From an economic standpoint, Teva has relatively little to gain from its own success with Lovenox, but it has an enormous amount to lose from MNTA’s success with Copaxone. Thus, anything Teva can do to undermine MNTA’s corporate success generally becomes an attractive undertaking.
I share your sense of how to compete - go for the jugular. This case for TEVA is easy.
The harder case is where driving down prices to destroy the profitability of the generic also destroys the branded profits. The incumbents have blown it in the past.
IF I were running a major drug company and I was inevitably going to lose a big drug, I would not allow the generic to make a profit. (Enoxiparin will never fit this case since there will only be a four-way split and the market will still be big enough for all to make some money.) But Lipitor or Viagra will fit.
So to apply what I am saying, if I were PFE, I would launch an AG at the same time the first generic launched and I would cut the price to take nearly all the sales and leave the "exclusive" generic my eating dust.
Why do that? Not doing it feeds profits and capital to the companies that will continue to attack your other products. Feed sharks and you get bigger sharks and more sharks.
If the FDA continues to hold off on TEVA's application through late October, i think buyers will start to recognize that its not a "bureaucratic" delay and that there are likely deeper issues with TEVA's mL application.
I suspect buyers will step in at that time, and we could start to see MNTA's PPS rise back to low-mid twenty levels. Thus, IMHO, this is an excellent buying opportunity.
That being said, I have been very mistaken in my prognostication with respect to MNTA PPS. That being said, at these levels, it may be an excellent take out target. It's so darn cheap....