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Yes, this is an important topic and I will encourage discussion here.
WE THE PEOPLE - are in a state of dispair.
WE know that we have been disempowered.
WE know that our government is faking democracy.
WE know that the facist cabal that is running our government is causing incredible harm to people around the world.
G-d bless his soul. He simply couldn't handle this knowledge any more.
https://time.com/6821425/israel-embassy-air-force-protest-fire-self-immolation-aaron-bushnell-latest-updates/
More informed criticism of the SEC:
The Ultimate DD about the CEBE (Counterfeit Electronic Book Entries) created by the SBP (Share Borrow Program) within the DTCC. Written by Dr. Jim DeCosta on a forum from 2006. Want it to get immortalized on Reddit.
📚 Due Diligence
Sitting on the plane yesterday, I was reading over some of the work a friend of mine produced on naked short selling, and it occurred to me that this info belongs in a venue where the public can access it. So I broke my commitment to take a few days off, away from computers, to post this - and then I will really stay offline...
By way of introduction, let me say that there are authorities, and then there are authorities. The gentleman in question is a true expert on the topic, partly because he’s been studying the issue for about 25 years – his comments to the SEC on Reg SHO have taken on near mythical status, as they so clearly warned of the abuse that would come should the SEC not implement the safeguards he’d advocated. His name is likely familiar to many who have closely followed this topic – Dr. Jim DeCosta.
The challenge in presenting the true state of the union is to provide data, supported by research, in bite-sized morsels that people can digest. I feel that his work is among the most comprehensive I’ve seen on the subject, so I leaned on him to allow me to publish a small sampling of his material. His premise has always been that the solution to the entire NSS mess lies in educating the investing public, the regulators, the Judiciary, and anybody else with a vested interest in the clearance and settlement system.
He’s written 2-1/2 unpublished books on naked short selling, which contain more data than any other work on the subject I’ve seen. In Chapter 42 he delineates some of what he calls “Not so bullet points”. He lists 40 of them, but I’m only going to publish the first dozen for now, as there is a lot of information to assimilate.
2008 - another informed criticism of the SEC...
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-08/s70808-418.htm
2007 - a comprehensive criticism of the system by a member of the SEC...
It explains how we got here:
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-06/s71206-899.pdf
The number of shares traded into the front loading cycle exceeds the number that could possibly have been traded by Cox. He was fully aware of the value of the technology because he was the only one at DFCO capable of developing it. The DFCO heat pump is dead, this is why you haven't heard anything from Averett...
https://www.averett.edu/about-us/news-events/averett-university-and-dalrada-corporation-team-up-for-a-sustainable-and-digitally-advanced-future/
02/28/19 0.035 0.038 0.0293 0.035 122,958
02/27/19 0.03 0.035 0.0291 0.035 88,100
02/26/19 0.032 0.038 0.028 0.03 209,577
02/25/19 0.0241 0.04 0.0232 0.032 1,212,802
02/22/19 0.0245 0.0245 0.02 0.0231 253,000
02/21/19 0.02 0.0245 0.02 0.0245 205,400
02/20/19 0.0208 0.021 0.018 0.018 222,700
02/14/19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 20,000
02/12/19 0.0225 0.0225 0.02 0.02 83,002
02/11/19 0.0239 0.0239 0.0239 0.0239 45,000
02/06/19 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.022 234,686
02/04/19 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 15,800
01/31/19 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 2,601
01/29/19 0.017 0.0178 0.017 0.0178 80,450
01/28/19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 16,750
01/24/19 0.019 0.019 0.0188 0.0188 61,680
01/23/19 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.019 401,664
01/18/19 0.0125 0.015 0.0125 0.015 60,330
01/17/19 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 1,036
01/14/19 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 10,000
01/02/19 0.0101 0.018 0.0101 0.018 350
12/31/18 0.0101 0.018 0.0101 0.018 2,393
12/28/18 0.019 0.019 0.0189 0.019 43,000
12/24/18 0.0085 0.0186 0.0055 0.015 267,250
12/21/18 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 30,000
12/20/18 0.0137 0.0186 0.0137 0.0186 281
12/19/18 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 17,000
12/14/18 0.0151 0.0151 0.0138 0.014 78,052
12/12/18 0.0151 0.0171 0.0151 0.0171 5,650
12/11/18 0.014 0.0195 0.014 0.0195 41,000
12/10/18 0.0188 0.0188 0.0188 0.0188 5,000
12/07/18 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 10,000
12/04/18 0.0202 0.0202 0.0202 0.0202 10,002
12/03/18 0.0175 0.0205 0.0175 0.0205 74,112
11/30/18 0.0152 0.0204 0.0138 0.0175 330,009
11/29/18 0.0197 0.0197 0.018 0.018 122,449
11/28/18 0.0178 0.0178 0.0178 0.0178 10,601
11/27/18 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 15,587
11/26/18 0.018 0.0183 0.018 0.0183 110,000
11/23/18 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 2,388
11/20/18 0.0186 0.0186 0.0152 0.0152 127,002
11/19/18 0.016 0.016 0.0151 0.016 193,699
11/16/18 0.0219 0.0219 0.02 0.02 21,000
11/15/18 0.0215 0.0215 0.02 0.0215 14,496
11/14/18 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 131,101
11/13/18 0.0201 0.0201 0.015 0.02 254,244
11/12/18 0.02 0.0217 0.02 0.0217 196,500
11/09/18 0.0202 0.0202 0.0175 0.02 260,025
11/08/18 0.0183 0.0195 0.0174 0.0195 571,477
11/07/18 0.0187 0.0187 0.0131 0.018 305,353
11/06/18 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 605
11/05/18 0.02 0.0209 0.0163 0.0193 438,799
11/02/18 0.0199 0.023 0.0136 0.0219 1,522,361
11/01/18 0.0187 0.0199 0.0187 0.0188 128,000
10/31/18 0.0155 0.0199 0.0155 0.0175 804,498
10/30/18 0.0195 0.0195 0.015 0.015 10,000
03/09/22 0.49 0.55 0.4804 0.4931 33,403
03/08/22 0.525 0.55 0.48 0.51 59,344
03/07/22 0.525 0.554 0.501 0.55 117,373
03/04/22 0.551 0.56 0.522 0.55 15,052
03/03/22 0.60 0.64 0.551 0.551 30,568
03/02/22 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.60 19,226
03/01/22 0.614 0.65 0.5151 0.5151 25,715
02/28/22 0.52 0.647 0.52 0.5868 35,358
02/25/22 0.595 0.595 0.4622 0.501 128,128
02/24/22 0.6247 0.667 0.62 0.62 11,352
02/23/22 0.72 0.721 0.555 0.67 134,800
02/22/22 0.69 0.74 0.677 0.7203 44,433
02/18/22 0.70 0.74 0.61 0.74 248,322
02/17/22 0.639 0.69 0.58 0.671 54,790
02/16/22 0.43 0.639 0.43 0.639 100,543
02/15/22 0.34 0.645 0.34 0.47 471,060
02/14/22 0.35 0.35 0.333 0.34 123,791
02/11/22 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.35 213,050
02/10/22 0.4498 0.46 0.3834 0.40 210,888
02/09/22 0.41 0.49 0.265 0.489 498,476
02/08/22 0.45 0.4799 0.355 0.38 796,361
02/07/22 0.585 0.585 0.451 0.4749 354,050
02/04/22 0.615 0.6999 0.5999 0.5999 130,297
02/03/22 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.695 174,190
02/02/22 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.7395 30,570
02/01/22 0.749 0.749 0.73 0.749 14,892
01/31/22 0.749 0.749 0.6801 0.739 21,100
01/28/22 0.716 0.749 0.706 0.7275 7,215
01/27/22 0.681 0.7949 0.681 0.7389 152,243
01/26/22 0.70 0.70 0.671 0.671 37,015
01/25/22 0.7355 0.81 0.68 0.6995 56,985
01/24/22 0.80 0.8347 0.66 0.66 75,286
01/21/22 0.831 0.859 0.80 0.80 19,937
01/20/22 0.6899 0.8595 0.6898 0.8595 175,939
01/19/22 0.7899 0.7899 0.6605 0.6655 74,063
01/18/22 0.74 0.799 0.74 0.76 10,567
01/14/22 0.751 0.869 0.75 0.75 16,231
01/13/22 0.869 0.869 0.755 0.76 49,155
01/12/22 0.81 0.884 0.75 0.8434 125,519
01/11/22 0.85 0.90 0.781 0.81 125,827
01/10/22 0.8403 0.899 0.7855 0.8985 60,365
01/07/22 0.775 0.929 0.76 0.85 106,718
01/06/22 0.82 0.82 0.7455 0.75 55,998
01/05/22 0.85 0.8805 0.825 0.8269 42,016
01/04/22 0.8605 0.865 0.85 0.85 36,779
01/03/22 0.8647 0.919 0.86 0.881 17,317
12/31/21 0.8548 0.899 0.853 0.8647 22,990
12/30/21 0.86 0.899 0.85 0.88 69,758
12/29/21 0.8705 0.8743 0.8505 0.8553 9,238
12/28/21 0.8985 0.8985 0.8501 0.87 48,320
12/27/21 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.85 79,180
12/23/21 0.91 0.92 0.8525 0.8525 77,934
12/22/21 0.909 0.92 0.87 0.9103 31,708
12/21/21 0.85 0.915 0.8118 0.87 58,972
12/20/21 0.919 0.92 0.76 0.76 214,783
12/17/21 0.871 0.92 0.85 0.91 79,469
12/16/21 0.897 0.91 0.86 0.91 36,682
12/15/21 0.919 0.919 0.865 0.89 48,109
12/14/21 0.91 0.91 0.827 0.91 41,779
12/13/21 0.89 0.91 0.85 0.91 97,391
12/10/21 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.885 78,034
12/09/21 0.87 0.88 0.8161 0.87 23,602
12/08/21 0.83 0.87 0.81 0.87 162,168
12/07/21 0.779 0.8395 0.7745 0.83 203,491
12/06/21 0.78 0.78 0.7206 0.7691 85,242
DFCO is trying to sue the guy that they got the heat pump tech from. The only problem is that the number of shares traded into the front loading cycle exceeds the number that could possibly have been traded by Cox. He was fully aware of the value of the technology because he was the only one at DFCO capable of developing it. The DFCO heat pump is dead, this is why you haven't heard anything from Averett...
https://www.averett.edu/about-us/news-events/averett-university-and-dalrada-corporation-team-up-for-a-sustainable-and-digitally-advanced-future/
02/28/19 0.035 0.038 0.0293 0.035 122,958
02/27/19 0.03 0.035 0.0291 0.035 88,100
02/26/19 0.032 0.038 0.028 0.03 209,577
02/25/19 0.0241 0.04 0.0232 0.032 1,212,802
02/22/19 0.0245 0.0245 0.02 0.0231 253,000
02/21/19 0.02 0.0245 0.02 0.0245 205,400
02/20/19 0.0208 0.021 0.018 0.018 222,700
02/14/19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 20,000
02/12/19 0.0225 0.0225 0.02 0.02 83,002
02/11/19 0.0239 0.0239 0.0239 0.0239 45,000
02/06/19 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.022 234,686
02/04/19 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189 15,800
01/31/19 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 2,601
01/29/19 0.017 0.0178 0.017 0.0178 80,450
01/28/19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 16,750
01/24/19 0.019 0.019 0.0188 0.0188 61,680
01/23/19 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.019 401,664
01/18/19 0.0125 0.015 0.0125 0.015 60,330
01/17/19 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 0.0125 1,036
01/14/19 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 10,000
01/02/19 0.0101 0.018 0.0101 0.018 350
12/31/18 0.0101 0.018 0.0101 0.018 2,393
12/28/18 0.019 0.019 0.0189 0.019 43,000
12/24/18 0.0085 0.0186 0.0055 0.015 267,250
12/21/18 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 30,000
12/20/18 0.0137 0.0186 0.0137 0.0186 281
12/19/18 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 17,000
12/14/18 0.0151 0.0151 0.0138 0.014 78,052
12/12/18 0.0151 0.0171 0.0151 0.0171 5,650
12/11/18 0.014 0.0195 0.014 0.0195 41,000
12/10/18 0.0188 0.0188 0.0188 0.0188 5,000
12/07/18 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 0.0198 10,000
12/04/18 0.0202 0.0202 0.0202 0.0202 10,002
12/03/18 0.0175 0.0205 0.0175 0.0205 74,112
11/30/18 0.0152 0.0204 0.0138 0.0175 330,009
11/29/18 0.0197 0.0197 0.018 0.018 122,449
11/28/18 0.0178 0.0178 0.0178 0.0178 10,601
11/27/18 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 15,587
11/26/18 0.018 0.0183 0.018 0.0183 110,000
11/23/18 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 2,388
11/20/18 0.0186 0.0186 0.0152 0.0152 127,002
11/19/18 0.016 0.016 0.0151 0.016 193,699
11/16/18 0.0219 0.0219 0.02 0.02 21,000
11/15/18 0.0215 0.0215 0.02 0.0215 14,496
11/14/18 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 131,101
11/13/18 0.0201 0.0201 0.015 0.02 254,244
11/12/18 0.02 0.0217 0.02 0.0217 196,500
11/09/18 0.0202 0.0202 0.0175 0.02 260,025
11/08/18 0.0183 0.0195 0.0174 0.0195 571,477
11/07/18 0.0187 0.0187 0.0131 0.018 305,353
11/06/18 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 605
11/05/18 0.02 0.0209 0.0163 0.0193 438,799
11/02/18 0.0199 0.023 0.0136 0.0219 1,522,361
11/01/18 0.0187 0.0199 0.0187 0.0188 128,000
10/31/18 0.0155 0.0199 0.0155 0.0175 804,498
10/30/18 0.0195 0.0195 0.015 0.015 10,000
03/09/22 0.49 0.55 0.4804 0.4931 33,403
03/08/22 0.525 0.55 0.48 0.51 59,344
03/07/22 0.525 0.554 0.501 0.55 117,373
03/04/22 0.551 0.56 0.522 0.55 15,052
03/03/22 0.60 0.64 0.551 0.551 30,568
03/02/22 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.60 19,226
03/01/22 0.614 0.65 0.5151 0.5151 25,715
02/28/22 0.52 0.647 0.52 0.5868 35,358
02/25/22 0.595 0.595 0.4622 0.501 128,128
02/24/22 0.6247 0.667 0.62 0.62 11,352
02/23/22 0.72 0.721 0.555 0.67 134,800
02/22/22 0.69 0.74 0.677 0.7203 44,433
02/18/22 0.70 0.74 0.61 0.74 248,322
02/17/22 0.639 0.69 0.58 0.671 54,790
02/16/22 0.43 0.639 0.43 0.639 100,543
02/15/22 0.34 0.645 0.34 0.47 471,060
02/14/22 0.35 0.35 0.333 0.34 123,791
02/11/22 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.35 213,050
02/10/22 0.4498 0.46 0.3834 0.40 210,888
02/09/22 0.41 0.49 0.265 0.489 498,476
02/08/22 0.45 0.4799 0.355 0.38 796,361
02/07/22 0.585 0.585 0.451 0.4749 354,050
02/04/22 0.615 0.6999 0.5999 0.5999 130,297
02/03/22 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.695 174,190
02/02/22 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.7395 30,570
02/01/22 0.749 0.749 0.73 0.749 14,892
01/31/22 0.749 0.749 0.6801 0.739 21,100
01/28/22 0.716 0.749 0.706 0.7275 7,215
01/27/22 0.681 0.7949 0.681 0.7389 152,243
01/26/22 0.70 0.70 0.671 0.671 37,015
01/25/22 0.7355 0.81 0.68 0.6995 56,985
01/24/22 0.80 0.8347 0.66 0.66 75,286
01/21/22 0.831 0.859 0.80 0.80 19,937
01/20/22 0.6899 0.8595 0.6898 0.8595 175,939
01/19/22 0.7899 0.7899 0.6605 0.6655 74,063
01/18/22 0.74 0.799 0.74 0.76 10,567
01/14/22 0.751 0.869 0.75 0.75 16,231
01/13/22 0.869 0.869 0.755 0.76 49,155
01/12/22 0.81 0.884 0.75 0.8434 125,519
01/11/22 0.85 0.90 0.781 0.81 125,827
01/10/22 0.8403 0.899 0.7855 0.8985 60,365
01/07/22 0.775 0.929 0.76 0.85 106,718
01/06/22 0.82 0.82 0.7455 0.75 55,998
01/05/22 0.85 0.8805 0.825 0.8269 42,016
01/04/22 0.8605 0.865 0.85 0.85 36,779
01/03/22 0.8647 0.919 0.86 0.881 17,317
12/31/21 0.8548 0.899 0.853 0.8647 22,990
12/30/21 0.86 0.899 0.85 0.88 69,758
12/29/21 0.8705 0.8743 0.8505 0.8553 9,238
12/28/21 0.8985 0.8985 0.8501 0.87 48,320
12/27/21 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.85 79,180
12/23/21 0.91 0.92 0.8525 0.8525 77,934
12/22/21 0.909 0.92 0.87 0.9103 31,708
12/21/21 0.85 0.915 0.8118 0.87 58,972
12/20/21 0.919 0.92 0.76 0.76 214,783
12/17/21 0.871 0.92 0.85 0.91 79,469
12/16/21 0.897 0.91 0.86 0.91 36,682
12/15/21 0.919 0.919 0.865 0.89 48,109
12/14/21 0.91 0.91 0.827 0.91 41,779
12/13/21 0.89 0.91 0.85 0.91 97,391
12/10/21 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.885 78,034
12/09/21 0.87 0.88 0.8161 0.87 23,602
12/08/21 0.83 0.87 0.81 0.87 162,168
12/07/21 0.779 0.8395 0.7745 0.83 203,491
12/06/21 0.78 0.78 0.7206 0.7691 85,242
You didn't cite a source, but I think I found it.
The pressure is on DFCO -
That said, as Plaintiffs indicate that a skip trace to locate Defendant is ongoing and allege facts that suggest that Defendant is evading service of process, the Court will GRANT Plaintiffs ninety (90) days from the date of this Order to serve Defendant through means authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). If Plaintiffs are unable to serve Defendant by this deadline, Plaintiffs SHALL FILE a status report describing their efforts to serve Defendant during the extension. If said status report does not demonstrate good cause for an additional extension, the Court may examine whether dismissal of this action is appropriate based on Plaintiffs' failure to serve. See Nylok Corp. v. Fastener World Inc., 396 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Because district courts need to be able to control their dockets, we have stated that the amount of time allowed for foreign service is not unlimited.”); Inst. of Cetacean Rsch. v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc 'y, 153 F.Supp.3d 1291, 1320 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “has contacted one of [Plaintiffs'] officers and has informed [the officer] that [Defendant] is aware that Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] filed a lawsuit against him.” Mot. at 3.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
They are two different proceedings. The January Filing was related to a double check on some financials I believe. There was no error found but I believe they were just doing due diligence. The restraining order case is something different and looks as though it is not finalized. See the February notice posted at the bottom. I believe from what I'm interpreting and my non-professional first take is this:
Your "Long post" is total B.S. because you didn't link to a freekin' source.
CONTEXT is of vital importance in legal proceedings.
Once more you fail to provide a link to source.
Without CONTEXT and access to the allegation of filed documents your posting of alleged excerpts is futile.
Do you realize how absurd this claim is?
They are two different proceedings. The January Filing was related to a double check on some financials I believe. There was no error found but I believe they were just doing due diligence.
Hey, when your agenda is telling the TRUTH you have to pull out all the stops, LOL!!!
Yeah the charts show they diluted the snot out of the stock (colluding shorts and issuance both) ..
..
Yet you claim "Nothing to do with the structure of the business from what I can tell, just related to share sales..."
Talk about gullible - your quote:
I actually really think this information is really helpful and supports my belief in Dalrada's future success. I'll certainly be watching for any final outcomes but as someone who has tried to follow all the information I can related to DFCO I was happy to be introduced to this topic!
Yet another dark UK affiliated BONAR entity...
https://suite.endole.co.uk/insight/company/05290758-silicon-services-consortium-europe-ltd
Yep, typical Xena...
Tons of facts and hard DD backing it all up.
So this is a capture DepTec home page - note DFCO signage at left:
\
https://deptec.com/
But U.K. registration says it's private:
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
So this is a capture DepTec home page - note DFCO signage at left:
\
https://deptec.com/
But U.K. registration says it's private:
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
Clue-4-U...
You can't brand a logical, documented argument as "nonsense" and expect a rational audience to believe your S#IT.
Additional information and discussion about BRIAN BONAR can be found here:
https://investorshub.advfn.com/Dalrada-Financial-Corp-DFCO-2545
"POS Nelson" has posted a whole lot of truth about your buddy BRIAN BONAR this weekend.
Reference this thread:
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=173918916
I am not affiliated with LWLG
This comes directly from the SEC:
April 28, 2007
Via Electronic Mail: rule-comments@sec.gov
Nancy M. Morris
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090
I thank you for the opportunity to once again comment on these proposed amendments to
Reg SHO. Since the topic of rescinding parts of Rule 10 a-1 which along with NASD
Rule 3350 have historically outlawed abusive “Bid-banging” by the short selling
community (The “Bid” and “Tick” tests) is also on the table currently I will address this
issue also as it is inextricably linked to any proposed amendments to Reg SHO in general.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“On Wall Street one can make money by betting for or against U.S. corporations.
Abusive DTCC participants illegally accessing the exemption from borrowing before
making short sales accorded to “Bona fide” market makers only have merely noticed
that whether it pertains to building corporations or sandcastles it is much easier to
destroy one than to build one”. (JAD-2005)
*** text omitted here skip to page 16 - but it's all good ***
It is beyond the comprehension of the U.S. investors as to why you at the SEC and the
DTCC do not recognize the EMERGENT nature of this crisis. Not only does the
“Supply” of readily sellable shares go through the roof with this fraud the “Effective
demand” variable is muted by the constant need to naked short sell into each buy order
that appears in order to keep the share price artificially low so that the collateralization
requirements for astronomically large naked short positions don’t become usurious.
The SIMULTANEOUS artificial increase in the “Supply” of readily sellable shares and
readily sellable “Share entitlements” i.e. the “Effective supply” and the intentional
muting of “Demand” leading to an artificially reduced “Effective demand” due to nearly
all buy orders becoming neutralized by naked short sell orders can lead to tremendous
damages to “Price discovery” mechanisms and “Pricing efficiency” in general. Let’s not
forget the legal definition of MARKET MANIPULATION: The intentional
interference with the free (i.e. “Unmanipulated”) forces of supply and demand. As
we both know Rule 10 b-5 of the ’34 Act expressly forbids fraudulent “Manipulation” of
share prices.
The question arises as to why the SEC as well as the DTCC are intentionally
“INTERFERING”, via the lack of addressing these delivery failures as per their
congressional mandate, with allowing the FREE/ UNMANIPULATED forces of supply
and demand to interact and instead is allowing these ARTIFICIALLY MODIFIED
supply and demand variables, the products of “MANIPULATION”, to continue to
interact to determine artificially lowered share prices? The “Grandfather clause”
prohibited the “FREE forces of supply and demand to interact” and instead allowed
previously “Manipulated” “Supply” and “Demand” variables to continue to put
downward pressure on share prices especially those of development stage issuers forced
to constantly go to the market to raise funds at steep discounts to these artificially
lowered levels.
The type of securities fraud known as naked short selling is especially damaging because
it affects BOTH the supply of and the demand for “Shares” simultaneously. The
synergies created by affecting both of these variables in companies constantly needing to
go to the market to raise funds is beyond comprehension and the securities fraudsters are
very well aware of it. All they need is for the DTCC to continue to disavow any
knowledge of the fraud and for the SEC to intentionally stall any meaningful solutions to
the fraud and before you know it it’s “Game over” for another U.S. Corporation, the jobs
it provided and the investments made therein. Note that the “Pump and dump” type of
securities fraud is also heinous but it only involves an increase in the “Demand” variable
due usually to inaccurate and over-embellished press releases made by corrupt
management teams and associated promoters.
In this post-Reg SHO era we now have the benefit of about 26 months of 20-20 hindsight
to learn from. We know which remaining loopholes have become the “Loopholes of
choice”. Among others these include the “Grandfather clause”, Ex-Clearing
“Arrangements”, the activities of options market makers, having “Reasonable grounds”
to believe a “Borrow” is available, not so “Bona fide” market making activity, bogus
“Repurchase agreements”, etc. The use of these settlement circumventing “Repurchase
agreements” for example have recently gone through the roof in Q-4 of 2006.
The fact that we are now being asked to once again “Comment” on these issues after the
previous “Comment period” was so one-sided in favor of immediate reform tells us that
you at the SEC and those at the DTCC are just not up to fulfilling your Congressional
Mandates to PROMPTLY settle all trades and to provide “Investor protection and market
integrity”. This constant stalling of the inevitable mandate to address these archaic
delivery failures does not resonate with the concept of “Promptness” mandated by
Congress. I am going to bite my tongue and not tell you about how absolutely infuriated
the worldwide investment community became when you announced the necessity for yet
another “Comment period” on a subject matter that had 95% agreement on in the past
“Comment period”. I’m going to go way out on a limb and venture that others are going
to express their disdain for these incredibly obvious stall tactics. I’ll try to make my
comments in an educational manner because it is clear to me after 26 years of studying
and writing books on naked short selling that EDUCATION is indeed the key to
ERADICATION no matter how “Captive” or “Conflicted” the regulators and SROs in
charge of addressing these crimes have become.
The eight naked short selling related issues that clearly need the most attention are firstly
the IMMEDIATE rescission of the “Grandfather clause”, secondly addressing the
inadequacies of the “Threshold lists” which unfortunately only relate to delivery failures
held at “Registered Clearing Agencies” like the DTCC and which totally ignore the
majority of these very mobile “Delivery failures” which not so surprisingly have
migrated to other hiding places coincident with the effective date of Reg SHO. Thirdly, I
would deal with the shenanigans occurring in the “Ex-Clearing” world involving these
“Arrangements” to intentionally postpone “Good form delivery” and therefore the
“Prompt settlement” of trades. Fourthly, the abuses of securities laws occurring at
“Lending desks” involving the lending of parcels of securities in many directions
simultaneously to the mortal enemies of the invested in company while raking in
immense levels of rental income needs to be addressed. Fifthly, the need to address the
lack of a clear cut definition of what constitutes “Bona fide” market making activity and
more importantly what activities don’t qualify for accessing the exemption from
borrowing before making short sales which is legally only to be accessed by truly “Bona
fide” market makers and only while acting in that capacity. Leaving market makers with
their clearly superior visibility of the markets on the current “Honor system” in this
regard is sheer insanity. The parameters must be more explicit than just the barring of
“Speculative trading strategies”. Sixthly, the regulators must realize that the combination
of “Anonymous pooling” and “Daily netting” used at the NSCC division of the DTCC
although theoretically very “Efficient” is ripe for abuse. The true levels of delivery
failures are “Efficiently” being covered up as their lifespan is expanded indefinitely.
The clearance and settlement system clearly needs a mechanism to relate any “Shares”
reflected as being “Held long” on an investor’s monthly brokerage statement to a paper
certificate or other benchmark somewhere in the system. Without this the same “Parcel”
of shares, if they were identifiable i.e. NOT held in an “Anonymously pooled” or
“Fungible mass” format as they currently are, can be simultaneously but unknowingly be
“Held long” by many investors and can simultaneously be loaned out to many different
borrowers. These “Long positions” need traceability otherwise the well known ravages
of “Counterfeiting” will gut not only the integrity of these markets but also the share
structures of targeted issuers. The seventh issue that needs to be dealt with is the
aforementioned need to end the abusive hedging being employed by certain options
market makers knowingly or unknowingly in conjunction with the naked short selling
community. The eighth issue would be to strike down the qualification of a solid
“Borrow/locate” being attained by “Having reasonable grounds to believe that a
“Borrow” was available. The concept of a mere “Locate” in a clearance and settlement
system full of damaging “Share entitlements” flying through cyberspace is sheer insanity.
You either have a firm and traceable “Borrow” or you have a license to steal from
unknowing investors. There is no in between especially when the DTCC acting as the
SRO most intimately familiar with these matters publicly claims to be “Powerless” to
perform all 8 of its main congressional mandates and regulatory responsibilities.
This comes directly from the SEC:
April 28, 2007
Via Electronic Mail: rule-comments@sec.gov
Nancy M. Morris
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090
I thank you for the opportunity to once again comment on these proposed amendments to
Reg SHO. Since the topic of rescinding parts of Rule 10 a-1 which along with NASD
Rule 3350 have historically outlawed abusive “Bid-banging” by the short selling
community (The “Bid” and “Tick” tests) is also on the table currently I will address this
issue also as it is inextricably linked to any proposed amendments to Reg SHO in general.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“On Wall Street one can make money by betting for or against U.S. corporations.
Abusive DTCC participants illegally accessing the exemption from borrowing before
making short sales accorded to “Bona fide” market makers only have merely noticed
that whether it pertains to building corporations or sandcastles it is much easier to
destroy one than to build one”. (JAD-2005)
*** text omitted here skip to page 16 - but it's all good ***
It is beyond the comprehension of the U.S. investors as to why you at the SEC and the
DTCC do not recognize the EMERGENT nature of this crisis. Not only does the
“Supply” of readily sellable shares go through the roof with this fraud the “Effective
demand” variable is muted by the constant need to naked short sell into each buy order
that appears in order to keep the share price artificially low so that the collateralization
requirements for astronomically large naked short positions don’t become usurious.
The SIMULTANEOUS artificial increase in the “Supply” of readily sellable shares and
readily sellable “Share entitlements” i.e. the “Effective supply” and the intentional
muting of “Demand” leading to an artificially reduced “Effective demand” due to nearly
all buy orders becoming neutralized by naked short sell orders can lead to tremendous
damages to “Price discovery” mechanisms and “Pricing efficiency” in general. Let’s not
forget the legal definition of MARKET MANIPULATION: The intentional
interference with the free (i.e. “Unmanipulated”) forces of supply and demand. As
we both know Rule 10 b-5 of the ’34 Act expressly forbids fraudulent “Manipulation” of
share prices.
The question arises as to why the SEC as well as the DTCC are intentionally
“INTERFERING”, via the lack of addressing these delivery failures as per their
congressional mandate, with allowing the FREE/ UNMANIPULATED forces of supply
and demand to interact and instead is allowing these ARTIFICIALLY MODIFIED
supply and demand variables, the products of “MANIPULATION”, to continue to
interact to determine artificially lowered share prices? The “Grandfather clause”
prohibited the “FREE forces of supply and demand to interact” and instead allowed
previously “Manipulated” “Supply” and “Demand” variables to continue to put
downward pressure on share prices especially those of development stage issuers forced
to constantly go to the market to raise funds at steep discounts to these artificially
lowered levels.
The type of securities fraud known as naked short selling is especially damaging because
it affects BOTH the supply of and the demand for “Shares” simultaneously. The
synergies created by affecting both of these variables in companies constantly needing to
go to the market to raise funds is beyond comprehension and the securities fraudsters are
very well aware of it. All they need is for the DTCC to continue to disavow any
knowledge of the fraud and for the SEC to intentionally stall any meaningful solutions to
the fraud and before you know it it’s “Game over” for another U.S. Corporation, the jobs
it provided and the investments made therein. Note that the “Pump and dump” type of
securities fraud is also heinous but it only involves an increase in the “Demand” variable
due usually to inaccurate and over-embellished press releases made by corrupt
management teams and associated promoters.
In this post-Reg SHO era we now have the benefit of about 26 months of 20-20 hindsight
to learn from. We know which remaining loopholes have become the “Loopholes of
choice”. Among others these include the “Grandfather clause”, Ex-Clearing
“Arrangements”, the activities of options market makers, having “Reasonable grounds”
to believe a “Borrow” is available, not so “Bona fide” market making activity, bogus
“Repurchase agreements”, etc. The use of these settlement circumventing “Repurchase
agreements” for example have recently gone through the roof in Q-4 of 2006.
The fact that we are now being asked to once again “Comment” on these issues after the
previous “Comment period” was so one-sided in favor of immediate reform tells us that
you at the SEC and those at the DTCC are just not up to fulfilling your Congressional
Mandates to PROMPTLY settle all trades and to provide “Investor protection and market
integrity”. This constant stalling of the inevitable mandate to address these archaic
delivery failures does not resonate with the concept of “Promptness” mandated by
Congress. I am going to bite my tongue and not tell you about how absolutely infuriated
the worldwide investment community became when you announced the necessity for yet
another “Comment period” on a subject matter that had 95% agreement on in the past
“Comment period”. I’m going to go way out on a limb and venture that others are going
to express their disdain for these incredibly obvious stall tactics. I’ll try to make my
comments in an educational manner because it is clear to me after 26 years of studying
and writing books on naked short selling that EDUCATION is indeed the key to
ERADICATION no matter how “Captive” or “Conflicted” the regulators and SROs in
charge of addressing these crimes have become.
The eight naked short selling related issues that clearly need the most attention are firstly
the IMMEDIATE rescission of the “Grandfather clause”, secondly addressing the
inadequacies of the “Threshold lists” which unfortunately only relate to delivery failures
held at “Registered Clearing Agencies” like the DTCC and which totally ignore the
majority of these very mobile “Delivery failures” which not so surprisingly have
migrated to other hiding places coincident with the effective date of Reg SHO. Thirdly, I
would deal with the shenanigans occurring in the “Ex-Clearing” world involving these
“Arrangements” to intentionally postpone “Good form delivery” and therefore the
“Prompt settlement” of trades. Fourthly, the abuses of securities laws occurring at
“Lending desks” involving the lending of parcels of securities in many directions
simultaneously to the mortal enemies of the invested in company while raking in
immense levels of rental income needs to be addressed. Fifthly, the need to address the
lack of a clear cut definition of what constitutes “Bona fide” market making activity and
more importantly what activities don’t qualify for accessing the exemption from
borrowing before making short sales which is legally only to be accessed by truly “Bona
fide” market makers and only while acting in that capacity. Leaving market makers with
their clearly superior visibility of the markets on the current “Honor system” in this
regard is sheer insanity. The parameters must be more explicit than just the barring of
“Speculative trading strategies”. Sixthly, the regulators must realize that the combination
of “Anonymous pooling” and “Daily netting” used at the NSCC division of the DTCC
although theoretically very “Efficient” is ripe for abuse. The true levels of delivery
failures are “Efficiently” being covered up as their lifespan is expanded indefinitely.
The clearance and settlement system clearly needs a mechanism to relate any “Shares”
reflected as being “Held long” on an investor’s monthly brokerage statement to a paper
certificate or other benchmark somewhere in the system. Without this the same “Parcel”
of shares, if they were identifiable i.e. NOT held in an “Anonymously pooled” or
“Fungible mass” format as they currently are, can be simultaneously but unknowingly be
“Held long” by many investors and can simultaneously be loaned out to many different
borrowers. These “Long positions” need traceability otherwise the well known ravages
of “Counterfeiting” will gut not only the integrity of these markets but also the share
structures of targeted issuers. The seventh issue that needs to be dealt with is the
aforementioned need to end the abusive hedging being employed by certain options
market makers knowingly or unknowingly in conjunction with the naked short selling
community. The eighth issue would be to strike down the qualification of a solid
“Borrow/locate” being attained by “Having reasonable grounds to believe that a
“Borrow” was available. The concept of a mere “Locate” in a clearance and settlement
system full of damaging “Share entitlements” flying through cyberspace is sheer insanity.
You either have a firm and traceable “Borrow” or you have a license to steal from
unknowing investors. There is no in between especially when the DTCC acting as the
SRO most intimately familiar with these matters publicly claims to be “Powerless” to
perform all 8 of its main congressional mandates and regulatory responsibilities.
So what are the odds that an early IBM'er would have the technical knowledge to set up an AI computer scam before the rest of the population understood AI?
So what are the odds that an early IBM'er would have the technical knowledge to set up an AI computer scam before the rest of the population understood AI?
The most recent pump and dump:
The 1993 dump and pump and dump. Note distinct physical similarities to the current P&D. IMO it indicates a similar algorithm was employed:
The 2003 dump and pump and dump:
2007 was a total dump - BONAR was in legal trouble:
Statute of limitations runs out - time for another pump and dump, putting shares in place for the algo play. Go to the top of this post and you will see the outcome.:
The most recent pump and dump:
The 1993 dump and pump and dump. Note distinct physical similarities to the current P&D. IMO it indicates a similar algorithm was employed:
The 2003 dump and pump and dump:
2007 was a total dump - BONAR was in legal trouble:
Statute of limitations runs out - time for another pump and dump, putting shares in place for the algo play. Go to the top of this post and you will see the outcome.:
June case - BONAR LOST...
I've been posting about why he lost and what's really going on here...
https://media1.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExOXJsajR3Y2JtMW9qMzQyZzZ2eGU5Y2JpbWI5NGk3ZjA0eDhwbjhyNyZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/LmCYGjPpr1SDS6FqZX/giphy.gif
Of course the fact that private BONAR BUDDY entities are ready to soak up all the assets of this farcical entity are something you are not willing to discuss.
And then we have the mechanical explanation of why the early distribution among DFCO PLAYAS allowed future manipulation...
Let's tell the truth now....
The Ultimate DD about the CEBE (Counterfeit Electronic Book Entries) created by the SBP (Share Borrow Program) within the DTCC. Written by Dr. Jim DeCosta on a forum from 2006. Want it to get immortalized on Reddit.
📚 Due Diligence
Sitting on the plane yesterday, I was reading over some of the work a friend of mine produced on naked short selling, and it occurred to me that this info belongs in a venue where the public can access it. So I broke my commitment to take a few days off, away from computers, to post this - and then I will really stay offline...
By way of introduction, let me say that there are authorities, and then there are authorities. The gentleman in question is a true expert on the topic, partly because he’s been studying the issue for about 25 years – his comments to the SEC on Reg SHO have taken on near mythical status, as they so clearly warned of the abuse that would come should the SEC not implement the safeguards he’d advocated. His name is likely familiar to many who have closely followed this topic – Dr. Jim DeCosta.
The challenge in presenting the true state of the union is to provide data, supported by research, in bite-sized morsels that people can digest. I feel that his work is among the most comprehensive I’ve seen on the subject, so I leaned on him to allow me to publish a small sampling of his material. His premise has always been that the solution to the entire NSS mess lies in educating the investing public, the regulators, the Judiciary, and anybody else with a vested interest in the clearance and settlement system.
He’s written 2-1/2 unpublished books on naked short selling, which contain more data than any other work on the subject I’ve seen. In Chapter 42 he delineates some of what he calls “Not so bullet points”. He lists 40 of them, but I’m only going to publish the first dozen for now, as there is a lot of information to assimilate.
So without further ado, the first of Dr. Jim’s bullet points:
“I want to end this Chapter 42 with 40 “Not so bullet points” in regards to DTCC behavior in general. Many of these were revealed in the above analysis of the DTCC’s “Self-interview” and others were covered in previous chapters. My goal here is to get all readers on the same wavelength and build a foundation from which we can tackle the concepts in the last 28 chapters of this book and then move onto Book #3.
40 NOT SO BULLET POINTS IN RE: NAKED SHORT SELLING
Legitimate and illegitimate electronic book entries at the DTCC: Every trade involving a failed delivery that is allowed to “clear”, or more accurately, is bailed out, by a DTCC Stock Borrow Program (SBP) pseudo-borrow (a) results in a “Counterfeit Electronic Book-Entry” (“CEBE”) – an electronic book-entry held at the DTCC without corresponding paper-certificated shares held in a DTCC vault, or anywhere else, to justify their existence. (a) “Pseudo-borrow” is defined as an illegitimate borrow made from a self-replenishing anonymous pool especially one whose contents are admittedly not monitored.
Why are these pseudo-borrows illegitimate? Because the admittedly unmonitored contents (or “pseudo-shares” theoretically “borrowed” from the SBP lending pool to cure the failed delivery), are allowed to be replaced right back into the same pool of lendable shares by the new purchaser’s broker/dealer, as if they never left in the first place. (Chapter 4) Even if all of the “Shares” residing in the lending pool at a given time were legally there, i.e. a margin agreement was signed approving their being loaned or hypothecated, this policy would still be insane.
The DTCC tells us that 20% of all failed deliveries at the DTCC are dealt with via the SBP’s creation of these CEBEs. This violates Section 17A of the ’34 Act, as Section 17 A only allowed the DTCC to convert 100 million “Acme” paper-certificated shares held in their vault [and under their legal custody] into 100 million Acme electronic book-entry “Shares” in their “book-entry” system. The reasoning for moving from paper to electronic book-entries was that electronic book-entries are much more efficient to process - especially important in the midst of the 1969 “paperwork crisis” that drove the move to automation.
The CEBEs created by the SBP are above and beyond what Section 17 A permitted. NASD Rule 11830 later expanded the one-for-one ratio of paper-to-electronic shares, and effectively allowed there to be 100.5 million Acme shares (0.5% above the number of shares outstanding) held in electronic book-entry format, before buy-ins of the overage of delivery failures was mandated. Rule 11830 provided the critical “metric” in regards to the number of “Unaddressed delivery failures” (the size of the naked short position at the DTCC) above which action was mandated, to halt the incredibly obvious dilutional damage incurred by an issuer, and the investors therein.
2) CEBEs. CEBEs cause artificial dilution because they represent readily sellable share facsimiles, without any rights attached - misrepresented (a) on an investor’s monthly brokerage statement as being genuine “Shares” (with an attached package of rights). They are readily sellable facsimiles by necessity, because there is no way a DTCC participating b/d could refuse to take a sell order, or refuse to provide voting privileges, for something that it has implied to its client as being genuine “Shares held long” on their behalf (as per the fiduciary duty of care owed as an agent/broker, to its client that paid it a commission).
Recall from earlier chapters how the perceived value of each of the (dozen or so) component rights which make up a genuine “Share” are what gives a “Share” its value. The components of the rights package are the “Share.” As an example, the dividend “Right” attached to a corporation paying a generous annual dividend, would have a commensurately larger perceived value ascribed to that particular right. Paper certificates and electronic book entries are mere formats to account for “Share” ownership; they’re not the “Share” – and formats have no intrinsic value – it’s the package of rights that has the value.
(a) (Misrepresentation: A false representation of a matter of fact that should have been disclosed, which deceives another so that he/she acts upon it to his/her injury)
3) Unaddressed CEBEs kill corporations, via massive dilution, if they are not constantly and rigorously monitored for their quantity, age, and the legitimacy of the failed delivery that procreated them. In naked short selling (NSS), the mere method of placing the bet against a corporation increases the odds of winning the bet, because of the dilutional damage done with each negative bet placed that didn’t involve a legitimate “borrow”. Note that even legal short selling done as sloppily as it is done on Wall Street via “iffy locates” (as the SEC calls them), causes artificial dilution - but legal short selling has a built-in “Governor”: there are only a finite number of legitimate shares legally-loanable. NSS has no such “Governor”, and there’s no limit to the damage that can be inflicted upon an issuer. As mentioned before, “pricing efficiency” mandates that all short sales or “negative votes” against a corporation be counted - but only if they are preceded by a legitimate “borrow”.
This lack of a “Governor” creates the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of NSS; just keep selling nonexistent shares until the company goes down. It’s analogous to ballot box stuffing. The mindset of the abusive DTCC participants and their co-conspirators becomes, “don't worry nobody's watching and you'll never be bought in, because the DTCC can be 100% counted on to pretend to be “powerless” in collecting the IOUs owed directly to them as the loan intermediary in the SBP “pseudo-borrow” process.
4) The only modality available to address archaic, excessive or illegitimate CEBEs is an open market "buy-in" - except for the extremely rare “negotiated settlement” with the victimized issuer.
5) Buy-ins force the seller of the nonexistent shares (who has refused to deliver them in a timely manner), to open his wallet, grab the investor’s money that he acquired under false pretenses as the share price “tanked,” and spend this money on purchasing the shares that he has already sold, but refuses to repurchase and deliver even after inordinate amounts of time. (See Dr. Boni’s research)
Recall the 2 parameters from earlier chapters that help address any intent to defraud issues – the length of time of this “refusal”, as well as whether or not the price has been declining during the “refusal” period. An abusive MM that refuses to cover even when the share price is tanking is, by definition, not acting in a bonafide market making capacity, and thus isn’t deserving of the pre-short-sale borrowing exemption accorded to “bonafide” MM’s only, and only while acting in that capacity. Recall that a true, bonafide MM deploys the proceeds from naked short sales at higher levels to post bids at lower levels, in order to flatten out the position and stabilize the markets. As we’ve seen time and time again, abusive market makers with these “stabilizing bids” are nowhere to be found as the share price of a victimized issuer drops - in fact, they’re still selling aggressively. If you know that you’re not going to be caught or prosecuted, why would an abusive DTCC participant decrease the size of the pile of booty taken from naïve investors by covering his naked short position? Why not increase the size of this plunder more yet? Decisions, decisions, increase or decrease the stack of stolen money sitting in front of one.
Recall the “triple whammy” from earlier chapters that occurs if an abusive DTCC participant did choose to cover. First of all, if you’ve been the only seller for a couple years, the mere action of stopping the selling will cause the share price to gap upwards, as it has been actively forced downwards in the past. Secondly, this increase in share price from the cessation of active selling will increase the collateralization requirements for the naked short position still on the books. Thirdly, if the abuser not only stops selling but actually starts buying then the share price will have am even greater tendency to gap upwards, which will exacerbate the collateralization requirements, as well as the price needing to be paid for future covering. In other words, THEY CAN’T COVER, and the SEC knew this when they grandfathered in all preexisting delivery failures as part of Reg SHO.
The mandated buy-in approach is extremely efficient because it results in the bill for the buy-in landing in the lap of the fraudster doing the naked short selling, no matter how many layers of “dummy, straw, or nominee” corporations he is acting through (usually in various offshore havens with various banking secrecy laws, that are inexplicably allowed to interface with the DTCC – Canada included). None of the intermediaries in these transactions are going to bail out those that actually placed the order. The clearing firms holding these NSS positions in their “DTCC participant” securities accounts have been well-collateralized, due to the theoretically ultra-high risk nature of the naked short selling of penny stocks -so there is money sitting there ready to be deployed.
6) The very obvious buy-in solution is violently fought by the DTCC, as well as the SEC, as witnessed in the research results of Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2003), showing that only one-eighth of 1% of Rule 11830 mandated buy-ins are ever effected. Why? In the case of the DTCC, it’s because their abusive market maker participants/owners, aware of how easy it is to steal a naïve investor’s money, are net naked short almost all of the development-stage corporations they make a market in. They know how tipped the playing field is and how these OTC markets are essentially rigged in favor of the DTCC participants owing a fiduciary duty of care to their clients - the investors whose money they are rerouting into their own wallets. They wouldn't be caught net long a development-stage micro cap corporation to save their lives. They may or may not know all of the intricacies of naked short selling, but they all know enough to work from a net short position. The reason why the SEC adamantly opposes buy-ins is a little more problematic, and the subject of a variety of theories held by various securities scholars. We’ll review them in future chapters.
A truly bonafide MM will hover near net neutral positions, sometimes net long, sometimes net short. He doesn’t get painted into a corner with a massive naked short position that forces him into criminal behavior to avoid financial catastrophes. He’s happy with living off “the spread”. Unfortunately for most MMs, these spreads became razor-thin after decimalization was instituted 5 years ago. Unlike an abusive MM that’s sitting on an astronomic naked short position in need of constant collateralization, the bonafide MM is not afraid to let a market with an imbalance of buy orders over sell orders advance in price until it reaches its own equilibrium level. The bonafide MM would naturally rather NSS shares at higher levels than at lower levels. The truly bonafide MM doesn’t dictate share price – rather, he buffers the wild swings in share price, and injects much needed liquidity into the markets of thinly-traded securities, and provides “pricing efficiency”, as noted in Chapter 18. The abusive MM, however, does not have the “luxury” of allowing prices to advance in buy order-dominated markets, as the cost to collateralize large naked short positions in advancing share price environments makes it cost-prohibitive. Abusive MMs are often forced to put a blanket of naked short sales over markets where they “accidentally” ran up a huge naked short position, but where buy orders keep coming in. You’ll recognize this scenario when you see victimized issuers mysteriously trading their entire float of shares every 3 or 4 days with the market going absolutely nowhere. Does anybody really think that all of these issuer’s shareholders got up one morning and simultaneously decided to sell all of their shares? Unfortunately for U.S. citizens, this buy order-dominated scenario often occurs in promising development-stage corporations with a wonderful prognosis for success, that now have to be snuffed out, lest abusive DTCC participants take a huge financial hit.
Many NSS proponents are of the mindset that all U.S. development-stage companies that advance in share price are by default “scams” in the midst of a “pump and dump” form of securities fraud. The irony of the SEC’s historical lack of success in stamping out “pump and dumps” is that they inadvertently welcomed an “irrefutable” form of fraud involving the blatant theft of money from naïve investors (NSS), in order to address a “suspected” form of fraud which gave rise to the “vigilante” type of naked short seller.
7) At the DTCC, the deterrence value of untimely buy-ins (which provides the “natural” deterrent to NSS abuses) has been surgically removed by DTCC policies, making the risk/reward ratio of this form of securities fraud incredibly low. The consistent refusal of the DTCC to buy-in the IOUs owed directly to them as the “loan intermediary” in the SBP’s pseudo borrowing process, is one of the two main factors that creates an invitation for fraudsters to pile on naked short sales on already brutalized victim companies. This refusal to buy-in is one of the most important pillars supporting that which many securities scholars refer to as “DTCC sponsored NSS” – namely the 100% certainty the fraudsters have that the DTCC will refuse to call in their own IOUs (while acting as the “loan intermediary” of the SBP) because of their claim of being “powerless” to do so.
An equally important pillar supporting NSS “DTCC style” involves the ability to count on the DTCC to claim to be equally “powerless” in monitoring and buying-in the failed deliveries of their participants/owners held in an “ex-clearing” format. The claim here is that these non-CNS delivery “arrangements” (I love that term “arrangements”!) associated with failed deliveries represent “contracts” between the DTCC’s participants/owners, and that the DTCC does not monitor “contract” law – only “securities” laws. This, despite the fact that they volunteer to process the cash part of these naked short sales (leading to failed deliveries), and still “clear” these trades and issue “securities orders” to allow these “non-CNS delivery arrangements”. This de facto serves to artificially delay settlement, as expressly forbidden by 15c6-1 of the ’34 act.
8) NASD Rule 11830 defines the threshold for the number of CEBEs (above which mandated buy-ins are necessary) as 10,000 shares AND 0.5% of the number of shares legally issued. Any CEBEs exceeding this level indicates that abusive dematerialization (as reviewed in Chapter 3) is occurring. This level is where the alarm bells should create a deafening noise but unfortunately for investors the wire to that alarm bell was effectively short-circuited by several of the rules and regulations of the DTCC and NSCC.
9) The conventional metric for determining the age of CEBEs (above which buy-ins should occur) would naturally correspond to the spirit of Addendum C to the rules and regulations of the NSCC, which created the SBP for deliveries that for legitimate reasons couldn’t quite be delivered by settlement day. The authors of Addendum C were well aware that it was critical to keep the lifespan of the CEBE extremely short. The assumption was that the DTCC would rigorously monitor the age, quantity, and legitimacy of these representations of shares, as they were clearly capable of causing massive damage via artificial dilution.
From a statistical point of view, the question that begs to be asked is: Is it a coincidence that the DTCC management: 1) allows its participants/owners to naked short sell with abandon, 2) refuses to monitor the age, quantity and legitimacy of the resultant failed deliveries, 3) refuses to call in its own IOUs resulting from its participants’ abuse of the SBP (because of its self-imposed “powerlessness” to do so), 4) refuses to monitor its participants’ failed deliveries in the ex-clearing netherworld (because of their theoretical “contractual” nature), despite the DTCC being an SRO in charge of “regulating the conduct and business practices of its members” as well as 17 A’s mandate to “promptly and accurately “settle” all transactions, and 5) goes well out of its way to remove the one natural deterrent to naked short selling abuse - the open-market buy-in? A second question begging to be asked is: when does a long litany of coincidences fail to plausibly remain a coincidence?
Remember, the DTCC is its owners. It's not some independent 3rd party, off to the side. There are 2 parties in the investment arena: the investors, and the DTCC-participating “Wall Street professionals” - with a vastly superior “KAV” factor (Knowledge of, Access to and Visibility of the clearance and settlement system). The DTCC portends to be playing an intermediary role between the buying and selling parties, while acting in the capacity of a “contra-party” to all trades, and the “loan intermediary” in the SBP pseudo-borrow process. But, as mentioned in earlier chapters, you can’t play a legally defensible “intermediary” role when you ARE one of the two parties being “intermediated”.
10) The methodology of monitoring for the legitimacy of failed deliveries was probably assumed by Congress and the SEC to involve the DTCC’s monitoring of their participating market makers’ usage of the bona-fide market maker exemption, and detection of any suspicious trading patterns and failed delivery patterns. These patterns jump out at you when access to this data is attained, and yet no matter how often an abusive clearing firm fails delivery of shares of a given issuer, all further delivery failures of this issuer’s shares by the abusive clearing firm are still assumed to be “legitimate”, as if by default. Recall the Compudyne case cited earlier, involving nearly a thousand consecutive trades failing delivery, without a single alarm bell going off. Every regulator and SRO seems to think that the monitoring for bona fide market making activity is the job of a different regulator and SRO - which leaves us with a regulatory vacuum, and the resultant “Industry within an industry” we refer to as naked short selling.
11) As the DTCC has been recently yelling from the mountaintops, the SEC did indeed authorize the SBP in 1981 to address legitimate failed deliveries – provided that the reason for the delay was of a legitimate nature (and there are indeed “legitimate” reasons for short-term delays in delivery). The assumption was that the DTCC would create checks and balances to monitor for abuses of this ultra-risky gamble (which allowed for the deliberate creation of a minute amount of “counterfeit” share “replicas” in an effort to enhance efficiencies in the clearing process). We have already identified over a dozen of these theoretical “quests for enhanced efficiencies” that have been abused by some DTCC participants to gain leverage over the investors they owe a fiduciary duty of care to, so it is questionable if that assumption was a reasonable one. Be that as it may, the other assumption was that the participants of the DTCC would act in good faith with this gigantic new responsibility (and incredibly large temptation to leverage their “KAV” factor and steal from investors). As it turns out there is way too much money “in play” on Wall Street to assume that those with an inherent advantage won’t leverage it.
12) Dr. Leslie Boni, while working as a visiting economic scholar for the SEC, was given access to the DTCC records. This was heretofore unheard of, except for perhaps the New York Supreme Court’s granting of discovery into the DTCC trading records to the CEO of Eagletech, in their NSS case.
Professor Boni found two distinct sub-types of delivery failures whose “median” ( half younger than and half older than) age was about 13 days. Half of delivery failures averaged about 6-7 days, assuming a bell-shaped curve distribution, and were of the type that the SBP was created to address. The older half of delivery failures, however, averaged approximately 106 days, again based upon a bell-shaped curve distribution. The overall average, or “mean” age of delivery failures, was 6 days plus 106 days divided by 2, equaling 56 days as opposed to T+3. These findings were obviously not consistent with the intentions of the SBP, as promulgated by Addendum C. Some DTCC participants had obviously chosen to not act in good faith, but rather to leverage their superior knowledge, access and visibility and abuse the SBP for their own monetary gain. They learned that nobody at the DTCC was rigorously monitoring for the age, quantity, or legitimacy of these failed deliveries, and that they could sell nonexistent shares all day long, and actually get access to the unknowing investors’ money. All they had to do was let the SBP allow these trades to “clear” via a pseudo-borrow, from what turns out to be a self-replenishing lending pool, whose contents are also admittedly not being monitored (see the @dtcc self-interview where the DTCC admits that they have placed their participants on the honor system in regards to what they place into the lending pool). Once this bogus trade cleared, then all the fraudsters had to do was to collateralize this debt on a daily marked-to-market basis. The precipitous fall in share price resulting from all of this artificial dilution involving “Share facsimiles” led to an unconscionable result - the investor’s money actually falls into the lap of the naked short selling fraudsters, despite the fact that they were still refusing to purchase the shares required to cover the short sale after inordinate amounts of time.
As it turns out, short covering is not necessary to gain access to the defrauded investors’ money. One must only collateralize the ever-diminishing debt, as the share price does its 100% predictable plunge driven by all the artificial dilution being created. Unlike the DTCC and its participants, there are those investors and securities scholars who find this concept disturbing – and one hopes that the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee, the overseers of the SEC, will as well.
Recall from earlier chapters that the risk of being bought-in was essentially zero, as the DTCC could be counted on to see to that via their policies and procedures. The closest thing to a real buy-in was just another trip to the self-replenishing lending SBP lending pool via the DTCC’s “Procedure X-1” Policy. “
SITE REFERENCE
https://cmkxunitedforum.proboards.com/thread/13156/02-analysis-nss-jim-decosta
LAST EXAMPLES
A quip to the SEC from Dr. DeCosta. The man is savage: “7) In 3 (ii) (B) withholding the proceeds of the crime for 90 days is like handing a bank robber the proceeds of the heist after a 90 day waiting period. This is a crime being committed. The motive is greed. The shares that were sold for real money don't exist, they never did. There was no intent to ever cover this naked short position. The "intent to defraud" is typically present right from the "get go" as there is usually not an imbalance of buy orders over sell orders at the higher trading levels of these "bear raid" victims.”
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72303/decosta122203.htm
EDIT: a few users mentioned that the SBP was discontinued officially in 2014 from the SEC https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nscc/2014/34-71455.pdf
This makes the GME debacle even worse for all official institutions and it’s participants up and down the chain. They’ve banned the process and continue to blatantly break the law. They’ve gotten so comfortable doing crime in broad daylight it’s why we watch 10-20 point drops on the live charts any given day/week.
EDIT 2
This video is from 12 years ago but it shows what we’ve been up against and proves the SEC won’t act even with the GameStop situation. It shows that we must take matters into our own hands by DRS and potentially even removing the physical stock certificates as the final nuke:
https://vimeo.com/4520843
EDIT 3:
Dr. Jim DeCosta has been writing to the SEC for over a decade with all the whistle blowing evidence the SEC needs to act and nothing has happened. In the video link above about NSS(Naked Short Selling) 5000 cases were sent to the SEC and not 1 was acted on. Welcome to a Madmax reality meaning we’re on our own which is what they thought would happen. What they didn’t expect is APES STRONG TOGETHER!
Here are a lot of Dr. DeCosta’s files:
https://cmkxunitedforum.proboards.com/board/14/dr-jim-decosta-files
WHERE’S THE GAMESTOP REPORT GARY!
Let's tell the truth now....
The Ultimate DD about the CEBE (Counterfeit Electronic Book Entries) created by the SBP (Share Borrow Program) within the DTCC. Written by Dr. Jim DeCosta on a forum from 2006. Want it to get immortalized on Reddit.
📚 Due Diligence
Sitting on the plane yesterday, I was reading over some of the work a friend of mine produced on naked short selling, and it occurred to me that this info belongs in a venue where the public can access it. So I broke my commitment to take a few days off, away from computers, to post this - and then I will really stay offline...
By way of introduction, let me say that there are authorities, and then there are authorities. The gentleman in question is a true expert on the topic, partly because he’s been studying the issue for about 25 years – his comments to the SEC on Reg SHO have taken on near mythical status, as they so clearly warned of the abuse that would come should the SEC not implement the safeguards he’d advocated. His name is likely familiar to many who have closely followed this topic – Dr. Jim DeCosta.
The challenge in presenting the true state of the union is to provide data, supported by research, in bite-sized morsels that people can digest. I feel that his work is among the most comprehensive I’ve seen on the subject, so I leaned on him to allow me to publish a small sampling of his material. His premise has always been that the solution to the entire NSS mess lies in educating the investing public, the regulators, the Judiciary, and anybody else with a vested interest in the clearance and settlement system.
He’s written 2-1/2 unpublished books on naked short selling, which contain more data than any other work on the subject I’ve seen. In Chapter 42 he delineates some of what he calls “Not so bullet points”. He lists 40 of them, but I’m only going to publish the first dozen for now, as there is a lot of information to assimilate.
So without further ado, the first of Dr. Jim’s bullet points:
“I want to end this Chapter 42 with 40 “Not so bullet points” in regards to DTCC behavior in general. Many of these were revealed in the above analysis of the DTCC’s “Self-interview” and others were covered in previous chapters. My goal here is to get all readers on the same wavelength and build a foundation from which we can tackle the concepts in the last 28 chapters of this book and then move onto Book #3.
40 NOT SO BULLET POINTS IN RE: NAKED SHORT SELLING
Legitimate and illegitimate electronic book entries at the DTCC: Every trade involving a failed delivery that is allowed to “clear”, or more accurately, is bailed out, by a DTCC Stock Borrow Program (SBP) pseudo-borrow (a) results in a “Counterfeit Electronic Book-Entry” (“CEBE”) – an electronic book-entry held at the DTCC without corresponding paper-certificated shares held in a DTCC vault, or anywhere else, to justify their existence. (a) “Pseudo-borrow” is defined as an illegitimate borrow made from a self-replenishing anonymous pool especially one whose contents are admittedly not monitored.
Why are these pseudo-borrows illegitimate? Because the admittedly unmonitored contents (or “pseudo-shares” theoretically “borrowed” from the SBP lending pool to cure the failed delivery), are allowed to be replaced right back into the same pool of lendable shares by the new purchaser’s broker/dealer, as if they never left in the first place. (Chapter 4) Even if all of the “Shares” residing in the lending pool at a given time were legally there, i.e. a margin agreement was signed approving their being loaned or hypothecated, this policy would still be insane.
The DTCC tells us that 20% of all failed deliveries at the DTCC are dealt with via the SBP’s creation of these CEBEs. This violates Section 17A of the ’34 Act, as Section 17 A only allowed the DTCC to convert 100 million “Acme” paper-certificated shares held in their vault [and under their legal custody] into 100 million Acme electronic book-entry “Shares” in their “book-entry” system. The reasoning for moving from paper to electronic book-entries was that electronic book-entries are much more efficient to process - especially important in the midst of the 1969 “paperwork crisis” that drove the move to automation.
The CEBEs created by the SBP are above and beyond what Section 17 A permitted. NASD Rule 11830 later expanded the one-for-one ratio of paper-to-electronic shares, and effectively allowed there to be 100.5 million Acme shares (0.5% above the number of shares outstanding) held in electronic book-entry format, before buy-ins of the overage of delivery failures was mandated. Rule 11830 provided the critical “metric” in regards to the number of “Unaddressed delivery failures” (the size of the naked short position at the DTCC) above which action was mandated, to halt the incredibly obvious dilutional damage incurred by an issuer, and the investors therein.
2) CEBEs. CEBEs cause artificial dilution because they represent readily sellable share facsimiles, without any rights attached - misrepresented (a) on an investor’s monthly brokerage statement as being genuine “Shares” (with an attached package of rights). They are readily sellable facsimiles by necessity, because there is no way a DTCC participating b/d could refuse to take a sell order, or refuse to provide voting privileges, for something that it has implied to its client as being genuine “Shares held long” on their behalf (as per the fiduciary duty of care owed as an agent/broker, to its client that paid it a commission).
Recall from earlier chapters how the perceived value of each of the (dozen or so) component rights which make up a genuine “Share” are what gives a “Share” its value. The components of the rights package are the “Share.” As an example, the dividend “Right” attached to a corporation paying a generous annual dividend, would have a commensurately larger perceived value ascribed to that particular right. Paper certificates and electronic book entries are mere formats to account for “Share” ownership; they’re not the “Share” – and formats have no intrinsic value – it’s the package of rights that has the value.
(a) (Misrepresentation: A false representation of a matter of fact that should have been disclosed, which deceives another so that he/she acts upon it to his/her injury)
3) Unaddressed CEBEs kill corporations, via massive dilution, if they are not constantly and rigorously monitored for their quantity, age, and the legitimacy of the failed delivery that procreated them. In naked short selling (NSS), the mere method of placing the bet against a corporation increases the odds of winning the bet, because of the dilutional damage done with each negative bet placed that didn’t involve a legitimate “borrow”. Note that even legal short selling done as sloppily as it is done on Wall Street via “iffy locates” (as the SEC calls them), causes artificial dilution - but legal short selling has a built-in “Governor”: there are only a finite number of legitimate shares legally-loanable. NSS has no such “Governor”, and there’s no limit to the damage that can be inflicted upon an issuer. As mentioned before, “pricing efficiency” mandates that all short sales or “negative votes” against a corporation be counted - but only if they are preceded by a legitimate “borrow”.
This lack of a “Governor” creates the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of NSS; just keep selling nonexistent shares until the company goes down. It’s analogous to ballot box stuffing. The mindset of the abusive DTCC participants and their co-conspirators becomes, “don't worry nobody's watching and you'll never be bought in, because the DTCC can be 100% counted on to pretend to be “powerless” in collecting the IOUs owed directly to them as the loan intermediary in the SBP “pseudo-borrow” process.
4) The only modality available to address archaic, excessive or illegitimate CEBEs is an open market "buy-in" - except for the extremely rare “negotiated settlement” with the victimized issuer.
5) Buy-ins force the seller of the nonexistent shares (who has refused to deliver them in a timely manner), to open his wallet, grab the investor’s money that he acquired under false pretenses as the share price “tanked,” and spend this money on purchasing the shares that he has already sold, but refuses to repurchase and deliver even after inordinate amounts of time. (See Dr. Boni’s research)
Recall the 2 parameters from earlier chapters that help address any intent to defraud issues – the length of time of this “refusal”, as well as whether or not the price has been declining during the “refusal” period. An abusive MM that refuses to cover even when the share price is tanking is, by definition, not acting in a bonafide market making capacity, and thus isn’t deserving of the pre-short-sale borrowing exemption accorded to “bonafide” MM’s only, and only while acting in that capacity. Recall that a true, bonafide MM deploys the proceeds from naked short sales at higher levels to post bids at lower levels, in order to flatten out the position and stabilize the markets. As we’ve seen time and time again, abusive market makers with these “stabilizing bids” are nowhere to be found as the share price of a victimized issuer drops - in fact, they’re still selling aggressively. If you know that you’re not going to be caught or prosecuted, why would an abusive DTCC participant decrease the size of the pile of booty taken from naïve investors by covering his naked short position? Why not increase the size of this plunder more yet? Decisions, decisions, increase or decrease the stack of stolen money sitting in front of one.
Recall the “triple whammy” from earlier chapters that occurs if an abusive DTCC participant did choose to cover. First of all, if you’ve been the only seller for a couple years, the mere action of stopping the selling will cause the share price to gap upwards, as it has been actively forced downwards in the past. Secondly, this increase in share price from the cessation of active selling will increase the collateralization requirements for the naked short position still on the books. Thirdly, if the abuser not only stops selling but actually starts buying then the share price will have am even greater tendency to gap upwards, which will exacerbate the collateralization requirements, as well as the price needing to be paid for future covering. In other words, THEY CAN’T COVER, and the SEC knew this when they grandfathered in all preexisting delivery failures as part of Reg SHO.
The mandated buy-in approach is extremely efficient because it results in the bill for the buy-in landing in the lap of the fraudster doing the naked short selling, no matter how many layers of “dummy, straw, or nominee” corporations he is acting through (usually in various offshore havens with various banking secrecy laws, that are inexplicably allowed to interface with the DTCC – Canada included). None of the intermediaries in these transactions are going to bail out those that actually placed the order. The clearing firms holding these NSS positions in their “DTCC participant” securities accounts have been well-collateralized, due to the theoretically ultra-high risk nature of the naked short selling of penny stocks -so there is money sitting there ready to be deployed.
6) The very obvious buy-in solution is violently fought by the DTCC, as well as the SEC, as witnessed in the research results of Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2003), showing that only one-eighth of 1% of Rule 11830 mandated buy-ins are ever effected. Why? In the case of the DTCC, it’s because their abusive market maker participants/owners, aware of how easy it is to steal a naïve investor’s money, are net naked short almost all of the development-stage corporations they make a market in. They know how tipped the playing field is and how these OTC markets are essentially rigged in favor of the DTCC participants owing a fiduciary duty of care to their clients - the investors whose money they are rerouting into their own wallets. They wouldn't be caught net long a development-stage micro cap corporation to save their lives. They may or may not know all of the intricacies of naked short selling, but they all know enough to work from a net short position. The reason why the SEC adamantly opposes buy-ins is a little more problematic, and the subject of a variety of theories held by various securities scholars. We’ll review them in future chapters.
A truly bonafide MM will hover near net neutral positions, sometimes net long, sometimes net short. He doesn’t get painted into a corner with a massive naked short position that forces him into criminal behavior to avoid financial catastrophes. He’s happy with living off “the spread”. Unfortunately for most MMs, these spreads became razor-thin after decimalization was instituted 5 years ago. Unlike an abusive MM that’s sitting on an astronomic naked short position in need of constant collateralization, the bonafide MM is not afraid to let a market with an imbalance of buy orders over sell orders advance in price until it reaches its own equilibrium level. The bonafide MM would naturally rather NSS shares at higher levels than at lower levels. The truly bonafide MM doesn’t dictate share price – rather, he buffers the wild swings in share price, and injects much needed liquidity into the markets of thinly-traded securities, and provides “pricing efficiency”, as noted in Chapter 18. The abusive MM, however, does not have the “luxury” of allowing prices to advance in buy order-dominated markets, as the cost to collateralize large naked short positions in advancing share price environments makes it cost-prohibitive. Abusive MMs are often forced to put a blanket of naked short sales over markets where they “accidentally” ran up a huge naked short position, but where buy orders keep coming in. You’ll recognize this scenario when you see victimized issuers mysteriously trading their entire float of shares every 3 or 4 days with the market going absolutely nowhere. Does anybody really think that all of these issuer’s shareholders got up one morning and simultaneously decided to sell all of their shares? Unfortunately for U.S. citizens, this buy order-dominated scenario often occurs in promising development-stage corporations with a wonderful prognosis for success, that now have to be snuffed out, lest abusive DTCC participants take a huge financial hit.
Many NSS proponents are of the mindset that all U.S. development-stage companies that advance in share price are by default “scams” in the midst of a “pump and dump” form of securities fraud. The irony of the SEC’s historical lack of success in stamping out “pump and dumps” is that they inadvertently welcomed an “irrefutable” form of fraud involving the blatant theft of money from naïve investors (NSS), in order to address a “suspected” form of fraud which gave rise to the “vigilante” type of naked short seller.
7) At the DTCC, the deterrence value of untimely buy-ins (which provides the “natural” deterrent to NSS abuses) has been surgically removed by DTCC policies, making the risk/reward ratio of this form of securities fraud incredibly low. The consistent refusal of the DTCC to buy-in the IOUs owed directly to them as the “loan intermediary” in the SBP’s pseudo borrowing process, is one of the two main factors that creates an invitation for fraudsters to pile on naked short sales on already brutalized victim companies. This refusal to buy-in is one of the most important pillars supporting that which many securities scholars refer to as “DTCC sponsored NSS” – namely the 100% certainty the fraudsters have that the DTCC will refuse to call in their own IOUs (while acting as the “loan intermediary” of the SBP) because of their claim of being “powerless” to do so.
An equally important pillar supporting NSS “DTCC style” involves the ability to count on the DTCC to claim to be equally “powerless” in monitoring and buying-in the failed deliveries of their participants/owners held in an “ex-clearing” format. The claim here is that these non-CNS delivery “arrangements” (I love that term “arrangements”!) associated with failed deliveries represent “contracts” between the DTCC’s participants/owners, and that the DTCC does not monitor “contract” law – only “securities” laws. This, despite the fact that they volunteer to process the cash part of these naked short sales (leading to failed deliveries), and still “clear” these trades and issue “securities orders” to allow these “non-CNS delivery arrangements”. This de facto serves to artificially delay settlement, as expressly forbidden by 15c6-1 of the ’34 act.
8) NASD Rule 11830 defines the threshold for the number of CEBEs (above which mandated buy-ins are necessary) as 10,000 shares AND 0.5% of the number of shares legally issued. Any CEBEs exceeding this level indicates that abusive dematerialization (as reviewed in Chapter 3) is occurring. This level is where the alarm bells should create a deafening noise but unfortunately for investors the wire to that alarm bell was effectively short-circuited by several of the rules and regulations of the DTCC and NSCC.
9) The conventional metric for determining the age of CEBEs (above which buy-ins should occur) would naturally correspond to the spirit of Addendum C to the rules and regulations of the NSCC, which created the SBP for deliveries that for legitimate reasons couldn’t quite be delivered by settlement day. The authors of Addendum C were well aware that it was critical to keep the lifespan of the CEBE extremely short. The assumption was that the DTCC would rigorously monitor the age, quantity, and legitimacy of these representations of shares, as they were clearly capable of causing massive damage via artificial dilution.
From a statistical point of view, the question that begs to be asked is: Is it a coincidence that the DTCC management: 1) allows its participants/owners to naked short sell with abandon, 2) refuses to monitor the age, quantity and legitimacy of the resultant failed deliveries, 3) refuses to call in its own IOUs resulting from its participants’ abuse of the SBP (because of its self-imposed “powerlessness” to do so), 4) refuses to monitor its participants’ failed deliveries in the ex-clearing netherworld (because of their theoretical “contractual” nature), despite the DTCC being an SRO in charge of “regulating the conduct and business practices of its members” as well as 17 A’s mandate to “promptly and accurately “settle” all transactions, and 5) goes well out of its way to remove the one natural deterrent to naked short selling abuse - the open-market buy-in? A second question begging to be asked is: when does a long litany of coincidences fail to plausibly remain a coincidence?
Remember, the DTCC is its owners. It's not some independent 3rd party, off to the side. There are 2 parties in the investment arena: the investors, and the DTCC-participating “Wall Street professionals” - with a vastly superior “KAV” factor (Knowledge of, Access to and Visibility of the clearance and settlement system). The DTCC portends to be playing an intermediary role between the buying and selling parties, while acting in the capacity of a “contra-party” to all trades, and the “loan intermediary” in the SBP pseudo-borrow process. But, as mentioned in earlier chapters, you can’t play a legally defensible “intermediary” role when you ARE one of the two parties being “intermediated”.
10) The methodology of monitoring for the legitimacy of failed deliveries was probably assumed by Congress and the SEC to involve the DTCC’s monitoring of their participating market makers’ usage of the bona-fide market maker exemption, and detection of any suspicious trading patterns and failed delivery patterns. These patterns jump out at you when access to this data is attained, and yet no matter how often an abusive clearing firm fails delivery of shares of a given issuer, all further delivery failures of this issuer’s shares by the abusive clearing firm are still assumed to be “legitimate”, as if by default. Recall the Compudyne case cited earlier, involving nearly a thousand consecutive trades failing delivery, without a single alarm bell going off. Every regulator and SRO seems to think that the monitoring for bona fide market making activity is the job of a different regulator and SRO - which leaves us with a regulatory vacuum, and the resultant “Industry within an industry” we refer to as naked short selling.
11) As the DTCC has been recently yelling from the mountaintops, the SEC did indeed authorize the SBP in 1981 to address legitimate failed deliveries – provided that the reason for the delay was of a legitimate nature (and there are indeed “legitimate” reasons for short-term delays in delivery). The assumption was that the DTCC would create checks and balances to monitor for abuses of this ultra-risky gamble (which allowed for the deliberate creation of a minute amount of “counterfeit” share “replicas” in an effort to enhance efficiencies in the clearing process). We have already identified over a dozen of these theoretical “quests for enhanced efficiencies” that have been abused by some DTCC participants to gain leverage over the investors they owe a fiduciary duty of care to, so it is questionable if that assumption was a reasonable one. Be that as it may, the other assumption was that the participants of the DTCC would act in good faith with this gigantic new responsibility (and incredibly large temptation to leverage their “KAV” factor and steal from investors). As it turns out there is way too much money “in play” on Wall Street to assume that those with an inherent advantage won’t leverage it.
12) Dr. Leslie Boni, while working as a visiting economic scholar for the SEC, was given access to the DTCC records. This was heretofore unheard of, except for perhaps the New York Supreme Court’s granting of discovery into the DTCC trading records to the CEO of Eagletech, in their NSS case.
Professor Boni found two distinct sub-types of delivery failures whose “median” ( half younger than and half older than) age was about 13 days. Half of delivery failures averaged about 6-7 days, assuming a bell-shaped curve distribution, and were of the type that the SBP was created to address. The older half of delivery failures, however, averaged approximately 106 days, again based upon a bell-shaped curve distribution. The overall average, or “mean” age of delivery failures, was 6 days plus 106 days divided by 2, equaling 56 days as opposed to T+3. These findings were obviously not consistent with the intentions of the SBP, as promulgated by Addendum C. Some DTCC participants had obviously chosen to not act in good faith, but rather to leverage their superior knowledge, access and visibility and abuse the SBP for their own monetary gain. They learned that nobody at the DTCC was rigorously monitoring for the age, quantity, or legitimacy of these failed deliveries, and that they could sell nonexistent shares all day long, and actually get access to the unknowing investors’ money. All they had to do was let the SBP allow these trades to “clear” via a pseudo-borrow, from what turns out to be a self-replenishing lending pool, whose contents are also admittedly not being monitored (see the @dtcc self-interview where the DTCC admits that they have placed their participants on the honor system in regards to what they place into the lending pool). Once this bogus trade cleared, then all the fraudsters had to do was to collateralize this debt on a daily marked-to-market basis. The precipitous fall in share price resulting from all of this artificial dilution involving “Share facsimiles” led to an unconscionable result - the investor’s money actually falls into the lap of the naked short selling fraudsters, despite the fact that they were still refusing to purchase the shares required to cover the short sale after inordinate amounts of time.
As it turns out, short covering is not necessary to gain access to the defrauded investors’ money. One must only collateralize the ever-diminishing debt, as the share price does its 100% predictable plunge driven by all the artificial dilution being created. Unlike the DTCC and its participants, there are those investors and securities scholars who find this concept disturbing – and one hopes that the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee, the overseers of the SEC, will as well.
Recall from earlier chapters that the risk of being bought-in was essentially zero, as the DTCC could be counted on to see to that via their policies and procedures. The closest thing to a real buy-in was just another trip to the self-replenishing lending SBP lending pool via the DTCC’s “Procedure X-1” Policy. “
SITE REFERENCE
https://cmkxunitedforum.proboards.com/thread/13156/02-analysis-nss-jim-decosta
LAST EXAMPLES
A quip to the SEC from Dr. DeCosta. The man is savage: “7) In 3 (ii) (B) withholding the proceeds of the crime for 90 days is like handing a bank robber the proceeds of the heist after a 90 day waiting period. This is a crime being committed. The motive is greed. The shares that were sold for real money don't exist, they never did. There was no intent to ever cover this naked short position. The "intent to defraud" is typically present right from the "get go" as there is usually not an imbalance of buy orders over sell orders at the higher trading levels of these "bear raid" victims.”
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72303/decosta122203.htm
EDIT: a few users mentioned that the SBP was discontinued officially in 2014 from the SEC https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nscc/2014/34-71455.pdf
This makes the GME debacle even worse for all official institutions and it’s participants up and down the chain. They’ve banned the process and continue to blatantly break the law. They’ve gotten so comfortable doing crime in broad daylight it’s why we watch 10-20 point drops on the live charts any given day/week.
EDIT 2
This video is from 12 years ago but it shows what we’ve been up against and proves the SEC won’t act even with the GameStop situation. It shows that we must take matters into our own hands by DRS and potentially even removing the physical stock certificates as the final nuke:
https://vimeo.com/4520843
EDIT 3:
Dr. Jim DeCosta has been writing to the SEC for over a decade with all the whistle blowing evidence the SEC needs to act and nothing has happened. In the video link above about NSS(Naked Short Selling) 5000 cases were sent to the SEC and not 1 was acted on. Welcome to a Madmax reality meaning we’re on our own which is what they thought would happen. What they didn’t expect is APES STRONG TOGETHER!
Here are a lot of Dr. DeCosta’s files:
https://cmkxunitedforum.proboards.com/board/14/dr-jim-decosta-files
WHERE’S THE GAMESTOP REPORT GARY!
LOL!!!!!!
LOL!!!!!!
LOL!!!!!!
How can you say this? Every post made today was linked to factual record.
Here's the website:
https://deptec.com/
Here's the filing that says it's private:
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC796064
False information on DepTec
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
Here's the website:
https://deptec.com/
Here's the filing that says it's private:
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC796064
False information on DepTec
DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD
Company number SC796064
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Filing historyfor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Peoplefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)Morefor DEPTEC SEMICONDUCTOR SOLUTIONS LTD (SC796064)
Registered office address
272 Bath Street, Glasgow, Scotland, G2 4JR
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
22 January 2024
Accounts
First accounts made up to 31 January 2025
due by 22 October 2025
Confirmation statement
First statement date 21 January 2025
due by 4 February 2025
Nature of business (SIC)
71121 - Engineering design activities for industrial process and production
71122 - Engineering related scientific and technical consulting activities
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified
I find it hard to believe that the writer of the replied to post was not aware that DepTec was owned by the BONAR BUNCH...
Fatsachs
Re: batty boots post# 23367
Tuesday, June 06, 2023 12:12:27 PM
Post# 23368 of 25818
63% ($53MM) of our backlog from Precision manufacturing segment. You're absolutely right- heat pumps are only 1 of the many moving parts at play here. In a video from the dalrada.com website, Bonar mentioned that they had some relationship with a "multi-billion dollar subcontract manufacturing organization" which I think pertains to DepTec/semiconductor stuff. Looking forward to news, as this seems like an amazing spot on the chart to drop a bomb.
William Bonar sets up new private entity at the beginning of this year:
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC796064
https://www.onlinefilings.co.uk/people/officers/search/097148680002/
A 20 year old private corporation - same set of actors:
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC262730/officers
William Bonar sets up new private entity at the beginning of this year:
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC796064
https://www.onlinefilings.co.uk/people/officers/search/097148680002/
A 20 year old private corporation - same set of actors:
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC262730/officers
Ian McKenzie owns this:
DALRADA LEGACY TECHNOLOGY LTD
OK - This is really fishy...
About Dalrada Technology Ltd.
Dalrada Technology Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dalrada Financial Corporation. The company’s primary focus is advancing semiconductor technologies and delivering clean energy solutions through the companies Deposition Technology (DepTec) and Likido. Dalrada Technology Ltd. is also the proud sponsor of Greenock Morton Football Club, a Scottish Championship league team.
About Deposition Technology
Deposition Technology (DepTec) was founded in 2004 to provide refurbished physical vapor deposition (PVD) systems. Over the years, the company has developed re-manufacturing capabilities and robust upgrades to legacy systems to keep these systems in operation while updating them with the latest technology and advanced features.
In 2014, DepTec developed its own unique PVD system, the EVOS, and entered the OEM arena. The company now has multiple systems installed to assist in producing devices used in modern medical and communications products.
DepTec innovates with continuous R&D programs, developing the next generation of precision equipment and upgrades. Its new product, the EVOS CVD, for advanced chemical thin film production, will be available to the market soon. For more information, please visit www.deptec.com.
DFCO now paying rent to the BONAR BUNCH!!!
Oh, definitely LWLG - just wanting to show that the crooks can be traced.
Look at this nifty trick - PR announces private company affiliation as if it were a DFCO asset.
This is really fishy...
About Dalrada Technology Ltd.
Dalrada Technology Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dalrada Financial Corporation. The company’s primary focus is advancing semiconductor technologies and delivering clean energy solutions through the companies Deposition Technology (DepTec) and Likido. Dalrada Technology Ltd. is also the proud sponsor of Greenock Morton Football Club, a Scottish Championship league team.
About Deposition Technology
Deposition Technology (DepTec) was founded in 2004 to provide refurbished physical vapor deposition (PVD) systems. Over the years, the company has developed re-manufacturing capabilities and robust upgrades to legacy systems to keep these systems in operation while updating them with the latest technology and advanced features.
In 2014, DepTec developed its own unique PVD system, the EVOS, and entered the OEM arena. The company now has multiple systems installed to assist in producing devices used in modern medical and communications products.
DepTec innovates with continuous R&D programs, developing the next generation of precision equipment and upgrades. Its new product, the EVOS CVD, for advanced chemical thin film production, will be available to the market soon. For more information, please visit www.deptec.com.
HOLD THE PHONE - DepTec (see linked PR) has a current listing as a PRIVATE company.
DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD.
Company number SC262730
Follow this company File for this company
CompanyOverviewfor DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD. (SC262730)Filing historyfor DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD. (SC262730)Peoplefor DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD. (SC262730)Chargesfor DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD. (SC262730)Morefor DEPOSITION TECHNOLOGY LTD. (SC262730)
Registered office address
1 Unit 1, Kingsthorne Park, Houstoun Industrial Estate, Livingston, West Lothian, United Kingdom, EH54 5DB
Company status
Active
Company type
Private limited Company
Incorporated on
1 February 2004
Accounts
Next accounts made up to 30 June 2023
due by 31 March 2024
Last accounts made up to 30 June 2022
Confirmation statement
Next statement date 1 February 2025
due by 15 February 2025
Last statement dated 1 February 2024
Nature of business (SIC)
82990 - Other business support service activities not elsewhere classified
Company Results (links open in a new window)
Date(document was filed at Companies House) Description(of the document filed at Companies House) View / Download(PDF file, link opens in new window)
14 Feb 2024 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2024 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2024 with updates - link opens in a new window - 5 pages(5 pages)
14 Feb 2024 Director's details changed for Mr. William Ian Martin Bonar on 14 February 2024
View PDF Director's details changed for Mr. William Ian Martin Bonar on 14 February 2024 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
07 Jun 2023 Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2022
View PDF Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2022 - link opens in a new window - 13 pages(13 pages)
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22 May 2023 Registered office address changed from Fairmont House 21 Oakbank Park Way Livingstone West Lothian EH53 0th United Kingdom to 1 Unit 1, Kingsthorne Park Houstoun Industrial Estate Livingston West Lothian EH54 5DB on 22 May 2023
View PDF Registered office address changed from Fairmont House 21 Oakbank Park Way Livingstone West Lothian EH53 0th United Kingdom to 1 Unit 1, Kingsthorne Park Houstoun Industrial Estate Livingston West Lothian EH54 5DB on 22 May 2023 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
15 Feb 2023 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2023 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2023 with updates - link opens in a new window - 5 pages(5 pages)
15 Jun 2022 Current accounting period extended from 31 March 2022 to 30 June 2022
View PDF Current accounting period extended from 31 March 2022 to 30 June 2022 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
23 Feb 2022 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2022 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2022 with updates - link opens in a new window - 5 pages(5 pages)
17 Dec 2021 Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2021
View PDF Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2021 - link opens in a new window - 12 pages(12 pages)
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12 Mar 2021 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2021 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2021 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
07 Dec 2020 Previous accounting period extended from 27 March 2020 to 31 March 2020
View PDF Previous accounting period extended from 27 March 2020 to 31 March 2020 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
07 Dec 2020 Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2020
View PDF Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2020 - link opens in a new window - 10 pages(10 pages)
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19 Mar 2020 Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2019
View PDF Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2019 - link opens in a new window - 10 pages(10 pages)
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03 Feb 2020 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2020 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2020 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
20 Dec 2019 Previous accounting period shortened from 28 March 2019 to 27 March 2019
View PDF Previous accounting period shortened from 28 March 2019 to 27 March 2019 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
08 May 2019 Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2018
View PDF Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2018 - link opens in a new window - 11 pages(11 pages)
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13 Mar 2019 Previous accounting period shortened from 29 March 2018 to 28 March 2018
View PDF Previous accounting period shortened from 29 March 2018 to 28 March 2018 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
08 Mar 2019 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2019 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2019 with updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
13 Dec 2018 Previous accounting period shortened from 30 March 2018 to 29 March 2018
View PDF Previous accounting period shortened from 30 March 2018 to 29 March 2018 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
20 Mar 2018 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2018 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2018 with updates - link opens in a new window - 5 pages(5 pages)
20 Dec 2017 Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2017
View PDF Total exemption full accounts made up to 31 March 2017 - link opens in a new window - 9 pages(9 pages)
15 Mar 2017 Total exemption small company accounts made up to 30 March 2016
View PDF Total exemption small company accounts made up to 30 March 2016 - link opens in a new window - 4 pages(4 pages)
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15 Mar 2017 Director's details changed for Mr. William Ian Martin Bonar on 15 March 2017
View PDF Director's details changed for Mr. William Ian Martin Bonar on 15 March 2017 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
15 Mar 2017 Secretary's details changed for Samantha Jane Lisa Mackenzie on 15 March 2017
View PDF Secretary's details changed for Samantha Jane Lisa Mackenzie on 15 March 2017 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
01 Feb 2017 Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2017 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 1 February 2017 with updates - link opens in a new window - 6 pages(6 pages)
16 Dec 2016 Previous accounting period shortened from 31 March 2016 to 30 March 2016
View PDF Previous accounting period shortened from 31 March 2016 to 30 March 2016 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
123
Repeat of the replied to post:
Current Likido filings in the U.K.
Company Results (links open in a new window)
Date(document was filed at Companies House) Description(of the document filed at Companies House) View / Download(PDF file, link opens in new window)
17 Jan 2024 Appointment of Mr Anthony Zolezzi as a director on 16 January 2024
View PDF Appointment of Mr Anthony Zolezzi as a director on 16 January 2024 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
17 Jan 2024 Appointment of Ms Pauline Gourdie as a director on 16 January 2024
View PDF Appointment of Ms Pauline Gourdie as a director on 16 January 2024 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
17 Jan 2024 Appointment of Mr Brian Bonar as a director on 16 January 2024
View PDF Appointment of Mr Brian Bonar as a director on 16 January 2024 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
08 Jan 2024 Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2023
View PDF Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2023 - link opens in a new window - 22 pages(22 pages)
18 Aug 2023 Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2023 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2023 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
22 Apr 2023 Cessation of Ian Robert Mackenzie as a person with significant control on 21 April 2023
View PDF Cessation of Ian Robert Mackenzie as a person with significant control on 21 April 2023 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
21 Apr 2023 Termination of appointment of Stuart Cox as a director on 18 April 2023
View PDF Termination of appointment of Stuart Cox as a director on 18 April 2023 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
31 Oct 2022 Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2022
View PDF Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2022 - link opens in a new window - 22 pages(22 pages)
23 Aug 2022 Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2022 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2022 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
11 Jul 2022 Notification of Ian Robert Mackenzie as a person with significant control on 11 July 2022
View PDF Notification of Ian Robert Mackenzie as a person with significant control on 11 July 2022 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
10 Jul 2022 Notification of William Ian Martin Bonar as a person with significant control on 5 July 2022
View PDF Notification of William Ian Martin Bonar as a person with significant control on 5 July 2022 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
29 Apr 2022 Appointment of Mr Ian Robert Mackenzie as a director on 29 April 2022
View PDF Appointment of Mr Ian Robert Mackenzie as a director on 29 April 2022 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
29 Apr 2022 Appointment of Mr William Ian Martin Bonar as a director on 29 April 2022
View PDF Appointment of Mr William Ian Martin Bonar as a director on 29 April 2022 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
21 Oct 2021 Notification of Dalrada Precision Corp as a person with significant control on 1 January 2020
View PDF Notification of Dalrada Precision Corp as a person with significant control on 1 January 2020 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
20 Oct 2021 Cessation of Stuart Cox as a person with significant control on 1 January 2020
View PDF Cessation of Stuart Cox as a person with significant control on 1 January 2020 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
15 Oct 2021 Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2021
View PDF Accounts for a small company made up to 30 June 2021 - link opens in a new window - 11 pages(11 pages)
23 Aug 2021 Previous accounting period extended from 31 December 2020 to 30 June 2021
View PDF Previous accounting period extended from 31 December 2020 to 30 June 2021 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
23 Aug 2021 Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2021 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2021 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
16 Sep 2020 Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2020 with updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2020 with updates - link opens in a new window - 4 pages(4 pages)
24 Jun 2020 Micro company accounts made up to 31 December 2019
View PDF Micro company accounts made up to 31 December 2019 - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
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21 May 2020 Previous accounting period extended from 31 August 2019 to 31 December 2019
View PDF Previous accounting period extended from 31 August 2019 to 31 December 2019 - link opens in a new window - 1 page(1 page)
12 Aug 2019 Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2019 with no updates
View PDF Confirmation statement made on 9 August 2019 with no updates - link opens in a new window - 3 pages(3 pages)
30 May 2019 Director's details changed for Mr Stuart Cox on 30 May 2019
View PDF Director's details changed for Mr Stuart Cox on 30 May 2019 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
30 May 2019 Change of details for Mr Stuart Cox as a person with significant control on 30 May 2019
View PDF Change of details for Mr Stuart Cox as a person with significant control on 30 May 2019 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
30 May 2019 Micro company accounts made up to 31 August 2018
View PDF Micro company accounts made up to 31 August 2018 - link opens in a new window - 2 pages(2 pages)
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Stuart Cox
• 3rd+
Driving Decarbonisation with Natural Refrigerant Heat Pumps | CEO at Karnot Limited | Former Founder of Likido Limited, advancing CO2 heat pumps through licensing agreements with like-minded partners.Driving Decarbonisation with Natural Refrigerant Heat Pumps | CEO at Karnot Limited | Former Founder of Likido Limited, advancing CO2 heat pumps through licensing agreements with like-minded partners.
3mo • 3mo •
I was the founder of Likido, who sold to Dalrada on the promise of great things. Unfortunately they saw fit to remove me and all the work I had spent building a really promising business…. All we now see is yet another fake picture from Dalrada. When I actually see real installations and case histories I will be very happy, but to the Dalrada marketing team, please stop fake news, people are getting tired of it. If you want CO2 heat pumps that work and have real references please contact me
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/stuart-cox-karnot_i-was-the-founder-of-likido-who-sold-to-activity-7127309716426276864-N4Zr/
Stuart Cox
Driving Decarbonisation with Natural Refrigerant Heat Pumps | CEO at Karnot Limited | Former Founder of Likido Limited, advancing CO2 heat pumps through licensing agreements with like-minded partners.
KARNOT LIMITED
Central Luzon, Philippines Contact info