Russia may take over U.S. Uzbek airbase By UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Published August 3, 2005
TASHKENT, Uzbekistan -- Uzbekistan has demanded that the U.S. vacate its Karshi-Khanabad air base within 180 days. Rossiiskaiia Gazeta reports that it is possible that the base and its infrastructure may be subsequently leased to Russia.
The Pentagon paid Uzbekistan's $50 million dollars annually to use Karshi-Khanabad, and obviously was planning to be there for a long time. The Pentagon restored the old airfield from the ground up, investing several dozen million dollars in upgrading the old soviet airfield's infrastructure.
After the May 13 shootings in Andijan, Uzbek-U.S. relations nose-dived, with the Bush administration subsequently supporting an independent international inquiry into the Andijan tragedy, while Moscow and Beijing firmly supported the Karimov administration's version of events.
Karimov rejected demands for an international inquiry and on July 29 formally gave the U.S. 180 days to evacuate the facility. In the short term the closure of the Karshi-Khanabad air base, loss of jobs and U.S. money will damage the Uzbek economy.
Shortly before Karimov evicted the U.S. he paid a visit to Beijing, which offered Uzbekistan $1.5 billion in credit. The Chinese offer however is transparently designed to access to Uzbekistan's oil and gas resources.
In early July Moscow and Beijing initiated a discussion of U.S. military bases in Central Asia at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, which subsequently issued a statement questioning the continued U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
Analysts now speculate that Moscow might take over the Karshi-Khanabad base. In the next few months Uzbekistan will conduct joint exercises with the Russian military in the biggest maneuvers since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
CHINA MAKES POLICY SHIFT, AIMING TO WIDEN ACCESS TO CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY
The SCO which represents nearly 50 percent of the world's population when including members with observer status, desires to be a serious force in international affairs. This can be seen in the granting of observer status to India (at Russia's request), Pakistan (at China's insistence) and Iran (to the delight of all members). #msg-7218273
-Am
CHINA MAKES POLICY SHIFT, AIMING TO WIDEN ACCESS TO CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY Stephen Blank 3/13/06
China hopes to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to help widen its access to Central Asian energy. Russia, meanwhile, is working to keep Beijing’s energy import ambitions in check.
Chinese officials recently leaked that they want the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to set up an energy working group later this year to study proposals for construction of pipelines among member-states. Since China is conducting parallel negotiations with Russia, the Chinese move to involve the SCO suggests an intensification of Beijing’s efforts to secure Central Asian energy. The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
China has been an aggressive player in the Central Asian energy game over the past year. Taking advantage of Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s need for increased political support following the Andijan tragedy, China rushed to provide diplomatic backing while making economic inroads in the form of a $600 million loan to explore energy deposits in Uzbekistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Last August, China’s largest oil producer announced that it had won a tender for PetroKazakhstan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Then in December China and Kazakhstan formally opened the 998-kilometer-long Atasu-Alashankou pipeline, even though it is not expected to start delivering up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day until 2007. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. China has also approached Turkmenistan about a possible pipeline venture.
Despite all the deals, China’s energy demands are pushing Chinese leaders to constantly search for more opportunities. Beyond Central Asia, Beijing has concluded energy deals with Nigeria and Burma, and is moderating its energy-related rivalry with India. Chinese and Indian companies, for example, filed a joint bid for Syrian pipelines in late 2005 -- a possible portent of an expansion of energy cooperation. Chinese officials have reportedly told their Indian counterparts that China would be interested in exploring a link to the long-discussed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAP) pipeline, in the event that the route ever becomes a reality. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Beijing’s actions, much of which represents potentially new departures in Chinese energy policy, can be ascribed to several factors. The main concern, from the Chinese point of view, is Russia’s reluctance to give China either the energy it needs, or the terms it wants. The Russian government views the country’s natural resources, as well as its energy conglomerates, as a strategic resource to be used to advance Moscow’s geopolitical interests. Russian energy producers have accordingly rebuffed China’s efforts to increase supplies. Russian officials have blocked the sale of Slavneft to China, as well as broken up Yukos, an energy giant that favored Russian-Chinese energy engagement. Yukos also was a leading proponent of the construction of the proposed Angara-Daqing pipeline.
Now it appears that Russia prefers a more-costly pipeline to Nakhodka on the Pacific coast. Japan is reportedly ready to subsidize construction of the Nakhodka route, and, in return, would be the primary recipient of the Russian exports. The Nakhodka pipeline’s construction would likely force China to purchase energy from Japan, instead of directly from Russia.
Similarly Russian and American energy companies have obstructed, and are still obstructing China’s efforts to buy energy holdings in Central Asia, forcing China to depend on external suppliers, rather than gain equity holdings there. Moscow has regularly sought to monopolize the transport of Kazakhstan’s enormous oil and gas deposits, oppose Kazakhstan’s participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline system (BTC), deprive Turkmenistan of the free choice of markets and pipelines for its gas and obstruct efforts to build pipelines that would connect Turkmenistan with Pakistan and the Indian Ocean. Not surprisingly, Russia’s maneuvering has rankled Kazakhstani officials.
Russia has worked diligently to tighten its control over export routes for Central Asian oil and gas. In late 2005, for instance, the Russian energy giant Gazprom reached a deal with KazMunaiGaz, Kazakhstan’s main gas and gas pipeline firm, to increase gas transit of Turkmen and Uzbek gas via Kazakhstan. While economic analysts say Russia’s strategy is aimed mainly at countering Ukraine’s effort to obtain energy independence, Moscow’s moves also serve to potentially constrict China’s options in Central Asia.
To date, China has pursued a go-it-alone approach in the great energy game, placing emphasis on bilateral deals to secure the oil and gas it needs. However, Russia’s obstructionism has helped force Beijing to abandon its preference for unilateral action. China’s new willingness to explore joint deals with India, as well as work through the SCO indicate that Chinese leaders now see multilateralism as perhaps the best way to outflank Russia in energy affairs.
At the same time, these moves might also reflect certain skepticism among Chinese leaders about the benefits of a go-it-alone approach. This earlier unilateralism proved to be expensive because it forced Chinese entities to pay for equity ownership in fields at prices higher than the market rate, and often for energy yields that are not as large as would be hoped for.
The new Chinese strategy could end up being cheaper and more reliable over time. Some experts also believe multilateralism could also smooth some of China’s rough edges in the energy game. In addition, Russian-Chinese competition over energy could be beneficial for the United States. While there are solid political and military grounds for cooperation between Beijing and Moscow against Washington, the energy issues dividing Russia and China will not disappear anytime soon. Thus, Beijing and Moscow may never fully realize the potential of a diplomatic alliance aimed at limiting the US role in Central Asia and elsewhere.
Editor’s Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.
Background: Remember there is no more ‘war on terror’ it has been renamed the ‘long war’ and officially includes a military confrontation with China, a conflict Bush has been pushing for a long time.
The new Chinese budget comes after the publication last month of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, which described the new priorities of the U.S. military as preparing to conduct a "long war" against terrorists worldwide, to improve homeland security capabilities, and to prepare for possible confrontation with China as an emerging superpower rival. #msg-10051566
First, Australia has said previously they would not enter into Bush’s world war against China and are in this text hinting the same. Moreover, Tokyo Gov Shintaro conveyed his views on China, arguing that economic containment is the best strategy because the United States would "certainly" lose a war with China, which he said would not hesitate to sacrifice its people on a massive scale when fighting against an enemy, thus Japan is not all that certain. #msg-9939104
Even if Bush can bully his way with Japan and Australia and form a ‘little NATO’ there is always the chance it will be met with China’s ‘little SCO’. Cold wars can turn warm.
The SCO which represents nearly 50 percent of the world's population when including members with observer status, desires to be a serious force in international affairs. This can be seen in the granting of observer status to India (at Russia's request), Pakistan (at China's insistence) and Iran (to the delight of all members). #msg-7218273’.
-Am
A 'little NATO' against China
Mar 18, 2006 By Purnendra Jain
ADELAIDE - After her two-day visit to Indonesia this week, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Australia on Thursday for a three-day official visit - her first since her appointment.
Although she has a busy schedule with many official meetings, press conferences and speeches, her main and most crucial business is to participate at the inaugural ministerial-level trilateral security dialogue with two of the United States' closest and most trusted allies in the Pacific - Australia and Japan.
This ministerial-level meeting has drawn the attention of political leaders and analysts across the Asia-Pacific region. Many view the new "triple alliance" with suspicion. There is a concern that this might be the beginning of a new Cold War-type alliance in which China is cast as the adversary.
This suspicion has become even stronger in the light of the comments made by Rice before her departure for Indonesia. China, she claimed, could become a "negative force" in the region. Consequently "all of us in the region, particularly those of us who are long-standing allies, have a joint responsibility and obligation to try [to] produce conditions in which the rise of China will be a positive force in international politics, not a negative force". Not surprisingly then, China's military and economic rise would be at the core of the trilateral security discussions.
This development will not be taken kindly in many capitals around the region. Although China has not responded to Rice's comment, it will most certainly make Beijing furious. To make a particular country the main item of discussion, as Rice has suggested, is far from the stated aims when the process was put in place five years ago.
The trilateral security dialogue process was put forward by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and endorsed by then US secretary of state Colin Powell and then foreign minister of Japan Makiko Tanaka in July 2001. The proposal was made in light of the weakening of multilateral processes such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in economic and security spheres, and growing concerns by the three nations over both North Korea's nuclear capability and China's intentions in relation to Taiwan and its growing defense capabilities. These and other security-related concerns, such as global terrorism, led conservative governments in Australia and Japan to link themselves with the United States and each other.
At the time the process was mooted in 2001, Downer emphasized the importance of closer Australia-Japanese collaboration as a way of fostering a stable security regime in East Asia. Powell spoke of the need to promote more comprehensive regional dialogue with and between its main Pacific allies - Australia and Japan. Both Downer and Powell stressed that any such security dialogue by the three countries would be purely informal and would not develop into anything as substantial as an alliance structure.
The idea behind this process was to break down the tight, mutually exclusive network of bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia - the "northern and southern anchors" of the US presence in the Pacific. This would lead to better coordination among the three than is possible under bilateral arrangements. The expectation was that the two spokes - Japan and Australia - would be able to share information and formulate a common approach in keeping with the hub's - the United States' - policy objectives.
To this end, all that was required was a secure and comfortable venue where the three sides could meet privately and discuss matters of mutual concern. This would permit the participants to share ideas on mutual cooperation without giving it an overt official imprimatur, which might offend some influential Asian governments not privy to the discussions.
However, regional reactions to this proposal ranged from concern to outright condemnation. China's state-controlled media strongly condemned the move, describing it as the formation of a US-led policy of containment designed specifically to hem in Chinese strategic aspirations in East Asia. Some commentators in China dubbed the arrangement a "little NATO" in the Asia-Pacific region.
Southeast Asian leaders have been generally comfortable with the existing regional security arrangement represented by the ARF and believe the new development will undermine it. Others see it as an exclusive security club of wealthy, technologically advanced states. Although not as vocal as China's, there has been a sense of discomfort in many Southeast Asian nations, especially among regional allies of the US such as Singapore and Thailand.
Despite such concerns, the informal trilateral security dialogue process has continued at a bureaucratic level in the national capitals of the three nations since 2001. Because of the subtle and opaque nature of the meetings, it has been difficult to get a detailed understanding of their content, or a sense of their ultimate purpose regarding the development of a trilateral security dialogue process. One could only assume that the troika of Pacific powers stayed true to its original intent on keeping strategic dialogue among them as quiet as possible.
Now, though, the game has been lifted to a higher level. The decision was made a year ago in Washington that a regular three-way strategic dialogue would be conducted at a ministerial level. Wide-ranging security issues related to Indonesia, the recent US-India nuclear deal, Iraq and Afghanistan will figure prominently at the inaugural meeting. Nevertheless, the issue being watched most carefully by outsiders is the discussion on China.
Rice has expressed concerns about China's growing military and economic power and its possible negative effect on the region. She would like China to be discussed in detail, but the Australian side sees China in a different light. Indeed, Downer has emphasized that the intent of the process is not to form a "little NATO", nor does Australia support a policy of containing China. Downer believes that China's economic power should be harnessed to the advantage of the region - a position quite different from the current US thinking. Australia has a huge economic interest in China and sees potential for further growth. Canberra is poised to sign an agreement to sell uranium to China.
As far as Japan is concerned, it is unlikely that it would favor ganging up against China even though there are serious Sino-Japanese frictions. It is not in the overall interest of Japan's foreign policy openly to support a containment policy when trade and economic relations with China are prospering and Tokyo is trying to improve its relations with Beijing.
The participants at this ministerial-level trilateral security dialogue need to tread very cautiously. There is no harm in like-minded nations getting together and talking about issues of mutual concerns. But this should happen in a transparent manner and should not target a particular nation. China can and must be discussed at the meeting, but not just as a threat or in the mold of a negative force. The three participating nations should find ways and means as to how best to engage China.
If a trilateral dialogue process such as this one turns into a formal alliance-type grouping, it may trigger a dangerous response across the region. Already there are talks about a China-India-Russia trilateral framework. Another proposal was made by Japan this year to establish a trilateral framework dialogue and security cooperation with India and the United States. A Japanese ambassador to India at some stage even suggested a three-way dialogue process among Tokyo, Beijing and New Delhi.
Proliferation of trilateral frameworks with major powers participating in them would have serious consequences on the current security architecture. For example, they would undermine the ARF process and smaller nations in Southeast Asia would have no effective security forum where they could express their concerns and feel confident that their voice would make a difference.
No doubt growing worries about terrorism and about nuclear developments in the Korean Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East have placed new demands on regional leaders. However, it is not necessarily politically sensible for a select group of nations to band together and exclude others - a Cold War-type response. A cooperative and inclusive framework rather than exclusion and containment would be a better way forward.
Purnendra Jain is professor and head of Adelaide University's Center for Asian Studies in Australia.
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