Strong Ties Bind Russia and Armenia at Karabakh Talks Sergei Blagov 9/14/04
As Armenia and Azerbaijan prepare for tomorrow’s presidential summit on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has begun to emphasize its own ties with Yerevan, prompting Baku to question the Kremlin’s role as an objective mediator for the conflict.
Chances for a genuine breakthrough in the September 15 talks at the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) conference in Astana, Kazakhstan are doubtful, but both Azerbaijan and Armenia are already touting their respective inclinations for peace. On September 2, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev told reporters in the province of Naxcivan, near the Armenian border, that "[t]he fact that I have not yet abandoned negotiations on Nagorno- Karabakh means that I believe in their productivity," Interfax reported. In turn, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian announced at an August 30 meeting in Prague with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov that the two sides had made progress in laying "the foundation" for the September talks, according to Interfax.
But that foundation is one that Baku believes should include Russia. In August, Azerbaijan called on the Kremlin to step up its own contributions to a Karabakh peace deal. Russia, long the region’s heavyweight, appears to be seen by Baku as a potentially influential counterweight to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose own peacemaking efforts via the tripartite Minsk Group have been the subject of much criticism from Azerbaijani parliamentarians and government officials.
When Moscow’s response to Baku’s demand came, however, it took place at a meeting with Armenia’s President Robert Kocharian -- the sixth such in the past year. At an August 20 summit in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that "Russia is ready to play a role of mediator and guarantor" in the Karabakh conflict, but noted that "[t]here have been no breakthrough decisions."
A show of Russian support could stand Armenia in good stead at the CIS talks. Speculation has recently mounted that Kocharian is prepared to return the seven Azerbaijani territories it occupies in exchange for a peace deal on Armenian-controlled Karabakh. According to one recent opinion poll, that would place Kocharian at variance with nearly half of Armenia’s population -- a delicate situation for a leader who withstood weeks of opposition protests earlier this spring. In a June 25 poll by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 45.5 percent of Armenians stated that they believe that territories seized during the 1991-1994 war with Azerbaijan should remain under Armenian control.
Meanwhile, Moscow appears ready to assist. Russia’s longtime influence in the Caucasus is already under political pressure from the US in Georgia and Azerbaijan and also under increasing economic pressure in both Georgia and Armenia from outside energy players like Iran. Even while expressing no official concern at reported US plans to establish a base in Azerbaijan, Moscow has been busy reinforcing its traditionally strong ties with Armenia.
Recent military exercises between the two longtime allies appear to have sparked the sharpest concern in Baku. At a training base not far from Yerevan on August 24-28, 1,900 Armenian and Russian troops fought back an imaginary invasion and assault on Russia’s 102nd military base at Guymri.
Despite assurances from Armenia’s army that the maneuvers are not directed against a third country, Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry has taken a different view. Voicing concern that Russia had held war games with "an aggressor state," Defense Ministry spokesman Ramiz Melikov has stated that the operations contradicted Russia’s role as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In November 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov described Armenia as Russia’s "only ally in the South."
The Russian military presence in Armenia has deep roots. A 1995 treaty gives Russia’s military base a 25-year-long presence in Armenia, while a 1997 friendship treaty provides for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat to either country. Currently, there are 2,500 Russian military personnel stationed in the country. Recent military materiel shipped to Armenia includes MiG-29 jetfighters and S300 PMU1 air defense batteries, an advanced version of the SA-10C Grumble air defense missile. Russia’s Federal Border Guard Service is also deployed to guard Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran.
Economic ties could also fuel Azerbaijani fears of favoritism toward its longtime rival. Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia for its natural gas and nuclear fuel supplies. In 2002, Russia wrote off $100 million of Armenia’s external debt in return for control of five state-run Armenian enterprises, including the Razdan thermal power plant. Russia’s state-run Unified Energy Systems power monopoly also controls Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power station and hydro-power plants under a similar debt repayment arrangement -- a deal that has placed 90 percent of Armenia’s energy system in Russian hands.
At the same time, however, divergent interests have begun to emerge, most notably with Armenia’s aspiration to limit its dependence on Russian energy supplies by building a $120 million, 141-kilometer gas pipeline from Iran to Europe. Iran reportedly has agreed to supply 36 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Armenia from 2007-2027, a plan that could undercut Russian energy companies’ own position in the Caucasus. The plan has yet to be finalized.
Such a situation would appear likely to push Russia to forge even closer links with Armenia to protect its own energy interests. If so, the bid to promote Moscow as an objective mediator could be fraught with additional difficulties.
In the meantime, with little time remaining before the summit in Astana, the Kremlin is playing its own cards carefully. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mamedyarov had little to show after an August 19 trip to Moscow to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh other than an official statement that the Kremlin recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Kocharian was treated to similarly circumspect language at his Sochi summit with Putin. Wedged between foes Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Russian leader said, is in "a very difficult geopolitical situation."
Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.
The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
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