In February 1991, as the defeated and shattered forces of Saddam Hussein were fleeing back into Iraq, the military commanders and political leaders of the victorious coalition faced a number of choices. One of these was to pursue and destroy Saddam's Republican Guard, the main prop of the regime. This, some argued at the time, could be done quickly and would enable the Iraqi people and perhaps even much of the Iraqi army to rise against Saddam and overthrow the regime. Others, more cautious, believed that to achieve any real change it would be necessary to advance on Baghdad, occupy the capital, and preside over the installing of a friendly regime. Opponents of this policy argued that such a regime would require continuing support-a military presence, at least for a while, and an ambassador with vice-regal authority. This, they said, would be the imperial method, as used by the British and French, and more recently, in a much harsher form, by the Russians and the Chinese. But the imperial way was not the way of the Americans, who lacked the desire-and some would add the skills-for such a policy.
President Bush decided to end hostilities after a hundred hours on the ground. Like the Israel-Arab Six Day War of 1967, this war was concluded without the occupation of an enemy capital or the overthrow of an enemy regime. America's war aims had been accomplished. They included the liberation of Kuwait from foreign occupation and of Saudi Arabia from the threat of invasion. They did not include the liberation of Iraq from domestic tyranny.
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