Lost at Tora Bora
September 11, 2005
(Page 6 of 6)
I puzzled over whether Musharraf's new determination would include finally becoming serious about the hunt for bin Laden. No one to whom I spoke was at all convinced. A few weeks earlier, I had asked George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an expert on South Asian security issues, what he thought about Musharraf's commitment to the search generally. "For me, the outstanding question is, At the highest levels in Islamabad is there a conviction that capturing or killing bin Laden would be good for the leadership of Pakistan?" Perkovich replied. "And given the answer to that question, how hard are they willing to try? And can they afford to be seen as being solidly on America's side? I think Musharraf also worries about whether or not Washington will stay the course. Therefore, he's got to keep the Americans online: hold back something that they want. And, in that respect, Osama could be seen as an insurance policy for them."
According to Gary Schroen, the former C.I.A. officer, "We're never going to get bin Laden without the total cooperation of Pakistan, and there's a lot more they could do."
"Such as?" I asked.
"Winning over their military is imperative," he said. "We've got to convince them that it's in their interest to bring bin Laden in. And that means allowing us to send Special Forces and C.I.A. teams, in sufficient numbers, into the northern areas with the ability to move around, to establish networks on the ground. We've also got to refocus U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan in order to have coordinated military operations between the two sides of the frontier." He paused and said, "It's all up to the Pakistanis now."
"How would this affect Musharraf if he agreed?" I asked.
He thought for a moment, and then he replied, "If his hand was ever seen as the one that turned bin Laden over, he wouldn't be able to survive."
Dec. 16, 2001: Despite the Afghan and American assault on Tora Bora, Osama bin Laden escaped.