and prison personnel continued to torture detainees and prisoners.”141 Common
methods of torture include sleep deprivation and “suspension for long periods in
contorted positions.”142 The State Department further noted that systematic abuses
included “prolonged and incommunicado detention.”143
Iraq Iraqi security services used extended solitary confinement in small dark compartments as a
form of torture, according to 2001 and 2002 reports.144 Reports from 2000, 2001, and
2002 also cite the use of prolonged and incommunicado detention and the continual
denial of citizens’ “basic right to due process.”145
137 Ibid.
138 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Egypt), Sect. 1(c).
139 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Egypt), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Egypt), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department,
2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Egypt), Sect. 1(c).
140 U.S State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Greece), Sect. 1(c).
141 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(c).
142 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department,
2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(c).
143 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(d). The
practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, 2001
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iran), Sect. 1(d); 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
(Iran), Sect. 1(d).
144 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iraq), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iraq), Sect. 1(c).
145 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iraq), Sect. 1(d). The practice
of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, 2001 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Iraq), Sect. 1(d); U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (Iraq), Sect. 1(d).
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 56
Country Methods Used:
Jordan The State Department reports that Jordanian police and security forces were alleged to
engage in acts of torture, including the use of sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and
prolonged suspension with ropes in contorted positions.146
North Korea The State Department stated that methods of torture “routinely” employed in North
Korea include “severe beatings . . . prolonged periods of exposure, humiliations such as
public nakedness, and confinement to small ‘punishment cells’, in which prisoners were
unable to stand upright or lie down, where they could be held for several weeks.”147 The
State Department characterized the use of leg irons, metal collars, and shackles as
“harsh”.148
Kuwait According to the State Department reports, “there continued to be credible reports that
some police and members of the security forces abused detainees during interrogation.”149
Abusive treatment included blindfolding and verbal threats.150
Laos The State Department reported that prisoners were subjected to “torture and other
abuses” including “beatings, long-term solitary confinement in completely darkened
rooms . . . . In some cases detainees were held in leg chains or wooden stocks”.151
Libya According to the State Department, Libyan authorities commonly chain detainees to a
wall or hang them by their wrists for hours and deprive them of food and water.152 The
State Department stated that “[t]he Government's human rights record remained poor,
and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses,” examples of which included
holding prisoners incommunicado.153
146 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Jordan), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Jordan), Sect. 1(c).
147 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea), Sect. 1(c).
148 Ibid.
149 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait), Sect. 1(c).U.S. State
Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department,
2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait), Sect. 1(c);
150 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait), Sect. 1(c).
151 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Laos), Sect. 1(c).
152 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department,
2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(c).
153 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(d). The
practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, 2001
57 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Country Methods Used:
Pakistan The State Department reports that prolonged isolation, being chained to a cell wall, and
denial of food or sleep are common torture methods.154
Philippines The State Department reported that “members of the security forces and police continued
to use torture and to abuse suspects and detainees.” The State Department cited reports
by a non-governmental organization stating that “torture remained an ingrained part of
the arrest and detention process.” The State Department noted that common forms of
torture and abuse reported during the arrest and detention process included striking
detainees and threatening them with guns. The State Department also cited reports of
detainees being tied up, blindfolded and punched during interrogations as cases of
torture.155
Russia The State Department described forms of “torture” by police officers including beating
with fists, batons or other objects.156
Saudi
Arabia
The State Department noted that Ministry of Interior officials use sleep deprivation and
suspension from bars with handcuffs as interrogation tactics.157
Sri Lanka According to State Department reports, “torture continues with relative impunity.”158
Reported methods of torture include suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted
positions and being forced to remain in unnatural positions for extended periods.159
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(d); U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices (Libya), Sect. 1(d).
154 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan), Sect. 1(c); U.S.
State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan) Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan), Sect. 1(c).
155 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Philippines), Sect. 1(c).
156 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Russia), Sect. 1(c).
157 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia), Sect. 1(c); U.S.
State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia), Sect. 1(c).
158 U.S. State Department, 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka), Sect. 1(c); U.S.
State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka), Sect. 1(c).
159U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka), Sect. 1(c); U.S.
State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka), Sect. 1(c).
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 58
Country Methods Used:
Tunisia Tactics such as food and sleep deprivation or confinement to a tiny, unlit cell are
commonly used in Tunisia.160 In addition, the State Department notes that despite the
shortening by Tunisian government of the maximum allowable period of pre-arraignment
incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days, “credible sources claimed that the
Government rarely enforces the new provisions and that appeals to the court for
enforcement are routinely denied.”161
Turkey According to the 2001 and 2002 country reports, some of the many methods of torture
employed by Turkish security forces and recognized by the State Department included
repeated beatings; forced prolonged standing; isolation; exposure to loud music; stripping
and blindfolding; food and sleep deprivation; and psychological torture including verbal
threats and deception of a detainee, for example, instilling a false belief that the detainee is
to be killed.162
Yemen According to the State Department, detainees in Yemen have been confined in leg irons
and shackles despite a 1998 law banning the practice.163
160 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c).
161 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c), (d). The
practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2002. U.S. State Department, 2002 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c), (d).
162 U.S. State Department, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Turkey), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State
Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Turkey), Sect. 1(c).
163 U.S. State Department, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Yemen), Sect. 1(c).
59 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Acknowledgments
This report was written by John Sifton, a researcher in the Asia Division of Human
Rights Watch. It is based on research conducted Human Rights Watch researchers in
2003 and 2004 in Afghanistan and Pakistan and from New York. Brad Adams,
Executive Director of the Asia Division, and Joe Saunders, Deputy Program Director,
edited the report. James Ross, Senior Legal Advisor, provided legal review. Saman Zia-
Zarifi and Marc Garlasco also reviewed the report and provided comments. Ami
Evangelista, Liz Weiss, Angelina Fisher, and Jane Stratton provided research assistance.
Production assistance was provided by Ami Evangelista, Veronica Matushaj, Andrea
Holley, Fitzroy Hepkins, Jose Martinez, John Emerson, and Jagdish Parikh.
Human Rights Watch would like to thank the Afghan women and men whom we
interviewed for this report and who assisted us in our investigation. For security
reasons, many of them cannot be named here.
We would also like to thank the countless staff and officials of non-governmental
organizations and U.N. agencies in Afghanistan who have assisted us with our work.
We also want to specially thank the numerous international and Afghan television, radio,
and print journalists in Kabul who have provided information for this report.
We would especially like to thank Ahmed Rashid for his support and encouragement.
Human Rights Watch also thanks Barnett R. Rubin and Patricia Gossman for their
ongoing assistance.
Our work on Afghanistan has required significant financial resources. We thank the
Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, Stichting Doen, and Rockefeller Brothers Fund for their
generous contributions to our emergency work in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003.
More recently, we wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Annenberg
Foundation, which has enabled Human Rights Watch to sustain our monitoring of
Afghanistan.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 60
Human Rights Watch
Asia Division
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the
world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent
discrimination, to uphold political freedom and to protect people from inhumane
conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and
respect international human rights law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human
rights for all.
The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Carroll Bogert, associate director;
Michele Alexander, development director; Rory Mungoven, advocacy director; Barbara
Guglielmo, finance director; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Steve Crawshaw,
London office director; Maria Pignataro Nielsen, human resources director; Iain Levine,
program director; Wilder Tayler, legal and policy director; and Joanna Weschler, United
Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L. Bernstein
is the founding chair.
Its Asia division was established in 1985 to monitor and promote the observance of
internationally recognized human rights in Asia. Brad Adams is executive director;
Saman Zia-Zarifi is deputy director; Sara Colm and Mickey Spiegel are senior
researchers; Meg Davis, Meenakshi Ganguly, Ali Hasan, Charmain Mohamed, John
Sifton, and Tejshree Thapa are researchers; Thomas Kellogg is Orville Schell Fellow; Liz
Weiss is coordinator; and Ami Evangelista is associate. Joanne Leedom-Ackerman is
chairperson of the advisory committee.
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