France's President François Hollande is sending in troops in to prevent the creation of a terrorist super-state, but can they do it alone?
Trouble in store: French troops arrive at Bamako's airport Photo: AP
By Con Coughlin and David Blair - 8:04PM GMT 15 Jan 2013 - 613 Comments
As hundreds of French troops are deployed to Mali to do battle with al-Qaeda-backed terrorists and another chapter in the long-running war against militant Islam develops, it is hard not to feel a sense of déjà vu.
It is now more than a decade since the UN Security Council unanimously approved the American-led campaign to destroy the terrorist infrastructure al-Qaeda had assembled in southern Afghanistan. There is nothing the world’s most notorious terrorist organisation likes more than to move into the ungoverned space of failed Islamic states, and southern Afghanistan proved the perfect hide-out from which Osama bin Laden and his cohorts could plot their diabolical attacks against the West.
Thanks to the success of Nato’s military intervention in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its allies no longer enjoy that freedom: its terrorist infrastructure has been destroyed and the few survivors of bin Laden’s original organisation have sought refuge in mountain retreats.
But arguably the most depressing aspect of what used to be known as the war on terror is that no sooner has one group of Islamist terrorists been dealt with than another pops up. Since the elimination of al-Qaeda from southern Afghanistan in late 2001 we have seen variations of the movement take root in failing Islamic states such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, and large tracts of North Africa.
Indeed, the ease with which groups of al-Qaeda operatives were able to set up new terrorist operations prompted General David Petraeus, the former CIA director, to liken the agency’s counter-terrorism campaign to a “whack-a-mole” policy, saying that “you need to hit all the moles at once”.
Al-Qaeda’s takeover of large swathes of the vast desert expanse of Mali should, therefore, be seen as the latest manifestation of a trend that began with the movement’s defeat in Afghanistan more than a decade ago, which has now resulted in its followers controlling a greater expanse of land than ever before.
For when “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), the North African offshoot of bin Laden’s franchise, and its allies from the Tuareg tribe seized control of northern Mali last year, they captured a domain covering some 300,000 square miles, including military bases, arms dumps, ready-made training facilities and airports.
This huge terrorist state, with its unofficial capital in the Saharan trading centre of Timbuktu, lies across a smuggling route used to run cocaine to Europe. This has provided AQIM with the means to make money out of its new heartland, as well as using it as a giant recruiting ground and training base.
Given that one of the cardinal objectives of the West’s original counter-terrorism strategy was to prevent the movement from achieving its long-held goal of establishing an independent fiefdom, AQIM’s successful takeover of large tracts of Mali might be considered something of a setback.
Certainly, the prospect of al-Qaeda further consolidating its hold over this desert kingdom was deemed to be too much for France, the region’s former colonial power, with the result that French President François Hollande felt obliged to launch the first military intervention of his presidency.
Mr Hollande is the last person one would expect to order his forces into action. During last year’s presidential election campaign, he positioned himself as the anti-war candidate, in contrast to the more bellicose president Nicolas Sarkozy, who played a leading role in the military campaign to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.
One of Mr Hollande’s first acts as president was to order the immediate withdrawal of 2,000 troops from Afghanistan and, so far as Mali was concerned, he was happy to comply with the consensus among the Western powers that the best option was to allow African forces to restore order. This was despite the fact that France had played a pivotal role in securing UN backing for restoring order in Mali.
But Mr Hollande’s determination to steer clear of foreign military entanglements became unsustainable once the extremists launched an offensive aimed at securing still more territory. When AQIM’s gunmen captured the outpost of Konna, they were less than 40 miles from Mopti, the last garrison town standing between them and the capital, Bamako. For a moment, it seemed as if the remaining one third of Mali notionally in the hands of the shambolic central government might also fall under their sway. Hence President Hollande had no realistic option but to act. If not, one of Africa’s biggest countries risked becoming a terrorist state.
According to Richard Fenning, the head of Control Risks, which specialises in global security assessments and has closely monitored the situation in Mali, al-Qaeda’s takeover is a classic example of the group’s strategy of exploiting ungoverned space in Islamic countries. “They have taken over a very large area which is hard to monitor,” he says.
France will also have felt a unique sense of responsibility for the fate of its former colony. Uniquely among the old imperial powers that once governed Africa, the French have retained a significant military presence on the continent. The Mirage 2000 jets that carried out the first air strikes are based not in France but in N’Djamena, the capital of Chad.
When Mr Hollande announced yesterday that French forces in Mali would be increased almost fivefold to reach 2,500 soldiers, the government explained that reinforcements would come from bases in Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal. While Britain has no permanent military presence in Africa – save for small training missions in Kenya and Sierra Leone – France has a string of outposts, giving it the ability to project its military power into the heart of the Sahara at a moment’s notice.
Given that France has demonstrated its ability to act with such speed, why did it take so long? After all, AQIM and its allies have been allowed 10 months of unchallenged control over northern Mali. They have used that time to gather strength, amassing weapons and recruits, particularly from Libya following the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime. Dislodging them now will be far harder than if such an operation had been attempted earlier.
But now that Mr Hollande has belatedly been obliged to intervene, what exactly is the objective of this operation? Does France intend to halt the Islamist advance and weaken its grip, or is the real aim to recapture the north and break AQIM altogether? And how much support can France expect from its Nato allies, beyond the two RAF C-17 transport planes that are being used to ferry French troops to and from the war zone?
If Mr Hollande’s goal is limited to stopping and degrading AQIM, but leaving it to dominate the north until an African force can be put together to reunite Mali, then this operation will provide nothing more than a sticking plaster over a gaping wound.
If, however, France is prepared to lead a general offensive to expel AQIM from Mali, that will inevitably involve hard fighting on the ground and a real risk of serious casualties.
But for that to succeed, France will need a great deal more support from its Nato partners which, at a time when most Nato nations are focused on the forthcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan, is unlikely to be forthcoming.
At yesterday’s meeting of Britain’s National Security Council, which was chaired by David Cameron, the consensus was that British support for the French mission should be kept to a minimum, and that on no account would the Government sanction the deployment of British “boots on the ground” to back the French effort. Similar messages are coming from other Nato allies, including Washington.
Which means that – for the moment, at least – Mr Hollande is very much alone in his campaign to bring a halt to al-Qaeda’s relentless advance. To achieve this aim, France aims to deploy two battlegroups of about 1,250 men each, which should prove sufficient to stiffen Mali’s national army and prevent AQIM from taking more territory or threatening the capital. And even if France backs this strategy by conducting an extended air campaign designed to weaken and degrade AQIM until the African soldiers can finish the job, it looks as though Mr Hollande’s military adventure is set to run for some time to come.
KIDAL, Mali — This desert town and the surrounding region house just 0.5 percent of the people who registered to vote in Mali's presidential election, a number likely to have little impact on the race's outcome. Yet experts say the future of Mali is likely going to be decided by how this region that has been at the epicenter of multiple rebellions handles Sunday's poll.
Many fear that if rebels in the north, whose flag still flies here, disrupt the ballot or pressure large numbers of people not to vote, Mali's election will be robbed of its needed legitimacy, laying the seeds for another rebellion.
The ballot is being held here even though representatives of the Malian state, including the army and the governor, were only able to return to Kidal three weeks ago, their access blocked by fighters from a Tuareg separatist movement which invaded, and briefly held, Mali's northern half last year.
Election workers who travelled to the province to deliver voter ID cards were kidnapped by the rebels and held overnight last week. And one of the only candidates to make a campaign stop in Kidal was nearly prevented from landing when separatists invaded the runway, aggressively blocking the plane's descent. They later pelted the parked aircraft with rocks.
"You could turn the whole thing around and say that the whole election is about Kidal," says School of Oriental and African Studies scholar Jeremy Keenan, who has been studying the Tuaregs since 1964. "Even though their numbers are minuscule, they are the only people that matter when push comes to shove."
The region of Kidal is a vast expanse of mostly deserted space, spanning an area larger than the state of Iowa in Mali's northeastern quadrant. Inside are just 35,393 registered voters out of 6.8 million total, according to data from the country's election commission. That's no more than one voter for every two square miles.
For this tiny percentage of the electorate, hundreds of Malian and United Nations troops have been sent here to try to secure the vote, bellying the region's outsized importance. They have instituted procedures which recall Afghanistan, including metal detectors and bag checks at polling stations, as well as checkpoints necklaced by sandbags and razor wire.
"Everything is in play for us to hold a bad election," said one of the 28 candidates on the ballot, Tiebile Drame, who dropped out last week citing the deeply problematic status of Kidal as well as the massive technical glitches in the voter roll. "Kidal's vote is not just something symbolic. It's imminently political. ...We will have failed to emerge from this crisis if the election is botched."
Mali weathered uprisings four times in the past half-century by Tuareg separatists who consider the country's north their birthright, including in 1962, in 1990, in 2006 and in 2012. One of three regions in the north, Kidal has particular significance; all four of the rebellions either began in Kidal, or were led by fighters from here.
Last year's uprising started like all the others, with grievances over the marginalization of the lighter-skinned Tuaregs in the north by the black ethnic groups who control the government in the south. After seizing a string of smaller towns, they succeeded in entering and briefly holding the three provincial capitals in the north, declaring the birth of their new Tuareg nation.
The conflict was catapulted to a new level when a veteran Tuareg leader and Kidal native joined forces with al-Qaida's army in the region. Together they overpowered the separatists, seizing the territory they had just conquered, and turning it into their version of an Islamic caliphate.
At the same time, Malian soldiers angered at the government's inept handling of the rebellion, overthrew the democratically elected president in a March 2012 coup, heightening the security crisis.
As the rebels pushed south, French forces launched a military campaign in January to help Mali flush out the extremists, though they stopped short of removing the very separatist rebels in Kidal who had started the conflict.
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or NMLA, has ruled Kidal as if it was its own mini-state since February, refusing to allow the Malian military in, and squatting in the city's administrative offices.
After intense international wrangling, they signed an accord in June, agreeing to allow the return of authorities and to garrison their fighters ahead of the election. Only they chose to garrison them in the very buildings that are supposed to serve as the seat of the provincial government.
The governor, Adama Kamissoko, sleeps in a concrete shell instead of the relative elegance of the Governor's Mansion.
"It's true that the governor's residence is a symbol. But what we are all focused on is the election. We can prepare for the election in any number of buildings," he said just 48 hours before the vote. "If my country asked me to come here and live under a tent, I would do it. The priority is the vote."
The rebels in Kidal say the governor better get used to his makeshift accommodation. The NMLA's communications officer in Kidal, Mazou Toure, happily showed reporters the Governor's Mansion, which he calls "le bureau du president," the president's office. By "President" he means the NMLA president.
They meet every morning in a salon decorated with faux leather couches, holding their daily briefings. Nearby are more Malian buildings which house the rebel police and rebel army.
He scoffed at the accord signed by his superiors at the NMLA last month, which paved the way for the army and the governor to return.
"We said what people wanted to hear. We signed what they wanted us to sign," Toure said. "We agreed in the short-term to abandon the idea of independence, but we have definitely not renounced it in the long term. ... We're allergic to the Malian flag."
Associated Press writer Baba Ahmed contributed to this report from Kidal, Mali.
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