Excellent read: Bulgaria, Romania and the Changing Structure of the Black Sea's Geopolitics
With the future inauguration of the ‘Caspian Guard’ the scope of our plans for this region becomes more obvious. Many of these countries have already been targeted and are being targeted for ‘democracy’.
Note: On 5/04/2005 Bulgaria, Greece and Russia agreed to build a new trans-Balkan oil pipeline, which is expected to ease the pressure on the Bosporus when it starts operating in 2008. #msg-6391963
On April 11, John J Fialka of the Wall Street Journal revealed that the US Department of Defense will spend $100 million over the next few years to establish the "Caspian Guard", a network of police forces and special operations units "that can respond to various emergencies, including attacks on oil facilities". Russia is also expanding its Caspian Fleet, as it too presses its claims to offshore fields in the region. Under such circumstances, it is all too easy to imagine how a minor confrontation could erupt into something much more serious, involving the US, Russia, Iran, and other countries. #msg-6368606
-Am
Bulgaria, Romania and the Changing Structure of the Black Sea's Geopolitics
20 May 2005
The geopolitics of the Black Sea region has profoundly changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has suffered from several setbacks since 1991, and its influence over the former Warsaw Pact countries -- including Romania and Bulgaria -- has declined. Although Russia maintains important -- and often underestimated -- economic ties with most of its ancient client states, American and European Union geopolitical penetration during the last 15 years into a great part of what has traditionally been Russia's sphere of influence has been tremendous. [See: "Russia's Future Foreign Policy: Pragmatism in Motion"]
This appears to be particularly true for the Black Sea region, which was poorly controlled by the U.S.-led bloc during the bipolar age (1947-1991). Turkey, which overlooks the Black Sea's southern shores, was then the only pro-Western country. Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia were all tightly under Moscow's control. After Georgia's drastic pro-Washington reorientation in 2002 and Ukraine's new pro-Western course, Romania's and Bulgaria's admission into N.A.T.O. in 2004 and the E.U. (to be formalized in 2007) completed a dramatic change in regional power relations –- with global consequences not to be underestimated.
The Black Sea's Basic Geopolitical Coordinates
From a genuinely geopolitical perspective, the Black Sea region is a relatively small and closed area, historically crossed-through by conflicting forces from the northeast (Russia, via-Ukraine and/or Georgia), south (Turkey), and west (Romania, Bulgaria and European powers like France, Germany, Austria, Great Britain). A big "salted lake," it has been historically a place of confrontation between the Russian-Orthodox world, the Turkish-Muslim world and the West. Its control is important from both the strategic/military and the economic aspects.
Today's geopolitical structure in this region is marked by two main dynamics. The first one is the substitution of former Russian and Soviet influence with American influence -- which, in its turn, enters in competition with French and German ambitions. The second dynamic is the emergence of an energy axis that connects Central Asian and Caspian gas and oil with the Balkans and the European Union. As the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989-91, Ukraine and Georgia remained initially under Moscow's influence, but the Russian capacity of maintaining its grip dramatically diminished at the end of the century, losing positions in both regional countries.
N.A.T.O.'s and the European Union's Further Enlargement: Bulgaria and Romania Go Western
Just like in the case of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania were first integrated into N.A.T.O. before joining the European Union. Sofia and Bucharest joined N.A.T.O. in the spring of 2004, after an intense period of negotiations, whilst their admission in the European Union has been postponed until 2007. The years 2002-03 marked a very important turn in the relations between the Atlantic Alliance's Western countries and the two ex-communist nation-states. American influence grew stronger, and during the crisis which preceded the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, the Bulgarian and Romanian governments allowed the U.S.-led coalition to use some of their military bases.
In February 2003, French President Jacques Chirac overtly criticized the "imprudent" move of the two E.U. candidates, mainly because it strongly complicated Paris' delicate anti-war diplomacy of the moment, but also because France felt it was losing influence over the E.U. "newcomers." It shouldn't be forgotten that France consistently backed Bucharest's and Sofia's application for E.U. and N.A.T.O. membership since the 1990s, and that historical ties between France and Romania have always been particularly strong. Paris has even accepted Bucharest as a member of the francophone countries, and the clear pro-American orientation of the new Romanian rulers disappointed France.
The Black Sea's new geopolitics shows a new competition among great powers. With Russia in retreat, the United States, France and (more discretely) Germany are the new main external actors struggling for influence in the region. Economic interests and security enhancement are at stake in an energy-rich, strategically crucial area connecting the Balkans with the Caucasus and East-Central Europe with Turkey.
In November-December 2003, both Bulgaria and Romania were at the center of U.S. military attention, in the context of post-Cold War U.S. forces redeployment. On November 29, the U.S. naval attaché in Bulgaria declared that Washington was looking for "small flexible bases for possible deployment of forces in Europe," thus sending delegations to Bucharest and Sofia. The Bulgarian parliament passed a resolution on December 19 that granted the U.S. and N.A.T.O. permission to station military forces on its territory. Sofia's government and diplomacy openly said that Washington could count on future strategic collaboration by Bulgaria.
This move helped Bulgaria in its goal of rapidly joining N.A.T.O. -- although its military forces must still meet Western standards -– while at the same time allowing the U.S. to plan a strategic redeployment of its forces. Washington wants to drastically reduce its presence in Germany and to move forces farther east in Europe and nearer to the Middle East's theater of operations. [See: "U.S. Troop Redeployment: Rational Adjustment to an Altered Threat Environment"]
Romanian application for N.A.T.O. was actually one of the first among former Warsaw Pact members. In January 1994, Bucharest signed the Partnership for Peace, a first step toward integration. Traditionally, apart from the Warsaw Pact era, Romania has looked Western for its security, in order to escape Russian hegemony.
The Bulgarian and Romanian relative positions in front of Moscow remain, by the way, very different, as Sofia is more Russia-friendly for historical and cultural (i.e. religious) reasons. What is interesting, though, is that this difference does not prevent them from being equally eager to be integrated into N.A.T.O. and the European Union. This is a clear sign of the decline of Russian influence and security-providing abilities in our time.
Romania's and Bulgaria's Ambitions and Security Concerns
The post-communist elites in place in Bucharest and Sofia share with other former socialist countries' ruling classes the ambition to be fully integrated into the European economic and monetary system. The common perception among these elites is that both their personal success and national prosperity are inextricably linked to their acceptance into the Western political and financial set of rules. Integration into the E.U. is, therefore, a vital goal for the post-communist rulers in both countries. [See: "Romania: Europe's New 'Sick Man'"]
However, as far as national security is concerned, former Romanian president Ion Iliescu, current president Traian Basescu and former Bulgarian president Petar Stoyanov clearly opted for a strategic alliance with Washington and London instead of backing France's attempts to build a more autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (E.S.D.P.). This is the fundamental lesson of the 2003 European crisis following Paris', Berlin's and Brussels' refusal to take part in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
As in the case of Poland and the Baltic states, Bulgaria's and Romania's new geopolitical orientation follows a double track: European integration (political and economic institutionalism) and a pro-U.S., pro-NA.T.O. strategic stance. This policy, as mentioned before, infuriated Chirac in February 2003, but it can be easily explained by historical and political reasons. Historically, the main security concern for all Eastern, Central-Eastern and South-Eastern European countries has been not to fall prey to German or Russian hegemony. An offshore great power (Great Britain or the U.S.) is therefore preferable to a continental one. Politically, the U.S. simply has momentum and capabilities far superior to French and German ones in the last 15 years, explaining its attractiveness to these smaller European states.
G.U.U.A.M. and U.S. Geopolitical Strategy
Placing Romanian and Bulgarian geopolitics in a macro-regional, broader context can help to clarify a lot of current stakes and dynamics. As we have seen, the Black Sea region must be analyzed also in light of the Balkans-Central Asia strategic and energy axis. This explains why the United States is trying to enhance the role of G.U.U.A.M. (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova organization) and pushing Bucharest to adhere to this political association.
On April 22, the Georgian, Ukrainian, Azeri and Moldovan governments met in Chisinau to revitalize G.U.U.A.M., trying to make it a political tool for their "Euro-Atlantic" integration. This upgrade attempt apparently wasn't accepted by the Uzbeks, but the meeting was significantly attended by the presidents of Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as a U.S. State Department representative.
Washington is, in fact, very active in the Black Sea region: in the last few years, Bruce Jackson -- a former U.S. Army officer and a former vice president with Lockheed Martin -- has worked with various pro-American lobbies in Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine in order to facilitate their future admission into N.A.T.O. and to open the way for a "Pax Americana" extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Caspian region.
Another significant U.S. move was the nominee of Jack Dyer Crouch II, an advisor to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as American ambassador in Bucharest. In fact, Romania is considered to be a key state necessary to increase American influence in the region. On March 9, one day before Romanian president Basescu visited Washington, Bruce Jackson explained to the press that the Black Sea is already vital for European energy acquisition, and that it will be even more so in the future. E.U. countries import around 50 percent of their energy, and they are projected to import 70 percent of it in 2020. The Black Sea will be the vital link to transport the Caspian resources to the West.
Washington is therefore trying to increase its political influence in the region, hence controlling present and future European capabilities.
Conclusion
The geopolitics of the Black Sea is still searching for stability after the 1989-91 "revolution." For the moment, a clear change can be assessed: Russian influence has declined and American influence has increased; in spite of still existing pro-Russian political forces, Moscow isn't able to effectively contrast Western superior capabilities in terms of economic integration and security-providing ability. Bulgaria's and Romania's admission into N.A.T.O. and projected admission into the European Union has been a major factor in altering the regional balance of power.
However, the situation is far from static. The political future of the European Union and the German-American relationship will be the key variables in how this develops. An increased, federalist European integration coupled by a strong Euro-American relationship would probably result in a diminution of great powers' competition and in a stronger Western hold on the area, at the expense of Russian ambitions. On the contrary, a more independent German foreign policy, predicated upon strategic partnerships with Russia and China rather than upon a "Euro-Atlantic community," could revamp a serious intra-Western competition, and will summon Sofia and Bucharest to make difficult choices.
Report Drafted By: Federico Bordonaro
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
On April 11, John J Fialka of the Wall Street Journal revealed that the US Department of Defense will spend $100 million over the next few years to establish the "Caspian Guard", a network of police forces and special operations units "that can respond to various emergencies, including attacks on oil facilities". Russia is also expanding its Caspian Fleet, as it too presses its claims to offshore fields in the region. Under such circumstances, it is all too easy to imagine how a minor confrontation could erupt into something much more serious, involving the US, Russia, Iran, and other countries.[i/] #msg-6368606
The Caspian flotilla would be a task group of the littoral states’ ships, and as such billed as a regional force. The connotation being the U.S. Caspian Guard is an intruder network.
Azerbaijan is the only pro West country that borders the Caspian. No one has heard from Turkmenistan in a long while.
-Am
RUSSIA EYES STRONGER CLOUT IN CASPIAN REGION Sergei Blagov 7/15/05
Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of a Caspian security conference on July 14 to promote the restoration of Moscow’s influence in the region. Kazakhstan appears to be the country most receptive to Russia’s offer of closer economic and strategic cooperation.
The security conference was held aboard the Tatarstan, the flagship of Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla. Putin, during an inspection tour of the Tatarstan, reiterated Russia’s readiness to work with other Caspian littoral states to resolve "common problems."
"It would be correct if we used our capabilities for this purpose," the RIA-Novosti news agency quoted Putin as saying.
Russia in recent years has beefed up its Caspian military presence. The flotilla, based in Astrakhan, includes two frigates, 12 patrol ships and a variety of smaller vessels. The Tatarstan, launched in 2003, is one of the newest ships in the Russian navy.
The Caspian flotilla would play a major role in any regional effort to combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking in the region, Vice-Admiral Yuri Startsev, the flotilla’s commander, said at the conference. He added that the concept has the backing of other states in the region. "The idea is to create a task group of the littoral states’ ships, similar to the Black Sea Force Group," RIA-Novosti quoted Startsev as saying.
While Russia is stressing the need for an improved regional security framework, energy issues also appear to play a big role in Moscow’s geopolitical calculations. A stronger strategic presence in the Caspian would provide Russia with added leverage as it competes with other regional powers, especially the United States, over energy export routes. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Cooperation has proved elusive for the five Caspian littoral states. Negotiations are stalled on a pact that would delimit the Caspian Sea’s territorial boundaries. Such a treaty is seen as the key to unlocking the region’s full energy potential. An effort to organize a summit meeting of Caspian states, envisioned as the follow up to a gathering held in Ashgabat in 2002, has experienced repeated delays. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Iran forced the postponement of the summit in late 2004, citing the approaching presidential election, eventually won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last month. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In the aftermath of the vote, Tehran has given no indication of wanting to reschedule the summit. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Iranian and Russian leaders have long been at odds over the formula to be used to divide the sea.
In the absence of a multilateral agreement on the sea’s status, Russia continues to work on strengthening bilateral relationships. So far in 2005, Russian officials have strenuously courted Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in hopes of reestablishing Moscow’s strategic and economic primacy in the region. Kazakhstan has responded to some of Russia’s overtures, forging stronger energy-development links. On July 6, Putin and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev hailed the signing of a 55-year production-sharing agreement for the Kurmangazy oilfield in the Caspian Sea. KazMunaiTeniz, a subsidiary of Kazakhstan’s state oil company KazMunaiGaz, will hold a 50 percent stake in the project. Two state-owned Russian oil companies, Rosneft and Zarubezneft, could end up holding the other 50 percent in the venture.
"Profits from this project are estimated at $50 billion," Putin said. Nazarbayev added that the project was of global importance, and that oilfield reserves are estimated at 1 billion tons. The countries’ joint investment in the project could reach $22 billion.
On July 12, Putin toured the Astrakhan region on the Kazakhstan border. Astrakhan’s governor, Alexander Zhilkin, informed Putin that the Caspian oilfield deal between Russian and Kazakhstan had already provided a considerable boost to the local shipbuilding industry. Zhilkin also reported that GazProm, the Russian energy giant, was on the verge of building a major petrochemical complex in Astrakhan, and that crude oil production will start in Russian-owned Caspian areas by 2007. Putin also discussed investment projects in Astrakhan with Transport Minister Igor Levitin and executives from GazProm and LUKoil.
Earlier this year, Russia and Kazakhstan also completed a deal to develop another Caspian oilfield, the Khvalynskoye. LUKoil agreed to invest in a $1 billion partnership with KazMunaiGaz, developing Khvalynskoye for a production start date of 2010.
These are only the latest development deals between Russia and its Caspian neighbors. On March 16, for example, KazMunaiGaz announced it would acquire GazProm’s 50 percent stake in the Orenburg Gas Processing Plant in Russia, and would use it to process gas from the Karachaganak oilfield in Kazakhstan. The JV partners would also upgrade the plant and build a $320-million Kazakhstan-Orenburg gas pipeline within two years, while possibly dropping plans to build its own $1.3-billion gas processing plant in Kazakhstan.
Since 2002, Russia has pursued a series of separate deals between the Caspian nations rather than one umbrella agreement. In the Kurmangazy case, Russia agreed to Kazakhstan’s ownership, but demanded that the oilfield fall under a bilateral venture. Russia also reportedly insisted that Kurmangazy crude would be funneled via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to Novorossiisk, rather than the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.
Russia has long urged Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to ship more oil through the CPC pipeline. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has tried to convince Kazakhstan to export via the BTC pipeline. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Kazakhstan has been reluctant to commit to the BTC, in part out of a desire to avoid a confrontation with Russia.
Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.
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