Turkey was given the honor of infiltrating and politically influencing Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan-- the "Newly Independent States" that will be producing the oil. Turkey was chosen for this because it is considered a "reliable ally" of the U.S. and Germany--it is firmly dominated by U.S. and German imperialism and overseen by a fascist military that operates within NATO. In addition, the majority population of Turkey is closely related--by language and culture--to the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, including the peoples of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. #msg-3775550
But lately the Iraq war has been straining US-Turkey ties and Turkey has turned to Iran in some instances. #msg-3677596
In addition Azerbaijan is not that happy with Georgia. While Georgia is striving to restore control over its northern separatist province of South Ossetia, tension is brewing in its predominantly Azeri southern districts. Local residents blame the Georgian president for failing to deliver on pre-election pledges to improve social conditions in the region. The situation has sparked concerns in neighboring Azerbaijan, where voices are rising in defense of Georgia's largest Muslim minority. #msg-3641789
And Chechnya’s kavkazcenter is starting to criticize Saakashvili. Georgia: Saakashvili attacks Chechen women
Most likely, after Georgian president Saakashvili did not get too lucky in South Ossetia, he decided to show how tough he is by sending Georgian troops against Chechen women and children. http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/article.php?id=3052
Outside View: Georgia, Ukraine and the U.S. By Ira Straus A UPI Ouside View Commentary Published 8/10/2004 3:29 PM
WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 (UPI) -- Georgia's new leader, Mikhail Saakashvili, is driving his democratic revolution to the edge of an abyss, as he pushes toward military methods of bringing Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia back under Georgian control. If he continues down this path, he risks fighting with Russian peacekeeping forces, which would likely act to protect the Ossetians and Abkhaz.
Russian analysts are writing that Saakashvili hopes to get the West to place the blame on Russia, as tends to happen whenever there are conflicts on the post-Soviet space. It is a tail-wag-dog scenario, with a well-scripted place for the West. They see this as central to Saakashvili's motivation. They anticipate a gloomy set of outcomes: self-ruination for Georgian democracy, a further downturn in Russia-West relations, possibly even a military confrontation since the United States and NATO have been involving themselves in Georgia.
This would be sharply contrary to American interests in the region, and could damage U.S. interests as far afield as Ukraine, where many Westerners have been speaking dreamily of a repeat of the Georgian scenario.
Southern Ossetians would rather be a part of a Russian federation, as their Northern Ossetian compatriots are, than of a nationalist Georgia, which already in the early '90s alienated its minorities by its attempts at enforced
centralization. Abkhazia has also asked for incorporation into the Russian Federation. Peaceful reunification of Georgia is possible only with Russia's help, which was forthcoming in Ajaria but would require compromises with
legitimate local and Russian interests in the other territories.
The outcome will shape not only Russia's relation with Georgia but its view of the Ukrainian elections which are coming up on Oct. 31. The Georgian "Rose Revolution" is often depicted as a model or inspiration for other ex-Soviet Republics, particularly for Ukraine. Russians will evaluate this model in their own way.
The better the Georgian revolution evolves in practice and in its dealings with Russia, the better the attitude of Russians will be toward Yushenko, who is typically assigned the role of the Saakashvili of Ukraine. But if Saakashvili continues down lines of confrontation and exacerbation of Georgian nationalism -- lines being compared in Russia to the first Georgian democrat-president, Gamsakhurdia -- then it will sour Russians not only on him but on Yushenko. And it will sour not only Russians but millions of Ukrainians, who would dread a similar downward spiral in relations with
Russia. We should bear in mind that a large majority of Ukrainians are pro-Russian: The personal ties are intimate, and a pro-Russian image has been the key to winning presidential elections in Ukraine.
The interest of the U.S. is for the positive variant to succeed: for Georgia to build a good relation with Russia, and for Russia and pro-Russian Ukrainians to take a more hopeful view of Yushenko. One Russian business newspaper has called, wistfully, for a reconsideration of Yushenko as potentially a good thing because a domestic reformer. Other Russians have argued that Yushenko has already lost and backed himself into an anti-Russian cul de sac where he cannot get much more than his 25 percent core vote.
The United States has placed considerable stakes on Yushenko and on Saakashvili. The U.S. also has stakes in Russia -- far greater stakes, in fact.
These three U.S. stakes are rapidly becoming incompatible. The United States will have to act to keep them from blowing up in its face. And if it fails to act, then it will be forced by unpleasant realities to realize in the end that its primary stake is in Russia anyway.
The United States can keep its several stakes compatible only if it takes major steps to get its favorites -- Saakashvili and Yushenko -- to act and speak in a more sober, reliable manner toward Russia. In particular:
-- State publicly that the U.S. is opposed to any use of force in restoring Georgian sovereign control over Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia. Show we are serious about this: put the onus on Georgia for its recent missteps, and specify consequences that would flow from further use of force on Georgia's initiative.
-- Consider deals among the U.S., Russia, and Georgia, to reconcile their interests: a. a two-way deal -- the U.S. stops opposing Russian bases in Georgia; Russia stops opposing U.S. forces and bases there. Cooperation among these bases; ultimately perhaps a joint base under NATO-Russia Council auspices.
A three-way deal could be Russia helps restore Georgian sovereign authority in Ossetia and Abkhazia (making possible peaceful reunion as in Ajaria), Georgia agrees to permanent autonomy arrangements for these territories and -- to guarantee their autonomy -- continued Russian bases there, and/or Russia agrees to Georgia's right to have U.S. and NATO bases.
-- Tell Russia that, if Yushenko is elected the United States would act similarly to make sure he would work with Russia. Say -- honestly -- that the door of NATO remains open to Ukraine and Russia alike, not just Ukraine. Make clear to Yushenko that United States support depends on avoiding any further
anti-Russian appeals.
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(Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
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