Replies to post #3495 on Foreign Correspondence

[otraque]

<<He says that while Shi'ite and Kurdish politicians want to bring Sunnis into the government, they are reluctant to take on board those Sunnis who collaborated with the former regime. Most influential Sunnis, he said, "are the same influential Sunnis who were around under Saddam Hussein".

The analyst says that the Shi'ite majority wants to pursue a de-Ba'athification campaign and has criticized the former cabinet for taking former Ba'ath party members into the government, police, and army. He says this negative attitude leaves only small numbers of Sunni politicians, who usually have little influence, acceptable.>>
In the Sunni north many probably yearn for the old days when all was for their benefit and none for Shi'ites and Kurds.
And Kirkuk where Baathist leaders forced the Kurds from their land in Kirkuk and gave it to Baathist or Baathist loyalist is an major explosion point.(and we aren't even addressing the Turkmon factor--that another piece)
Kurds are determined to get back all the land they were driven from.
Kirkuk is so essential to them they want it to become the capital of the Kurdish province.
The people of Kirkuk want this to happen and aren't happy with any political Kurd that want to compromise on Kirkuk.
And on the hand the Shi'ites fear Kurds taking control of Kirkuk even though Kurds at one time said they would only pocket 50% of revenues from oil fields.
The Kirkuk oil field is of huge value because the cost of getting one barrel filled with crude is significantly cheaper than elsewhere as it is extremely accessible, so profits on one barrel at the going price is greater than others.
The issue however is not being even addressed now, it is still being swept under the rug and let's deal with this later.
And then comes the U.S that hold Kirkuk the centerpiece of what we must control it.
In my opinion the PershMerga(those not afrid to die think the meaning of pershmerga)--in my opinion the PershMerga could take Kirkuk but that could bring Turkey to a call to arms and send their army to take Kirkuk to which they also say they have an historical claim to Kirkuk.
As nothing has been done regards resolving the matter of Kirkuk, it remains a powderkeg.
Regards Kurds and Shia coexisting with Baathist in an Iraq goverment is like believing you can put out a fire by throwing gasoline on it.

[Amaunet]

Iraq: Intelligence Brief

10 May 2005

Events in Iraq over the weekend and into the new week reveal a heightened uncertainty about the future of that country. The nearly complete formation of the interim government, the re-emergence of Moqtada al-Sadr into public opposition to the provisional government, the pronounced spike in the violence of the insurgency, and the capture of an aide to insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi point in different directions -- some to improved prospects for the stabilization of the provisional government, but most to the possibility that it will fail.

Iraq Gets a Government

Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari's cabinet met for the first time on May 5, with seven vacancies remaining to be filled, including the oil and defense ministries. The defense ministry was to go to a Sunni in order to win support away from the insurgency, but the Shi'a-led United Iraqi Alliance had rejected candidates associated with the former Ba'athist regime. On Sunday, the deadlock over the defense ministry was broken with the nomination of a Sunni ex-general -- Saadoun al-Dulaimi -- who had defected from the Ba'athist regime.

The new government comes into power riven by factions and -- despite the concession of the defense ministry -- without significant support among the Sunni minority, which lacks parliamentary representation. Saleh Mutlak, an official of the National Dialogue Council, which negotiated for the Sunni community with al-Jaafari, concluded that the provisional government will not satisfy Sunni interests and opinion.

An indication of the distance between the Sunni and Shi'a communities is provided by the refusal of Sunni politician Hashim Shibli to accept the post of human rights minister on the grounds that his National Democratic Party is non-sectarian and that he was not prepared to represent the Sunni community.

Washington will be pleased that a provisional government is in place -- and that achievement will provide some momentum to the constitutional process -- but the legitimacy of that government, particularly for the Sunni community, is questionable.

Al-Sadr Re-emerges

A continuation and possible intensification of the interim government's crisis of legitimacy was signaled when 3,000 backers of dissident Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr clashed with government security forces after they had heard a message from their leader threatening to restart armed resistance if the provisional government did not produce "tangible results," and warning: "We have laid down our weapons but we still exist, and our fingers are still on the trigger."

Since he backed down from armed rebellion in 2004, al-Sadr has stayed on the sidelines, refusing to be directly represented in the provisional government, but allowing some of his supporters to play a role in it, while he has maintained his movement. Al-Sadr's challenge to the provisional government adds another strain on it and opens the possibility -- now still remote -- of an insurgency within the Shi'a community.

The Insurgency Gets Uglier

As the interim government moved haltingly toward its completion, the Sunni-dominated insurgency in central and western Iraq intensified, reaching levels of violence that had not been recorded since January 30 elections for the provisional parliament. In the ten days before May 9, 300 people, including eight U.S. troops, were killed by suicide bombers, car bombs and improvised roadside explosives.

The spike in insurgent activity, which was mainly directed at recruiting centers for Iraqi security forces and at U.S. convoys, put to rout hopes that the insurgency had been contained. Coincident with the rise in opposition violence, the U.S. military launched a mission to root out the insurgents, deploying 1,000 troops, supported by aircraft, into Anbar Province. They were reportedly acting on information from captured al-Zarqawi aide Amar al-Zubaydi.

In an escalation of the conflict, U.S. forces engaged in a pitched battle with insurgents in the town of Ubaydi, in which U.S. helicopter gunships reportedly fired rockets and machine guns into buildings in the town. U.S. military sources reported support for the insurgents among the civilian population, which warned them of the U.S. presence.

The spike in the insurgency and the U.S. operation in Anbar Province show the failure of U.S. forces and the Iraqi provisional authorities to provide security in the country with Iraqi forces. Significant portions of the Sunni community remain disaffected.

Capture of al-Zubaydi

The capture and detention of al-Zubaydi on May 5 was hailed by Washington as a victory for the U.S.-led coalition. A reputed top leader of al-Zarqawi's Islamic revolutionary group al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Zubaydi was thought to have prepared car bombs for the group, planned the bombings and, most importantly, facilitated the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq from Syria and Jordan.

Al-Zubaydi's removal from the scene is a plus for the coalition and Iraq's interim government -- especially if he provides information on the operation of al-Qaeda in Iraq -- yet it also revealed more starkly the lack of border security, highlighting the ease with which foreign fighters come and go almost at will, and the networks in Sunni-dominated areas that have allowed al-Zarqawi to evade capture.

Bottom Line

The mixed signals coming from recent events in Iraq point to greater momentum for the insurgents and less for the provisional government and its Washington backers, increasing the probability of deepening instability and a continuation of the legitimation crisis.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein



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