In considering GSM/WCDMA and CDMA as competing nodes, we want to know which node, compared to the other, has a more favorable ratio of strong and sustainable competitive advantage, my proposed index of fitness. It returns us to an old theme: the head start of an installed based versus innovative scientific, engineering, and marketing capabilities. Above, I argued that emerging principles of networks that were discovered in computer simulation experiments of the growth of complex networks demonstrated not only that fitness trumps richness as an explanatory driver of network externalities, but also, that there were deep mathematical correspondences between the physics of Bose-Einstein Condensate and the principles governing the growth of complex networks.
Moreover, the dynamic path that leads from theory to product is perilous. If commercializing CDMA was as difficult as placing a man on the moon, then commercializing WCDMA from scratch will prove as hard as placing a man on Mars. If you doubt my ability to forecast such matters, then you should have no residual uncertainty that it is mere hyperbole, a blustering forecast blind to its dangers, searching to reduce forecasting itself, in the face of not only unknown but also unknowable uncertainties, to absurdity.
Five hazards pose imminent dangers to Europe's strategy for UMTS success: (a) a failure to faithfully translate the theory of spread spectrum into operational product specifications, (b) the 3GPP process of setting a standard amid its overarching proprietary politics, (c) the order of magnitude increase in complexity from GSM to 3G spread spectrum, (d) the power of a stranded installed base of GSM versus the power of a naturally evolving and expanding platform, (e) the missing technical and leadership capabilities in the integrated base of organizational learning in Nokia, NTT, and 3GPP.
The Failure in Translation Fidelity. To test a scientific theory, scientists search for a set of operations that will measure significant concepts when challenging the confirmation of a theory's central hypotheses. Scientists must translate the abstract theory into a form that permits measurement of its basic concepts. Only then can the theory's hypotheses be subjected to an empirical test. The translation fidelity from the theory into a set of operations is an essential link in the chain of reasoning in research. No theory can be tested without this faithful translation into a carefully specified set of operations, procedures and measurements. There is nothing easier and less useful than the creation of a straw man to knock down a rival's theory by facile, but conceptually untrustworthy, experimentation.
By analogy, just as faithful translation of the theory's concepts into observables is required in experimentation, so too must the process of translating the abstract theory of spread spectrum into a set of concrete design rules and parameters in a Radio Access Network be faithful to the specifics of its theory of modulation. Otherwise, the engineer settles for far less than the scientist promised.
After contributing his own advanced scientific research, Richard Viterbi wrote the standard advanced textbook on code division multiple access. He faithfully translated this theory of modulation into a set of operations that were transformed by deep craft engineering skills into the cdmaOne IS-95 standard.
If you begin from sound science that specifies the optimal solution to the problem of frequency reuse, and if you translate this best possible solution into a set of specifications that are designed and cross tested in the architectural designs of a set of elegantly engineered products, and if you carefully patent this fundamentally-sound architecture, then you have proprietary strategic control of the advanced coding that faithfully translates spread spectrum and transforms the breakthrough idea of power control (equalizing power in all signals at the receiver) into a complete CDMA Radio Access Network.
Recall this minimax law of physics from Part I: CDMA is the "best" signaling modulation of the "worst" form of interference (jamming). CDMA is spectrally efficient because "each user's transmitted bandwidth is greatly enlarged by making the coded signal's symbol rate, or clock, run much faster than the digital rate of the source." By coding at the higher chip rate, Qualcomm not only created a processing gain proportional to the ratio of the increased chipping rate to the symbol rate, but also simultaneously used this coding process to spread a unique set of orthogonally coded signals across the spectrum to reduce interference and improve the quality of the received signal. The combination of channelization, power control, rake receivers, synchronized soft handoff, and RAN system, taken together, created a carefully designed and tightly integrated system within the ASIC brain that became a complete standardized solution to the problem of frequency reuse.
Because Qualcomm owned this ideal architecture that became the future of the industry's third-generation, Europe cobbled together its own "proprietary version," UMTS, in a futile effort to bypass Qualcomm's intellectual property by introducing abortive newly spawned elements, like GSM's asynchrony, into a wide 5 MGHz bandwidth of spectrum now made problematic by interference from nearby channels because, given today's filter technology, the guardbands were too narrow and, thus, inadequate.
Because Europe looked forward to replicating the GSM-strategy for proprietary control of a marketplace in the next generation, they inadvertently compromised and corrupted the ideal solution in their attempt to transform 3G-spread spectrum into their own "proprietary European standard." This politically motivated corruption created a bastardized standard with inherent scientific problems that no set of engineers can elegantly or fully solve. Qualcomm's success in faithfully translating the modulation theory of spread spectrum into practice stands in sharp contrast to Europe's technical and strategic failures. Certain of Qualcomm's design rules were mandated by the necessities of radio wave physics, fundamentally required to make a spread spectrum network function efficiently.
The Flawed 3GPP Process. On August 30, Benjamin Garrett posted a multi-page excerpt from Deutsche Bank's 275-page May report on "The Rise of the 3G Empire," which reviewed the 3GPP process for setting a standard. The 3GPP divides itself into technical specifications groups to write the standards for their separate areas. Once written, the specification are endorsed by the vote of 3GPP without testing and submitted to the ITU. The UMTS standard is not a single unitary standard but is instead a series of releases. Each release builds upon previous releases by adding enhancements and offering fixes to earlier releases, using a multitude of requests for corrections (CR). Here, the posted Empire excerpt is quoted with emphasis added: http://www.siliconinvestor.com/stocktalk/msg.gsp?msgid=17939084
"Further adding to the confusion, within each release (e.g., Release 99) there are multiple versions. …Although the basic functionality of Release '99 does not change each quarter, the technical definition of how the functionality is implemented does change. …Each subsequent version (the date of the first version is March 2000) of Release '99 is most likely not compatible with earlier versions of the release, this is especially true for the earliest versions. For example, if one OEM uses the June 2001 version and another OEM implements the December 2000 version, it is likely that their solutions will not be compatible with each other. …Until the release is stable, it is difficult and impractical to introduce 3G handsets into the market. …Complete and accurate IOT (interoperability testing) cannot begin until after the standard is stable and after test scripts have been developed. Further, it can literally take years, not months, to successfully complete the initial set of tests, especially when problems are identified, subsequently fixed and then re-tested, not to mention developing additional test scripts and subsequently testing/fixing to address all of the little ‘quirks' that are noticed during network trials. …Our view is that some vendors in the industry have suggested that all the work on Release '99 standards is complete, since the standard is ‘frozen." However, the term ‘frozen' only means that the 3GPP has decided what functionality to include or exclude from the release. Once the functionality is ‘frozen,' the technical aspects of implementing that standard remain. …Two separate industry contacts, that have good insight into the major vendor's base station solutions, informed us that the test equipment they are providing to each vendor to test the their base stations require different parameters in the test equipment. The implication is that each vendor is interpreting the standard differently or testing their base station to a different version of Release '99. …It has been suggested by some contacts in the industry that Release '99 handsets may not be fully compatible with Release 4 infrastructure. As a result, once carriers upgrade their RAN and Core to Release 4, the already distributed Release '99 3G handsets may not work properly, if at all. …Another important consideration for successful early 3G launches is the handoff between the UMTS and GSM/GPRS networks and vice versa. This capability is especially important since initial UMTS networks will have very limited geographical coverage, thus depending on GPRS to provide the majority of the coverage. In our view, handoff problems will continue to loom well beyond 2002 due to the technical challenges of handing off between different technologies, not to mention the work remaining to develop a complete set of test scripts to ensure vendor and network interoperability. …FOMA is a hybrid of Release '99, but it will evolve to become compatible with the UMTS standard. …NTT DoCoMO is a member of 3GPP and it is still involved in the 3GPP process. However, it elected early on to deploy 3G service before the Release '99 standard was frozen. …Since DoCoMo went at it alone, its 3G solution has evolved, but has since evolved and is not compatible with Release '99. …At this point Release 5 is probably a 2005 deployment scenario, at best. Even if the release were ‘frozen' this summer, it will still undergo a lengthy CR [request for corrections] process. However, what concerns us most is the major OEMs are proposing vastly different network architecture solutions to implement the same release. As a result, vendors are distributing the functionality of Release 5 across different, and often newly introduced, hardware components. In some cases, our initial impression is that carriers will have to scrap some Release '99 hardware and replace it with completely new hardware, especially if they elect to switch vendors."
Hence, the 3GPP process is fatally flawed. Instead of repeating the successful GSM-strategy of a uniting stakeholders around a single standard to be imposed on all of Europe and exported around the world under the guise of offering universal roaming, it is ghettoizing Europe into a rat's nest, a warren of unstable and incompatible releases, non-interoperable handsets and infrastructures, and diverse, but incompatible, GSM/GPRS/UMTS networks that become available sometime after 2005.
Its first error resulted from its members' failure to acquire a deep understanding of the complexities of spread spectrum itself that left its members vulnerable to electing a political process of voting over the scientific method as the criterion of fitness for developing third-generation mobile communication systems.
Its second error was its apparently endless series of requests for corrections that attempt to extend, patch, and re-patch a kluge with a plague of mini-kluges. Its third error was the transparent attempts by multiple members to build company-specific proprietary advantage into a politically proprietary standard at either the level of setting the standard or at the level of hardware built upon the unstable and constantly shifting standard. Individual OEMs build-in a specific proprietary standards-based interpretation of what should be a single completely specified standard. Their intent in adding hooks and extensions is to lock in customers to its proprietary version of the unstable, shifting, and fractionating UMTS standard.
Simply put, stable platforms are a necessity. Standards that are not standardized defeat their purpose: To foster network externalities. Yet, the UMTS standard is not only unstable, it is fractionating into numerous incompatible releases that are further fractionating into proprietary company-specific interpretations and extensions to the various releases.
Given this debacle in its industry, it is no wonder that Qualcomm seeks to unify by offering complete standardized solutions as an antidote the standards-based incompatibilities. Using its own MSM6200 solution to facilitate interoperability testing, Qualcomm strives to unite the fractious European Union around a seamless worldwide solution that will give them the universal roaming they claim to seek. Thornley has said carriers are responding by pressing manufacturers to use the Qualcomm solution.
Qualcomm cannot harmonize a set of fractionated standards that are not interoperable, but it can substitute its own complete standardized WCDMA solution based on its series of tightly integrated multimode chips. The 3GPP process of setting an untested standard, with its proprietary politics, pollutes the waters, creating a hazard for UMTS interoperability.
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