Tornado Alley (PROG)

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Human Rights Watch March 2004 Vol. 16, No. 3(C)
“Enduring Freedom”
Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan
I. Summary..................................................................................................................... 1
II. Background: “Operation Enduring Freedom” ........................................................8
III. Violations by U.S. Forces ...................................................................................... 10
Indiscriminate and Excessive Force Used During Arrests............................................................. 11
Arbitrary or Mistaken Arrests and Indefinite Detention................................................................ 24
Mistreatment in Detention .................................................................................................................. 34
Bagram airbase ..................................................................................................................................34
Mistreatment in other facilities ........................................................................................................37
Detainees held by Afghan forces ....................................................................................................42
Deaths in U.S. custody......................................................................................................................43
IV. International Legal Context................................................................................... 47
V. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 49
VI. Recommendations ................................................................................................. 51
Appendix: U.S. Criticisms of Mistreatment and Torture Practices ........................... 54
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................ 59

1 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
I. Summary
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States went to war in Afghanistan
in the name of national security and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms,
and with a stated secondary aim of liberating the people of Afghanistan from the cruel
and capricious rule of the Taliban.
Yet today, on Afghan soil, the United States is maintaining a system of arrests and
detention as part of its ongoing military and intelligence operations that violates
international human rights law and international humanitarian law (the laws of war). In
doing so, the United States is endangering the lives of Afghan civilians, undermining
efforts to restore the rule of law in Afghanistan, and calling into question its
commitment to upholding basic rights.
This report, based on research conducted in southeast and eastern Afghanistan in 2003
and early 2004, focuses on how U.S. forces arrest and detain persons in Afghanistan.1 It
details numerous abuses by U.S. personnel, including cases of excessive force during
arrests; arbitrary and indefinite detention; and mistreatment of detainees. The report
also details the overall legal deficiencies of the U.S.-administered detention system in
Afghanistan, which, as shown here, operates almost entirely outside of the rule of law.
In Afghanistan, United States and coalition forces, allied with local Afghan forces, are
fighting armed groups comprised of members of the Taliban, the mujahidin group
Hezb-e Islami, and a relatively small number of non-Afghan fighters, some of whom are
associated with al-Qaeda. For their part, these groups have shown little willingness to
abide by international humanitarian law or human rights standards: they have carried out
abductions and attacks against civilians and humanitarian aid workers and detonated
bombs in bazaars and other civilian areas. Those responsible for these violations,
including the leaders of these groups, should, if captured, be investigated and prosecuted
for violations of Afghan law and the laws of war.
1 For the purposes of this report, the term “U.S. forces” refers to U.S. personnel in the Department
of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and all other military personnel under the overall
command of the President of the United States. The U.S.-led coalition force in Afghanistan is made
up predominately of U.S. personnel, although there are approximately two thousand troops from
other nations in the force. Approximately 6,000 troops from various nations are also stationed in
Kabul and Kunduz city as part of the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 2
But the activities of these groups are no excuse for U.S. violations. The Geneva
Conventions do not require reciprocity to be applicable. Abuses by one party to a
conflict, no matter how egregious, do not justify violations by the other side. This is a
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law.
* * * * *
From 2002 to the present, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least one thousand
Afghans and other nationals have been arrested and detained by U.S.-led forces in
Afghanistan. Some of those apprehended have been picked up during military
operations while taking direct part in hostilities, but others taken into custody have been
civilians with no apparent connection to ongoing hostilities. (This latter category may
include persons wanted for criminal offenses, but such arrests are not carried out in
compliance with Afghan or international legal standards.)
There are numerous reports that U.S. forces have used excessive or indiscriminate force
when conducting arrests in residential areas in Afghanistan. As shown in this report,
U.S. military forces have repeatedly used deadly force from helicopter gunships and
small and heavy arms fire, including undirected suppressing fire, during what are
essentially law-enforcement operations to arrest persons in uncontested locales. The use
of these tactics has resulted in avoidable civilian deaths and injuries, and in individual
cases may amount to violations of international humanitarian law.
Human Rights Watch has also documented that Afghan soldiers deployed alongside U.S.
forces have beaten and otherwise mistreated people during arrest operations and looted
homes or seized the land of those being detained. These violations should be a matter
of concern to the United States. The Afghan government remains responsible for
violations by Afghan forces that are under their control, and individual Afghan military
commanders are culpable for abuses by their troops. But where Afghan forces have
been put under the de facto control or command of U.S. forces during operations, U.S.
personnel have a responsibility to prevent ongoing abuses by Afghan troops, and may be
criminally culpable if they fail to do so.
Many of those arrested by U.S. forces are detained for indefinite periods at U.S. military
bases or outposts. While held, these detainees have no contact with relatives or others,
although some detainees receive visits from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). Detainees have no opportunity to challenge the basis for their detention,
and are sometimes subjected to mistreatment or torture. Some detainees have been sent
to the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, while others have
3 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
been kept in Afghanistan.2 Many have ultimately been released; but some detainees in
Afghanistan have been held for over two years.
The U.S. military maintains its main detention facility in Afghanistan at the Bagram
airbase, north of the capital Kabul. There are an unknown number of additional U.S.
detention facilities in the country, including at bases in Kandahar, Jalalabad, and
Asadabad. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is also holding an unknown
number of detainees, both at Bagram airbase and at other locations in Afghanistan,
including in Kabul. Furthermore, the United States has encouraged local Afghan
authorities to detain hundreds of persons taken into custody during joint U.S.-Afghan
operations. These persons are held without charge and in poor conditions, and some
have been subjected to torture and other mistreatment. In the northern city of
Shiberghan, approximately one thousand detainees—alleged Taliban combatants and
foreign fighters allied and captured with them—are being held at a facility under the
control of Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a member of the Karzai government
and the commander of a predominately Uzbek militia, Junbish-e Melli. CIA and U.S.
military interrogators are believed to have access to these detainees and others held by
Afghan forces. The United States has opposed efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani
governments to screen such detainees for release.
Human Rights Watch is also concerned about mistreatment of detainees in custody.
Human Rights Watch has had access only to detainees released from U.S. custody.3
Human Rights Watch researchers therefore have only been able to interview detainees
whom U.S. authorities did not consider to be a security risk or indictable for criminal
offenses. From these detainees, however, Human Rights Watch has received credible
allegations of mistreatment in U.S. custody. These allegations are consistent with other
allegations received by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and numerous international
journalists.
2 The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where the United States is holding approximately 660
detainees, most of whom were taken into custody in Afghanistan, is not the subject of this report.
3 Human Rights Watch sent written requests in 2003 to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
General John Abizaid, the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), for permission to visit
U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan and discuss our concerns about alleged abuses by U.S. forces
with officials in the Department of Defense. To date we have not received any response. Officials in
the public affairs offices of the Pentagon and CENTCOM told Human Rights Watch in October
2003 and again in January 2004 that such requests would not be granted. Human Rights Watch has
also made written requests to George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, regarding concerns
about CIA operations in Afghanistan; a response from the General Counsel of the CIA indicated that
CIA officials would not be available to discuss operations in Afghanistan.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 4
Afghans detained at Bagram airbase in 2002 have described being held in detention for
weeks, continuously shackled, intentionally kept awake for extended periods of time, and
forced to kneel or stand in painful positions for extended periods. Some say they were
kicked and beaten when arrested, or later as part of efforts to keep them awake. Some
say they were doused with freezing water in the winter. Similar allegations have been
made about treatment in 2002 and 2003 at U.S. military bases in Kandahar and in U.S.
detention facilities in the eastern cities of Jalalabad and Asadabad.
In December 2002 two Afghan detainees died at Bagram. Both of their deaths were
ruled homicides by U.S. military doctors who performed autopsies. Department of
Defense officials claim to have launched an investigation into the deaths in March 2003.
In June 2003, another Afghan died at a detention site near Asadabad, in Kunar province.
The Department of Defense has yet to explain adequately the circumstances of any of
these deaths. Human Rights Watch is concerned that the results of any investigations
may never be publicized, and that appropriate criminal and disciplinary action may never
take place.
Concerns about conditions at Bagram persist. The Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission has collected complaints alleging torture and mistreatment made by
recently released detainees and families of persons still detained.
Human Rights Watch is also deeply concerned about the lack of legal process for
detainees. The United States has set up a system in Afghanistan that does not provide
detainees a process whereby they can contest their detention and obtain their release.
Ordinary civilians caught up in military operations and arrested are left in a hopeless
situation. Once in custody, they have no way of challenging the legal basis for their
detention or obtaining a hearing before an adjudicative body. They have no access to
legal counsel. Their release is wholly dependent on decisions of the U.S. military
command, with little apparent regard for the requirements of international law—whether
the treatment of civilians under international humanitarian law or the due process
requirements of human rights law.
Not a single person detained in Afghanistan since the start of U.S. operations in 2001
has been afforded prisoner-of-war status or other legal status under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.4 No one held by the United States since the start of hostilities to the
4 Belligerents captured during the international armed conflict between the United States and the
Taliban should have been afforded the status of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention
unless and until a “competent tribunal” under article 5 determined otherwise. The U.S. did not
5 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
present has been charged or tried for any crime (with the single exception of John
Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen) nor has the United States or the present Afghan
government set up any tribunals or other legal mechanisms to process detainees
captured in connection with military operations. The United States continues to treat all
detainees it has captured in Afghanistan as “unlawful combatants” it considers not
entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions or of human rights law.
The Afghan government also has obligations to protect the rights of persons within its
borders. President Hamid Karzai has complained to U.S. authorities on occasion about
abuses by U.S. troops. The Afghan government and the Afghan Ministry of Defense
have limited influence over U.S. military strategies and policies, but they can do more to
insist that U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan uphold international humanitarian law
and human rights law.
* * * * *
The violations of detainees’ rights documented in this report are exacerbated by the
almost complete opacity maintained by U.S. officials about the Bagram facility and other
detention facilities in Afghanistan. The United States refuses to allow access to
detainees’ families, lawyers, or advocates, or to journalists or representatives of nongovernmental
organizations (other than the ICRC). And it is not evident that the
detention system maintained by the United States in Afghanistan is conducive to the
security of U.S. forces. The routine arrests and indefinite detention of persons who have
no genuine connection to armed opposition groups has angered many Afghan
communities and lessened their willingness to cooperate with U.S forces.
Almost nothing is known about U.S. investigations or prosecutions of U.S. military
personnel for alleged violations of international humanitarian law. (This is in sharp
contrast with Iraq, where a number of cases involving U.S. soldiers have been publicly
reported.) Simply put, the United States operates its detention facilities in Afghanistan
in a climate of almost total impunity. As noted, the Department of Defense has not
even released the results of its investigations into the deaths of Afghan detainees at
Bagram and Asadabad and has yet to explain adequately the circumstances of these
deaths. Nor have U.S. officials adequately responded to inquiries about alleged
convene a single article 5 tribunal in Afghanistan, though it has held hundreds during the 2003 Iraq
war and in previous conflicts. Afghan nationals found not to be prisoners of war would be entitled to
“protected person” status under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 6
mistreatment and torture by U.S. forces in Afghanistan made by human rights groups
and members of the U.S. Congress.5
There is little doubt that U.S. policies on the detention of terrorism suspects—both in
Afghanistan and elsewhere—have harmed public opinion of the United States around
the world, and have damaged some of its efforts in building a coalition to combat
international terrorism.
These policies are also making it more difficult for the United States to criticize other
governments for violating international human rights and humanitarian law standards in
maintaining detention facilities. Every year, the U.S. State Department publishes
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” which contain criticisms of abuses
similar to those documented in this report, such as beatings, use of sleep deprivation,
continuous shackling, and long-term isolation.6 The United States is undermining the
effectiveness of these reports by committing the same abuses it has rightly criticized
elsewhere.
The U.S. detention policy in Afghanistan serves as a poor example for other nations
around the world, and for Afghanistan itself. Afghan warlords whose troops are
deployed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan have done little to improve their horrific
records with regard to the treatment of detained persons. Instead of setting a positive
example for them, the behavior of the United States sends the message that the U.S.
operates on a set of double standards. And worldwide, it is now all too easy for
governments to justify their failures to uphold human rights by pointing to U.S.
violations in Afghanistan.
It doesn’t have to be this way. Human Rights Watch believes that the protections
provided under international humanitarian and human rights law do not conflict with the
security of states. The U.S. and Afghan governments have both a duty and a
responsibility to provide for the security of their populations and to take appropriate
actions against those who threaten state security or violate the law. But in Afghanistan,
the United States appears to have allowed its single-minded pursuit of security to
obscure the obligation to protect individual rights, rights deeply ingrained in U.S.
5 See, e.g., Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, June 2,
2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-rice.pdf; Response to Senator Leahy
from Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes, June 25, 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf.
6 See Appendix.
7 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
constitutional law and reflected in international law (as well as in the former and current
Afghan constitutions). This course of action is shortsighted and damaging to the rule of
law, not only in Afghanistan but across the world.
A list of recommendations to the United States, the Afghan government, and other
countries involved in Afghanistan begins on page 51.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 8
II. Background: “Operation Enduring Freedom”
The ongoing U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan discussed in this report fall
under a larger campaign referred to by the United States and its coalition partners in
Afghanistan as “Operation Enduring Freedom.”
Operation Enduring Freedom as originally planned was a response to the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States. It was, in its first manifestation, a military operation
against the Taliban government of Afghanistan and the network of foreign groups,
including al-Qaeda, believed responsible for the September 11 attacks.7
The U.S.-led coalition’s initial military operations in Afghanistan, from September
through December 2001, were directed at the Taliban forces and their foreign allies. In
late September, CIA forces entered Afghanistan to organize existing Afghan anti-Taliban
forces (primarily the loose coalition of groups called the Northern Alliance) and assist
covert U.S. Army and Air Force units to transport equipment into the country.
Throughout the first phase of the conflict, millions of dollars in cash and significant
amounts of weapons, communications equipment, and other military supplies were
ferried into Afghanistan and given to anti-Taliban forces. As the war progressed, the
U.S. advance teams were joined by Army Special Forces and Special Forces units from
the Navy and Air Force, and ultimately, regular army ground troops and units from
coalition partners such as the United Kingdom and Australia. Over the next two
months, the U.S.-led coalition carried out an extensive air campaign against the Taliban
and its allies. Anti-Taliban forces on the ground initially assisted in identifying targets
for the air campaign and later advanced and seized areas held by Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces.
Since December 2001, the U.S.-led coalition’s primary military focus has been on
locating remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda which did not surrender and fled into
remote areas of the country.
However, there was and is more to Operation Enduring Freedom than military
operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants. Coalition operations have included
7 For more information on the diverse characteristics and composition of non-Afghan armed groups
operating in Afghanistan before and after the U.S.-led attack in 2001, including al-Qaeda, see Jason
Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, (B. Tauris : September 2003). See also Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
9 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
investigative and intelligence-gathering components aimed at locating or uncovering
threats to the United States and other coalition members, and disrupting or eliminating
those threats. Operations have also included efforts to capture terrorist suspects and
gather intelligence in Afghanistan as part of the global campaign to disrupt the
worldwide operations of al-Qaeda.
U.S. and Coalition forces have also increasingly broadened the scope of their activities in
Afghanistan to include peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, delivery of humanitarian
aid, counter-narcotics work, and general intelligence gathering. As in other post-conflict
situations where the United States has taken the leadership role, it has deployed
significant numbers of personnel from the CIA and other intelligence services,8 the State
Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, in addition to the
armed forces.
Since the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, U.S. and coalition military
operations under Operation Enduring Freedom have largely consisted of small- and
medium-scale operations whose overall aim is to destroy or disrupt the remaining
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other hostile forces in the country. Some of these operations
have focused on fixed Taliban or al-Qaeda military positions, such as caves, bunkers, and
other fortified positions, usually in remote rural areas. Others have been directed at
residential compounds, usually in small villages, in which anti-coalition suspects are
thought to be hiding. These operations can be divided into those where the primary
intent appears to be to destroy the target, such as through bombing raids and other
direct attacks, and those where the intention is to take into custody particular individuals
and collect intelligence information, either from local residents or seized materials.
8 The office of the Director of Central Intelligence officially oversees not only the CIA but also the
“U.S. Intelligence Community,” which consists of at least fourteen different government agencies,
including Department of Defense intelligence offices and several non-military agencies.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 10
III. Violations by U.S. Forces
This chapter is divided into three sections addressing, respectively, use of excessive force
by U.S. forces during arrests; arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention; and mistreatment
in detention.
As the cases in the first section show, U.S. forces repeatedly have used military means
and methods during arrest operations in residential areas where law enforcement tactics
were more appropriate. This has resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties and in some
cases may have involved indiscriminate or disproportionate force in violation of
international humanitarian law.
Cases in the second section of this chapter raise serious questions about the intelligence
gathering and processing that leads to coalition arrests. Members of the U.S. armed
forces have arrested many civilians not directly participating in hostilities and persons
whom U.S. authorities have no legal basis for taking into custody. The cases in the
second section also make clear that persons detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan are
held without regard to the requirements of international humanitarian or human rights
law and are not provided reasons for their arrest or detention. Detainees are held
virtually incommunicado without any legal basis for challenging their detention or
seeking their release.
The final set of cases presented here raise serious concerns regarding the treatment of
detainees at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, particularly in light of the failure of
the United States to investigate and publicly report on several unexplained deaths in
detention. There is credible evidence of beatings and other physical assaults on
detainees, as well as evidence that the United States has used shackling, exposure to cold,
and sleep deprivation amounting to torture or other mistreatment in violation of
international law. To date neither the Department of Defense nor the CIA has
adequately responded to allegations of mistreatment.
11 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
Indiscriminate and Excessive Force Used During Arrests
As this section shows, U.S. forces routinely use military force when carrying out arrests
in Afghanistan, sometimes with insufficient regard to the requirements of applicable
international humanitarian and human rights law. U.S. military Rules of Engagement
designed for combat situations seem to be applied where law enforcement protocols are
required.9 In addition, it appears that faulty and inadequate intelligence has resulted in
targeting of civilians who were not taking a part in the hostilities, unnecessary civilian
deaths and injuries during arrest operations, and needless destruction of civilian homes
and property.10 There are also credible reports that U.S. forces have beaten and abused
persons during arrest operations, and that Afghan troops accompanying U.S. forces have
abused local residents and looted the homes of those detained.
According to U.N. officials in Kabul, numerous complaints have been made to their
offices about U.S.-led operations in southern, southeastern, and eastern areas of
Afghanistan alleging excessive use of force by coalition troops.11 Complaints often state
that U.S. forces have been manipulated by local Afghan forces, including local Afghan
“fixers” and interpreters; that U.S. military forces have unwittingly been used as proxies
in local rivalries; and that the presence of U.S. forces has been the backdrop for Afghans
to extort money from local residents or intimidate opponents.
Government officials in the Karzai government, along with local government officials,
have also repeatedly raised concerns with U.S. officials about excessive military force
being used during operations.12
One U.N. official who collected complaints about U.S. operations in 2002 said many of
the complaints concerned the “use of cowboy-like excessive force” against residents
9 The Department of Defense was unwilling to provide Human Rights Watch with copies of current
Rules of Engagement (ROE) Cards for their personnel in Afghanistan, or a copy of Afghanistanspecific
ROE.
10 The consequences of mistaken attacks on Afghan civilians and civilian objects during air strikes is a
large issue of concern but is not discussed in this report. Human Rights Watch has raised this issue
elsewhere. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: U.S. Military Should Investigate Civilian
Deaths,” press release, December 13, 2003.
11 Human Rights Watch interviews with U.N. officials, Kabul, December 16, 2003. Human Rights
Watch telephone interviews with a former senior U.N. official, December 5, 2003 and February 6,
2004.
12 Paul Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003; Patrick
Quinn, “U.S. raids, cultural problems lead to rising resentment in southern Afghanistan,” Associated
Press, June 24, 2002.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 12
“who generally turn out to be law abiding citizens.” The official noted cases of U.S.
forces “blowing doors open with grenades, rather than knocking,” and roughly treating
women and children.13
Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about the use of suppressing fire during
arrest operations—that is, the indiscriminate firing of weapons to immobilize possible
enemy forces. As noted below, Human Rights Watch believes that the use of
suppressing fire in the first resort (not in response to enemy fire) is inappropriate during
arrest operations in residential areas where no combat is taking place or underway.
The case of Ahmed Khan and his sons
On a night in late July 2002, U.S. forces raided the home of Ahmed Khan, a resident of
Zurmat district in Paktia province. Zurmat district, while not completely stable, is firmly
under the control of Afghan forces allied with the United States and was under such
control in July 2002. During the raid, Ahmed Khan was arrested along with his two
sons, aged 17 and 18 years.14 A local farmer died from gunfire during the arrest
operation, and a woman in a neighboring house was wounded. Human Rights Watch
spoke with several neighbors and other witnesses to the raid. Ahmed Khan described
the attack:
It was around harvest time. The farmers were sleeping by the harvests. .
. . It was about nine at night. We were lying in bed, but we were not yet
asleep. . . . Suddenly, there was a lot of noise. Some helicopters were
flying over. Then there were large explosions. The house shook; the
13 Human Rights Watch e-mail exchange with former U.N. official in Afghanistan, February 2004.
14 There were conflicting reports by reporters who visited the site of the attack about what the target
of the raid was and whether other men in the area were taken into custody during the raid. One news
report about the incident suggested that five other persons were arrested on the same night. “US
troops kill Afghan, take away six in raid; False report misled soldiers: governor,” Agence France
Presse, August 1, 2002. Another report suggests that the arrest was aimed at a man called Haji Uddin,
who was alleged to have given shelter to anti-U.S. forces in the area. Liz Sly, “U.S. grabs at shadows
in hunt for Al-Qaeda,” Chicago Tribune, September 3, 2002. The same report stated that five persons
were arrested during the raid: two relatives of Haji Uddin, including a 14-year-old boy, and three farm
workers. But Human Rights Watch interviews with residents and local officials in Zurmat shed no
light on the reason for the U.S. forces raid on Ahmed Khan’s home. The governor of Paktia, Raz
Mohammad Dalili, who was familiar with the incident, could not explain why the attack took place.
Human Rights Watch interview with Raz Mohammad Dalili, governor of Paktia, March 9, 2003. See
also Pamela Constable, Frustrated hunt for Bin Laden; al-Qaeda leader elusive, but U.S. sees success in Afghan
raids, Washington Post, September 11, 2002.
13 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
towers [corners of the house] had been hit. . . . The operations started.
Some helicopters came, we could hear them circling and firing machine
guns. It was a lot of noise. There were also explosions. They rocketed
one of the towers, and they rocketed a hole through the wall.15
During the shooting, Ahmed Khan said he and his family hid on the floor in their
bedroom on the second floor of the house. Gunfire shattered their windows and
doors.16 Neighbors said they saw helicopters shooting at the house and at areas around
it.17 Ahmed Khan described how U.S. forces entered his house, firing their weapons:
I looked out the broken windows here, and saw that there were many
soldiers in the compound. They shot at the door [front door of the
house], and opened it, and came up these stairs. They came through the
windows. . . . They entered the house, through the windows, which had
been broken by the shooting and the explosions. They came up to our
room, and they kicked the door open and entered with torches and
machine guns. They signaled for us to put up our hands, there were no
Afghans with them, no Pashto speakers, although later [we saw]
interpreters in the yard. . . . Then they fastened the men’s hands and
told the women to go into the yard. And they took us into the yard
too.18
Troops, including Afghan soldiers, then searched the house, occasionally using gunfire
to open locks.
They [U.S. soldiers] made the women go to the other house [across the
yard]. Then they searched the house. They broke all the windows, and
15 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003. A neighbor of
Ahmed Khan’s described the attack in similar terms: “I heard a lot of noise, which came from
helicopters. So I got up, and I crept up to my roof. I looked around. There were helicopters circling
his [Ahmed Khan’s] house. There was a lot of shooting and it was difficult to look thoroughly at
what has happening. There were many, many helicopters. We did not dare to go near that house.”
Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
16 “There were a lot of bullets. The glass broke in all the windows . . . .” Human Rights Watch
interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
17 Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003, Human Rights Watch
interview with brother of Niaz Mohammad, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
18 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 14
tore the doors off cupboards, and shot open the boxes, and turned them
over. . . . [Later,] they put hoods over our heads, and walked us out.
We were lifted up, into a helicopter. I could hear the rotors. We were
in the helicopter for a long time. . . . I don’t know how long. Later I
learned I was in Bagram.19
The body of a local laborer and farmer, Niaz Mohammad, was found after the raid. A
neighbor told Human Rights Watch:
[Later, we] found the corpse of the man who was killed. It was Niaz
Mohammad. He had a bullet in his foot, and a bullet in his back. It had
entered in his back, and come out right where his heart is. He was
found near to the mill.20
Ahmed Khan and his neighbors told Human Rights Watch that Niaz Mohammad had
been sleeping outside, near piles of harvested wheat, in order to keep watch so that no
one would steal the grain.21
According to neighbors, a local woman was also wounded in the attack. She received a
bullet wound that was not considered to be serious. The homes in the vicinity of
Ahmed Khan’s house received considerable damage from bullets and other weapons,
indicating that the U.S. forces used considerable firepower even though there was no
evidence of any armed opposition. A U.N. local staff person visited the site the day after
the attack: “There were bullet shells all around the house, everywhere, many shells.
There was a big hole in the wall and bullet holes in the windows; the glass was all broken
and had fallen into the yard. Household items were scattered all about—all around the
compound.”22 Human Rights Watch visited Ahmed Khan’s compound in March 2003
19 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
20 Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
21 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
22 Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003. Human Rights Watch
interview with G.A.U., local U.N. staff, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003. One of the neighbors
described the house after the attack: “After all the noise ended and the helicopters left, I went to the
house to see what happened. I went with some neighbors. We went inside. The first thing is that the
women were very scared. Boxes from the house were thrown around the yard, and there were
possessions scattered about. . . . About ten minutes later, we walked outside. We were walking
around to ask people what happened.” Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia,
March 10, 2003.
15 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
and observed scores of bullet holes in the window frames and doors of the house, bullet
slugs, and destroyed farm equipment.23
Ahmed Khan’s family said they lost many of their most valuable possessions on the
night of the raid. U.S. forces confiscated some books and four automatic weapons,
which they later returned to Ahmed Khan, when he and his teenage sons were released.
But the family said that other possessions were missing. Said Ahmed Khan:
They stole all my possessions. . . . I don’t know who it was. The
Americans returned some things to us, but a lot of jewelry disappeared.
The women were in the other room. They didn’t see anything. . . . The
Americans may have taken the jewelry, or the Afghans. I don’t know. I
lost a lot of property. I don’t know what was lost that night. A lot of
jewelry was taken.24
Ahmed Khan’s frustration was manifest months later:
They killed a farmer, Niaz Mohammed. He was just guarding his
harvest and was killed. He had four children, two boys and two girls.
What will I do for these children? I take care of them now. We will
forgive America when they pay for his life, at least to help me with these
children.25
23 Human Rights Watch researchers also saw that newly laid mud and brick had been used to fill in a
large hole in the compound’s wall, approximately three meters in diameter, where a rocket was said to
have hit. Scores of bullet holes in the house’s walls and window frames indicated that gunfire had
come from two directions: the hole in the wall, and the door of the compound. Bullets in the window
frames were embedded in two trajectories: some were clearly driven in perpendicularly (at 90 degrees),
coming from the direction of the hole in the wall; others were driven in much more obliquely (less
than 10 degrees off the surfaces flush with the house) starting from the direction of the house’s door.
24 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
25 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 16
Other cases
Human Rights Watch documented a case in February 2003 in the southern province of
Uruzgon in which U.S. troops assaulted two children during a raid on a civilian house.26
The owner of the house, a low-level military commander in Uruzgon province,
cooperated with U.S. forces during coalition attacks on Taliban forces in southern
Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. But one night in February 2003, U.S. forces
raided the man’s home, entering by force and tying up him and one of his older sons.
Through local interpreters and Afghan soldiers accompanying them, the U.S. troops
accused the man of holding weapons and cooperating with the Taliban. A Farsi-speaker,
the man was baffled why the soldiers believed he was cooperating with the Pashtunspeaking
Taliban.
According to the man, the soldiers pushed him and his older son against a wall, and
seized the man’s young son and nephew:
In front of my eyes, two Americans laid down both the boys on the
ground and pressed their boots into the children’s backs. And they were
yelling: “Where is the ammunition? Where is the ammunition?”
These boys were aged only eleven and thirteen. The children were
shrieking and shouting. I was saying, “Look over all my house – I have
nothing!” But they kept asking this, as the children screamed.27
The soldiers subsequently searched the house, but only found two weapons, both of
them registered with the authorities. Still, the man was arrested by the local Afghan
forces and taken to a neighboring province. He was released a few days later.
On December 5, 2003, U.S. forces conducted an operation in the village of Kosween, in
Sayed Karam district of Paktia, near Gardez in southeast Afghanistan.28 According to
U.S. military officials, the aim of the operation was to arrest a man named Mullah Jalani,
alleged to be a Hezb-e Islami leader involved in anti-U.S. military operations. As a result
of the operation, a couple and their six children were killed: Ikhtari Gul, 35 (a farmer),
26 Information about this incident is taken from a Human Rights Watch interview with man from
Uruzgon, Kabul, March 2003.
27 Human Rights Watch interview with man from Uruzgon, Kabul, March 2003.
28 Information about this case is based on interviews in December 2003 and January 2004 with several
journalists who visited the site of the raid in the weeks after it occurred.
17 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
and his wife, Khela; their four daughters, Khela, Daulat Zai, Anara and Kadran; and two
sons, Asif and Nematullah.29 The use of military methods and tactics during the
operation may have violated international legal obligations to minimize harm to civilians
and prohibitions against disproportionate attacks.
The U.S. military gave inconsistent accounts of the operation after it occurred. On
December 6, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty told several reporters at Bagram airbase
that U.S. forces the previous night had raided the home of Mullah Jalani in Sayed
Karam.30 He said that U.S. forces had detained “several persons” during the raid, but
had not captured Jalani.31 The village was sealed off in the week after the raid: several
journalists who attempted to visit the site of the operation during the week of December
7 - 12 were turned back by Afghan forces cooperating with a Special Forces unit in the
village.32
On December 10, Hilferty admitted that the Sayed Karam raid had involved close air
support and bombing, and said that on December 7 U.S. forces found eight civilians
who had died during the operations.33 Hilferty indicated that the dead civilians were in
another compound than the one attacked and were buried by a wall that collapsed
because of “secondary and tertiary explosions” from stored ammunition in Jalani’s
compound.34 He suggested that U.S. forces were not “completely responsible” for the
deaths because the civilians (presumably including the children) had “surrounded
29 Ikhtari’s brother, Naser, told a reporter that the children’s ages ranged from one to twelve. Pamela
Constable, “Deadly U.S. Raid Leaves Some Afghans Bewildered; Villagers Say Target Was Not a
Terrorist,” Washington Post, December 12, 2003.
30 “Troops In Afghanistan Raid Insurgent Base, Destroy Weapons,” Associated Press, December 6,
2003.
31 Ibid. The next day, December 7, the military announced that nine children had been killed in a
separate incident—an air attack on a building in Ghazni, Afghanistan. Aijaz Rahi, “Afghan Village
Angry After Gunship Attack,” Associated Press, December 8, 2003. For more information about
these two attacks, see also Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: U.S. Military Should Investigate
Civilian Deaths,” press release, December 13, 2003. There was no indication that the Ghazni incident
was an arrest operation.
32 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with an international journalist who attempted to visit
Sayed Karam, February 6, 2004.
33 Paul Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2003.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a press briefing in Washington on December 9 but
did not reveal the civilian deaths in Gardez. Why this information was withheld by the military for
three days was not explained.
34 Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.”
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 18
themselves” with weapons and ordinance—a puzzling claim, since the dead civilians
were not in Jalani’s compound.35 A foreign correspondent visiting the village the same
week found a large concave crater at the compound where the civilians were killed,
suggesting that an errant bomb had hit the compound.36
Hilferty said that the aim of the operation had been to arrest Mullah Jalani, whom he
described as a suspected associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Islami:
“We try very hard not to kill anyone. We would prefer to capture the terrorists rather
than kill them.”37 But he gave no adequate explanation as to why U.S. forces on the
ground ultimately used bombs in an operation in a residential area.
There are conflicting reports from different sources as to how many people were
arrested in the operation, varying from five to fourteen.38 A reporter from the
Washington Post visited the village a week after the attack and was told by villagers that
Jalani was a local military leader who had cooperated with Taliban forces during the
Taliban era, but who had changed sides and cooperated with U.S. forces at times and sat
on a local governmental council.39 Villagers said that Jalani had been involved in several
tribal disputes in the area and was living openly in the village before the attack, but had
left before it took place.
Human Rights Watch received a complaint from government officials in Paktia about an
operation in Zurmat district in February 2003 in which Abdul Gehafouz Akhundzada, a
cleric, was arrested in his home after a firefight. (Akhundzada’s detention is discussed in
more detail in the section on arbitrary arrests and detention below). Among other
35 Ibid.
36 Human Rights Watch interview with a journalist who wished to remain anonymous, Kabul,
December 12, 2003.
37 Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.”
38 Officials in the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission told Human Rights Watch that
eleven persons were arrested during the operation, and had not been released. Human Rights Watch
interview with AIHRC official, Kabul, December 16, 2003. A local Afghan governmental official in
Paktia, Faiz Mohammed Zalan, told a reporter: “There were five people arrested during the whole
operation, but they were innocent, so they were released the next day.” See Watson, “Civilian Toll
Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.” The Washington Post reporter who visited the village was told by
residents that possibly as many as fourteen people had been arrested during the raid.
39 Pamela Constable, “Deadly U.S. Raid Leaves Some Afghans Bewildered; Villagers Say Target Was
Not a Terrorist,” Washington Post, December 12, 2003. U.S. Special Forces in the village refused to
talk to the reporter.
19 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
things, officials complained of U.S. forces coming for Akhundzada in the middle of the
night, a course of action which they believe set off a dangerous firefight.
According to Akhundzada’s family and neighbors, the arrest took place on or around
February 20, 2003. Afghan and U.S. soldiers gathered outside his home late at night and
knocked on his door.40 Akhundzada reportedly thought they were Afghan troops who
had come to rob him—a common occurrence in Zurmat district.41 He fired a weapon
from his rooftop, either in the air or directed at the troops. The troops outside returned
fire, and soon thereafter, U.S. helicopters flew toward the house, reportedly firing
weapons. According to his family and neighbors, Akhundzada then realized that the
Afghan troops were working with U.S. forces, and surrendered. Before this happened,
however, U.S. and Afghan forces fired hundreds of rounds of ammunition into
Akhundzada’s home, where there were two women—Akhundzada’s mother and wife—
and his two children. The women and children told Human Rights Watch that they lay
on the floor of the home during the attack, and were not wounded.
After Akhundzada was arrested, U.S. troops entered the home and searched it, shooting
open steel trunks with their weapons and breaking doors and windows.42 Human Rights
Watch researchers inspected the house in March and saw hundreds of bullet holes in the
compound’s external and internal walls. Two bullet slugs dug out of the compound’s
internal walls appeared to be from an M-60 machine gun, a more powerful weapon than
the standard assault rifles carried by U.S. and Afghan troops (M-16s and Russian AK-
47s).
Local officials maintained that Akhundzada was a civilian, living openly in Zurmat, who
could have been peacefully approached and taken into custody during the day.
Kandahar officials also complained to U.S. forces in 2002 about a raid involving U.S.
Army and Special Forces troops that took place on May 24, 2002, in the village of Band
40 Information about this case is based on interviews in Zurmat with family members of Abdul
Gehafouz Akhundzada, March 10, 2003; interviews with villagers in Zurmat district on March 10,
2003; and interviews with governmental officials in Gardez on March 9, 2003.
41 Human Rights Watch documented in 2003 that home robberies by Afghan soldiers and police were
common in southeastern Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, including in Paktia province and Zurmat
district in particular. See Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing For Us: Human
Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan,” A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 15, no. 5(c), July
2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/.
42 Sometime during the operation, the family’s copy of the Koran was shot through with a bullet, a
fact which later and understandably caused anger in the local community.
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 20
Taimore, in Kandahar province. Accounts of the operation are not clear, but according
to journalists who interviewed villagers, a tribal leader in his 80s was shot dead in a
mosque and a 3-year-old girl drowned after she fell into a well trying to run away from
U.S. forces.43
* * * * *
Through 2003, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission office in Gardez
city has received numerous complaints from the Gardez area, including allegations that
U.S. forces or Afghan forces working with them used excessive force and destroyed
property during operations. According to the complaints:

 November 9, 2003, Central Gardez: G.K.44 claims he “was arrested without cause
and his house was damaged by coalition forces. Women and children were kept in
the yard in the cold weather and the locks of the women's boxes were broken,
money and jewels were taken.”

 November 8, 2003, Gardez, Shekar Kheil village: H.M.K. complains that “house was
damaged by the coalition forces and the named person was taken along with
property deeds and other things.”

 August 22, 2003, Central Gardez, Khajeh village: Dr. B, Dr. J, Engineer T.B claim
that “In the middle of the night, their house was damaged and coalition forces
entered the women’s rooms without permission. Due to fear and terror one woman
lost her fetus [spontaneously aborted]. [Dr. B] was taken, along with some money
and jewelry.”

 July 28, 2003, Central Gardez: N.G. claims he “was arrested by coalition forces
without cause in the middle of the night from his house, and money and jewels were
taken.”

 July 13, 2003, Central Gardez, Shaykhan village: J.M.M. complains that: “Coalition
forces arrested, beat, harassed and insulted him.”
43 See Michael Ware, “‘We Were Better Off Under the Russians,’” Time Magazine, June 10, 2002;
Patrick Quinn, “U.S. raids, cultural problems lead to rising resentment in southern Afghanistan,”
Associated Press, June 24, 2002.
44 Names have been replaced with initials to protect the confidentiality of the complainants.
21 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)

 May 2003, Khost province, Lelamy Koli district: H.I.K. complains that “compound
bombed by coalition forces: two killed, four injured, four others were taken
[arrested] by coalition forces.”
UNAMA local offices and UNAMA headquarters in Kabul have also received numerous
complaints over 2002 and 2003 about U.S. forces using excessive or “culturally
insensitive” force during operations in the south and southeast of the country.45
(Complaints about culturally insensitive force usually refer to allegations of male troops
touching or looking at women during searches, which in some areas violate local norms
even if there is no sexual intent. Local leaders have requested, among other things, that
the U.S. military use more women soldiers during search operations.)
Abuses by Afghan forces
Afghan forces deployed alongside U.S. forces have been implicated in abuses during
military operations. As noted elsewhere in this report, persons arrested by U.S. forces
routinely complain about local Afghan forces looting their homes in the wake of U.S.
military operations.
An Afghan journalist in Kandahar city told Human Rights Watch in November 2003
that he received several complaints in 2003 from residents in Zabul and Helmand about
local forces operating with U.S. troops extorting money from villagers by threatening to
tell U.S. forces that local residents are “with the Taliban,” claiming that the villagers will
be targeted for arrest by the United States if they fail to pay certain sums of money—
typically around 10,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately U.S.$175).46
In October 2003, a reporter from the Los Angeles Times documented that local troops
from Kandahar, working as guides for U.S. forces, looted homes and beat and tortured
civilians during a week-long military operation in Zabul province, which lies directly to
the east of Kandahar.47 Residents showed the journalist two young men who had been
45 Human Rights Watch interview with U.N. officials, Kabul, December 13 and 16, 2003. Human
Rights Watch telephone interview with former U.N. official, February 6, 2004.
46 Human Rights Watch interviews with A.G.S., Afghan journalist, October 5 and 9, 2003.
47 Paul Watson, “Afghans Tell of Torture During Security Sweep,” Los Angeles Times, October 30,
2003; Paul Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003. See also
transcript of interview with Paul Watson by Los Angeles Times Online editor, on documenting
abuses and interviewing witnesses, available at: http://www.latimes.com/
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 22
beaten by the troops; one described being severely beaten and blacking out, the other
was still unconscious days after the attack. According to other residents, U.S. forces did
not witness the abuses, but the Afghan troops allegedly stole “cash, jewelry, watches,
radios, three motorcycles—even the mud-brick school’s windows and doors” before
leaving when U.S. and Afghan troops moved on to other areas. Said one elder: “These
people are robbing us, torturing us and beating us . . . . They are also taking innocent
people to jail.”
In late October 2003, a spokesman for President Hamid Karzai said publicly that
Karzai’s office had been receiving information about similar abuses by local troops for
more than a year; that Karzai had told U.S. military commanders in Kabul that Afghan
militias accompanying U.S. troops were committing abuses; that Karzai had suggested to
U.S. commanders they not use Afghan militias in non-combat situations; and that the
U.S. actions with local militias were undermining the overall effort to combat terrorism
in Afghanistan.48
Legal standards applicable to use of force during arrest operations
International humanitarian law seeks to protect civilians from unnecessary harm during
armed conflict. Central to this protection is the imperative that military forces
differentiate between combatants and civilians during military operations and when they
take persons into custody.
Rules applicable to the current conflict in Afghanistan49 require a military force to “take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.”50 Attackers must refrain from an attack that may be
expected to cause disproportionate civilian casualties and damage.51 Also prohibited are
indiscriminate attacks, which include those not directed at a specific military objective
48 Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003.
49 See section on “International Legal Context,” below.
50 Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”), art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
Many of the provisions of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, including those applying to
methods and means of attack, are accepted as customary international law applicable to international
and non-international armed conflict. See section on “International Legal Context,” below.
51 Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
23 Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C)
and consequently of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.52
In situations where forces are conducting essentially law enforcement operations—for
instance, arrests of civilians wanted for questioning—basic rules of international human
rights law also apply, including standards applicable to the use of force by law
enforcement personnel. Applicable law enforcement standards are typically more
stringent than those under international humanitarian law, and narrowly prescribe the
contexts in which deadly force and firearms may be used.
Human Rights Watch believes that the use of military tactics and military rules of
engagement in operations that otherwise bear the characteristics of civilian law
enforcement, particularly the arrest of suspects in residential areas, raises legal concerns
and in Afghanistan likely has led to avoidable casualties and destruction of civilian
property. The United States has an obligation to investigate such incidents, take
disciplinary or other legal action as appropriate, scrutinize its arrest methods and rules of
engagement, and adopt necessary policy changes to prevent further unnecessary loss of
life and property.
52 Protocol I, art. 51(4). Among indiscriminate attacks are those expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life and property that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated. Id. art. 51(5).
Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 3 (C) 24
Arbitrary or Mistaken Arrests and Indefinite Detention
U.S. forces in Afghanistan regularly capture combatants and civilians who have taken up
arms against U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces, during both combat and search and
arrest operations. However, as shown here, U.S. forces also routinely arrest civilians
taking no direct part in hostilities, sometimes in contexts in which the arrests seem
arbitrary or based on poor or faulty intelligence.
As shown in this section, U.S. forces sometimes take into custody all men of military age
found within the vicinity of an operation. Other times, it seems persons are targeted for
arrest because U.S. officials have determined they are a security risk or are useful for
intelligence purposes—for instance, clerics or local tribal leaders who might be politically
involved with the Taliban, or civilians spotted near the site of a recent attack. Human
Rights Watch has interviewed many Afghans who were arrested for simply being at the
wrong place at the wrong time.
For many of these men, arrest is the start of an ordeal in which they may be beaten or
otherwise mistreated during arrest or detention, repeatedly and seemingly randomly
interrogated, held for weeks or months without family visits, and eventually released only
to find that their homes were looted by Afghan troops. (Allegations of beatings and
mistreatment are not discussed here but in the “Mistreatment in Detention” section
below.)
In late May 2002, U.S. forces raided two homes in the village of Kirmati, near Gardez
city, and arrested five Afghan men, all of whom were later released and returned to
Gardez. During the raid, U.S. forces reportedly used helicopters and airplanes to patrol
the area and lay down suppressing fire. The raid took place in an entirely residential
area, and there is no evidence that U.S. forces met any resistance. Kirmati is firmly
under the control of Afghan forces allied with the United States and was so at the time
of this attack.
U.S. forces took five people into custody: Mohammad Naim and his brother Sherbat,
Ahmaddullah and his brother Amanullah, and Khoja Mohammad. Mohammad Naim
described the raid as follows:
It was late at night. It was after midnight. Suddenly, there were a lot of
noises, very loud, confusing . . . . I went into the yard. Suddenly, there
was someone in my house with a gun on me. So I surrendered.53
53 Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003. cont...