As hopes fade for a speedy resolution of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program, there have been indications that South Korea and Japan - Pyongyang's principal enemies in the region - might themselves have been or might be considering embarking on the road to nuclear weapons, or at least giving thought to the option, and not for the first time. While the short-term threat stems from North Korea's nuclear weapons, over the longer term both South Korea and Japan are increasingly pursuing a path of "strategic independence" from their principal security guarantor of the past 60 years, the United States.
If both nations possessed nuclear weapons, that arguably would defuse the North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as change the geostrategic landscape of North Asia. Regardless of what Washington and Beijing wants, and even though it is not yet inevitable, the chances that South Korea and/or Japan may go nuclear in coming years has risen substantially of late.
Both Seoul and Tokyo are aspiring to greater global influence, and to this end they may see benefits from possessing their own nuclear forces even if North Korea is eventually disarmed. The big "losers" in any potential arms race could be the US and China.
Cold War considerations drove Seoul's early research. South Korea recently revealed that its scientists had conducted experiments (not authorized by the government) with nuclear materials in 1982 and 2000. These experiments were by no means the first time that Seoul had weighed the nuclear option. Former military ruler General Park Chung-hee (1961-79) had ordered his defense and scientific establishment to embark on a fledgling nuclear-weapons program as far back as 1970, and proceeded with the project for five years before the US discovered its existence and pressured Park to abandon it.
For South Korea, the initial nuclear drive was triggered by Park's fear of US unreliability after the administration of president Richard M Nixon ordered the withdrawal of the US 7th Division from Korea in 1970. This subsequently reduced the US military presence in South Korea by 20,000 from 62,000 troops. Indeed, under the "Guam Doctrine" (1969), Washington had already begun pressing its allies to do more to take care of their own security arrangements, so that the US could avoid losing its soldiers in major wars in Asia. When the US withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, Park became increasingly convinced that South Korea had to become more militarily independent of the US if Seoul were ever to be able to deter or decisively repulse another North Korean invasion.
Japan first embarked on a nuclear-weapons program during World War II, although Tokyo failed to match the progress made by the US and the Soviet Union. Ironically, much of Japan's research and development infrastructure was located in what is today North Korea, in order to keep those facilities safe from US bombing raids on its home islands. After the war, the government of prime minister Eisaku Sato (1964-72) carried out a special study in 1967 into the desirability and viability of Japan independently developing nuclear weapons, though the report recommended against such a move. In 1968, Sato's administration adopted the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" of not possessing, developing, or allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory.
A year later, however, a government report - the contents of which were only revealed in 1994 - stated that while the country did not need nuclear weapons "for the time being", Tokyo should "keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard".
During the Cold War, Japan's main enemy was the Soviet Union. Tokyo remained without a nuclear deterrent, instead counting on the protection of the United States' "nuclear umbrella". Whether the US actually would have risked destruction of its own cities by Soviet nukes if Washington retaliated against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after the USSR invaded or attacked Japan is something we will never know, since the Cold War ended peacefully.
Japan, however, is once again facing the nuclear threat, and this has prompted growing calls for Japan to break with its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
North Korea's nukes a short-term threat North Korea's nuclear-weapons program remains the main catalyst for any attempts by Seoul and Tokyo to go nuclear. At the height of the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear program in 1994, the North threatened to turn the South into a "sea of fire". Barely a fortnight ago, on September 23, North Korea's official media warned that Pyongyang would turn Japan into a "nuclear sea of fire" if the US were to attack it with nuclear weapons. While these threats may be mere posturing - Pyongyang's media rhetoric is often far more apocalyptic than that of its diplomats - neither South Korean nor Japanese leaders can afford to take that chance and risk letting six decades of economic progress and development go up in a mushroom cloud.
Indeed, uncertainty over a mysterious explosion and mushroom cloud (albeit non-nuclear) over North Korea on the 56th anniversary of the republic's foundation (September 9) - and the fact that Pyongyang frequently test-fires missiles capable of hitting all of Japan as well as South Korea - underscore the dangers faced by Seoul and Tokyo. Japan, the only country ever to have experienced a nuclear attack, will do whatever is necessary to prevent another Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
Officially, the US would most probably use nuclear weapons to retaliate against North Korea if Pyongyang ever used its own atomic bombs against the South or Japan. Even the comparatively mild-talking former president Bill Clinton publicly warned North Korea in 1993 that "it is pointless for them to try to develop nuclear weapons, because it they ever use them it would mean the end of their country". However, if push came to shove, it is not clear whether Washington would retaliate accordingly, especially given that Pyongyang is developing longer-range intercontinental missiles capable of hitting the United States as a deterrent against Washington.
For both Seoul and Tokyo, developing their own nuclear weapons would send a clear message to Pyongyang that regardless of what actions the United States takes or fails to take in and around the Korean Peninsula in any new crisis, South Korea or Japan would be able to respond to any nuclear strike by the North.
For South Korea, this is not just a question of deterring a Northern nuclear strike. The city of Seoul is particularly vulnerable to North Korea's conventional artillery pieces, some 1,000 long-range units (out of a total of 12,500 guns) of which target the capital, according to comments this week by South Korean legislator Park Jin. Pyongyang therefore has the ability to wreak devastation against the South even without the use of nuclear weapons. If the South possessed nukes, it would have a major card to play against the Northern artillery threat. Japan is out of range of North Korean artillery, but not out of range of Pyongyang's short-range missiles, which could be used to carry chemical or biological warheads. A nuclear card would serve as deterrence against Pyongyang's dire "sea of fire" threats.
Seoul, Tokyo seeking world-power status Beyond the immediate threat of North Korea, both South Korea and particularly Japan are seeking a greater global role after decades of junior partnership with the United States. Their new ambitions reflect an increasing confidence within both countries, especially in view of the fact that they are the most economically developed in the region, and in Japan's case, the world's second-largest economy. Since the US withdrawal from South Vietnam in the early 1970s, South Korea has served as the US military's only base on the Asian mainland, and it currently hosts 37,000 troops. For its part, Japan has for decades served as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" off the east coast of Eurasia, and currently hosts 42,000 US soldiers.
Neither South Korea nor Japan is content to occupy forever the secondary roles they have been playing until now, auxiliary to the US. While Japan's leaders have long bemoaned Tokyo's lack of global clout in relation to the size of its economy, South Korea is also becoming increasingly assertive. There has been a generational shift in both countries, which is also fostering new foreign-policy visions. In South Korea, the younger, more nationalistic generation edging into power grew up after the Korean War (1950-53), and it sees the US - its longtime ally and protector - as the main obstacle blocking the Korean reconciliation process.
In Japan, the older generation that suffered the devastation of World War II is passing from the scene, and the younger generation feels less beholden to the US. This has created the conditions for a more independent strategic posture by both countries. Although both domestic and foreign critics of South Korea's and Japan's decisions to send 3,000 and 600 troops, respectively, to Iraq have portrayed these deployments as traditional bows to Washington, the missions more accurately reflect the fact that Seoul and Tokyo are laying the groundwork for military deployments wherever their interests may be threatened in future. In view of the fact that South Korea and Japan import the vast bulk of their oil supplies from the Middle East, Iraq represents a logical first destination.
In this regard, while South Korea's troop contingent in Iraq is bigger than Japan's, Tokyo's overall global ambitions are greater. Japan is lobbying hard for a permanent seat on the 15-member United Nations Security Council. Although nuclear capability is not a prerequisite for membership, it cannot have been lost on Japan that all five permanent members - the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France - are all declared nuclear-weapons-possessing states, and major military powers.
With both South Korea and Japan competing to emerge as major powers, the nuclear dimension also feeds into how the two nations view each other. Bilateral relations have traditionally been hostile, owing to Koreans' deep resentment of Japan's brutal occupation of the peninsula (1910-45). More recently, as South Korea has come to compete economically against Japan in vital areas such as manufactured products, consumer goods, high-tech components, cars, steel and shipbuilding, the two nations have found themselves competing in geopolitical terms. Furthermore, in view of Japan's publication in 2001 of school textbooks downplaying the Imperial Army's atrocities in Korea, Seoul fears that Tokyo is unrepentant for past misdeeds, and consequently politically untrustworthy as well.
Therefore, if Japan goes nuclear, so will South Korea, and vice versa. That does not mean that the two countries will target each other militarily; rather this reflects a competition for prestige, as has been the case with longtime allies Britain and France.
China looms in Korea's and Japan's calculations Aside from expanding their global roles, South Korea and Japan must also take into account the aspirations and destiny of China in their strategic considerations. This is much more an issue for Japan's defense planners, in view of China's emergence as a major military power and its historical distrust of Japan, rather than distrust of Korea.
Furthermore, Beijing fears that Japan would allow the US to use its bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in the Japanese archipelago to stage missions in the defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island state. Meanwhile, Japanese leaders fear that the rise of China could lead to its domination of East Asia and Southeast Asia - regions over which Japan also is seeking influence. It was such fears of China as a menacing regional superpower that prompted Ichiro Ozawa, leader of Japan's opposition Liberal Party, to warn in April 2002 that his country could quickly build thousands of nuclear weapons if Tokyo felt challenged by China. Although Ozawa is more hawkish than most Japanese politicians, calls for nuclear weapons have grown louder in recent years.
By contrast, South Korea's perception of China is more complicated. Although Beijing sided with North Korea against the South during the Korean War, Seoul has managed to forge warm ties with China, despite the fact that formal bilateral relations were only established as late as 1992. China last year overtook the United States as the biggest purchaser of South Korean exports, and Seoul is courting Beijing in the hope that the latter will use its influence over Pyongyang to improve inter-Korean relations. Many Korea-watchers believe that once Korea is reunified, the peninsula republic will gradually move into Greater China's orbit, as has been the case in past centuries. However, the recent dispute between China and South Korea over whether the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (Goguryeo) was a Chinese or a Korean entity raises the possibility that a reunified Korea may press territorial claims on parts of China's neighboring Jilin province, where up to 2 million ethnic Koreans live. That won't necessarily mean that China and Korea will become nuclear enemies, but possession of a nuclear capability may allow Seoul to speak with a louder voice in future. (It is also argued by some that China is laying the "historical" foundation to make a future territorial claim against a reunified Korea.)
US, China, would lose influence The biggest losers in the event that South Korea and Japan went nuclear would be the United States and China. The US has wielded a strong influence over South Korean and Japanese security policies over the past six decades thanks to its military presence on their territories, its provision of the nuclear umbrella, and the fact that the South Korean and Japanese militaries buy US weapons. Indeed, Seoul's decision in March 2002 to purchase 40 US F-15K fighter planes at a cost of US$4.5 billion instead of more modern European Eurofighter and French Rafale aircraft - which would have offered South Korea greater technology transfers and manufacturing opportunities - underscores the subservient nature of this relationship.
A nuclear South Korea or Japan would no longer feel the need to host so many US troops, and might ask for their withdrawal, as the government of the Philippines requested the exit of US forces stationed there in 1991. A US departure from South Korea or Japan would result in diminished political influence in the two countries. Indeed, South Korea could subsequently enter a security relationship with China in the long term, and even Japan could follow suit by bandwagoning with Beijing, if Tokyo concluded that Chinese domination over Asia was inevitable, and resistance was pointless and futile.
The United States thus would see reduced influence in one of the most economically powerful regions in the world, one that increasingly would become a major transportation hub if the Eurasian "Iron Silk Road" rail corridor linking South Korea and China (and possibly Japan, if an undersea tunnel is ever built) to European and Russia markets is developed.
Furthermore, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the grand US strategy has been aimed at preventing the emergence of a peer competitor on the world stage. While many strategic analysts now see China as filling that role, it should be recalled that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many in the US feared that Japan was the next up-and-coming superpower. While Japan's subsequent decade-long economic slump reduced such concerns, the fact remains that for some time Japan will remain one of the very few countries with the economic resources and the technological and industrial bases with which to build a first-class military. Therefore, if Japan were to go nuclear, it would raise the possibility of greater geopolitical competition with the United States itself.
For similar reasons, Beijing does not wish to see a nuclear Japan that could become a superpower rivaling what China calls its own "peaceful rise". Nor does Beijing want South Korea to develop such weapons, since this would undermine its nuclear hegemony in Northeast Asia and could prompt arch-rival Taiwan to follow suit. For Beijing, a nuclear Korea and a nuclear Japan would only be desirable in the unlikely event that the two countries moved closer to a full partnership with China and openly rejected their alliances with the United States.
Regardless of what Washington and Beijing want, and even though it is not yet inevitable, the chances that South Korea and/or Japan might go nuclear in coming years has risen substantially of late. While the US is busy fighting a global "war on terrorism", it may find that the emergence of a nuclear Northeast Asia - and the emergence of independent new powers in South Korea and Japan - does more to undermine its global hegemony than the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.
Yoel Sano has worked for publishing houses in London, providing political and economic analysis, and has been following Northeast Asia for many years.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
The chief concern is that U.S. bases in Japan might come to play a pivotal role in global U.S. military operations --
That's global as in world war.
-Am
The United States is reviewing the role of its military bases in Japan in line with its plans for global troop redeployment (or "force transformation" as the U.S. Defense Department calls it). This is raising concerns that some realignment plans involving U.S. forces stationed here might exceed the geographical and operational limits set by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi should stick to his stated position that these plans should be carried out within the framework of the treaty.
The government is not necessarily united on this issue. It is now in talks with the U.S. administration to coordinate views. Internal reviews are also under way, including discussions among the three Cabinet ministers concerned: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, and Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono.
One realignment plan calls for moving the U.S. Army's 1st Corps headquarters in the state of Washington to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. The U.S. is said to be giving top priority to this plan as an integral part of relocating 5th Air Force headquarters at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo to 13th Air Force headquarters in Guam.
U.S. officials reportedly say relocation of both headquarters is vital to the global redeployment strategy, particularly with regard to a wide, volatile region -- the so-called "arc of instability" -- that stretches from Northeast Asia all the way to the Middle East. The chief concern is that U.S. bases in Japan might come to play a pivotal role in global U.S. military operations -- a role that could go well beyond treaty provisions.
Article 6 of the pact states: "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the U.S. is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan." The government defines the Far East as areas north of the Philippines -- namely, Japan and surrounding waters, South Korea and Taiwan. According to this definition, moving 1st Corps headquarters to Camp Zama would be outside the purview of the treaty.
Foreign Minister Machimura maintains that the realignment issue should be discussed from a broader perspective that takes into account new security threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The scope of discussion will be limited, he says, if the debate is premised entirely on the security treaty, particularly the Far East clause.
Given the global reach of the U.S. strategy, Mr. Machimura's comment seems to reflect concerns that talks with the U.S. may bog down if they are held within the limits of the security treaty and the Far East clause. In the Foreign Ministry, the prevailing view is that Japan should be willing to make certain concessions in return for U.S. measures to reduce the military presence in Okinawa, such as moving the Marines to an overseas location, and allow military and civilian flights at Yokota Air Base.
Past events seem to suggest that the security treaty, especially the Far East clause, is already out of touch with reality. In 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton signed a joint security declaration redefining the role of the bilateral alliance as contributing to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The deployment of about 3,000 Marines in Okinawa to the Middle East in connection with the Iraq situation has effectively expanded the scope of the treaty.
It does not follow, however, that the treaty's stated aims should be altered implicitly in keeping with U.S. military transformation. The Japan-U.S. alliance is important, but this is not the same thing as saying that Japan should accept U.S. requests in toto. Considering the mistakes or misjudgments often made by U.S. policymakers in the past -- most recently in Iraq -- the government should not lose sight of the Japanese perspective in dealing with the U.S. realignment strategy.
To be sure, easing the excessive burden of military bases in Okinawa is an urgent necessity. It is open to question, though, whether Japan should agree to strengthening U.S. command functions here in return for reducing bases on Okinawa. In the long run, upgrading the role of U.S. forces in Japan seems unlikely to lead to the reduction of U.S. bases here.
The security alliance will change qualitatively if, in the name of building a better alliance, Japan strengthens its ties to the U.S. military strategy through the "flexible interpretation" or "redefinition" of the security treaty. This should not be allowed to happen. The question for Japan is what and how it should act to deal with new security threats and thereby promote regional and global peace in accordance with the pacifist principles of the Constitution. To this end, an in-depth debate on security policy should be conducted.
US/Japan to use force for international peacekeeping.
Little by little words of war are creeping into the security agreements of countries.
-Am
U.S., Japan to conduct joint exercises
Associated Press November 09, 2004
TOKYO — The United States and Japan will carry out joint military drills this week aimed at increasing their ability to defend against security threats, officials said Tuesday. “Exercise Keen Sword” will begin Wednesday and will involve air, ground and sea operations at U.S. and Japanese military installations throughout Japan, the 5th Air Force headquarters said in a statement released in Tokyo.
The 10-day exercise reflects the countries’ “continued commitment” to ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region and aim to, “increase the defensive readiness of Japanese and American forces,” the statement said.
The troops will practice evacuating civilians, conducting search-and-rescue operations and boosting security at military bases among other activities, the statement said.
Some 11,300 members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and 4,400 U.S. military personnel will take part in the drills, Kyodo News agency said.
Japanese troops cooperate closely with the U.S. military under a joint security treaty that has some 50,000 American troops based in this country.
The two countries recently revised a security agreement to extend the scope of their military cooperation, allowing both sides’ troops to use force when defending Japanese territory or when deployed for international peacekeeping.
The revision still has to be approved by Japan’s Parliament.
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