WPR: Gates Trip to China Fails to Achieve Major Objectives
Richard Weitz | Bio | 29 Nov 2007 World Politics Review Exclusive
U.S. officials established several key objectives for Defense Secretary Robert Gates' week-long visit to East Asia earlier this month. It now appears that, at least with respect to China, the trip failed to achieve its key goals.
During his Nov. 4-6 stay in Beijing, Gates held a 90-minute conference with Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, a shorter meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, and additional sessions with other Chinese officials and journalists. Although Gates had visited China before, this was his first official trip since becoming Secretary of Defense last November.
One of Gates' major objectives was to induce the Chinese government to increase information-sharing regarding its defense plans and policies. The United States and other countries have repeatedly urged Beijing to make its military budget, planning, and other activities more transparent in order to minimize misunderstandings related to China's defense programs.
At a Pentagon news conference prior to his departure, Gates simultaneously denied that China presented an immediate military threat to the United States, and stressed that "I have concerns with a variety of the military programs they have under way -- developmental programs. I have concerns with the lack of transparency. Those are the issue we will be talking about in addition to the ways we can strengthen the relationship."
Although the Chinese government's declared annual military spending is $45 billion, this figure excludes expenditures on nuclear weapons, foreign weapons imports, paramilitary forces, military-related R&D, and other defense items -- leaving foreign analysts to offer their own diverse estimates.
During their meetings with Gates, Chinese officials repeated the argument articulated in their latest defense white paper, that China's surging defense budget is primarily due to the country's economic growth, which has enabled the government to pay for necessary improvements in troop pay and living conditions. The paper also stresses Beijing's need to keep pace with other countries that are modernizing their respective militaries. An issue of particular concern to Washington is why the Chinese government decided, for the first time earlier this year, to destroy one of its own satellites. Some U.S. analysts fear that the move implied a Chinese desire to blind U.S. space-based sensors in a future confrontation, hindering any American military response to Chinese aggression against an Asian U.S. ally. Others interpret the act more benignly -- as a Chinese attempt to induce the Bush administration to accede to Beijing's call for an international agreement against the militarization of space.
An unnamed senior U.S. defense official explained to reporters that, "We are still looking for the kind of the response from the Chinese that really helps us understand why they did it." He added that, "We also don't have a clear idea that they understand the kinds of level of concern that we and other space-faring nations have as a result of that test."
Notwithstanding Gates' entreaties, the Chinese refused to explain the reasons for their anti-satellite test. When asked about the issue at a joint news conference with Cao, Gates tersely replied that, "I raised our concerns about it, and there was no further discussion."
Another ill-received agenda item on Gates' China trip was to realize longstanding American efforts to establish a hotline between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to supplement their program of reciprocal military visits and other bilateral exchanges. U.S. policymakers aim to avoid another incident like the 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese warplane, which froze defense engagement between the two countries during much of the first Bush administration. They also seek to avert even more potentially disruptive situations, such as occurred last October when a Chinese submarine unexpectedly surfaced within five miles of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk.
Beijing remains unenthusiastic about allowing direct communications between the Chinese and American national defense communities. Their existing international hotlines link civilian political leaders. In March of this year, however, the Chinese told the visiting then-Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, that they decided to accept the American proposal. At the June Shangri-La security conference in Singapore, Chinese Gen. Zhang Qinshen announced that he would fly to Washington in September to finalize the arrangement. However, that month passed without any further progress on the issue.
In his joint press conference with Gates, Gen. Cao again reaffirmed Beijing's agreement "in principal" to establish a direct communications link between the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense, but described the next step as simply "urg[ing] the relevant departments to press ahead with the technical consultations and preparations so that the agreement can be finalized," without giving a specific timeline.
The Americans had also hoped to use the Gates visit to at least sustain existing Sino-American military exchanges. Last year, warships from both navies conducted simple search-and-rescue exercises. In addition, Chinese vessels conducted port calls at U.S. naval bases in Pearl Harbor and San Diego. At the news conference, Cao would only say that Chinese and American ships intended to conduct more complex exercises "at an appropriate time." In subsequent weeks, however, Chinese officials, perhaps angered by the prominent meetings offered the Dalai Lama in Washington, refused to grant several U.S. military vessels the right to enter Hong Kong, which normally is open to American naval visits.
Gates and other members of the Bush administration also sought to reassure Beijing that Washington would continue to oppose the current Taiwanese government's desire to gain international recognition as a sovereign country. Whatever Gates said was not entirely convincing to Gen. Cao, since the latter subsequently warned that, "The Chinese government will act in accordance with the anti-secession law to take any necessary actions to maintain the unification of the country and safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits."
Gates' final major objective in China was to convince Beijing to toughen its opposition to Iran's nuclear program. Recognizing that one reason for the good relationship between Beijing and Tehran was China's dependence on Iranian oil (Iran is China's third-largest oil supplier after Angola and Saudi Arabia), Gates tried to argue that Iran's current role as a "destabilizing force" in the Persian Gulf threatened China's energy interests in the region: "If one is interested in long-term energy security, then a stable Persian Gulf, Middle East area is a very high priority."
Although Chinese Foreign Ministry officials said that Beijing and Washington "both believe Iran should not have nuclear weapons," they maintained that the way to prevent such as development was through "dialogue and negotiation" rather than additional sanctions. A clearly disappointed American defense official told reporters anonymously that, "Just talking hasn't gotten us very far with Iran."
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a WPR contributing editor.
Photo: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates reviews Chinese troops with Chinese Minister of Defense Gen. Cao Gangchuan during a military welcome ceremony in Beijing, Nov. 5 (Defense Dept. photo by Cherie A. Thurlby)
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