Yup, minority extremists as the Salafists and the theocratically inclined Santorum/Romney .. re the latter see .. .......... Times & Seasons, An Onymous Mormon Blog (also known as Times and Seasons, and abbreviated T&S) is a multi-author weblog featuring commentary and discussion especially of contemporary Mormon culture, thought and current events. Times and Seasons was founded in 2003 by Nathan Oman, whom podcaster John Dehlin has since termed "the godfather of the Mormon bloggernacle", with Matt Evans, Adam Greenwood, and Kaimipono Wenger. The blog was named after Times and Seasons, a nineteenth-century Latter Day Saint periodical.
Media mentions
* In an article in The Salt Lake Tribune, reporter Peggy Fletcher Stack wrote in 2004, "Kaimipono David Wenger, a New York City lawyer who regularly participates in the Mormon blog, found himself in the middle of the debate [about the Bybee memo]. 'I would personally be uncomfortable writing a memo on how the administration could legally justify torture of people, but I don't think it's against the tenets of our faith.'" .. bit more: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Times_%26_Seasons,_An_Onymous_Mormon_Blog ..........
Americans today who ply so much influence in the overly obstructionist GOP, and those as the bombers of abortion clinics in the USA are a problem .. a hindrance to anything close to reasonable and commonsense evolution of things .. these overseas and domestic 'Christian/Salafist' minorities don't seem to be able to accept that their way just may not be the only right way .. guess it's because they see it as 'Sod given'.
I know this board has looked at who is who aplenty yet the overlaps still get me, so to this one .. not here for the opinion at the bottom of it, but for the analysis ..
The words Islamism, Islamist, Salafist and Wahhabist all conjure various images to each of us, and not all of them the will be the same degree. What we can say is that most of these images provokes extremist views, either from those within or from without those that are connected to them. Actually, what do they mean?
ISLAMISM
Islamism is another word for “political Islam”. Wikipedia does a sincere effort in describing Islamism as: “set of ideologies holding that Islam is not only a religion but also a political system; that modern Muslims must return to their roots of their religion, and unite politically. Islamism is a controversial term and definitions of it sometimes vary. Many confuse or conflate Islamism with Salafism, however early Salafism is the contrary to modern Islamism.[1] Leading Islamist thinkers emphasized the enforcement of sharia (Islamic law); of pan-Islamic political unity or caliphate.”
As with most ideologies, there is no single version of what is an Islamist and equally elements at various times are hijacked by sub-groups within it. Equally, Islamism may be the force or a push for a utopian goal within an existing Muslim community or state just as much as it is the effort by Muslims outside the Muslim world attempting to push for political power over their own community or the greater community. In this last case, in conflict with the existing non-Muslim and Muslim non-Islamist communities.
Islamism has been defined by Robert Pelletreau, probably the most experienced US Diplomat dealing with the Muslim World, (and also quoted by Wikipedia) as:
* “The modernist attempt to claim that political sovereignty belongs to God, that the Shari’ah equates to state law, and that it is a religious duty on all Muslims to create a political entity that reflects the above.”
* “Islam as a modern ideology and a political program”, * “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life”,[11] * “the ideology that guides society as a whole and that law must be in conformity with the Islamic sharia”, * “a movement that seeks cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe”, * “the organised political trend, owing its modern origin to the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, that seeks to solve modern political problems by reference to Muslim texts”, * “the whole body of thought which seeks to invest society with Islam which may be integrationist, but may also be traditionalist, reform-minded or even revolutionary”, * “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character,” * a movement of “Muslims who draw upon the belief, symbols, and language of Islam to inspire, shape, and animate political activity;” which may contain moderate, tolerant, peaceful activists, and/or those who “preach intolerance and espouse violence
From this we can point out that by simply supporting the concept that Islam is not only a way of life but a social and political faith does not necessarily but in most cases is at conflict with the set of freedoms and values established within most western nations.
For example, the former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, award-winning Finance Minister and now Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim is considered an advocate of Islamism. He is not an advocate for global domination of Islam, does not call for war against western values nor does he demand a global caliphate. But what he does, is advocate that Islam in its purist concepts is also a political concept.
To a similar level, the current ruling political party the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) (AKP) is also following the base-level and moderate version of Islamism that seeks to incorporate Islamic principles not just at an individual level but at a social and political level.
The question then must follow, is it the same as the following?
Ayatollah Khomenei and the Islamism-inspired Iranian Revolution believes that the imitation of the early Muslims and the restoration of Sharia law were essential to Islam and that secular, Westernizing Muslims were actually agents of the West serving only Western interests. A direct and announced opposition to a perceived set of westernized values and standards.
Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and the Sudanese Brotherhood have not only turned Islam into politics but have embraced militancy and force to ensure its dominance. They have made it a matter of force that their own version of Islamic dogma will not only dominate but must be followed by others.
Similarly, Islamists such as the global-terrorist group Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad have chosen to forcibly reject democracy and what they refer to as self-proclaimed Muslims (those Muslims whom do not follow them) . Most of us have heard the names of Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the Iranian Revolution and correctly link them to the ugliness of radicalism, extremism and use the generalized term Islamism or Islamist, not necessarily realizing that there is a general political term behind it.
Radicalism by its very nature means a willingness to alter their faith, standards and morals to suit that radical agenda, does that work similarly with Islamism? It does. The term Salafi or Salafism is a radical off-shoot or sect of Islam that very much is a form of Islamism.
SALAFI
Within Islamism there are the “guardians of the tradition” of the Salafism and Wahhabi movements, and a “vanguard of change” which is commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood (the latter focussing on the linking of Islamism with pan-Arabism). The Muslim Brotherhood’s history dates back before the turn of the last century and has a strong nationalist independence history but more recently has been hijacked by the Salafi movement that centres on the importance of “sharia rather than the building of Islamic institutions,” (The Future of Political Islam, (2003), p.194-5, Fuller), and pushes a theological cause to reject anything to do with Shia Islam.
Salafi according to the GobalSecurity.org is:
Salafi is a term often used to describe fundamentalist islamic thought.
The teachings of the reformer Abd Al-Wahhab are more often referred to by adherents as Salafi, that is, “following the forefathers of Islam.” This branch of Islam is often referred to as “Wahhabi,” a term that many adherents to this tradition do not use. Members of this form of Islam call themselves Muwahhidun (“Unitarians”, or “unifiers of Islamic practice”). They use the Salafi Da’wa or Ahlul Sunna wal Jama’a. Wahhabism is a particular orientation within Salafism. Most puritanical groups in the Muslim world are Salafi in orientation, but not necessarily Wahhabi.
The Salafiyyah are a movement, and like the Sufis, can come from the Maliki, the Shafi, the Hanbali, or the Hanafi. .......... Insert: .. these inside .. chuckle .. reflect expected points of view as to why some are followers of ..
cuz, i was born into, so .. the preacher guy was convenient, so .. cuz the other guy said, so .. mirrors why many in the West are whatever too, of course .. ..........
But, that said, the Salafiyyah movement, is primarily confirmed to the Hanbali, and in particular the Wahhabiyyah, and their theological equivalents. The Salafiyyah movement to return Islam to it’s purest roots (like the Islamic Amish!) has taken as reference points the teachings of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal , Al Barbahaaree, or Al Laalikaa’ee, or Ash-Shaatibee, or Adh-Dhahabee, or Al Layth ibn Sa’d, or Abu Haneefah, and other scholars who adhered to the methodology of the salaf.
As-Salaf us-Salih (or briefly: the Salaf) refers to the first and best three generations of Muslims. They are the Companions (Sahabah) of the Prophet (S), their immediate followers (Tabiun), and the followers of the Tabi’in. The meaning in the Arabic language is “Those who precede, have gone before”. It is a word used by the earliest scholars for “The first three generations of Muslims” and those who are upon their way in accordance with the Ahaadeeth of the Messenger Muhammad (sallAllaahu` alayhi wa sallam) which is reported in Saheeh al-Bukhaaree: The best of people/mankind is my generation, then those that follow them, then those that follow them.
Salafists make nothing more clear than what they reject and from this it could be clearly defined as being for the purposed of this blog as “radical”. An inability to tolerate an alternative, an assumption within the principle ideology that other reject (what some would also call philosophically as “the lie”), the need to push that assumption even if it throws contradictions and takes on a life itself and the ultimate value judgement that all but them are righteous with the public in general being simply stupid and foolish requiring to be told what to think and do.
Salafist teachings point out that there are 11 “deviant sects” of Islam – or alternatively those Muslims that are not Salafists themselves:
Introductory Materials
Basic materials highlighting the splitting and differing in the Ummah and that its cause is the introduction of newly-invented matters and principles into the religion.
The Khawarij The very first sect to split away from the main body of the Muslims. They will remain in the Ummah till they fight alongside Dajjal against this Ummah.
The Raafidah (Shi`ah) Initiated by the Jew, Abdullah bin Saba, this sect has developed into what we now know as the Shi’ah whose beliefs and thoughts are repugnant beyond belief.
The Qadariyyah The deniers of Divine Pre-Determination who claimed that Allaah has no power of His creation and that mankind is totally independent of His Will and Power.
The Murji`ah One of the earliest sects. They did not include actions in the definition of faith and claimed that sins do not affect a persons faith.
The Ash`arees A sect that denies the Attributes of Allaah, ta’weel being one of its outstanding hallmarks.
The Mu`tazilah The Mu’tazilah are from the Rationalist school of thought and have very many deviations in their methodological principles.
The Baatiniyyah The Baatiniyyah claim that there is the internal hidden aspects to things and also the outward manifestations of things and that they have exclusivity to the internal hidden matters.
The Soofees The Sufis have introduced many innovations into Islam in the name of Tasawwuf and have justified such practises by fabricated statements and unsound arguments.
The Ismaa’eelis The Ismaa’eelis are an offshoot of the Raafidah (Shi’ah) and share some of their characteristics. Aga Khan is their supreme leader and, in their view, has characteristics and attributes similar to those of Allaah.
The Qadianis The Qadianis are disbelievers, outside the fold of Islam and were instigated by British Imperialists in 19th century India. They hold that Ghulam Ahmad Mirza was a prophet.
(note spellings directly quoted from the source)
Salafists believe only in the Koran, the Sunnah, certain Haddiths and the words of the first three generations of followers. Interestingly, and to some not-suprisingly, they added a number of new “rightly guided” followers, namely the creators of the Salafist movement. It could be argued in philosophical terms, that this is the core of “the lie” and to some the concept that as good as their intentions may have been, that the words of three-plus generations of 7th and 8th century followers must be taken literally.
Within Salafism there is another component to add to the mixture, those whom are called Wahhabists.
WAHHABI
Wahhabists call themselves “Muwahiddun” (in English: Unitarians). They are an ultra-conservative Islamic sect based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th century theologian and scholar. It is the largest sub-sect of Islam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Abd-al-Wahhab advocated to completely purge Islam of what he considered innovations in Islam, though other Muslims would say his opposition to change itself is an innovation – the innovation of stopping the clock.
Conceptually what makes Wahhabists different from other Salafists is that they do not follow any particular scholar (other than those of al-Wahhab and those that he followed). Many have argued that this concept is why Wahhabists are so extreme, non-conformist, radical and to a degree dangerous.
Wahhabism also denounces the practice of blind adherence to the interpretations of scholars, except his own interpretation, and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. Of the most widely used excuse of the pagans around the time of the prophet was that they worshiped idols because they saw their forefathers engaged in that practice. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wrote in support of the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah. – A History of the Modern Middle East. Third Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004. Page.123
Wahhabists, for example, do not support any fatwas by accepted Islamic Schools or Institution and often make their own such as those often quoted in the media and on blog-sites demanding the killing of foreigners (by the non-cleric Osama bin-Laden) or the banning of women from working, schooling etc.)
What is obviously clear is that as a radical strain of an already radical Salafist ideology under the banner of a controversial Islamism code, Wahhabists are willing to force their view on those around them and beyond. The puritanical Wahhabis denounce not only those Muslims that do not support their views as heretics (which ironically all five Islamic Schools of jurisprudence considers to call another Muslims an un-believer as “haram” or forbidden) but are also mausoleums, shrines and combination mosque-shrines as heresy and are willing to and have destroyed them.
The links to modern-day Islamist terrorism is mostly linked to Wahhabist and salafist communities. The chain of events that have increased since the Iranian Revolution in 1978 that motivated the already Wahhabi dominated Saudi population to force even tighter control over that Kingdom has led us to the situation that the world is in today. The Wahhabi self-proclaimed militant leader Osama bin-Laden is a product of Wahhibist teachings and politics.
As Wahhabi is as much a part of an ideology, it is important not to forget that it is just as much a political venture, and thus can be classed as a classic radical political ideology as that of a religious one and the standards that apply to all forms of radicalism apply here as well.
1) The lie – that their way is the only way, that the west are out to destroy Islam and western values (and any non-Wahhabi value) is “haram”.
2) The hard-sell and abuse of context – the use of mass-media, war, force, terror, to “defend” Islam and push for that elusive Caliphate that we can assume is a Wahhabi one.
3) The assumption that the “people” be it the Muslim Ummah or the western population are stupid. That they need to be told how to think and what to do and that they will or at worst must follow “the lie”.
ISLAMISM, SALAFI and WAHHABI
Though there is arguments that the concept of Islamism is not malign, it certainly is a cause that is often hijacked by various existing politics agendas, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
As previously mentioned, the highly respected Malaysian politician Anwar Ibrahim is an Islamist but in the sense that he believes that in an Islamic environment there is a “political Islam” and supports that the tenants and principles of Islam does create a politic. It also works within the “Concept of Normality” in opposition to the “Concept of Radicalism” set by Erasmus. The argument is that radicalism is willing to change its faith, standards and morality to suit its agenda rather than the other way. Thus, the “other way” is that agendas should only be designed or molded by one’s faith, standards and morality. In this case Anwar Ibrahim and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan are correct in their assumption.
Salafi and its more ugly brothers the Wahhabists though are certainly malign, are extreme, radical and prone to serious violence to ensure its way is the only way. It is certainly the element that is the cause for the vast majority of terrorism in the world and a promoter of the cause of a violent Islamism that has and is currently being followed by political militants, however much they think it is done in the name of God.
IN EUROPE?
Salafists and Wahhabists are present in Europe and the West and are a cause for genuine fear and concern. They are a security risk because of the ideological links to insurgency, terrorism and war. Their efforts to sway and push militant islamism to the Muslim immigrant populations is also well-known and they also have the money to sweeten “the lie”. They push many elements from non-integration, demanding a level of Islam that is neither accepted nor common-place in the actual Muslim world to obstinate and active disobedience and disrespect to western governments. Simultaneously they encourage their own variant of Islam as the only solution – the ugly radical version.
My own conclusion is that not only is Salafist and Wahhabist ideological a danger to the West but in fact Islamism is incompatible as well. Though I fully understand the ideals and concepts of Ibrahim and Erdogan, they are ideals for their world and does not equate to the morals and standards that have bene developed for Europe and most of the West. Europe has almost completely secularized religion from State and though the values of the faiths that make up Europe is reflected in the laws via reflecting them, Islamism directly links it.
Islam, for my part is not only welcome in Europe but already a part of it – in fact it always has been to varying degrees), but from an individualistic and social level only. If necessary, I would argue that the problem with Islam in Europe is that because of history and the old-political-Christianity, there has been no opportunity to create a separate and clearly defined European-Muslim identity – one that is clearly European, faithfully Islamic and equally secular to the level that Christianity and Judaism is. .. http://blootstellen.wordpress.com/islamism-salafi-and-wahhabis/
======== .. this one no sensible person would agree with all of, hence the source site, yet it does give a decent historical review ..
.. thank you, Steph .. truly 'the meeting had slipped me by' were my thoughts on reading yours .. your bigger picture pocket-book summaries often get me back to the broader highway .. so, thank YOU ..
In the Iranian capital and in Cairo, Dina Ezzat deciphers President Mursi's Iran visit, its intentions and possible outcomes
Mursi (r)attended the NAM summit with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Iranian chief of Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran
"It is still early to talk about specifics regarding Egyptian-Iranian relations," said Yasser Ali, the Egyptian presidential spokesman.
Ali was speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly as President Mohamed Mursi was exiting the meeting room at the Tehran Conference Hall where he had conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for around 40 minutes, following the participation of both in the opening session of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran Thursday, whereby Mursi transferred the rotated presidency of the summit from Egypt to Iran.
According to Ali's statement to the Weekly and that of Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the head of Egypt's Interest Section in Iran, and of Ambassador Moatez Ahmadine, Egypt's permanent representative to the UN headquarters in New York, the venue of the NAM Secretariat, Mursi's brief visit to Tehran on his way back from Beijing was by and large multilateral with not much bilateral input.
"Of course, there were good exchanges of courteous statements and an emphasis by President Ahmadinejad on the respect that Iran has for Egypt and its great people, and its great [25 January] revolution. Of course Egyptian President Mursi, in turn, expressed respect for Iran and its history and its role, but we cannot say that bilateral relations were really discussed," commented an Iranian official who took part in the Mursi-Ahmadinejad encounter.
He added that eventually the time would come for that, because ultimately "what the two nations, these two great nations, have in common is much bigger than their differences."
The visit of Mursi to Tehran, which started late morning and ended early afternoon, is the first such high-level visit by an Egyptian official to Tehran after it severed its relations with Egypt in 1979 at a time of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, when refuge was offered by then Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat to Iran's ousted Shah, and against the backdrop of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
Since that time, relations between Cairo and Tehran went from cold to hostile. Differences between the two countries grew with the time from mere political differences over the management of the Arab-Israeli struggle to differences over the Islamist rule of Iran versus relatively secular rule in Egypt, and of Sunni versus Shia leadership in the Middle East, especially during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, then under the leadership of president Saddam Hussein, in the late 1980s.
The visit of Mursi to Tehran this week, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the NAM summit, was hoped by many to signal the end of these differences and to initiate a new rapprochement that could eventually lead to the normalisation of relations -- something that was attempted by former foreign minister Amr Moussa under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the late 1990s, but that he did not successfully pull off, according to Egyptian diplomats, due to Mubarak's hesitation and US influence over his foreign policy choices.
None of the aspired to change happened, according to almost identical accounts offered by Egyptian and Iranian officials, during Mursi's brief visit to Tehran. Rather the contrary could well be true, some officials say.
Mursi received huge media attention upon his arrival to Imam Khomeini International Airport and upon his departure from the Tehran Conference Hall. It is also true that Mursi referred to his Iranian counterpart as "my dear brother" during the opening of the summit. Following the visit of Mursi, the Iranian president also told the Iranian official press that, "Egyptians and Iranians have so much in common."
However, beyond this symbolism there is very little to be said in terms of substance on a positive outcome of Mursi's visit to Tehran from a bilateral perspective.
Mursi was not at all sensitive, in the assessment of Iranian individuals who spoke to the Weekly in Tehran, over Shia reluctance to the mention of some of the Prophet Mohamed's associates in his ultra-Islamic greeting at the beginning of what was otherwise a political speech in the opening of the NAM summit.
"May God's peace and prayers be upon the Prophet Mohamed and his sahabah (close associates) Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali and that of the Holy Family of the Prophet," Mursi said at the onset of his speech.
While the mention of the last, Ali and the Holy Family of the Prophet, falls squarely within the bounds of predominantly Shia Iran appreciation, the reference to the first three is all but a taboo according to the Shia sect.
According to one of Mursi's aides, the reference in its totality was designed to indicate the need to go beyond the barriers of division in Muslim history between those that Shias appreciate and those appreciated by Sunnis, the predominant Muslim sect in Egypt.
[ YEAH! GO MURSI, GO! ]
This might have been the intention, but Mursi's interlocutors were certainly offended. According to one Iranian official who asked not to be named, this introductory paragraph in the speech of Mursi acted as a reminder of statements that the Egyptian president had earlier made in Saudi Arabia where he spoke in an untypical fashion for an Egyptian head of state on Egyptian-Saudi determination to defend the Sunni sect.
[ oops .. lol .. ]
According to an Egyptian diplomat who accompanied Mursi during the visit to Saudi Arabia in early July, that Sunni emphasis "came out of nowhere" and it was not introduced or advised by diplomatic aides to the president, nor had it ever been part of Egyptian political jargon.
"I remember back in 2004 when [ousted president] Mubarak made a reference in a TV interview to the attempt of Iranian Shias to get in alliance with the Shia majority in Iraq, the [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry strongly advised against this line. Egypt does not identify itself as a Sunni state but as a leading Arab Muslim state," the diplomat said.
The ultra-Muslim stance and specific Sunni identification that Mursi seemed to be proposing in his speech before NAM was not just offending to the Iranians. It was also perceived as unfortunate back home in Egypt.
"This is a really disturbing remark," suggested Amin Iskandar, a Nasserist politician and member of the Arab Affairs Committee in the dissolved People's Assembly.
"The introduction of Mursi's speech is not becoming of that of the president of Egypt. Why talk about Sunni versus Shia matters in the onset of a political speech before an international organisation? What was the purpose? Was Mursi trying to reposition Egypt as an Islamist state now?" asked Iskandar.
He added: "Egypt had never been trapped in the Sunni-Shia polarisation game and it should not be doing so today, and not ever, because that goes against its regional leadership interests and consequently against its national security interests."
For his part, prominent political scientist and commentator Amr El-Shobaki, who generally held a positive view of Mursi's trip to Iran, argued that the Sunni versus Shia component in the speech before NAM was uncalled for and unfortunate.
"Egypt is not a radical Sunni state; Egypt is a state of a very moderate Sunni majority that has an affinity to the Holy Family and has as such a very unique nature to its Sunni Islam. Egypt through Al-Azhar University has always played a leading role in bridging the gap between Sunnis and Shias and it should not be abandoning this crucial mission, which is not only religious but indeed cultural and strategic," El-Shobaki added.
If some were offended by the Sunni aspect in Mursi's speech, others were perturbed by what they qualified as the "Muslim Brotherhood policy line" they said Mursi put across in the speech.
"When the Egyptian president spoke against Damascus he was, I am afraid, reflecting his perspective as a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and not as that of the president of what is supposed to be a leading Arab state," commented Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim, who headed the delegation of his country to the NAM summit.
In his speech, Mursi crossed borders he had personally embraced with regards to the Egyptian position on the Syrian file. Mursi used to speak of the need for the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for democratisation to be observed and for bloodshed to come to an end. In Tehran, the Egyptian president surprised his hosts, the closest regional allies to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, with an unprecedented attack on the Syrian regime for its actions during 18-month plus protests-turned-armed confrontations.
Mursi qualified the Al-Assad regime as an "oppressive regime" and insisted that it had "lost legitimacy". Indeed, the president equated the Syrian people under Al-Assad with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.
"This was the talk of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood," restated Al-Muallim.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria are particularly active within the ranks of an otherwise diversified Syrian opposition that emerged in March 2011 demonstrations to end the rule of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot, that has headed Syria from the 1970s until today.
Iskandar too was critical of what he qualified as Muslim Brotherhood influence over the position that Mursi expressed with regards to Syria. "We are all appreciative of the legitimate and overdue demand of the Syrians for democracy. There are no two ways about it. However, it is impossible for anyone to equate the regime of Al-Assad, despite the horrid bloodshed in Syria, with the Israeli occupation of Palestine," Iskandar said.
According to Iskandar, "had Mursi been really concerned about the call for freedom and democracy he should have also made a reference to the call for democracy in Bahrain," where the Shia majority has for over a year been protesting against persecution at the hands of Sunni minority rule.
"For Mursi, it is not a matter of defending freedom but rather a matter of defending the Muslim Brotherhood perspective and associations," Iskandar suggested. He added that this line is compatible with the foreign policy agenda of Qatar, "that has an increasing influence over Egyptian foreign policy," adding that "Qatar is a regional proxy for the US."
During his visit to Tehran, President Mursi had a brief encounter with the emir of Qatar who had just visited Egypt mid-August. "The Qataris are opposed to the regime of Al-Assad, but not to the persecution of Shia in Bahrain, and Mursi spoke about Syria under the pretext of defending freedoms but completely dropped Bahrain," Iskandar criticised.
Indeed, the Iranian interpreter who was translating Mursi's speech into Persian was said, according to Iranian journalists, to have played around with his translation. In converting Mursi's speech into Persian, the Iranian interpreter pinned the attack made by the Egyptian president on the Bahraini rather than the Syrian regime.
Nonetheless, many Egyptian politicians and commentators had a positive reaction to Mursi's statements on Syria. "It was an overdue support," El-Shobaki said.
According to El-Shobaki, it is reductionist to suggest that the Egyptian position expressed by Mursi in Tehran is an outcome of Qatari influence over Egyptian foreign policy. "This is absolutely exaggerated," he said. El-Shobaki made reference to the criticism that the majority of Egyptian political quarters expressed against what they qualified as Mursi's "hesitant and flat positions on Syria".
"In Tehran, the president should have acknowledged the Bahraini call for democracy, but his failure to do so does not mean that he should have also overlooked a very bloody situation in Syria, especially that the support for the Syrian revolution is widely sensed not just in Egyptian political circles but indeed in the Egyptian street," El-Shobaki suggested.
According to Amr Ramadan, deputy assistant foreign minister, Mursi had already called for a political end to the crisis in Syria. During his participation in the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two weeks ago in Mecca, at the invitation of the Saudi monarch, Mursi called for the launch of a working group of the OIC to help find resolution to the situation in Syria.
In Tehran, on Thursday, and Friday when the summit closed, Ramadan added, Egypt was supportive of a resolution that the NAM meeting adopted to welcome the mission of the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.
"What we opposed was an Iranian proposal to start a NAM working group on Syria, and our rationale there was simple: there are already several mechanisms and what is needed now is the coordination of efforts rather than the launch of a parallel mediation process," Ramadan suggested.
At the end of the day, both Ramadan and El-Shobaki agree that what Mursi did in essence with his remarks in Syria during the NAM summit was to substantiate Egypt's commitment to take a clear stance on the matter.
Indeed, in the analysis of El-Shobaki, the clear outcome of the Mursi visit to Tehran is the re-launching of Egyptian foreign policy.
Mursi in his speech also departed from the traditional reconciliatory line that Egypt had for the past 10 years embraced on the Palestinian cause. The president voiced direct and untypical criticism of Israel and highlighted previously overlooked matters, like the fate of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.
"This file is a crucial matter on the agenda of NAM. It had received much attention during the Egyptian presidency of the NAM summit and it is recommended as a priority issue in the transfer report that Egypt made during the handover of the presidency of the summit," Ramadan argued.
Moreover, the NAM summit made a commitment to support the diplomatic and political attempts to get Palestine permanent and full membership in the UN, in view of the failure of the so-called "peace process" to lead to a Palestinian state.
"Of course this mobilisation, in which Egypt is playing a key role, is not at all to the liking of the Israelis and they are endlessly complaining about it," the same diplomat suggested.
Egyptian diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity said that the mere participation of Mursi in a Tehran-hosted summit is in itself a clear message to Israel that Egypt is no longer hostage to what makes Israel comfortable or not.
"We were told clearly that the Israelis are feeling very apprehensive about this visit, even when they knew that it was not designed to re-launch diplomatic relations immediately," said one diplomat.
Alarm against Mursi's visit to Tehran was sounded also in Washington. "There was much pressure, but it was declined," the same diplomat added.
According to Ramadan, the decision of Egypt to participate at this high level was made in view of the reclaimed attention that Egypt is giving to its role in the Third World.
"In a sense, the decision was made irrespective of the venue of the summit. NAM might not be making as much commotion as it used to during the heydays when it was first launched with the support, and indeed initiative, of [late president Gamal] Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s, but ultimately it is a grouping that brings together about two thirds of UN member states," Ramadan said.
He added that the issues on the agenda of NAM, which range from international conflicts to disarmament and economic and environmental cooperation, fall squarely within the list of priorities of Egyptian foreign policy.
And the fact that Mursi went to Tehran, El-Shobaki argued, opens a new phase of Egyptian foreign policy by which Egypt would not restrict itself to communication with the countries it sees eye-to-eye with.
"The president went to Tehran in a positive sign of goodwill. But while there he did not shy away from expressing disagreements between Cairo and Tehran. This is the way things should be," El-Shobaki said.
The shaking and remaking of Egyptian foreign policy seems to be a priority for Mursi. The president, who repeatedly committed to observe the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and who is as yet acting in line with the close alliance between Cairo and Washington, is venturing into a wider spectrum and a more diversified sphere of communication.
Ahead of his short and controversial visit to Tehran, Mursi had been in Beijing. For October, he is planning visits to Malaysia and Indonesia, whose vice president he met while in Tehran. He is also considering a trip to Brazil and Chile, which will possibly come in the wake of his visit to New York during the last week of this month to head the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.
The South America and Asian trips are in parallel with plans to visit European capitals that Egypt keeps in close relation with.
"If Egypt is aiming to reassume its leadership it needs to take clear positions on key matters and to widen its scope of foreign policy engagement. I think Mursi is attempting to do both," El-Shobaki concluded.
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