In the context of GUUAM and the SRS, Washington has encouraged the formation of pro-US client states strategically located along oil pipeline routes. The latter are to be "protected" by NATO under GUUAM and various other military cooperation agreements. The hidden agenda is to eventually cut the Russians off altogether from the Caspian oil and gas fields.
GUUAM is to be the tool by which Bush works his wonders through his minions Yushchenko and Saakashvili who were prompted by Washington to revive GUUAM. #msg-5904330
-Am
GUUAM: THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT
4-25-2005
MOSCOW (Tatyana Stanovaya, leading expert at the analytical department of the Center for Political Technologies - RIA Novosti)
The "colored regimes" in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, initiated the revival of GUUAM, an organization that incorporates Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan along with the three aforementioned states, and which they regard as an alternative to the CIS.
According to the founders, GUUAM, with support from the West, must free its members from Russia's "patronage."
However, the recent GUUAM summit in Chisinau clearly showed that the development of this organization has a number of limitations. The first problem is the lack of common interests pursued by its members. Ukraine and Georgia have become the organization's informal leaders. The presidents of these countries are united not only by the way they came to power, their desire to join NATO, and integration priorities with the European Union. They also want to expand on post-Soviet territory. Georgia has predicted a "third wave" of revolutions in the CIS, naming Belarus as the next candidate, whereas Ukraine offered Moldova an uncoordinated plan for the settlement of the Transdnestr problem. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we are witnessing alternative attempts to exercise external political influence on post-Soviet territory. But are other GUUAM members ready to be subordinate to the geopolitical ambitions of Ukraine and Georgia?
Moldova took an extremely skeptical view on Ukraine's plan to settle the Transdnestr conflict. The recent deterioration of its relations with Russia does not mean that Chisinau is willing to accept Ukraine as a new "big brother." According to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, though, the plan should become the first confirmation of the GUUAM concept's viability.
Azerbaijan does not want to play second fiddle to Ukraine and Georgia either. Ilham Aliyev still regards GUUAM as simply a mechanism for the development of oil pipeline infrastructure to transport hydrocarbons from oil fields in the Caspian Sea region to global markets. However, the prediction of "colored revolutions" made by Georgia and Ukraine certainly sound to Azerbaijan more like a call for disintegration than unification. On the eve of the summit, Aliyev had to convince his colleagues that there was no sign of a coming revolution in his country. GUUAM membership for Aliyev is clearly not motivated by a desire to give his nation the right to democratization through revolution.
Finally, Uzbekistan remains a nominal member of GUUAM. The Georgian leadership's attempts to fuel Uzbekistan's interest in the organization ended in failure. Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili could not convince President Islam Karimov to attend the summit and had to cut short her visit to Tashkent. Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with America, Uzbekistan is coming to understand increasingly better that Moscow is a more reliable choice between the two centers of geopolitical influence; therefore, Uzbekistan's participation in the clearly anti-Russian GUUAM summit might have damaged its future relations with Russia. Last year, the Uzbek parliament ratified the Treaty on Strategic Partnership with Russia.
The second problem is Russia. Objectively, Russia is the center of geopolitical influence in the former Soviet Union due to geographical, economic, political, and infrastructure factors. The overly harsh remarks made by Georgian and Ukrainian officials about the lack of a future for the CIS and the need to destroy the "empire" (with a hint on Moscow's domination) have forced potential GUUAM members to make a tough choice: to join Russia or to go against it. Kyrgyzstan is a perfect example. The visit of the Georgian and Ukrainian foreign ministers to Bishkek to convince the Kyrgyz leadership to attend the summit ended in failure. Fearing that relations with Moscow would suffer, Kyrgyzstan, which was expected to join Georgia and Ukraine, instead distanced itself from GUUAM. Bishkek's refusal to participate in the summit clearly showed that GUUAM members are not united by the ideal of "colored revolutions," but rather by attempts to limit Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space.
The third problem is the West. The U.S. and the EU played a key role in the emergence of GUUAM. They regarded the organization as a rival to Moscow, which previously did not have any internal competitors in the former Soviet Union. In their turn, GUUAM members are hoping for assistance from the West in solving their own conflicts with Moscow. Georgia and Moldova want to see Russian troops leave their territories quickly, whereas Ukraine wants to integrate with Europe and join NATO. The West, though, does not wish to see another ambitious player emerge on post-Soviet territory; it simply desires a restraining force to limit the spread of Russia's influence in the region, rather than to substitute Russia with another country altogether. This restraining force by no means should interfere with the interests of the U.S. and the EU.
Parliamentary elections in Moldova might serve as a good example of their true intentions. The West was interested in weakening President Vladimir Voronin's regime (there was obviously no hope for a "colored revolution" there). However, the examples of Georgia and Ukraine strengthened it even further and Voronin now enjoys an even bigger parliamentary majority than before. Besides, both the U.S. and the EU maintain balanced relations with Russia and an excessive anti-Russian policy on the part of GUUAM will force the West to distance itself from the organization, at least publicly. The West does not want GUUAM to be an independent force. Georgia and Ukraine apparently still do not realize that the West needs them only to expand its influence on the post-Soviet territory.
The revival of GUUAM will only lead to partition of the post-Soviet territory into small isolated states. Moscow's influence might decrease, but there will be no alternative to Russia either, which means that the protection of national interests of CIS countries will largely depend on external intervention.
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