By September I'd figured out that a monopsony buyer might turn the tables on the 'seller' if rationality trumped executive ego - see link below - but nobody here was interested. (I got out of the bet even - timing is always the problem with puts.) It seemed advisable - - but I'm no M&A lawyer - for Roche to make an exploding offer: every month you delay accepting, the offer drops by x%. That may be what happens next, but without the explicit threat it's less effective.
Q: Which of the following is the most like outcome?
a) Roche’s tender fails to obtain enough shares to continue with a merger, Roche withdraws the offer, and the companies return to business as usual.
b) Roche’s tender obtains enough shares to force a shareholder vote, shareholders vote in favor of the $86.50 price, and a ‘hostile’ merger is consummated at $86.50.
c) Roche’s tender obtains enough shares to force a shareholder vote, but DNA and Roche agree to a ‘friendly’ merger at a price higher than $86.50.