Ishihara says U.S. can't win war with China, calls U.S forces incompetent
I don’t believe we can economically contain China to the point that the Middle Kingdom is no longer a partner in a multi-polar world. Using the fertile grounds of Chinese internal oppression in which to plant seeds of dissention much like we see in Iraq is again probably the only viable avenue available to Washington.
However China is very aware of Washington’s game plan and is making long overdue overtures to suppressed masses. Now this is a tall order and has a dubious chance of succeeding, however I just do not think Bush can take down China. Somehow the Dragon will fly. Not very logical, going on feeling.
-Am
Ishihara says U.S. can't win war with China, calls U.S forces incompetent
Nov 7 2005, 08:36 PM Saturday, November 5, 2005 at 07:57 JST WASHINGTON — Tokyo Gov Shintaro Ishihara used a speech in the U.S. capital Thursday to convey his views on China, arguing that economic containment is the best strategy because the United States would "certainly" lose a war with China, which he said would not hesitate to sacrifice its people on a massive scale when fighting against an enemy.
"In any case, if tension between the United States and China heightens, if each side pulls the trigger, though it may not be stretched to nuclear weapons, and the wider hostilities expand, I believe America cannot win as it has a civic society that must adhere to the value of respecting lives," Ishihara said in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that was primarily focused on China.
The governor, an outspoken politician known for his nationalistic views, also said U.S. ground forces, with the exception of the Marines, are "extremely incompetent."
"Therefore, we need to consider other means to counter China," he said. "The step we should be taking against China, I believe, is economic containment."
Ishihara said while China would begin a war without hesitation at the cost of massive human casualties, the United States has found that the deaths of only 2,000 troops in Iraq has created major domestic problems.
"I believe we are placed in a high degree of tension that poses greater danger than the Cold War structure between the United States and Russia posed," he said.
Ishihara said China would be unlikely to use the conventional nuclear tactic of pinpointing attacks on nuclear facilities instead of cities out of fear of retaliatory strikes.
China would attack major cities even at the cost of retaliatory U.S. nuclear strikes on such cities as Shanghai, which would entail a huge loss of civilian lives, Ishihara said.
Noting some American politicians believe China will move toward democracy and that some people say there will be elections in the near future, Ishihara said, "I believe such predictions are totally wrong."
As for Japan building up its own defense capability, Ishihara said the United States is the country most opposed to such a move, while China is next in opposition.
Ishihara also said the security treaty between Japan and the United States is "so undependable."
Later in the day, Ishihara held talks with U.S. Defense Deputy Undersecretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless to discuss the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan.
The governor has been calling for civilian use of Yokota Air Base in Tokyo.
Ishihara, who arrived in Washington on Wednesday, will move to New York on Friday to watch Sunday's New York City Marathon to prepare for a large-scale marathon in Tokyo in February 2007.
A split between Seoul and Washington coming at a time when with floods of cash and a new policy of patience and friendly support, China has quietly penetrated the thick wall surrounding North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's regime - gaining significant leverage for the first time in one of the world's most closed societies, now that could be interesting. #msg-9932251
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Seoul and Washington closer to divorce By Lee Kyo-kwan
Mar 7, 2006
SEOUL - South Korea and the US have drifted so far apart on North Korea policy there is now speculation the longtime partners are getting close to divorce.
Kurt Campbell, former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, reportedly likened the two to a king and queen who live separately but pretend to be happy before their subjects. The allies do not want to announce their divorce because it would have enormous consequences, he said at a seminar in Washington on February 27.
It is believed US officials no longer trust their South Korean counterparts on North Korea policy. Fueling that speculation has been the recent friction between Seoul and Washington over how to deal with US allegations North Korea is counterfeiting US dollars. While Washington has stepped up financial pressure on Pyongyang in an effort to defend the US currency, Seoul appears to have opposed such a move.
The US Treasury Department charged in September that Banco Delta Asia in Macau is one of the foreign financial institutions being used by North Korea to launder illegal money, including counterfeit currencies. The Treasury Department reportedly came up with a measure designed to prevent foreign banks with North Korean accounts from carrying out transactions with US banks.
So far, US pressure appears successful. South Korean banks have followed their Japanese counterparts in carrying out the US tactic - by last month the Korea Exchange Bank, Shinhan Bank and National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives had stopped all transactions with Banco Delta Asia.
However, unlike its banks, the South Korean government has been reluctant to support the US financial pressure on the North.
South Korean Unification Minister Lee Jong-suk last month said his country still needs to make a strategic judgment based on relations between North and South Korea over how much will it support the US measure against Pyongyang.
The government of President Roh Moo-hyun is known to have urged the US administration of President George W Bush to stop putting financial pressure on the Kim Jong-il regime.
Michael Green, former senior director in charge of Asia and the Pacific for the White House's National Security Council (NSC), said early last month that Seoul has sent Washington signals several times suggesting that the US lessen pressure on Pyongyang over the counterfeit issue.
Sending such signals seems to be in line with Roh's US policy. In his New Year's address in late January, the president said that if the US tries to solve matters with North Korea by methods aimed at the regime's collapse, it will cause a feud between Washington and Seoul. This suggests he sees US financial pressure on North Korea as a hardline scenario aimed at toppling the Kim regime.
Two weeks after Roh's address, friction between the two allies increased. South Korea and the US disagree over the origins of counterfeit US$140,000 found in April at the Namdaemun market in Seoul. Washington says it told Seoul the counterfeit dollars were printed in North Korea. But Seoul countered that it hadn't received any notice from Washington.
Since the US Treasury Department identified Banco Delta Asia as one of Pyongyang's money-laundering channels, most North Korean trading companies have suffered difficulties in foreign exchange transactions.
If the US measure aimed at preventing foreign banks with North Korean accounts from doing transactions with US banks is successful, nearly all North Korea's foreign-exchange transactions are forecast to be paralyzed, according to the diplomatic sources.
If such a scenario materializes, Pyongyang may have difficulty maintaining its political and economic system. North Korea as a result has called on the US to halt the pressure as a precondition of its return to the six-party talks on its nuclear program.
And if Pyongyang is seriously affected by the US tactics, Seoul's feud with Washington is likely to worsen.
Meanwhile, the number of South Korean officials voicing concern over US financial pressure is increasing. If US sanctions designed to contain North Korea economically work, there is a strong possibility of a severe diplomatic conflict between South Korea and the United States. Such a diplomatic split could be a death blow to the half-century-long alliance, diplomatic sources say.
Meanwhile, the US State Department insists pressure on North Korea and the six-party talks (involving the two Koreas, Russia, Japan, China and the US) are separate matters. This suggests that regardless of the alliance's future, the US will continue its pressure on North Korea to stop the country printing counterfeit US currency.
Speculation that the alliance is in trouble is also precipitated by Seoul's three-year objection to Washington's policy aimed at enabling US Forces Korea (USFK) to be moved about freely beyond the Korean Peninsula.
The US Defense Department since 2003 has called on the Roh government to allow US forces to be dispatched to regions near the peninsula - such as the strait between mainland China and Taiwan - whenever there is a security crisis in the region. The Pentagon calls the policy "strategic flexibility".
But the Roh government had refused permission, based on a long-standing agreement involving US forces based on South Korean soil, because of its deep worry that South Korea could be unwillingly involved in military conflict between the United States and China.
Seoul decided early this year to accept a limited version of the Pentagon policy of strategic flexibility. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and his US counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, signed an agreement in late January in Washington. According to the deal, the US is required to obtain permission from Seoul before deploying South Korea-based troops to other areas near the peninsula.
However, two weeks after the deal was signed, it ran into strong opposition within the South Korean government and the ruling Uri Party. Opposition is being led by lawmakers and some Foreign Ministry officials who have sought security policies more independent from Washington.
Uri Party Representative Choi Jae-chon produced a confidential NSC document showing that in late 2003 senior officials of the Foreign Ministry and the NSC sent Washington a memorandum spelling out their intention to permit USFK's strategic flexibility without Roh's permission. The document was made public with the help of some Foreign Ministry officials working in the presidential office who have reportedly advocated independent foreign policy.
It would appear that officials seeking independent foreign policy are accelerating their attack on their counterparts who have placed more emphasis on policy coordination with Washington.
With the South Korea-US alliance rapidly deteriorating, USFK is having difficulty securing training fields across the nation. US General Leon LaPorte last month expressed concern about the alliance's future in a speech before leaving his office as commander of both USFK and the South Korea-US Joint Forces.
"In the coming years, the ROK-US alliance will be tested," he warned, referring to South Korea by its official name, Republic of Korea.
If a conservative candidate supporting the alliance fails to win the Korean presidential election of 2007, the US is forecast to withdraw its forces from South Korea, according to diplomatic sources. In fact, speculation the allies' split may be imminent has begun spreading since Roh took office in 2003 - mainly because his government has officially sought much more autonomy from Washington in its North Korea and military policies.
Such a policy shift has contributed to widening the rift in the 53-year alliance. The split began with former president Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, which advocates peaceful cooperation between North and South with short-term reconciliation in advance of eventual unification of the peninsula.
Kim, Roh's predecessor, provided Pyongyang with economic support. Washington's neo-conservative hardliners lashed out at the Kim government for weakening their efforts by economic containment to prevent Pyongyang from making weapons of mass destruction. The policy rift is believed to have led to North Korea beginning its highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear-weapons program in the 1990s.
James Kelly, then assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, told North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kye-kwan during a visit to Pyongyang in October 2002 that Washington knew North Korea had an HEU nuclear-weapons program. Kim denied the accusation, though the next day North Korean First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju admitted to Kelly that his country had the program.
Two weeks after Kelly left Pyongyang, the White House announced North Korea's admission. But Pyongyang denied acknowledging existence of the program and called on Washington to sign a non-aggression pact in return for abolishing all nuclear-weapons programs. Washington rejected the proposal.
Since the end of 2002, the Kim Jong-il regime has adopted brinkmanship policies such as withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Roh government as part of its effort to seek independent foreign policy, has refused to join the Bush administration's diplomatic and military pressure on North Korea.
For example, the Roh government so as not to irritate North Korea hasn't participated in the June 2003 US-led Proliferation Security Initiative to diplomatically and militarily prevent weapons of mass destruction from proliferating. The initiative is believed aimed at blocking North Korea's proliferation of fissile material and missile technology.
Seoul has also blocked Washington's plan to present Pyongyang's violation of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework on nuclear issues to the UN Security Council. North Korea has maintained that if the United States brings the issue before the council, it will regard the move as a provocation of war.
As proved by these disagreements in North Korea policy coordination, South Korea and the US seem to be having difficulty keeping a minimum alliance.
In South Korea, the progressive camp continues to seek a security policy much more independent of the United States regardless of concern over the weakening partnership, while the conservative camp strives to resurrect the struggling alliance.
The former maintains the current North Korean nuclear crisis originates from the US military goading the North. But the latter contends the South Korea-US alliance has prevented North Korea from provoking a war over the past five decades.
Arguably, the most important question for South Korea is whether it can succeed in peacefully solving the social and political conflict.
Lee Kyo-kwan is a Seoul-based writer covering Korean political and business affairs. He has worked for the Chosun Ilbo, the Korea Herald and the Sisa Journal.
I think it should be considered that the North Korean missile launches might also have something to do with helping good friend Iran. And it should be remembered that China how now moved into a position of greater influence in North Korea.
Ignore North Korea at your peril By Brendan Taylor
Mar 11, 2006
North Korea's recent missile launches are the latest in a long series of provocations. The reputedly "crazy" and "irrational" North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il has pulled similar stunts on numerous occasions - most obviously in August 1998 when Pyongyang test-fired a Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan and in March 2003 on the eve of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's inauguration.
But North Korea's latest provocation does seem a long way from the euphoric atmosphere of last September, when the group of six - North Korea, the US, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia - agreed to a "statement of principles" for resolving the North Korean nuclear stalemate.
In return for abandoning all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, Pyongyang was provided with a security "guarantee" from Washington, along with desperately needed economic and energy assistance. Most significant, the six parties promised to discuss the provision of a light-water reactor (LWR) to North Korea, at some "appropriate time" in the future.
The devil was always going to be in the detail of that agreement, which was falling apart even before the ink was starting to dry. The LWR issue remained the most obvious hurdle, but there are strong indications that hardliners in Washington were miffed that the agreement had even been forged in the first place. These hardline elements have clearly upped the ante since.
The US ambassador to South Korea, Alexander Vershbow, for instance, has recently referred to North Korea as a "criminal state". The administration of US President George W Bush has unilaterally applied financial sanctions targeting Pyongyang's illicit drug-trafficking and money-laundering activities. The six-party talks, meanwhile, have unceremoniously ground to a startling halt.
The North Korean missile launches need to be understood against this backdrop. Some have argued that these are routine tests that represent a major leap in North Korea's missile capabilities. Even if that were the case, it is impossible to detach completely the political dimension.
Pyongyang is clearly sending a political message. Frustrated by the stuttering progress of the six-party talks, it is employing what in essence amounts to the only leverage it has at its disposal in an effort to kick-start this process. The parallels with the 1990s - when the North Koreans ran a submarine aground in South Korea, launched a ballistic missile over Japan and engaged in suspicious tunneling activities, all in the interests of spurring the United States and its allies to honor their commitments to it under the 1994 Agreed Framework - are stark.
The key difference this time, however, is that Washington is severely distracted by events in Iraq and Iran. While this US strategic preoccupation elsewhere is somewhat advantageous for Pyongyang, in that it limits the coercive options at Washington's disposal as it seeks to shape the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the downside is that it may also encourage Pyongyang to engage in increasingly hostile and provocative acts in the interests of capturing Washington's attention.
Those who speculate that the latest missile launches were merely "accidental" would dismiss such a prognosis. But North Korea's growing missile prowess suggests that their thinking is wishful. That said, with the "red lines" between what acts Washington would and would not be prepared to tolerate from North Korea remaining decidedly blurred, we should still not dismiss outright the possibility that the North Korean nuclear crisis, through some "accident" or serious act of miscalculation on the part of Pyongyang, could yet unintentionally spiral into a conflict of epochal magnitude.
The Korean Peninsula is, after all, a region where the interests of each of the great powers intersect. A significant amount of the cooperation that has occurred between Washington and Beijing during the five years since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, for instance, has been built upon their common interest in keeping the Korean Peninsula free from nuclear weapons.
Moreover, a potent combination of Japanese domestic politics, alliance politics and simple geography make it virtually impossible to envisage Japan remaining neutral in any Korean contingency, with potentially catastrophic results given the recent spiking in tensions between China and Japan.
Against that backdrop, it would be dangerous for analysts and policymakers to trivialize the latest North Korean missile launches. Pyongyang, not unlike a neglected child, is clearly crying out for attention. As the fable of "the boy who cried wolf" reminds us, it might be a mistake merely to ignore or neglect those cries.
Dr Brendan Taylor is a post-doctoral fellow at the Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University.
The U.S. military also said it is looking for stronger trilateral military cooperation with South Korea and Japan as it seeks to adjust to changing security environments targeting China. This is likely to trigger frictions with Seoul, which has made clear that it would not join U.S.-led military cooperation against Beijing.
For those of you who have been away, Bush has renamed the ‘war on terror’ the ‘long war’ and it includes a military conflict with China. He knew this before he was elected for his second term but effectively kept the ‘heads up’ American public focused on the Muslim terrorists who are nothing more than a lounge act.
The new Chinese budget comes after the publication last month of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, which described the new priorities of the U.S. military as preparing to conduct a "long war" against terrorists worldwide, to improve homeland security capabilities, and to prepare for possible confrontation with China as an emerging superpower rival. #msg-10051566
Ishihara says U.S. can't win war with China, calls U.S forces incompetent #msg-9932251
-Am
South Korea US Alliance At Risk
by Jong-Heon Lee Seoul (UPI) Mar 13, 2006 Concerns are growing in South Korea over further troubles in its decades-long security alliance with the United States as Washington seeks to reshape its military presence in the Asian country.
Some analysts warn Washington's move toward a new role of U.S. forces in South Korea and disputes over financial burden sharing would further damage bilateral security ties already strained by differences over how to deal with a North Korea accused of developing nuclear weapons and counterfeiting U.S. currency. Some observers say the longtime partners are getting close to divorce.
The concern was sparked earlier this week when a senior U.S. military official floated the idea of transforming the U.S.-led U.N. forces in South Korea into a multinational coalition command.
At a Senate Armed Forces Committee hearing Tuesday, Gen. B.B. Bell, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said the United States would seek to increase the function of participant nations in the United Nations Command in South Korea.
"It is the (U.N.) command's intent to create a truly multinational staff by expanding the roles of the member nations and integrating them more fully into our contingency and operational planning and operations," Bell said.
Seoul's defense officials on Friday downplayed Bell's comment as his personal opinion. But Bell's reMark was largely considered as a move to enhance the role of the U.N. Command that oversees the Korean armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, while scaling down the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command that has played a key role in deterring another armed conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Bell heads the U.N. Command, comprised of 16 nations, which joined forces to rescue a South Korea that was almost occupied just days after North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, launched a surprise invasion on June 25, 1950.
Bell is also leading the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command that controls South Korea's 690,000 troops and 32,500 U.S. troops. Under a mutual defense treaty reached at the end of the Korean War, the United States has stationed more than 30,000 troops in the South to deter another attack by the communist North.
Since then, South Korea has heavily relied on U.S protection for its national security, while focusing its resources on rebuilding the war-torn economy, which now stands as the world's 11th biggest.
In a departure from his pro-U.S. predecessors, President Roh Moo-hyun, elected in late 2002 on a strong wave of anti-U.S. sentiment, has declared that his country would emerge from the decades-long U.S. security umbrella within the early 2010s.
Roh has said his nation would no longer be locked into the U.S.-led alliance, a decades-long security framework in Northeast Asia counterbalancing the communist alliance led by China. He has pledged to lay the groundwork for a self-defense system independent of the United States within 10 years during his five-year term that ends in early 2008.
Roh's government has also pushed to regain wartime operational control of South Korean troops. South Korea got back the peacetime operational control of its forces from the United States in 1994, but its wartime operational control still remains in the hands of a four-star U.S. army general who concurrently heads the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command.
Some defense analysts express concerns that the smaller role of the U.S. military in South Korea may weaken their joint deterrence against North Korea, which has a 1.2 million-strong army.
Washington has already unveiled a plan to reshape American troops in South Korea as "rapid deployment forces" to interfere in military conflicts in Northeast Asia, under the posture of "strategic flexibility."
Under the plan, the United States would slash one-third of its 37,500 troop level by 2008. It currently keeps 32,500 troops in South Korea after having withdrawn about 5,000 soldiers in 2004.
Fueling security jitters in South Korea, Adm. William Fallon, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, said Thursday he anticipates a further cut in the U.S. troop size in South Korea if it assumes a greater role in defending itself
"If that's the case, then I would expect that there will be additional negotiation regarding what role the U.S. forces play," Fallon said in an interview with South Korea's Yonhap news agency after testifying before the House Armed Services Committee.
The U.S. military also said it is looking for stronger trilateral military cooperation with South Korea and Japan as it seeks to adjust to changing security environments targeting China. This is likely to trigger frictions with Seoul, which has made clear that it would not join U.S.-led military cooperation against Beijing.
The U.S. military has also called for Seoul to pay more to maintain American forces in South Korea, saying any shortfall would compromise their combat readiness. Bell called for "a balanced defense burden sharing arrangement... fundamental to the strength of the alliance," pointing to South Korea's growing economic improvement.
South Korea and the United State remain differed over U.S. base relocation costs, estimated at about $5.5-6.8 billion.
Kim Seung-hwan, a professor at Myongji University in Seoul, said a weakened Seoul-Washington security alliance would hurt much-needed policy coordination to curb North Korea's nuclear aspirations.
"Further troubles in the South Korea-U.S. alliance would fuel uncertainties in the security conditions on the Korean peninsula," said Kim, who is now advising for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Note: South Korea’s move toward China comes at a time when with floods of cash and a new policy of patience and friendly support, China has quietly penetrated the thick wall surrounding North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's regime - gaining significant leverage for the first time in one of the world's most closed societies. Chinese leaders have gained Mr. Kim's ear, sources say, with a message that the North can revitalize its economy while still holding tight political control. #msg-9932251
-Am
By Hyejin Kim
Apr 8, 2006
For decades, South Korea's out-migration rate has been among the highest in the world. In the 1960s, Koreans left their impoverished homeland for wealthy countries, especially the United States and Germany. Korean migrants dreamed they could get rich in those societies, or at least they could give their children a better future. Many gave up positions of high social status in South Korea, as lawyers or professors, to enter US factories and laundromats.
Over the past 10 years, however, the stream of Korean emigration has been diverted from Western countries to China, now the hottest destination for Koreans moving abroad. South Korea's rise to OECD status (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development includes 30 industrialized nations that share a commitment to democratic government and market economy) has caused out-migration to turn from developed societies to developing ones.
South Korea and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1992. Since then, Koreans have flocked to China. By the year 2000, China was the top destination for trips out of the country. In 2005, South Koreans made twice as many visits to China as to any other country.
The maturing of the South Korean economy, together with China's ongoing industrialization, has spurred Korean business to look to China for manpower. According to a study by the Boston Group of consultants, wages of Chinese manufacturing laborers in 2003 were one-tenth those of South Koreans. That research predicts that at least in the near future Chinese labor costs will remain much lower that South Korean labor costs.
China has become a major engine behind South Korea's economic growth. Last year China surpassed the US to become South Korea's No 1 trading partner. Not all Korean firms in China are there for manufacturing. Samsung, for example, employs 50,000 Chinese workers in 29 factories. The firm is increasingly concentrating on research and development work in China and hiring local people for top management.
South Korea's largest companies send residential representatives to China for two to five years. Their employers provide them with new apartments and tuition for their children to enter elite schools. Representatives get used to their luxurious lives in China and once their tenure is up, they prefer to stay and open their own firms or consulting services.
The promise of China's cheap labor pool attracts another group from South Korea, small-time entrepreneurs. Some had operated factories in Korea, and then transferred to China. Others dash off to China with a small amount of capital hoping to establish their own firms. The financial crisis in 1997 pushed a wave of laid-off Koreans to China in search of business. Some take their retirement funds to open a shop or restaurant in China. More than half of the investment abroad by South Korean small and medium enterprises in 2004 went to China.
The other major motivation for South Koreans to move to China is schooling. Previously, Korean parents sent their children to school in the United States or Canada, so they could learn English and return to high-paying jobs. Now parents have another option for sending their children to study abroad. Chinese schools are far cheaper than those in Western countries and China is much closer. Furthermore, China offers relatively inexpensive international schools where students learn both Chinese and English. Koreans make up more than half of foreign students in China.
A visible sign of the rise of South Korean migration to China is the emergence of "Korea towns" in Chinese cities. South Korean businessmen, students and their families form communities in major cities, such as Beijing, Qingdao and Shanghai, as well as in some small cities. In addition, all these Korean communities are tightly connected across cities. Based in the main office of the Beijing-Korean Association, 31 local Korean associations join South Koreans across the country through regular meetings and special events. These communities are all linked by the Internet, and when one association holds an annual sports competition, for example, other associations send their teams or financial aid.
Korean restaurants, karaoke bars and grocery stores in Korea towns offer goods and services at prices far below those in South Korea. South Koreans live packed together in these towns. From their neighbors and from community leaflets, they can get information in Korean and can avoid the language barrier.
While South Korean migrants tended to stay in China on a short-term basis in the 1990s, now they prefer to stay more permanently. Rather than going back to South Korea after finishing school, young people become interested in working or starting their own businesses in China. Whereas married businessmen previously went alone back and forth to China, now they have a tendency to take their families with them. In Korea towns, these families can be satisfied with their relatively luxurious lives and with schooling opportunities for their children. The increase in long-term settlers has led to the expansion of Korea towns.
The rapid rise of South Koreans in China reveals a new concept of international migration among South Koreans. In the past, international migration was a way of seeking a better life in a wealthier country. That meant saying farewell to the homeland, possibly forever. In the earlier form of migration they worked hard as members of a minority group that sometimes faced discrimination.
Now that their country has industrialized, South Korean emigrants are no longer fleeing poverty for chances in richer countries, but using the wealth they have generated over the last decades to invest in their rising neighbor. In China, South Koreans have stayed in close contact with the home country and built up "Korean villages".
Hyejin Kim is a specialist in East Asian affairs. She is the author of two books and holds a doctorate in Global Affairs.
(Copyright 2006 Hyejin Kim.)
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