The simple answer is that enriching uranium to 20% represents about 90% of the effort needed to produce weapons grade fissile material. Once a proliferator reaches this threshold, it could be ready to weaponize in a relatively short time. For research reactor fuels enriched to less than 20%, the plutonium component dominates proliferation concerns, which is why the 20% mark is a useful distinction to differentiate between civilian and military applications.
Once the international community knows what to watch for, there are remedies. If plutonium production is the problem, then shipping out the spent fuel or placing safeguards on the reprocessing facilities can give the world confidence a program remains peaceful. If uranium enrichment is the problem, safeguards including limits on numbers and types of centrifuges, as well as online enrichment monitors that report directly to the IAEA, can give the world confidence that a program remains peaceful.