Trump still striving to turn terrorism into religious war: US strikes on IS targets in Nigeria may only fan the flames of insurgent violence
Nigerian leader calls for end to hardship protests "The ugly truth about Nigeria's child trafficking [...][Dowden in Africa - Nigeria election blog [...]This runs contrary to my theory that Nigeria is not entirely a failed state. It works well for those who own it and control it. Chaos in Nigeria is created, organised to ensure that nothing works because that benefits the ruling elite who control the economic choke points.The best example is the three oil refineries. None of them have worked for years, despite pledges from successive governments and billions of dollars promised. Why? Because the fuel importers have more power than the reformers, and they buy off anyone who tries to fix the refineries. One of the diplomats tells me that Nigeria spends more on importing petroleum products, largely for personal generators, than the whole government budget. P - How much of Britain’s national budget goes on parliament? In Nigeria 25 percent of the budget is spent on MPs, the workings of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The members have voted themselves $1 million a year each in salaries and allowances, and on top of that almost all of them use their positions to make money by taking backhanders to fix contracts or block reforms. In the last three years the senate has passed only seven bills, three of them finances bills, which are necessary to pay their grotesque salaries and perks. It makes the British parliament’s recent expenses scandal look like children’s pocket money. 2011 - https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=62174005] "Forward ever, backward never!" he said.
------ Related: AI Overview Yes, available data consistently shows that the majority of victims of the Islamic State (ISIS) and other Islamist extremist groups have been Muslims.
This is primarily because:
* Operating Regions: Extremist groups like ISIS and Boko Haram predominantly operate in Muslim-majority countries and areas, such as Iraq, Syria, and parts of Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Mozambique, the Sahel region). Attacks in public spaces, bombings, and mass killings in these regions disproportionately affect local Muslim populations.
* Ideological Conflict: ISIS views rival Muslims, particularly Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims who oppose their ideology, and those who collaborate with governments, as a significant enemy and target them routinely. Some of their most horrific acts have involved the mass execution of Muslim soldiers or community leaders.
* Scale of Attacks: While ISIS has explicitly targeted Christians and other religious minorities (Yazidis, etc.) in a campaign formally recognized as genocide by the US and EU, the sheer scale of overall attacks and conflict in the regions where they are active means the absolute number of Muslim victims is higher.
The public is looking for relief from terrorism and violence. But Donald Trump’s words bolster narratives of foreign ‘crusader’ aggression
Mon 29 Dec 2025 01.32 AEDT
Police secure an area hit by a US airstrike, Jabo, Nigeria, 26 December 2025. Photograph: Tunde Omolehin/AP
The response of Nigerians to the airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Sokoto state, north-western Nigeria are complicated. The rationale behind them has been widely opposed, but the strikes themselves have been welcomed.
The airstrikes were framed as a response to what have been described as genocidal attacks on Christians in the country. But the Nigerian authorities have consistently rejected this narrative, arguing that armed groups in the country do not discriminate based on religion, and that Christians and Muslims largely coexist peacefully. Ironically, it was Trump’s redesignation of Nigeria as a “country of particular concern” in November that deepened Muslim-Christian tensions. Many northerners, who are predominantly Muslim, blamed southern Nigerians for championing a narrative that ultimately resulted in US sanctions and international stigma.
The geographic and operational focus of the strikes has complicated the “Christian genocide” framing. Sokoto is the spiritual heartland of Islam in Nigeria, but armed violence in the area disproportionately affects Muslim communities. By contrast, attacks against Christian farmers are most prevalent in north-central states such as Benue and Plateau, where violence is often linked to armed Fulani herders rather than explicitly jihadist groups. The strikes targeted IS elements, not herder militias. While some reports suggest tactical collaboration between jihadist groups in the north-west and armed herders, the mismatch between the stated justification and the operational target raises questions about whether Washington fully understands the local drivers of violence it has labelled genocidal.
Despite there being opposition to – and confusion over – the rationale behind the strikes, they have been broadly welcomed, cutting across religious, ethnic and social divides. Earlier fears were shaped by the spectre of the prolonged US occupations in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, cases frequently cited in Nigerian media. By contrast, the Sokoto operation was a limited, targeted precision strike. Moreover, there have so far been no credible reports of civilian casualties, alleviating a major concern in a country where Nigerian air force operations have, on several occasions, accidentally killed hundreds of civilians.
The strikes against IS came at a time of public fatigue with insecurity caused by insurgency, terrorism, banditry and communal violence. Nigerians were ready to accept almost any intervention that promised relief. As terrorist networks become increasingly interconnected across the Sahel and West Africa, Nigerian security forces have become overstretched. Persistent corruption, inadequate training and equipment shortages continue to undermine counterinsurgency efforts. In some theatres, groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter factions now wield more sophisticated weaponry than state forces.
The Nigerian authorities have confirmed that they endorsed the operation. The minister of foreign affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, acknowledged that Abuja provided intelligence that enabled the strike and Nigerian officials remained in communication with US forces until minutes before execution. This joint counter-terrorism action, rather than a unilateral violation of Nigerian sovereignty, eased concerns about territorial integrity and external military overreach.
Despite the support, Nigeria’s insecurity will not be resolved through airpower alone. Airstrikes may yield short-term tactical gains, but they risk generating longer-term strategic setbacks. Framing the intervention as the defence of persecuted Christians may strengthen extremist narratives of foreign “crusader” aggression, potentially attracting more external funding and support for jihadist groups. Organisations such as Isis-Sahel and emerging groups such as Lakurawa thrive on such symbolism.
The durable solution lies in starving violence of its fuel by addressing its structural drivers: deep socioeconomic inequality (Sokoto has one of the highest numbers of out-of-schoolchildren in Nigeria), desertification and climate stress, weak state presence in rural areas, porous borders and fragile security institutions. Strengthening state capacity to manage grievances, regulate competition over land and resources, and counter extremism remains the only sustainable path to peace.
Onyedikachi Madueke is a security analyst at the University of Aberdeen
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