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zipjet

12/14/10 6:32 PM

#110903 RE: jbog #110902

I'm not one bit surprised that the Fed is "staying the course" considering it isn't working at all.



So Fed is irrational? They just keep doing something that is NOT working?


All the FED is really doing is monetizing the public debt which be felt down the road in future inflation.




Not really, unless you think that YOY M2 up 2.7% constitutes monetizing the debt:

http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/usfd/page6.pdf

Nor is the effect of QE2 limited to the effects you note. It also has made home financing cheaper, puts downward pressure on the exchange rate, tends to reduce the trade deficit, tends to reduce the current accounts deficit, is reducing the treasury to corporate spread, and is coercing investors out the risk spectrum.

Considering that the Fed is buying about $800 to $900 Billion in treasuries over a six month



I think they only announced the plan to purchase $600M. There is no need to alter the facts to support your errors. :-)

ij
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jq1234

12/14/10 6:43 PM

#110904 RE: jbog #110902

considering it isn't working at all.



What do you mean it isn't working. It is working right now. The ultimate goal of the program is to increase inflation to 2% target, or increase the expectation of inflation. It is working as intended. Whether it is good or bad is a different matter.

The problem with public policy is one can only adopt one at the same time. It will never settle the argument that it would be better if the Fed had adopted the other option as many suggested.
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bladerunner1717

12/14/10 6:46 PM

#110905 RE: jbog #110902

jbog,

I'm a little baffled that Treasuries sold off, when the Fed is clearly signaling that economic growth is still anemic and disinflation, not inflation, is still the dominant worry. I'm not sure if the rise in bond yields is due to fears of inflation or a belief that the economy is headed upward (Retail sales have been up for five months in a row.)

Rosenberg, by the way, is not buying any of this. He still thinks a "double-dip" is a possibility and he quotes Mitsubishi Asset Management to the effect that the 10-yr. note is headed to 1.75%. He says the Japanese know a lot about deflationary cycles.

Indeed, as the Bank of Canada (GoC) Governor put it yesterday (his entire
speech is well worth a read), “if nominal exchange rates do not change, the
adjustment will come through inflation in emerging economies and disinflation
in major advanced economies.” The barbell investment strategy of being short a
basket of emerging market bonds and long a basket of developed market bonds
makes perfect sense.


Because market sentiment is so wildly bullish, Rosenberg thinks that equities are due for a big sell-off. However, Rosenberg concedes that the tax deal, by keeping the taxes on dividends at 15%, will add $75 billion to the accounts of individual investors. Since that money usually gets reinvested, this will be bullish for equities.

Be that as it may, relative strength and momentum indicators are clearly faltering. Sentiment is wildly bullish with the AAII and the Investors Intelligence survey in excess of 50%. Not only that but the latest Shiller P/E ratio jumped to 21.87x in November from 21.38x — we have not seen it this high since June 2008 (and recall that the market went down another 45% from there to the lows). According to this metric, the U.S. stock market is overvalued by 33%. Yikes! And the typical Wall Street strategist thinks this market is cheap!

You and I will continue to disagree about Fed policy and QE. I think it has/will save us from a far more serious economic crisis, but, I admit, that is difficult to prove (as Obama and the Dems have found out politically). Nonetheless, it's hard not to believe that Bernanke's "weak-dollar" policy is helping the surge in U.S exports, which should help the job market, eventually.

One tidbit that you may find interesting is that the household debt to disposable income ratio in Canada--Rosenberg is headquartered in Canada--just hit 150%. At the height of the bubble in the U.S. the ratio, to the best of my knowledge, was 134%. Whatever happened to the prudent and cautious Canadian? When this bubble pops--and it surely will--I don't know the exact effect it will have on the U.S. But you can be sure that it won't be positive. If Japan, Europe and the U.S. are all going through this de-leveraging, disinflationary cycle, I just know see how your hyperinflationary thesis can hold up.

I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree.


Bladerunner

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bladerunner1717

01/03/11 7:06 PM

#111842 RE: jbog #110902

"The sinkhole of austerity"--Stiglitz on prospects for 2011


What Lies Ahead in 2011?
Joseph E. Stiglitz


2010-12-13

NEW YORK – The global economy ends 2010 more divided than it was at the beginning of the year. On one side, emerging-market countries like India, China, and the Southeast Asian economies, are experiencing robust growth. On the other side, Europe and the United States face stagnation – indeed, a Japanese-style malaise – and stubbornly high unemployment. The problem in the advanced countries is not a jobless recovery, but an anemic recovery – or worse, the possibility of a double-dip recession.

This two-track world poses some unusual risks. While Asia’s economic output is too small to pull up growth in the rest of the world, it may be enough to push up commodity prices.

Meanwhile, US efforts to stimulate its economy through the Federal Reserve’s policy of “quantitative easing” may backfire. After all, in globalized financial markets, money looks for the best prospects around the world, and these prospects are in Asia, not the US. So the money won’t go where it’s needed, and much of it will wind up where it’s not wanted – causing further increases in asset and commodity prices, especially in emerging markets.

Given the high levels of excess capacity and unemployment in Europe and America, quantitative easing is unlikely to trigger a bout of inflation. It could, however, increase anxieties about future inflation, leading to higher long-term interest rates – precisely the opposite of the Fed’s goal.

This is not the only, or even the most important, downside risk facing the global economy. The gravest threat comes from the wave of austerity sweeping the world, as governments, particularly in Europe, confront the large deficits brought on by the Great Recession, and as anxieties about some countries’ ability to meet their debt payments contributes to financial-market instability.

The outcome of premature fiscal consolidation is all but foretold: growth will slow, tax revenues will diminish, and the reduction in deficits will be disappointing. And, in our globally integrated world, the slowdown in Europe will exacerbate the slowdown in the US, and vice versa.

With the US able to borrow at record-low interest rates, and with the promise of high returns on public investments after a decade of neglect, it is clear what it should do. A large-scale public-investment program would stimulate employment in the short term, and growth in the long term, leading in the end to a lower national debt. But financial markets demonstrated their shortsightedness in the years preceding the crisis, and are doing so once again, by applying pressure for spending cuts, even if that implies reducing badly needed public investments.

Moreover, political gridlock will ensure that little is done about the other festering problems confronting the American economy: mortgage foreclosures are likely to continue unabated (legal complications aside); small and medium-sized enterprises are likely to continue to be starved of funds; and the small and medium-sized banks that traditionally provide them with credit are likely to continue to struggle to survive.

In Europe, meanwhile, matters are unlikely to be any better. Europe has finally managed to come to the rescue of Greece and Ireland. In the run up to the crisis, both were governed by right-wing governments marked by crony capitalism or worse, demonstrating once again that free-market economics didn’t work in Europe any better than it did in the US.

In Greece, as in the US, a new government was left to clean up the mess. The Irish government that encouraged reckless bank lending and the creation of a property bubble was, perhaps not surprisingly, no more adept in managing the economy after the crisis that it was before.

Politics aside, property bubbles leave in their wake a legacy of debt and excess capacity in real estate that is not easily rectified – especially when politically connected banks resist restructuring mortgages.

To me, attempting to discern the economic prospects for 2011 is not a particularly interesting question: the answer is bleak, with little upside potential and a lot of downside risk. More importantly, how long will it take Europe and America to recover, and can Asia’s seemingly export-dependent economies continue to grow if their historical markets languish?

My best bet is that these countries will maintain rapid growth as they shift their economic focus to their vast and untapped domestic markets. This will require considerable restructuring of their economies, but China and India are both dynamic, and proved their resilience in their response to the Great Recession.

I am not so bullish on Europe and America. In both cases, the underlying problem is insufficient aggregate demand. The ultimate irony is that there are simultaneously excess capacity and vast unmet needs – and policies that could restore growth by using the former to address the latter.

Both the US and Europe, for instance, must retrofit their economies to address the challenges of global warming. There are feasible policies that would work within long-term budget constraints. The problem is politics: in the US, the Republican Party would rather see President Barack Obama fail than the economy succeed. In Europe, 27 countries with different interests and perspectives are pulling in different directions, without enough solidarity to compensate. The bailout packages are, in this light, impressive achievements.

In both Europe and America, the free-market ideology that allowed asset bubbles to grow unfettered – markets always know best, so government must not intervene – now ties policymakers’ hands in designing effective responses to the crisis. One might have thought that the crisis itself would undermine confidence in that ideology. Instead, it has resurfaced to drag governments and economies down the sinkhole of austerity.

If politics is the problem in Europe and America, only political changes are likely to restore them to growth. Or else they can wait until the overhang of excess capacity diminishes, capital goods become obsolete, and the economy’s internal restorative forces work their gradual magic. Either way, victory is not around the corner.

Joseph E. Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University and a Nobel laureate in Economics. His latest book, Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy, is now available in French, German, Japanese, and Spanish.



Bladerunner