More history: NATO-Russia charter 1997 was “forced step,” said Yeltsin
"I'm old enough to remember after the Berlin wall fell, how thrilled the Russkies were to try on a pair of Levi's and be introduced to the horrors of our major fast food chains along with Harley-Davidson bikes, John Deere and Caterpillar tractors. It was an act of good faith.. Our space programs even worked together...... Don't be so sure that once Putin is wiped from the game board that it can't happen again."
And i'm old enough to remember all of that on reading yours. Whether i could have put it as well as you did is another question. A question, by memory, of some 25 more years. LOLs
U.S. President Bill Clinton shakes hands with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during the signing ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris on May 27, 1997, as French President Jacques Chirac looks on. (Luke Frazza, AFP/Getty Images)
Partnership for Peace alternative, which included Russia and Ukraine, only a holding pattern
NATO enlargement waited for Clinton and Yeltsin re-elections 1996
Clinton’s parallel tracks of NATO enlargement and Russia engagement depended on Yeltsin personally, often collided, often won cooperation
Washington, D.C., July 9, 2024 - Hailed at the time as an historic change “burying” a Cold War rivalry, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 was privately characterized as a “forced step” by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who told U.S. President Bill Clinton that he opposed NATO expansion but saw no alternative to signing the accord. Yeltsin’s blunt admission is one of several revelations from a new set of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive to mark the NATO 75th Anniversary Summit in Washington.
The documents show that the Clinton administration’s policy in the 1990s emphasizing two tracks of both NATO enlargement and Russian engagement often collided, leaving lasting scars on Yeltsin, who constantly sought what he called partnership with the U.S. But as early as fall 1994, according to the documents, the Partnership for Peace alternative security structure for Europe, which included both Russia and Ukraine, was de-emphasized by U.S. policymakers, who only delayed NATO enlargement until both Clinton and Yeltsin could get through their re-elections in 1996.
Yeltsin and his foreign minister in 1997, Yevgeny Primakov, provided the Americans neither the “grudging endorsement” of NATO expansion that the U.S. hoped for nor even the “acquiescence” that subsequent American memoirs claimed. Rather, as Yeltsin told Clinton personally at Helsinki in March 1997: “Our position has not changed. It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward. But I need to take steps to alleviate the negative consequences of this for Russia. I am prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO, not because I want to but because it is a forced step. There is no other solution for today.”
The newly declassified documents also show that Yeltsin and his top officials continued to cooperate with NATO on more flexible arrangements under the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) even while NATO was bombing Belgrade during the Kosovo crisis of March-April 1999.
These newly published records come from the Clinton Presidential Library and are the result of Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests filed by the Archive and other researchers and a successful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit brought by the Archive against the State Department to open the files of Strobe Talbott, who was a top adviser on Russian affairs (1992-1993) and Deputy Secretary of State (1994-2001) during the Clinton administration.
The documents include internal National Security Council memos read and annotated by President Clinton, never-before-published notes from Vice President Al Gore’s dramatic face-to-face session with Yeltsin in his hospital suite in December 1994 (the “spaceships docking” conversation), Talbott’s detailed “framework” memos from 1996, including direct quotes from Primakov and his deputy Yuri Mamedov, a candid British assessment from 2000 of Moscow’s attitudes towards NATO enlargement, and Talbott’s conclusion that a second wave of NATO expansion would actually be easier under Vladimir Putin.
For thousands of additional declassified documents covering U.S.-Russian relations in the 1990s, see the new reference collection in the Digital National Security Archive series published by ProQuest and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, U.S.-Russia Relations: From the Fall of the Soviet Union to the Rise of Putin, 1991-2000 .. https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/63 . These documents provide essential historical context on the primary challenges facing NATO today: addressing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and working out new European security arrangements that would help to prevent such conflicts in the future.
This research was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
The Documents
Document 1 Cable from Secretary of State to U.S. Mission NATO, “Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting with NATO SYG Manfred Woerner, March 3, 1993” Mar 6, 1993 Source: Clinton Presidential Library. Mandatory Review 2016-0118-M1
The Secretary General of NATO visits Washington on March 1-3, 1993, early in the Clinton administration, and meets with President Clinton, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. This cable summarizing the Christopher-Woerner conversation is declassified in full and gives good insight into the topics that Woerner discussed with the President and the National Security Adviser. The NATO SYG had three major items on the agenda: calling a NATO summit for the fall of 1993, strengthening NATO outreach to East Europeans, and asking for more money from the United States for NATO infrastructure and travel funds for North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) members.
Woerner reminded Christopher that President George H. W. Bush used a NATO summit in May 1989 to establish his leadership and that it would be good for the Clinton administration to hold a NATO summit to “determine the course of NATO’s development.” The main idea behind the need for the NATO summit is the future security arrangements in Europe at a time when many people questioned the rationale for NATO’s existence after the Cold War. Woerner encourages Christopher to look more closely at the East European countries and to think about how to integrate them into European security structures. This cable is one of the first documents from the Clinton administration that explicitly raises the issue of NATO expansion: “Woerner urged the Secretary to start considering possible timeframes, candidates and criteria for membership expansion.” He says that East European leaders are less concerned about the military threat from Russia and rather hope that “NATO membership can help stave off the return of authoritarian forces” in their own countries.
Woerner is pessimistic about CSCE
[ Insert: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a key element of the détente process during the Cold War. Although it did not have the force of a treaty, it recognized the boundaries of postwar Europe and established a mechanism for minimizing political and military tensions between East and West and improving human rights in the Communist Bloc. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conference_on_Security_and_Co-operation_in_Europe ]
and thinks that it would not survive. In his telling, East European leaders “had more trust in NATO than CSCE, since NATO is an organization with power.” To integrate Eastern Europe, Woerner believes the U.S should provide more funding for travel and per diem for visits from NACC representatives and other outreach and cooperative activities.
What is strangely not mentioned in this conversation is Woerner’s and other NATO representatives’ very active interaction and cooperation with Russian representatives throughout 1992 and Woerner’s assurances to his Russian counterparts regarding NATO’s sensitivities about Russian security concerns (see previously published documents: Document 1, in “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” and Document 1 in “The Short-Lived NATO-Russia Honeymoon”) regarding possible NATO expansion.
Document 2 John Podesta/Todd Stern to the President, “NSC Memos for Meeting with Secretary Christopher,” Attached: Anthony Lake to the President: “The NATO Summit and Europe’s East” Oct 19, 1993 Source: Clinton Presidential Library, Mandatory Review 2015-0772-M
[...]
The debate results in a compromise by the NSC Principals Committee: on the one hand, a NATO statement of principle that NATO will expand (but without specific criteria or a timetable), and on the other hand, a “Partnership for Peace” that would engage all of the “new and aspiring democracies in Europe’s east” in an “evolutionary movement” towards full NATO membership. The core reasoning, according to Lake’s memo: “All your advisers agree that doing anything at this stage to indicate that NATO’s border will move closer to Russia and Ukraine without at the same time including those two states would have major negative consequences within both. That could, inter alia, make the Central Europeans less secure.”
President Clinton approved this memo with a handwritten “OK.”
When Secretary of State Warren Christopher briefed Russian president Boris Yeltsin on the Partnership for Peace a week later, Yeltsin called it “genius,” thinking that the Partnership was instead of expansion, while the Americans considered it a precursor.
[...]
Almost exactly a year after the Principals agreed to the October 1993 compromise, this policy paper from the NSC staff, led by Anthony Lake and addressed to the Principals, shows that the NATO expanders are now in charge of U.S. policy, not the Defense Department proponents of the Partnership for Peace. The title of the paper, “Moving Toward NATO Expansion,” belies the subsequent rhetoric about an “integrated and inclusive security system for Europe.” This paper contains perhaps the clearest statement of the “Insurance Policy” rationale for NATO expansion, also known as the “strategic hedge.” This memo says this “(i.e. neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On the contrary, the possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly, as the President and Yeltsin agreed (pace Volker Ruhe)” (referring to the German defense minister who publicly ruled it out). At the same time, the memo anticipates “earliest explicit NATO decision on new members to be taken no sooner than first half of second Clinton term” – in other words, after both Yeltsin and Clinton have been re-elected. Not said but implicit here is that to make such explicit statements before then would have highly negative effects on Russian politics. The document also mentions the parallel track policy wherein NATO (and the U.S.) expand their relationships with Russia, “implicitly foreshadowing ‘alliance with the Alliance’ as alternative to membership track” for Russia.
[...]
Yeltsin, at Budapest and in front of Clinton, accused the U.S. President of creating a “cold peace” by speeding up NATO expansion. Budapest was where the two tracks of Clinton’s policy, NATO enlargement and Russia engagement, collided. (See the detailed discussion in “NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up”) Gore wanted to reassure Yeltsin that the communiqué from NATO that Yeltsin heard as breaking Clinton’s promises actually did not represent a change and that no expansion would take place before Russian Duma elections in 1995 and Russian presidential elections in 1996. The metaphor Gore uses for the US-Russia and NATO-Russia relationships, of two spaceships carefully docking and proceeding on parallel tracks, resonates with Yeltsin, invoking Russian prowess in space, Russian parity and cooperation with the U.S.
Document 5 Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel Berger to the President, “Meeting with the Vice President on Russia and NATO Expansion” Dec 21, 1994 Source: Clinton Presidential Library, Mandatory Review 2015-0772-M
[...]
Toned down somewhat is the “insurance policy” bullet point, this time just saying the “hedge” against Russia “should not be emphasized in public diplomacy, with focus instead on goal of building inclusive European security architecture in which a democratic Russia will be a major partner.” The paper drafts talking points for Secretary of State Christopher to use with the Russian foreign minister in their upcoming meeting, emphasizing “sensitivity to Russian elections in 1995-96” while rejecting any “joint decision-making about NATO expansion.” The paper shows the more confident U.S. approach after Gore’s reassurance of Yeltsin,
[...]
Featuring a thick black checkmark (Clinton was left-handed) and scrawled notes from Clinton, this memo from the national security adviser gives the President some bad news: “hardening Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, unease among some West Europeans and still-uncertain Congressional support pose a challenge to our policy.” Clinton wrote the next day, “I think we need to discuss how the Europeans feel [underlined] about this and what they are likely to do.”
[...]
But the memo goes on to describe in detail the “hardening” opposition among Russia’s elites: “Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is unlikely to yield in the near or medium term to some kind of grudging endorsement; Russia’s opposition is deep and profound. For the period ahead, the Russian leadership will do its level best to derail our policy, given its conviction that any eastward expansion of NATO is at root antithetical to Russia’s long-term interests.” The best the U.S. can do, Lake concludes, is just to achieve a “muted reaction in a context of broader cooperation.”
Document 8 Memorandum for Anthony Lake from John R. Schmidt through Alexander Vershbow, “Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, June 24, 4 p.m.” Jun 21, 1996 Source: - Clinton Presidential Library, Mandatory Review 2015-0772-M
[...]
He mentions Primakov’s proposed “eight areas of exploration,” of which the most important are the Russian desire to “prevent the movement of NATO ‘infrastructure’ (especially nuclear weapons) onto the territory of new allies,” drawing red lines around the Baltics and Ukraine and the need to “establish some sort of binding mechanism for Russia to influence NATO and European decision making.” Kornblum warns that these stipulations should not be seen as the Russian price for agreeing to NATO expansion.
Instead, the United States should outline a clear foundation for a dialog with Russia with the goals of “the most cooperative possible security relationship with Russia,” where Russia will be “integrated in a new sort of European security community” so that “Russia’s voice [would] be heard in European security councils.” He lists all previous U.S.-Russian understandings and joint statements that would constitute the foundation for Russia-NATO negotiations with the goal “to find the widest possible consensus with the Russians on the outlines of new security structures in Europe,” not just NATO enlargement.
The key issues in preparation of this work program “will be handled between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov.”
[...]
He outlines the “eight areas of exploration” proposed by Primakov and U.S. positions on all these areas, most importantly the issue of NATO infrastructure moving closer to the Russian borders and the issue of Russian consultation with NATO, warning that it should never give Russia a veto over NATO decisions.
[...]
This is a draft response from Talbott to the letter Kennan sent to him on January 31 expressing his opposition to NATO expansion.[1] In the letter, Kennan calls the decision to expand NATO “the greatest mistake of Western policy in the entire post-Cold War era,” which, in his view, would undermine the building of Russian democracy and lead to the rise of nationalistic forces.
In response, after profoundly thanking Kennan for his wisdom and contribution to U.S. foreign policy for many years, Talbott explains President Clinton’s thinking about NATO and his efforts to assure Russia that the newly transformed NATO would not be a security threat to Russian interests. Drawing on examples from the 19th century, Talbott notes that alliances are not just directed at defending against an enemy, but that they also have important political functions, including to “manage relations between their member states and restrain and control the policies of alliance members themselves.” In this sense, the enlarged NATO would enhance stability and security in Europe and provide support for the democratic development of new members, but would also be ready to defend if danger arises. As Talbott summarizes it, “The essence of strategy as I see it is to prepare for the worst while trying to bring about the best.”
Addressing the concern about the negative reaction in Russia, Talbott says that [the President] continues to believe that the arguments in favor of enlargement were sufficiently compelling to outweigh the negative of opposition in Russia (including, as you say, on the part of most Russian reformers and democrats).”
Document 12 Dennis Ross Memorandum to Strobe Talbott Feb 10, 1997 Source : State Department, National Security Archive Freedom of Information Lawsuit
[...]
Document 16 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, “Subject: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin” Apr 19, 1999 Source: Clinton Presidential Library, Mandatory Review 2015-0782-M-2
This is the first conversation between the Russian and American leaders since the start of the NATO bombing campaign of Belgrade. Clinton calls his Russian counterpart to appeal for cooperation in Yugoslavia and to assure him that “Russia in central in implementing a solution.” Clinton proposes a direct confidential channel for negotiations, naming Talbott on the U.S. side and suggesting Viktor Chernomyrdin on the Russian side—showing the U.S. grudging respect for the Russian prime minister whom the Clinton people initially considered a former communist apparatchik. Now, Clinton says, “we respect him and think he is a problem solver.” In fact, Chernomyrdin showed himself indispensable for U.S.-Russian relations in the 1990s in the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission.
[...]
Document 18 Ambassador Pickering Cable to U.S Embassy London, “The Deputy Secretary’s November 7 Meeting with UK NATO Ambassador-Designate, David Manning” Nov 16, 2000 Source: State Department, National Security Archive Freedom of Information Lawsuit
During the 40-minute meeting, Strobe Talbott and David Manning discuss Manning’s recent trip to Moscow and his impressions of the new Putin administration. During the meeting at the Russian Defense Ministry, Manning says “no one talked about partnership” and a lot of people exhibited old thinking. However, he also expresses his hope that “the Russians would realize that dealing constructively on NMD and NATO enlargement was in their interest.” Talbott countered that “the West might now be paying a price for seven years of successfully turning Yeltsin’s big ‘Nyet’s’ into grudging OK’s.” Turning to Putin, Talbott suggested that “the next round of NATO enlargement might be easier under Putin” compared to the experience they had with the Yeltsin administration. In his view, “while the former Russian president saw NATO in symbolic, even emotional terms, the current president appears to think more in terms of a hard-headed concept of Russia’s principal threats, namely Islamic extremism and the Chinese.”
Don't be so sure that once Putin is wiped from the game board that it can't happen again.
Maybe. But he's not the only slimy oligarch. There're others waiting to take his place. We may have to wait till they all throw each other out of windows. Or alternatively, poison each other.
Market Data 
Markets 
AI
