One day before the deadline for Iraq's new constitution, Sunni Arab negotiators appealed Sunday to the United States and the international community to prevent Shiites and Kurds from pushing a draft charter through parliament without Sunni consent.
An Iraqi government spokesman suggested that if the factions cannot agree on a draft by Monday night, parliament may have to amend the interim constitution yet again to extend the deadline and prevent its dissolution.
In Jordan, two newspapers published a letter from Saddam Hussein in which he vowed to sacrifice himself for the cause of Palestine and Iraq, urged Arabs to follow his path and implied he would become a martyr for the Arab cause.
The letter was delivered through the International Committee of the Red Cross to an old friend of Saddam's now living in Jordan.
"My soul and my existence is to be sacrificed for our precious Palestine and our beloved, patient and suffering Iraq," the letter to an unidentified friend said.
"It is not much for a man to support his nation with his soul and all he commands because it deserves it since it has given us life in the name of God and allowed us to inherit the best."
Saddam's trials on war crimes charges begin this fall.
The deadline for a new constitution already was extended by a week last Monday after negotiators failed to reach agreement on a number of contentious issues, including federalism, distribution of Iraq's oil wealth, power relationships among the provinces and the role of the Shiite clerical hierarchy in Najaf.
The 15-member Sunni Arab bloc issued its statement after complaining that it was being sidelined by Shiites and Kurds, who were cutting deals without them.
"At a time when there are few hours left to announce the draft, we still see no active coordination and seriousness to draft the constitution," the statement said.
Sunni Arabs said they were only invited to a single meeting with the other community negotiators since Monday. That session was held Friday.
The statement urged the United States, the United Nations and the international community to intervene to prevent a draft constitution from moving forward without unanimous agreement, "which would make the current crisis more complicated."
Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite, told Forat television that 97 percent of the document had been agreed upon and would be submitted to parliament by the deadline.
Government spokesman Laith Kubba also expressed hope that political leaders would complete the draft in time. If not, Kubba said there were two options: amend the interim constitution again and extend the deadline or dissolve parliament.
Shiites and Kurds have enough seats in parliament to push through a draft even without the Sunnis. Because so many Sunni Arabs boycotted the Jan. 30 elections, they won only 17 of the 275 seats in the National Assembly. Sunni Arabs form an estimated 20 percent of the national population.
But Sunni Arabs could in theory scuttle the constitution in the Oct. 15 referendum. Under current rules, the constitution would be defeated if it is opposed by two-thirds of the voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. Sunni Arabs form the majority in at least four.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government criticized its neighbor Jordan for allegedly allowing Saddam's family to fund a network seeking to destabilize Iraq and re-establish the banned Baath Party.
"It is regrettable to say that until now there are big numbers of elements, not only former regime elements, but supervisors of some terrorist groups who are in Jordan," Kubba, the government spokesman, said.
Kubba cited Saddam's relatives who live in Jordan, where they have "huge amounts of money" to "support ... efforts to revive Baath Party organizations." Kubba did not specify individual family members, but Saddam's two oldest daughters live in the Jordanian capital, Amman.
Relations between Jordan and Iraq have been strained by various issues since Saddam's regime was toppled in 2003. However, it appeared Kubba's statements were aimed in part at deflecting criticism from Jordan about the possible involvement of Iraqis in subversive operations in Jordan.
Jordanian police have detained an undetermined number of Iraqis as well as other foreign Arab suspects in the Friday rocket attack that barely missed a U.S. warship docked in Aqaba.
"We don't want Jordan to harm a quarter of a million Iraqis (living in Jordan) because of one Iraqi" involved in Friday's attack, which killed a Jordanian soldier, Kubba said.
There was no immediate comment from the Jordanian government, which has been seeking to improve relations with its eastern neighbor once its closest trading partner and only supplier of oil.
In other developments:
Baghdad city councilman Sabir al-Issawi was in serious condition after a Saturday ambush that left one of his bodyguards dead and three others wounded, officials said.
Two Interior Ministry security officials were shot dead while driving through western Baghdad, police Lt. Majid Zaki said.
In Samarra, 60 miles north of Baghdad, a policeman and a civilian were killed in a drive-by shooting, and five members of a single family were found shot dead overnight, a police spokesman said.
Riding the tiger of democracy in Iraq is dangerous for the three major actors - the Shi'ites, the Kurds and their interlocutor, the United States - for different reasons. In the ongoing process, the weakest group of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq - the Sunnis - could be the ultimate winners. They appear desperate right now, while the Shi'ites and the Kurds are negotiating an acceptable version of the Iraqi constitution, which was due to be presented to parliament before midnight on Monday.
The choices for the Sunnis are infinitely wider and longer-lasting than those of the Shi'ites and the Kurds. Even if there is accord on the final draft of the constitution, the real loser here is still likely to be the US, which has consistently linked the transformation of the Middle East into a democratic region to the emergence of a democratic Iraq. The Sunnis are poised to undermine democracy in Iraq, either now or in the near future.
The US invasion of Iraq created a unique opportunity for the Shi'ites and the Kurds to become dominant groups. As long as the political power play in Iraq is based on democracy, the Sunnis have much to lose as they are outnumbered by the Shi'ites. They simply don't have the numbers to become the dominant group. The historical repression of the Kurds by Saddam's Sunni-dominated government left no room for a political compromise between the Sunnis and the Kurds, whereby the Sunnis can become a major player, even though a majority of the Kurds are also Sunnis.
In terms of Sunni-Kurdish ties, the enormity and intensity of political differences and stakes, not the commonality of Sunni Islam between them, is the driving force. The brutal Sunni rule of the past has left no compassion for them among Kurds. The dog-eat-dog style of politics ran rampant during the Sunni rule of modern Iraq; and it promises to play a similar role now. Except, the shoe is on the other foot. By all indications, the Kurds will play their political power to the hilt. They originally wanted a federal form of government in Iraq that would institutionalize autonomy for them. Then they translated that autonomy by focusing on the control of oil revenues from the fields of Mosul and Kirkuk. As if that wasn't enough, they topped it off recently by demanding independence. The Sunnis suspected all along that the Kurds were nurturing that motive. Now the genie is out of the bottle. The Sunnis are equally adamant that Iraq should never be allowed to become anything but an integrated entity.
The Iraqi Shi'ites have also been brutalized by the Sunni regimes of Iraq. Call them magnanimous winners or hardnosed realists, but, in the aftermath of the January 30 elections, they have demonstrated that, despite the weak electoral showing of the Sunnis, the Shi'ites would do all they could to incorporate Sunni interests and representation in the new Iraq.
However, the current power game in Iraq is becoming intense, brutal and nasty. As much as the Shi'ites wish to safeguard Sunni interests, protecting their own interests has lately emerged as a motive of utmost significance. Besides, to show compassion toward anyone else, especially in the long run, they (the Shi'ites) must ensure that their own political power is not jeopardized, as the details of the newly emerging constitution are being hammered out. No matter how much they manifested genuine understanding toward growing Sunni insecurity and resentment toward what the new Iraq will hold for them, by announcing their own preference for an autonomous region in the southern part of their country, the Shi'ites have convinced the Sunnis that they, in the final analysis, would not think twice before sacrificing Sunni interests.
In their desperation, the Sunnis are now pleading with the United Nations and the US to prevent the other two groups from pushing the draft charter through the National Assembly without Sunni consent. The Shi'ites and the Kurds have ample votes in the legislative body (United Iraqi Alliance 48.2%, and Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan 25.7%) to railroad the Sunnis into accepting it. Then the latter will have to rely on the last legal choice of vetoing the constitution during the ratification process. Given the high degree of intra-Sunni disunity, the Shi'ites and the Kurds might be counting on the possibility that the Sunnis will not be able to muster sufficient support to veto the draft constitution.
President George W Bush could not have believed how contentious, cantankerous and rambunctious the evolution of democracy would become in Iraq. At the same time, he does not know that, as far as Iraq is concerned, "he ain't seen nothing yet", especially from the Sunni side.
The Sunni perspective on the new Iraq is that they have to live with the reality of remaining "number three" in the political power game from now on. They also know that they live next door to Iran, which will do everything - short of military intervention - to ensure a sustained Shi'ite dominance of the political process. The Sunnis are also fearful that the Kurds will not stay within the framework of a united Iraq for long, and will use all sorts of shenanigans to disintegrate it as soon as they can.
What the Shi'ites and the Kurds fail to realize is that Sunni perspectives of an Arab Iraq are couched in the larger context of pan-Arabism. As such, it has never envisioned Iraq as a country where they would be in the minority; or would see the day when their country would be known as "The Republic of Iraq" (minus the word "Arab"), as its official name promises to be. Being a part of a very large Sunni Arab milieu, they have always considered themselves as a "legitimate group" to rule Iraq. That perception was not based on democracy, which would have given them a lesser role, as they are experiencing today. Rather, it was simply based on the fact that they should rule Iraq because it is part and parcel of a Sunni Arab region. Consequently, the entire current notion of a democratic Iraq appears illegitimate, fictitious or even conspiratorial to them. It also appears to them as an outcome of a conspiracy chiefly contrived by the US, the Shi'ites and the Kurds. The Sunni view of the US is that it has always wanted to bring about the demise of their country as a major Arab power and become a subservient actor to both America and Israel.
As Muslims and Arabs, the Iraqi Sunnis seem to have assigned themselves the role of the "new Salladin", fighting for the primacy of Sunni Islam against the nexus of "blasphemy and heresy, and infidelity", In that fight, there may be room for tactical compromises, but never for a permanent sellout.
What are the Sunni choices? First, at least for now, they will continue to cooperate, while looking for better provisional deals for themselves. Second, at the same time, they will not abandon the option of sabotaging the entire proposition of a "new Iraq", which they envision as a recipe for their permanent marginalization. Third, they will not make a clean break from the insurgency, which is as much opposed to the Shi'ite-dominated new Iraq as the Sunnis themselves are, albeit with minor substantive or tactical differences.
What are the implications of this Sunni behavior for the US? Given that it wants to promote democracy in Iraq, any long-term commitment of the Sunnis to undermine that arrangement goes against everything the US government is attempting to promote. More to the point, inasmuch as the transformation of the Muslim Middle East has been linked with the development of democracy in Iraq in the public statements of all national security officials of the Bush administration - including Bush himself - any sabotaging of democracy in Iraq will be the end of any prospects of its evolution in the region. Only the Sunnis of Iraq have the potential of doing that. Even by incorporating Sunni political interests in the new constitution, the other three participants of the negotiating process - the Shi'ites, the Kurds and the US - will only be buying Sunni cooperation for a limited time.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
Iran’s new defence minister may impact Iraqi insurgency Wed. 24 Aug 2005
Iran Focus
Tehran, Iran, Aug. 24 – Analysts and defectors from Iran’s booming arms industry believe that the appointment as Defence Minister of an ultra-Islamist regarded as the father of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ operations beyond the country’s borders could have a direct impact on the supply of sophisticated weapons and bombs to terrorist groups operating in Iraq.
Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar was all but assured of an easy confirmation vote by Iran’s Islamist-dominated parliament on Tuesday, when none of the deputies rose to speak against his nomination.
“Mohammad-Najjar was the first commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Middle East branch and is committed to export of Iran’s Islamic revolution”, said Nasser Akbarian, a former Iranian army officer who now lives in Germany. “As Defence Minister, he will be in a unique position to take care of all the logistical needs of the Qods Force for its operations in Iraq and in other parts of the region”.
The Qods Force is one of the five main branches of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and has the task of conducting operations beyond Iran’s borders.
Mohammad-Najjar hinted at a role for the Ministry of Defence in the IRGC’s extra-territorial activities in support of Iran’s proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories, when he told Majlis deputies on Monday said that he would pay special attention to “the production of equipment related to asymmetric warfare”.
Asymmetric warfare is the term used by the IRGC strategists to describe the role of unconventional methods in their war planning, including the use of suicide operations and weapons of mass destruction.
“Iran has already made a deep impact on the military situation in Iraq by giving the terrorists more powerful bombs”, said Simon Bailey of the London-based Gulf Intelligence Monitor. “With his close ties to the Qods Force, the new defence minister could help the force’s Iraqi operations in a significant way”.
Mohammad-Najjar said he also planned to upgrade the country’s weapons systems and missiles after assuming the post of defence minister.
The veteran Revolutionary Guards commander also expressed confidence that under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself a former IRGC commander, the military would develop greater ties with the country’s industrial sector.
Mohammad-Najjar, who spent most of his time as commander of IRGC’s Middle East forces in Lebanon between 1981 and 1985, has been implicated in the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marines compound in Beirut airport in October 1983, which killed 241 Americans.
On October 23, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a large water delivery truck to the Beirut International Airport, killing 241 U.S. servicemen as they slept in their temporary barracks.
Mohammad-Najjar expanded the IRGC’s presence and influence in Lebanon, both directly and through its proxies, and established active ties with radical Palestinian and Arab groups in the region.
Mohammad-Najjar’s forces were also actively expanding their clandestine presence in Iran’s southern neighbours, including Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Mohammad-Najjar became head of the IRGC’s Military Industries Organisation in 1985. On his watch, the MIO developed a range of weapons that were suited for terrorist operations, including powerful plastic explosives, a man-portable version of mini-Katyusha rockets, and finally the 320-mm “super mortars” that were intended for use by the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force for terrorist operations in Europe and the Middle East.
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