Turkey warms up to the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds as support by U.S. for autonomy has faded
This excerpt from the previous post is a misconception regarding Turkey’s stance on autonomy for the Kurds.
Alani says it is not only Iraqi Shi'ite and Sunni Arabs who are opposed to Kurdish autonomy goals. Neighboring Turkey, Iran and Syria are against the move as well, as they have sizeable Kurdish minorities with limited civil rights. Turkey already maintains two military bases in northern Iraq, one of which is in the heart of Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan's largest city. Kurdish politicians have repeatedly demanded that the Turkish army leave, but the Turkish government has refused to pull the forces out. Last year the Turkish parliament voted to invade Iraq if Kurds there declared independence. #msg-3311183
Turkish Kurd rebels announced last week that they would end a unilateral five-year ceasefire with Ankara as of June 1, warning foreigners against coming to Turkey. However, Turkey is reaching out to Kurds in both Iraq and Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds are responding in that they will not allow Turkish Kurd rebels hiding in northern Iraq to use the enclave as a launch pad for attacks on neighboring Turkey.
Turkey warms up to the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds as support by U.S. for autonomy has faded
Is Turkey's policy towards Iraq changing? 06.10.2004 Thursday
The Iraqi interim government that is expected to take over sovereignty from the occupation authority, and lead the country to democratic elections next year was announced in Baghdad last week. When Adnan Pachachi turned down the offer to become the president of Iraq on the grounds that he had been presented to the public as Americans' favorite, Ghazi al-Yawar who is a Georgetown University graduate and belongs to a Sunni Arab tribe, was appointed to the largely ceremonial post.
Iyad Allawi, who was appointed prime minister has the following qualifications: He is a Shiite Arab who was originally a passionate supporter of the Saddam regime, later worked for the American and British intelligence services for a long time, holds a British passport, and is known as an enemy of Ahmad Chalabi. In the meantime, Chalabi, who at the start of things was Pentagon's favorite for Iraq's leadership, now stands accused not only of supplying misinformation to the Bush administration in order to get the US to attack Iraq, but also for working on behalf of Iran.
The new interim government was formed by United Nations envoy [Lakhdar] Brahimi apparently in line with the preferences of Washington. Even though there are deep suspicions as to the extent of its would be sovereignty, and acceptance by the people of Iraq, the new Iraqi administration's success will, nevertheless, be in the interest of all concerned. We can therefore expect that Ankara will provide all support to the new government short of troop deployment (rejected by all Iraqis) to help neighboring Iraq to achieve stability and protect its integrity under a representative government. Securing Iraq's territorial integrity, and avoiding a civil war among ethnic and religious groups which would inevitably drag neighboring countries into it is certainly Turkey's top priority regarding Iraq. If, however, this is the top priority, Ankara needs to see that Iraq's territorial integrity can only be secured in the context of a loose federal structure that protects the rights of all ethnic and religious groups. I believe that the AKP government is aware of the fact that imposition of the Turkish model on Iraq as once suggested by the Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal would be tantamount to subverting the very foundations of that country.
I asked the other day Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul if the AKP government's policy towards Iraq is any different than those followed by previous governments. After emphasizing that the protection of Iraq's territorial integrity is a must for the interest of all parties in Iraq, Mr. Gul said that "The restructuring of Iraq cannot be considered independently of the realities on the ground." Mr Gul, reiterated that Ankara will maintain equal distance with all the ethnic and religious groups in Iraq who are all relatives, also said that the AKP government had given up the policy of "remote control" of the Turkmen community in Iraq, having realized that this policy hampered the emergence of real leaders for the community.
The signs that Turkey is basing its Iraq policy on more realistic and rational foundations are on the rise. A report by Hugh Pope and Bill Spindle published in the WSJ on May 19, carries the headline, "Turkey warms up to the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds." According to the report, Turkish officials say Ankara could suggest a kind of protection for Iraqi Kurds in order to avert an influx of refugees, and to keep other problems away from Turkey's borders should the U.S. relinquish its control over Iraq. It is apparent that the danger of establishment of an Islamist regime in Iraq scares both Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. One of the Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) leaders, Necirvan Barzani, says: "Turkey has changed its policy. The Turkish government speaks to us in a more useful and logical language. We would like to talk the language of business, not fear… We prefer Turkey over the others." It is possible that both parties are increasingly aware of the fact that they need each other.
By SELCUK GOKOLUK Reuters News Service Thursday, June 10, 2004 - Page A18
ANKARA -- Former Nobel Peace Prize nominee Leyla Zana and three other Kurdish activists were freed from a Turkish jail yesterday in a move that was hailed by the European Union, which had warned their detention could wreck Turkey's EU bid.
The former members of parliament walked free after serving 10 years of a 15-year sentence for links to Kurdish rebel guerrillas.
They were mobbed by hundreds of ecstatic supporters singing, dancing, waving Kurdish flags and hurling flowers. Ms. Zana, small and bespectacled, was briefly knocked over in the melee.
"At this point, this country has entered a new era. It has turned a new page," she told a hastily assembled news conference. "My wish is for everyone to set aside their disputes and to solve our problems hand in hand."
The European Commission, which had warned Turkey that the continued detention of the four could harm its drive to join the EU, hailed the appeals court decision to release Ms. Zana, Hatip Dicle, Selim Sadak and Orhan Dogan.
The ruling, which frees the foursome pending appeal, coincided with historic first Kurdish-language broadcasts on state television, and the start of an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights on the fate of jailed Kurdish rebel chief Abdullah Ocalan.
"Turkey's 80-year ban on the Kurds is over today," Sirri Sakik, another Kurdish former lawmaker, told Reuters outside Ankara's Ulucanlar prison before the release.
Guenter Verheugen, the EU's Enlargement Commissioner, said in a statement: "Today's decision is a sign that the implementation of political reforms, which Turkey has been introducing in the past two years, is gaining ground."
The commission trusted the retrial would be fair and the verdict would reflect sound legal principles, Mr. Verheugen added.
Ms. Zana carries great symbolic importance both for supporters and those who see her as threatening Turkish unity.
For decades, Turkey denied the very existence of its Kurdish minority, estimated to be 12 million strong. Courts came down hard on expressions of Kurdish identity, especially after armed separatism emerged in 1984.
The EU sees Ms. Zana and the other three as prisoners of conscience. They were jailed in 1994 for ties to Kurdish guerrillas, a verdict upheld in April by another court in a retrial ordered by the European Court of Human Rights.
"Their verdict has not been overturned. But taking into account their long imprisonment, a decision was made for their release pending the end of the investigation," a court official said, adding that the retrial would start on July 8.
Ankara is working flat out on political and human-rights improvements, hoping they will help win a firm start date for accession talks when EU leaders meet in December. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said the reform drive had laid the foundations of a sound legal system, opening the way for the releases and capping the drive to fulfill EU political criteria.
"Honestly, with these changes we really achieved a critical mass," Mr. Gul said in an interview.
In May, the government abolished the controversial state security courts under which the newly released Kurds were tried, and is working to set up new civilian structures to replace them.
Ms. Zana and the others were convicted at the height of a separatist conflict waged by Kurdish guerrillas seeking an ethnic homeland in southeastern Turkey.
Kurds Say Support by U.S. for Autonomy Has Faded By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
Published: June 11, 2004
ASHINGTON, June 10 — Before the war to oust Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration counted on the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq as its closest ally. But now ties with the Kurds have reached a bitter new phase, with some Kurdish leaders charging that they have been betrayed by Washington.
The problem, in the Kurds' view, was reflected in an administration decision this week to rebuff Kurdish pleas to have the United Nations Security Council give its blessing to the temporary Iraqi constitution, which they see as protecting their rights.
Kurds value the document because it gives the three Kurdish provinces the effective power to veto a permanent constitution, which is to be written next year. They fear that the Shiite majority may try to impose Islamic law through the new constitution, or dilute Kurdish control of oil fields in their region.
"It's not just that we have been misled by the Americans," said a high-ranking Kurdish official. "It's also that they change their position day to day without any focus on real strategy in Iraq. There's a level of mismanagement and incompetence that is shocking."
The temporary constitution, hammered out under American supervision in March, was hailed by the American authorities at the time as one that would prevail until a new constitution is written and ratified and a permanent government takes office under its provisions.
But Iraq's new leaders, in statements this week, described it as only operative until the beginning of next year, when a newly elected national assembly convenes to write the permanent charter.
Iraq's new prime minister, Iyad Allawi, who was picked under a process led by the United Nations, said in Baghdad that the document approved last March remains the law of the land for now. His comment was intended to reassure Kurds, but Kurdish spokesmen said Thursday that it may have had the opposite effect.
The reason is that Dr. Allawi's comments implied that the newly elected national assembly could well change the ratification process for the permanent constitution, endangering the Kurds' veto.
The omission of references in the Security Council resolution to the temporary constitution, known as the transitional administrative law, came at the insistence of the supreme Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Kurds, stunned at the omission, are threatening to withdraw from any Iraqi government unless the temporary constitution is reaffirmed through next year.
Ayatollah Sistani, the most revered figure among Iraq's Shiites, who constitute about 60 percent of the population, has gained enormous power in the waning months of the American occupation, which formally ends in two and a half weeks.
Administration officials say they have had no choice but to follow his dictates. When he called for an end to the American offensive against Shiite rebels in Najaf, American military commanders complied, even lifting their order for the arrest of a rebel leader, Moktada al-Sadr.
In the end, the officials say, Kurds are going to have to make their own arrangements with the Shiites for ratifying the constitution.
"The Kurds are saying to us, `We are your true allies, the only people in Iraq who truly like you and who respect your values.' " said Noah Feldman, a New York University law professor who advised on the drafting of the temporary constitution.
"The U.S. is saying, though maybe not explicitly, `We want you to have power, but if Sistani is going to put his name on a letter to the U.N. demanding things be done his way, we're not going to go to the mat over it," Mr. Feldman added. "Frankly, the U.S. is a little scared of Sistani."
Another former adviser to the American occupation, Larry Diamond, said the problem stemmed not from Ayatollah Sistani's position, but from the original demand by the Kurds that they be given an effective veto over a future constitution.
"I am profoundly sympathetic to the concerns of the Kurds, but I think they overreached in these negotiations," said Mr. Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. "They wound up obtaining a settlement that was unsustainable in light of continuing Shiite objections."
Mr. Diamond said the United States should try to negotiate some kind of a deal between the Shiites and Kurds to avoid a worse confrontation later.
He added that it was possible that without such an arrangement, Shiite religious leaders would press the new Iraqi government to take other steps to change the law, including a repeal of a ban on extending Islamic law to such matters as marriage and divorce.
"We have a budding crisis here," said Mr. Diamond. "My fear is that if we don't get a broad societal consensus behind this document, the whole thing could unravel down the road. I would rather fix it now with a compromise."
Responding to Kurdish criticism, Richard A. Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said Wednesday that the failure to include the transitional law in the United Nations resolution was insignificant, because the resolution endorsed the law's principles of pluralism and minority rights in general.
"What the resolution did was stick to the basic principles that are embodied in that law," Mr. Boucher said.
American officials deny that they betrayed the Kurds and reject the idea that American diplomats should try to mediate a solution to Iraqi federalism.
Rather, they said, the United States had created a situation where the Kurds will have to negotiate their future with supporters of Ayatollah Sistani, and seek their own accommodations.
"This is going to become the first big test of the government in Iraq," said a United Nations diplomat. "You've got a government. Now let's see how much internal and external pressure they can take."
March 28, 1988 -- Uses chemical weapons against Kurdish town of Halabja, killing estimated 5,000 civilians.
[From Iraq's first use of chemical weapons in 1983, the U.S. took a very restrained view. When the evidence of Iraqi use of these weapons could no longer be denied, the U.S. issued a mild condemnation, but made clear that this would have no effect on commercial or diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. Iran asked the Security Council to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use, but the U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to try to prevent a resolution from coming to a vote, or else to abstain. An Iraqi official told the U.S. that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution and did not want any specific country identified as responsible for chemical weapons use. On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. (Battle.)
At the same time that the U.S. government had knowledge of that the Iraqi military was using chemical weapons, it was providing intelligence and planning assistance to the Iraqi armed forces. (Patrick Tyler, "Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq In War Despite Use Of Gas," New York Times, Aug. 18, 2002, p. 1.)
When Iraq used chemical weapons in March 1988 against Halabja, there was no condemnation from Washington. (Dilip Hiro, " which at least 50,000 and possibly 100,000," The Observer, September 1, 2002, p. 17.) "In September 1988, the House of Representatives voted 388 to 16 in favor of economic sanctions against Iraq, but the White House succeeded in having the Senate water down the proposal. In exchange for Export-Import Bank credits, Iraq merely had to promise not to use chemical weapons again, with agricultural credits exempted even from this limited requirement." (Rubin, "The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War," p. 261.)]
Kurds seek justice for '88 gassing
Posted on Fri, Jun. 25, 2004
People in Halabja would like to host the trial of 'Chemical Ali,' the man many say gave the order to gas the Kurdish town 16 years ago.
BY MARK McDONALD
Knight Ridder News Service
HALABJA, Iraq - Nobody's sure what kind of nerve gas was in that first bomb, the one that flattened the House of Charity mosque. It collapsed the dome and toppled the minaret, and within minutes hundreds of townspeople were twitching and blistering to death in the dust of Mokhtar Street.
About 5,000 people -- more than half of them children -- died in Halabja on that warm Wednesday morning on March 16, 1988. On that day, Saddam Hussein's air force was nothing if not thorough.
The terrible clouds of sarin, cyanide and mustard gas caught up with 15,000 other Halabja residents, blistering their skin and lungs, unwiring their nervous systems or forever clouding their minds. Even today, this little Kurdish hill town is full of the slow, the blind, the lame and the halt.
The chemical attack on Halabja was a principal reason cited by the U.S. administration for going to war in Iraq.
There is also widespread sentiment for sleepy little Halabja, a farming town in northeastern Iraq, to host the war-crimes trial of Ali Hassan al Majid. The former general, a cousin of Hussein's, is widely believed to have ordered the attack on Halabja, earning himself the nickname ``Chemical Ali.'
ALLEGED KEY MAN
Majid is accused of helping orchestrate the Anfal campaign of terrorism that killed an estimated 132,000 people in northern Iraq in 1988, almost all of them Kurds and Turkmens. Majid, who was captured last August, was the king of spades in the coalition's deck of cards of most-wanted Iraqis.
Halabja, with a population of 53,000, is too small and remote to handle a full-blown trial for Hussein. But with some preparations, local officials think it could hold the Chemical Ali trial. They've petitioned the Iraqi government to be the venue.
The people along Mokhtar Street -- the shopkeepers, the idlers, the workmen, the fruit-cart vendors -- remember the day quite clearly.
The Iran-Iraq war was under way, and about 1,400 Iranian troops had taken over Halabja three days earlier. It was an easy march for them across the border, just eight miles away. Large numbers of pro-Iranian guerrilla fighters -- the renowned Kurdish peshmerga -- also had taken shelter in the town.
All this movement had put Halabja in harm's way.
People grew nervous when some low-flying Iraqi airplanes began to circle the town slowly around 10 a.m. They were puzzled when crewmen in the planes began tossing out scraps of white paper.
'They were gauging the wind,' said Muhammad Amin Hassan, 54, who's still working the same job, as the security guard at the primary school. ``A little later, the first bomb went directly into the mosque.
``People were dying all up and down the street. It was like they had suddenly fallen asleep. Cows and dogs died. All the hens, too.'
LIKE A HEAVY FOG
More bombs followed, some of them detonating in great bursts in midair, others exploding on impact. The gases hugged the ground like a heavy fog and seeped into wells, basements and bomb shelters.
Some of the planes dumped chemicals directly from their cargo doors, and Hassan remembered they looked 'quite beautiful' as they fell to earth.
``It was like snow. But it was blue. Blue snow. When it hit your clothes it burned right through them. It boiled your skin. It ate your flesh.'
Hassan and his wife gathered their eight children and began running into the foothills of the Shenearwea mountains on the Iranian border.
'I was blinded; my eyes were burning,' Hassan said. ``We were all holding hands. The 10 of us were strung together in a chain. Holding hands, that's how we ran up the mountain.'
As he ran, he said, he kept tripping over dead villagers who had dropped in their tracks, felled by the gas.
MEDICAL PROBLEMS
Along with many other Halabja residents, Hassan and his family made it to Iran, where they received medical aid, food and shelter. They stayed about two months, then warily went back home.
Today, Hassan can make out only shapes and colors, and the pupil of his right eye is clotted and gray. His family has had all sorts of medical problems, which they attribute to the gassing, but Hassan is saddest about his son, Ohmed, who was a third-grader at the time.
'The chemicals disturbed him very much,' the father said, his milky eyes brimming with tears. ``He has lost all his senses.'
History From 1973-75, the United States, Iran, and Israel supported a Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. Documents examined by the U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence "clearly show that the President, Dr. Kissinger and the [Shah] hoped that our clients [the Kurds] would not prevail. They preferred instead that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap [Iraqi] resourcesY. This policy was not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise." Then, in 1975, the Shah and Saddam Hussein of Iraq signed an agreement giving Iran territorial concessions in return for Iran's closing its border to Kurdish guerrillas. Teheran and Washington promptly cut off their aid to the Kurds and, while Iraq massacred the rebels, the United States refused them asylum. Kissinger justified this U.S. policy in closed testimony: "covert action should not be confused with missionary work." (U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence, 19 Jan. 1976 [Pike Report] in Village Voice, 16 Feb. 1976, pp. 85, 87n465, 88n471. The Pike Report attributes the last quote only to a "senior official"; William Safire, Safire's Washington, New York: Times Books, 1980, p. 333, identifies the official as Kissinger.)]
March 28, 1988 -- Uses chemical weapons against Kurdish town of Halabja, killing estimated 5,000 civilians.
[From Iraq's first use of chemical weapons in 1983, the U.S. took a very restrained view. When the evidence of Iraqi use of these weapons could no longer be denied, the U.S. issued a mild condemnation, but made clear that this would have no effect on commercial or diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. Iran asked the Security Council to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use, but the U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to try to prevent a resolution from coming to a vote, or else to abstain. An Iraqi official told the U.S. that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution and did not want any specific country identified as responsible for chemical weapons use. On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. (Battle.)
At the same time that the U.S. government had knowledge of that the Iraqi military was using chemical weapons, it was providing intelligence and planning assistance to the Iraqi armed forces. (Patrick Tyler, "Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq In War Despite Use Of Gas," New York Times, Aug. 18, 2002, p. 1.)
When Iraq used chemical weapons in March 1988 against Halabja, there was no condemnation from Washington. (Dilip Hiro, " which at least 50,000 and possibly 100,000," The Observer, September 1, 2002, p. 17.) "In September 1988, the House of Representatives voted 388 to 16 in favor of economic sanctions against Iraq, but the White House succeeded in having the Senate water down the proposal. In exchange for Export-Import Bank credits, Iraq merely had to promise not to use chemical weapons again, with agricultural credits exempted even from this limited requirement." (Rubin, "The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War," p. 261.)]
Aug. 2, 1990 -- Invades Kuwait.
[The chronology omits one of Saddam Hussein's most egregious atrocities, his Anfal campaign against the Kurds from 1987-89, in which at least 50,000 and possibly 100,000 Kurds were systematically slaughtered. (Middle East Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993.)
The response of the new Bush administration was to increase Iraq's commodity credits from half a billion to a billion dollars, making it the second largest user of the credit program in the world. As late as April 1990, the administration was opposing sanctions against Iraq ("They would hurt U.S. exporters and worsen our trade deficit," said the State Department). (Guy Gugliotta, Charles R. Babcock, and Benjamin Weiser, "At War, Iraq Courted U.S. Into Economic Embrace," Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1990, p. A1.) The administration also blocked efforts to cut back high-tech exports to Iraq with obvious military applications. (Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush insisted on aiding Iraq until war's onset," Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 23, 1992, p. 17.) And the United States was providing intelligence data to Iraq until three months before the invasion. (Murray Waas, Douglas Frantz, "U.S. shared intelligence with Iraq until 3 months before invasion of Kuwait," Houston Chronicle, March 10, 1992, p. A6.)]
Many dedicated anti-war campaigners, for years have tried to stop the American and British governments from supplying Saddam with the tools of his oppression. - Pilger
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