Shi'a Islam is the only major schism in Islam. It is not a recent schism, however, for it dates back right to the foundations of Islam. Shi'ite historians believe that Shi'ism began shortly after the death of Muhammad, when the Caliphate, or secular leadership of Islam, was handed to Muhammad's father-in-law, Abu Bakr, rather than 'Ali, Muhammad's chosen successor. The Muslims who supported 'Ali called themselves the "Partisans of 'Ali" (Shi'a 'Ali ); these supporters, who were only four in number, are the root of Shi'a Islam. Western and Sunni historians date Shi'ism as a religion to the death of Husayn, the grandson of Muhammad, in the battle of Karbala. The celebration of this martyrdom by the Shi'a 'Ali represents for these historians the first clear instance of separate religious practice.
However that may be, Shi'a Islam is a crucial part of the Islamic tapestry throughout the history of Islam. World history textbooks tend to blissfully ignore the Shi'ite adventure through history, but the minority Shi'ites have played a determining role in Islamic and world history. Most recently, Shi'ism has given rise to a new Islamic political theory called velayat-i faqih , or "rule by jurisprudence" (Westerners call it "Islamic Republicanism"). Velayat-i faqih is perhaps the most important Islamic innovation of our century; it may be very possible that by the end of the century, the bulk of the Islamic world will be practicing it in one form or another. Or maybe not. You're sitting at one of these great moments in history, in which an entirely new way of conducting human culture and human business has been invented in your lifetime. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 may turn out to be the most significant event in Islamic history for the last five centuries. Or it may not. The Revolution and the political theory it spawned, however, are continuing evidence of the crucial role that Shi'ism plays in the global community.
'Ali The foundational figure in Shi'a history is 'Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of Muhammad. After the death of Muhammad, rival claims were put forth for the caliphate which was the office that was the supreme secular authority of Islam. In Shi'a history, Muhammad designated 'Ali as his successor, so that all the others who served in this capacity were illegitimate. The "Partisans of 'Ali," Shi'a 'Ali in the struggle to get 'Ali in the Caliphate and in the civil war that broke out when 'Ali was finally named Caliph gave the name to the religious schism that divided the Islamic world from the very beginning. Eventually the Shi'ites would develop a religious doctrine that differs in fundamental respects from orthodox, or Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, at the cornerstone of Shi'a history is the figure of 'Ali and his persecution by the illegitimate caliphs.
Upon Muhammed's death, a hastily collected group of prominent Muslim leaders elected Muhammed's father in law, Abu Bakr, to be the secular head of Islam. However, 'Ali, Muhammed's son-in-law and cousin, was not part of this committee nor were other members of Muhammed's immediate family, and many believed that Muhammed had designated 'Ali as a successor, for the Traditions had Muhammed naming him as both his brother and his successor. 'Ali had been raised with Muhammed and was the second person (after Muhammed's wife Khadija) to recognize Muhammed's role as a prophet; he was the first of Muhammed's tribe, the Quraysh, to declare himself an apostle. But the Meccan and Medinan leaders, with no members of Muhammed's house present, gave their allegiance to Abu Bakr as Caliph, or Successor to Muhammad and supreme head of Islam, and attempted through force of arms to coerce 'Ali into acknowledging Abu Bakr as well. After the caliphates of 'Umar and 'Uthman, 'Ali became caliph n 656. The Umayyads who ruled the various governments, however, revolted and established the Umayyad caliphate.
From this point onwards, authority was divided in the Islamic world. The Umayyads continued as caliphs; but there now existed in Iraq a separate Islamic community that did not recognize the authority of the Umayyad Caliphs. Rather they recognized only the successors to 'Ali as authorities, and they gave these successors the title Imam, or spiritual leader of Islam, both to differentiate their leaders from the more worldly and secular Umayyads. They called themselves Shi'a 'Ali, or "The Partisans of 'Ali," and are called by historians, 'Alids.
Husayn In Shi'ite history, 'Ali is the first Imam and was followed by a grand total of eleven Imams, who passed the Imamate down to their sons in hereditary succession. However, the most important Imam of Shi'a was Husayn, whose martyrdom at Karbala is the most important event in the Shi'a experience of history. Husayn was killed by Yazid, the second Umayyad caliph, because of the growing threat the 'Alids posed to caliphal power. The successful massacre of Husayn and his followers was in part due to the failure of Shi'ites to rally to their Imam--so the martyrdom of Husayn represented to Shi'ites both the illegitimacy of Islamic authority and Shi'ite failure to bring about legitimate Islamic rule.
The Imamate From the abdication of 'Ali onwards, authority was divided in the Islamic world. The Umayyads continued to pass the Caliphate down through the ages among their family; but their now existed in Iraq a separate Islamic community that did not recognize the authority of the Umayyad Caliphs. Rather they recognized only the successors to 'Ali as authorities, and they gave these successors the title Imam. A grand total of eleven Imams succeeded 'Ali (ten in non-Shi'ite histories), passing the Imamate down to their sons in hereditary succession. However, the eleventh Imam (the tenth Imam to succeed 'Ali), Hasan al-Askari, died without a son, and the Shi'ites were thrown into disarray. Shi'a Islam divided into several different sects, the most important of which was the Qat'iyya ("those who are certain"). The Qat'iyya believed that Hasan al-Askari did indeed have a son, Muhammed al-Mahdi; one of the Qat'iyya sects believed that Muhammed al-Mahdi, the twelfth Imam, had hidden himself and remained in hiding. This sect was called Ithna-'Ashari (Twelver) or Imami (Imam) Shi'a, and was the form of Shi'a that eventually came to exclusively represent Shi'ism. When you say Shi'a, you really mean Twelver Shi'a.
The Imamate is the central aspect of Shi'ite Islam and what principally distinguishes it from orthodox or Sunni Islam. In all other respects, Shi'a Islam is virtually identical with Sunni practice. In the Shi'a concept of the Imam, a central belief is that at no time in human history has the world been bereft of an Imam. The Imam is a gift by God to humanity; he serves as both a guide (Hadi ) to humans, a Proof of God (Hujjat Allah ) and a Sign of God (Ayyat Allah ). The Imams span history from Adam, the first Imam, to the present day; Muhammad himself was an Imam. The Imams, according to Shi'ites, were a light created before the creation--this light was the instrument of creation and is embodied in each Imam. The Imam has secret knowledge of God and creation; the most important of these secrets is "The Greatest Name of God." The Imams are designated or appointed (mansus ) by God and they are free from all sin or fault (ma'shum ); therfore, they are the most perfect of humans (afdal an-nas ). But above all, the Imam is the one who teaches human beings the mystical truths of the universe. The Shi'ites believe that the Imam that the esoteric, mystical aspects of God are transmitted to human beings.
The son of Hasan al-Askari, however, hid himself away from men in order to preserve his life. This last Imam, the twelfth Imam, has been "hidden" or "occulted" and still is alive today on earth. "The Guided One," as he is called, is awaiting the time when he will return, guide the world, and restore Shi'a to its proper place as the universal religion of God. Richard Hooker
This situation seems even more illogical than most.
I have to ask is Bush committing these blunders, attacking mosques, disregard for civilians, etc., on purpose in order to insure a civil war? He has done everything to assure chaos not that the situation even in the best of circumstances could be easily won.
A civil war would have advantages for Bush. Under cover of its anarchy he might be able to sneak in a compliant government. It would also afford a great excuse to keep a large number of United States troops on the ground waiting what is considered the bigger prize, Iran, the Caspian and perhaps Lebanon as a bonus.
The operation - engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience - is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people's elections. #msg-4669091
Civil disobedience or disorder is a major characteristic of the United States template for winning other countries elections.
In Iraq the situation is unique perhaps the civil disobedience or disorder that we have used so often in various countries is to come in the form of civil war preceding the election.
What is the Shiite strategy for the January elections? Iraqi Shiites—some 60 percent of the population—have never held political power in Iraq and believe they deserve the dominant voice in the new government, experts say. But winning their full share of the vote will require a show of unity among the country’s many disparate Shiite movements. Efforts to create a unified Shiite slate are ongoing.
Who is promoting the idea of a unified Shiite slate? The country’s most influential figure: the senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The single electoral slate Sistani favors could also include Kurdish and Sunni parties. Sistani has issued a fatwa commanding his millions of followers to cast ballots and is running a massive get-out-the-vote effort through mosques and shrines. “With such a fatwa issued, I can’t imagine anyone [Shiite] not voting,” Jaber Habib, professor of political science at Baghdad University, recently told the Associated Press.
How likely is it that Shiites will run on a single slate? That topic—the central political issue of the moment—is the subject of intense negotiation. Two related issues remain unsettled: whether Shiite religious and political figures can agree on a unified slate of candidates; and, if they can, whether it will be enlarged to include some Sunnis and Kurds. Sistani is the key powerbroker. “Everyone is saying the Sistani list is going to be the clock-cleaner in this election. No other list is even going to come close,” says Kenneth Katzman, senior Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service, the nonpartisan research arm of Congress.
Why is a unified slate being considered? On January 30, Iraqis will elect a 275-member transitional National Assembly that will pass laws and draw up a constitution by the end of 2005. Instead of voting for legislators to represent particular local districts—as in the U.S. voting system—all Iraqis will choose from a single national ballot, which will contain various lists, or slates, of candidates. Each slate will receive seats in the National Assembly according to the percentage of the total vote it wins, with about 50,000 votes required to win a seat. Candidates will be awarded seats according to where they fall on the list, with those on the top seated first. Supporters of a unified slate say it will ensure that votes are not wasted on candidates who would likely fail to reach the vote threshold.
What are the chances a Sistani-backed slate will include Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish parties? Fairly high. Sistani’s idea is to have a list dominated by Shiite parties that also includes some Kurds, Sunnis, and other Iraqi minority groups, Katzman says. Some 20 percent of Iraqis are Kurds; some 20 percent are Arab Sunni. An earlier version of this plan would have joined Shiites with minority parties in a unified national or “monster” coalition that closely resembled the makeup of the current interim government. The presence of such a strong coalition on the ballot would have essentially turned the January election into a referendum on the current government—and would likely have watered down the majority voice of the Shiites. This idea was favored by U.S. policy-makers, but appears to have died for lack of Iraqi support, experts say.
Which Shiite groups and individuals are potential participants in a unified slate?
The Islamic Da’wa Party: Da’wa was a major Shiite opposition party in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and thousands of its members were executed by the regime. The party has strong support among Shiites in southern Iraq. Its leader, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, is vice president of the interim Iraqi government. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI): SCIRI is a large, popular Shiite party that opposed Saddam Hussein’s regime, predominately from exile in Iran and elsewhere. It is led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. His brother, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, headed the party until he was killed in a Najaf car bombing in August 2003. Both Da’wa and SCIRI are known to have worked closely with Sistani in the past. The Iraqi National Congress (INC): This party is led by Ahmed Chalabi, the controversial Shiite exile and banker who received U.S. support for a coalition of anti-Saddam exile groups. Chalabi fell out of favor with Washington in May amid accusations that he had passed U.S. secrets to Iran. Chalabi has recently emerged as a champion of Iraqi Shiite interests—previously, he spoke more broadly about a Western-style Iraqi democracy—and has created the Shiite Political Council as a rival to SCIRI and Da’wa. It consists of about a dozen smaller Shiite parties. Chalabi is now reportedly trying to fuse his multi-party council with SCIRI, Dawa, and other Shiite and non-Shiite parties to create a unified, national list. “Chalabi does not represent the views of all Shiites, but he should not be counted out completely,” says Marina Ottaway, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Muqtada al-Sadr: Sadr is the young, radical cleric whose militia battled U.S. forces in Baghdad, Najaf, Kufa, and other southern cities last April and August. The August fight ended in a Sistani-brokered truce. In recent months Sadr, with Chalabi’s encouragement, has flirted with embracing electoral politics through the Shiite Political Council. “Sadr will represent a very, very important part of this [Shiite] coalition,” says INC spokesman Entifadh K. Qanbar. The Iraqi National Accord (INA): Led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the INA, like the INC, received support from the U.S. government to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990s. Some press reports indicate that Allawi may form his own slate of secular Sunnis and Shiites. Katzman says he believes that Allawi will not be invited to join the unified Shiite list because they fear, assuming the unified slate comes out on top, Allawi would insist on remaining as prime minister. In a late September poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 47 percent of Iraqis supported Allawi’s work as prime minister—but the recent offensive in Falluja appears to have hurt his domestic standing. He has the strong backing of the United States and Britain. What would prevent these parties from joining forces? Rivalries between individuals for power and seats in the National Assembly. Sadr has tried in the past to usurp authority from Sistani in Najaf. Chalabi and Allawi are longtime adversaries. SCIRI and Da’wa want to dominate the coalition, and may form their own joint list if they feel squeezed by the other parties. Sadr may also demand more seats in the coalition than the other parties are willing to give him, experts say.
Is it likely that Shiites will join forces with Kurds? It is too soon to say. Representatives of nearly all major Iraqi parties met November 19 to discuss the possibility at a one-day summit in Dukan, a lakeside resort in the Kurdish north. Kurdish leaders have already agreed to unify all the parties based in the Kurdish area into a single slate, but they are still deciding whether to run with Shiites, Arab Sunnis, or alone. “I think a Kurd-Shiite coalition is quite possible,” Ottaway says.
What about Sunni participation? Most experts agree it is crucial to bestow legitimacy on the vote, but it is uncertain whether Sunnis will eventually form lists or go to the polls in large numbers. Experts cite four factors influencing Sunni participation:
The insurgency. Sunni insurgents, responsible for the bulk of the current violence, have sworn to oppose the election. This will create great instability, and likely great danger, for voters in predominately Sunni areas, including neighborhoods in Baghdad and the restive cities in the so-called Sunni Triangle north and west of the capital. Some have suggested that elections could be postponed in violence-prone parts of the country. Boycotts. An important Sunni clerical organization, the Muslim Scholars Association, has called for a boycott of the election. (One of its leading members, Sheik Mohammad Amin al-Faidhi, was killed in a drive-by shooting by unknown assailants November 22.) The Iraqi Islamic Party, the main Sunni party in the interim government, withdrew from the government to protest the recent U.S.-led offensive in Falluja. It may participate in the January election. New parties/coalitions. Experts say there are independent Sunnis and some new Sunni parties willing to join the government. Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar, the Iraqi president and a Sunni tribal leader, announced through a spokesman November 23 that he had formed a new party to run in the elections. Called the Iraqis’ Party, it includes the current ministers of defense and industry. In addition, Chalabi is in discussions with Sunni Arabs from Mosul to join his national list, Qanbar says. The occupation. U.S. forces’ anti-insurgency campaigns will increase Sunni animosity toward the United States and, by extension, the government in Baghdad. U.S. and Iraqi government forces have begun to arrest Sunni clerics who preach violence against U.S. forces. Three Iraqis were killed in a raid on a Sunni mosque in Baghdad November 19. What advance indications are there about voter participation? According to the IRI poll conducted between September 24 and October 4, 89 percent of Shiites and 81 percent of Sunnis said they planned to vote. This poll was taken before the start of the recent Falluja offensive, so Sunni participation may fall—especially if no powerful Sunni candidates emerge who voters feel represent their interests.
Could violence derail or delay the election? Yes. The election date has been set by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, which is responsible for technical preparations for the vote. Its president, Abdul Hussein al-Handawi, says he is optimistic that polling will take place throughout the country. But it is unlikely that adequate numbers of trained Iraqi security forces will be ready to secure the country on Election Day, The New York Times reported November 23. On November 19, leading Sunni politicians and aides to Prime Minister Allawi called for elections to be postponed for two or three months or until order is restored in the Sunni Arab heartland. Shiite and Kurdish leaders objected, saying that even an imperfect vote will increase the government’s legitimacy and thus improve security.
What is the status of election preparations? Voter registration began November 1, but in recent weeks 90 of the 540 registration centers have been closed because of potential violence, The New York Times reported. Nevertheless, Ashraf Qazi, the United Nation’s special envoy to Iraq, said November 22 that January elections were technically feasible. There are some 25 U.N. election experts providing advice and support to the Iraqi Electoral Commission. The commission has hired about 1,000 Iraqi staffers so far, Handawi says. In total, some 14 million voters are expected to register inside Iraq, and some 3 million Iraqi expatriates in at least 14 other countries will also be permitted to register.
How many political parties have registered so far? More than 150 parties and individuals have registered for the elections, according to an Electoral Commission spokesman. There are groups of every description: Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian-Chaldean, and communist. The Baath Party of Saddam Hussein is banned from participating in the election, as are candidates who held high rank in it.
Which posts are being chosen? Voters are to choose candidates for three types of assemblies:
All Iraqis will cast votes for the transitional National Assembly, which will serve as the legislature until elections for a permanent body are held. Iraqis who live in the semi-autonomous northern region will also cast votes for the 105-member Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly, the regional law-making body. Voters will also elect governorate councils in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces, which will provide the framework for elected local government. The electoral commission has not yet decided on the makeup or size of these councils, experts say. Will there be a direct election for the president or prime minister? No. These posts will be elected by the transitional National Assembly, according to the terms of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), or interim constitution, that was approved by the now-defunct Iraqi Governing Council and occupation administrator L. Paul Bremer III in March.
What will the transitional National Assembly do? Its first act will be to choose a president and two deputy presidents from among its own members. This so-called presidency council will also appoint a prime minister and other government ministers. The National Assembly will be responsible for drafting a constitution by August 15, 2005. According to the tight timetable laid out in the TAL, Iraqis will vote in a referendum on the constitution by October 15, 2005. If they approve it, elections for a permanent government will be held in December 2005. If they reject it, the National Assembly will be dissolved and an election held for a new transitional assembly that would try again to write a constitution.
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