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jbog

01/15/11 3:03 PM

#112638 RE: DewDiligence #112634

Dew, Barron's Roundtable Article today is very interesting. Basically, 10 financial people state that basically our economy is going to hell in a handbasket, but that's not enough reason that the markets won't scream ahead 10% to 30% this year.

Their reasoning is that the continued stimulus will not stop, which helps equities but once someone turns off the money spigot we're in a heap of big trouble.

Party on!!!
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oc631

01/21/11 5:09 AM

#112932 RE: DewDiligence #112634

Now, a wave of fear about the financial condition of state and local governments has caused some munis to become so cheap that they are screaming buys.



Here's one of the reasons the muni market has become so fearful.



NYT: Path Is Sought for States to Escape Debt Burdens

By MARY WILLIAMS WALSH


Policy makers are working behind the scenes to come up with a way to let states declare bankruptcy and get out from under crushing debts, including the pensions they have promised to retired public workers. Senator John Cornyn asked this month whether Congress should consider establishing a bankruptcy procedure for states. Unlike cities, the states are barred from seeking protection in federal bankruptcy court. Any effort to change that status would have to clear high constitutional hurdles because the states are considered sovereign.

But proponents say some states are so burdened that the only feasible way out may be bankruptcy, giving Illinois, for example, the opportunity to do what General Motors did with the federal government’s aid.

Beyond their short-term budget gaps, some states have deep structural problems, like insolvent pension funds, that are diverting money from essential public services like education and health care. Some members of Congress fear that it is just a matter of time before a state seeks a bailout, say bankruptcy lawyers who have been consulted by Congressional aides.

Bankruptcy could permit a state to alter its contractual promises to retirees, which are often protected by state constitutions, and it could provide an alternative to a no-strings bailout. Along with retirees, however, investors in a state’s bonds could suffer, possibly ending up at the back of the line as unsecured creditors.

“All of a sudden, there’s a whole new risk factor,” said Paul S. Maco, a partner at the firm Vinson & Elkins who was head of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Municipal Securities during the Clinton administration.

For now, the fear of destabilizing the municipal bond market with the words “state bankruptcy” has proponents in Congress going about their work on tiptoe. No draft bill is in circulation yet, and no member of Congress has come forward as a sponsor, although Senator John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, asked the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, about the possiblity in a hearing this month.

House Republicans, and Senators from both parties, have taken an interest in the issue, with nudging from bankruptcy lawyers and a former House speaker, Newt Gingrich, who could be a Republican presidential candidate. It would be difficult to get a bill through Congress, not only because of the constitutional questions and the complexities of bankruptcy law, but also because of fears that even talk of such a law could make the states’ problems worse.

Lawmakers might decide to stop short of a full-blown bankruptcy proposal and establish instead some sort of oversight panel for distressed states, akin to the Municipal Assistance Corporation, which helped New York City during its fiscal crisis of 1975.

Still, discussions about something as far-reaching as bankruptcy could give governors and others more leverage in bargaining with unionized public workers.

“They are readying a massive assault on us,” said Charles M. Loveless, legislative director of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. “We’re taking this very seriously.”

Mr. Loveless said he was meeting with potential allies on Capitol Hill, making the point that certain states might indeed have financial problems, but public employees and their benefits were not the cause. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a report on Thursday warning against a tendency to confuse the states’ immediate budget gaps with their long-term structural deficits.

“States have adequate tools and means to meet their obligations,” the report stated.

No state is known to want to declare bankruptcy, and some question the wisdom of offering them the ability to do so now, given the jitters in the normally staid municipal bond market.

Slightly more than $25 billion has flowed out of mutual funds that invest in muni bonds in the last two months, according to the Investment Company Institute. Many analysts say they consider a bond default by any state extremely unlikely, but they also say that when politicians take an interest in the bond market, surprises are apt to follow.

Mr. Maco said the mere introduction of a state bankruptcy bill could lead to “some kind of market penalty,” even if it never passed. That “penalty” might be higher borrowing costs for a state and downward pressure on the value of its bonds. Individual bondholders would not realize any losses unless they sold.

But institutional investors in municipal bonds, like insurance companies, are required to keep certain levels of capital. And they might retreat from additional investments. A deeply troubled state could eventually be priced out of the capital markets.

“The precipitating event at G.M. was they were out of cash and had no ability to raise the capital they needed,” said Harry J. Wilson, the lone Republican on President Obama’s special auto task force, which led G.M. and Chrysler through an unusual restructuring in bankruptcy, financed by the federal government.

Mr. Wilson, who ran an unsuccessful campaign for New York State comptroller last year, has said he believes that New York and some other states need some type of a financial restructuring.

He noted that G.M. was salvaged only through an administration-led effort that Congress initially resisted, with legislators voting against financial assistance to G.M. in late 2008.

“Now Congress is much more conservative,” he said. “A state shows up and wants cash, Congress says no, and it will probably be at the last minute and it’s a real problem. That’s what I’m concerned about.”

Discussion of a new bankruptcy option for the states appears to have taken off in November, after Mr. Gingrich gave a speech about the country’s big challenges, including government debt and an uncompetitive labor market. “We just have to be honest and clear about this, and I also hope the House Republicans are going to move a bill in the first month or so of their tenure to create a venue for state bankruptcy,” he said. A few weeks later, David A. Skeel, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, published an article, “Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt,” in The Weekly Standard. It said thorny constitutional questions were “easily addressed” by making sure states could not be forced into bankruptcy or that federal judges could usurp states’ lawmaking powers.

“I have never had anything I’ve written get as much attention as that piece,” said Mr. Skeel, who said he had since been contacted by Republicans and Democrats whom he declined to name.

Mr. Skeel said it was possible to envision how bankruptcy for states might work by looking at the existing law for local governments. Called Chapter 9, it gives distressed municipalities a period of debt-collection relief, which they can use to restructure their obligations with the help of a bankruptcy judge.

Unfunded pensions become unsecured debts in municipal bankruptcy and may be reduced. And the law makes it easier for a bankrupt city to tear up its labor contracts than for a bankrupt company, said James E. Spiotto, head of the bankruptcy practice at Chapman & Cutler in Chicago.

The biggest surprise may await the holders of a state’s general obligation bonds. Though widely considered the strongest credit of any government, they can be treated as unsecured credits, subject to reduction, under Chapter 9.

Mr. Spiotto said he thought bankruptcy court was not a good avenue for troubled states, and he has designed an alternative called the Public Pension Funding Authority. It would have mandatory jurisdiction over states that failed to provide sufficient funding to their workers’ pensions or that were diverting money from essential public services.

“I’ve talked to some people from Congress, and I’m going to talk to some more,” he said. “This effort to talk about Chapter 9, I’m worried about it. I don’t want the states to have to pay higher borrowing costs because of a panic that they might go bankrupt. I don’t think it’s the right thing at all. But it’s the beginning of a dialog.”

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DewDiligence

01/22/11 3:05 PM

#112996 RE: DewDiligence #112634

Re: Munis are a screaming buy

From the current issue of Barron’s (http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970204853904576090033417218302.html ):

The best indication that the upheaval in the muni market extends beyond credit concerns to the emotional level is that triple-A pre-refunded tax-exempt bonds trade at a higher yield than Treasuries. "Pre-re" bonds are collateralized by U.S. government securities held in escrow that pay the debt service on the munis; thus they are dependent not on the credit of the issuing state or municipality, but Uncle Sam. Yet pre-re bonds yield more than Treasuries—though they are basically the same credit and are tax-exempt.

For instance, a 30-year, triple-A pre-re tax-exempt muni closed Friday at a 4.90% yield—well above the 4.57% on the federally taxable Treasury 30-year bond. In 10-year bonds, the pre-re muni yielded 3.42%, a hair more than the 3.40% on the benchmark Treasury note. At the short end, 0.75% for a two-year pre-re muni beats 0.61% on the comparable Treasury.

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oc631

01/27/11 1:37 AM

#113407 RE: DewDiligence #112634

NYT: Moody’s Credit Ratings of States to Factor in Unfunded Pensions
By MARY WILLIAMS WALSH
Published: January 27, 2011




Moody’s Investors Service has begun to recalculate the states’ debt burdens in a way that includes unfunded pensions, something states and others have ardently resisted until now.

States do not now show their pension obligations — funded or not — on their audited financial statements. The board that issues accounting rules does not require them to. And while it has been working on possible changes to the pension accounting rules, investors have grown increasingly nervous about municipal bonds.

Moody’s new approach may now turn the tide in favor of more disclosure. The ratings agency said that in the future, it will add states’ unfunded pension obligations together with the value of their bonds, and consider the totals when rating their credit. The new approach will be more comparable to how the agency rates corporate debt and sovereign debt. Moody’s did not indicate whether states’ credit ratings may rise or fall.

Under its new method, Moody’s found that the states with the biggest total indebtedness included Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey and Rhode Island. Puerto Rico also ranked high on the scale because its pension fund for public workers is so depleted that it has virtually become a pay-as-you-go plan, meaning each year’s payments to retirees are essentially coming out of the budget each year.

Other big states that have had trouble balancing their budgets lately, like New York and California, tended to fare better in the new rankings. That is because Moody’s counted only the unfunded portion of states’ pension obligations. New York and California have tended to put more money into their state pension funds over the years, so they have somewhat smaller shortfalls.

In the past, Moody’s looked at a state’s level of bonded debt alone when assessing its creditworthiness. Pensions were considered “soft debt” and were considered separately from the bonds, using a different method.

“A more standard analysis would view both of these as liabilities that need to be paid and put stress on your operating budgets,” said Robert Kurtter, managing director for public finance at Moody’s.

In making the change, Moody’s sidestepped a bitter, continuing debate about whether states and cities were accurately measuring their total pension obligations in the first place. In adding together the value of the states’ bonds and their unfunded pensions, Moody’s is using the pension values reported by the states. The shortfalls reported by the states greatly understate the scale of the problem, according to a number of independent researchers.

“Analysts and investors have to work with the information we have and draw their own conclusions about what the information shows,” Mr. Kurtter said.

In a report that is being made available to clients on Thursday, Moody’s acknowledges the controversy, pointing out that governments and corporations use very different methods to measure their total pension obligations. The government method allows public pension funds to credit themselves for the investment income, and the contributions, that they expect to receive in the future. It has come under intense criticism since 2008 because the expected investment returns have not materialized. Some states have not made the required contributions either.

Moody’s noted in its report that it was going to keep using the states’ own numbers, but said that if they were calculated differently, it “would likely lead to higher underfunded liabilities than are currently disclosed.”

After adding up the values of each state’s bonds and its unfunded pensions, Moody’s compared the totals to each state’s available resources, something it did in the past only for each state’s bonds. It found that some relatively low-tax states, like Colorado and Illinois, had very high total debts compared with their revenue, suggesting that their finances could be improved by collecting more taxes.

But some states that are heavily indebted, like New Jersey, also have among the highest tax rates, suggesting other types of action may be needed to reduce their debt burdens.

Moody’s also ranked total indebtedness on the basis of each state’s total economic output and its population. It did not factor state promises for retiree health care into its analysis, on the thinking that pensions are a fixed debt like bonds, but retiree health plans can usually be renegotiated.

Mr. Kurtter said Moody’s was not suggesting that any state was in such serious trouble that it was about to default on its bonds, something considered extremely unlikely by many analysts. [Meanwhile the federal government is trying to figure a way for states to declare bankruptcy so they don't have to bail them out.]

Some state officials have complained about a recent tendency to focus on total pension obligations, calling it a scare tactic by union opponents who want to abolish traditional pensions and make all state workers save for their own retirements.

Mr. Kurtter said Moody’s had decided it was important to consider total unfunded pension obligations because they could contribute to current budget woes.

“These are really reflections of the budget stress that states and local governments are now feeling,” he said. A company with too much debt could close its doors, he said, but governments do not have that option.

“They have a tax base. They have contractually obligated themselves to make these payments. These are part of the ongoing budget stress,” he said. “It ultimately all comes back to being an operating cost. Addressing those problems is really what’s happening today.”

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oc631

05/20/11 6:30 PM

#120353 RE: DewDiligence #112634

Another twist in the muni market saga.






http://finance.yahoo.com/news/The-Real-Fear-for-the-Muni-usnews-72284488.html?x=0





"......the real fear for the municipal bond market will arise when the primary pool of muni-bond holders (high-net-worth individuals) begin to see the previously rising values of their bond accounts begin to drop quickly. Due to falling interest rates, most of these investors have only experienced ever-growing bond prices--and thereby reasonable total rates of return after tax--their entire investing lives. Very few have ever lived through a meaningful rising interest-rate environment. When these generally conservative investors begin to see sharp drops of 10 percent or more in their "safe" accounts over short periods of time, history tells us they are likely to panic, and sell fast."