For more than two decades, through two wars and domestic upheaval, the idea that al-Qaeda acted alone on 9/11 has been the basis of U.S. policy. A blue-ribbon commission concluded that Osama bin Laden had pioneered a new kind of terrorist group—combining superior technological know-how, extensive resources, and a worldwide network so well coordinated that it could carry out operations of unprecedented magnitude. This vanguard of jihad, it seemed, was the first nonstate actor that rivaled nation-states in the damage it could wreak.
That assessment now appears wrong. And if our understanding of what transpired on 9/11 turns out to have been flawed, then the costly policies that the United States has pursued for the past quarter century have been rooted in a false premise.
The global War on Terror was based on a mistake.
A new filing in a lawsuit brought by the families of 9/11 victims against the government of Saudi Arabia alleges that al-Qaeda had significant, indeed decisive, state support for its attacks. Officials of the Saudi government, the plaintiffs’ attorneys contend, formed and operated a network inside the United States that provided crucial assistance to the first cohort of 9/11 hijackers to enter the country.
The 71-page document, released in redacted form earlier this month, summarizes what the plaintiffs say they’ve learned through the evidence obtained in discovery and recently declassified materials. They allege that Saudi officials—most notably Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam at a Los Angeles mosque and an accredited diplomat at Saudi Arabia’s consulate in that city, and Omar al-Bayoumi, who masqueraded as a graduate student but was identified by the FBI as an intelligence operative—were not rogue operators but rather the front end of a conspiracy that included the Saudi embassy in Washington and senior government officials in Riyadh. https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218963865
You could have checked, you SHOULD have realized, that Australia was grateful for what the U.S. did in the Solomon Islands in WWII and that cooperation is the highest form of honor.
You lazy ass assumptions, conclusion jumping and ahistorical misinformation are wearing thin.
1ST BATTALION, 1ST MARINES, COME TO AUSTRALIA BRINGING HISTORY WITH THEM 6 OCT 2016 | Sgt. Carlos Cruz Jr.The Official United States Marine Corps Public Website
MELBOURNE, Australia --Under the Southern Cross star map, Marines endured a six-month land, air and sea battle causing massive casualties to the U.S., their allies and the Japanese.
"It was the first moment that untested Marines met Japanese troops in the skies, on the beaches, and deep in the jungle — and prevailed," said Retired Gen. James Amos. "Men on both sides struggled in the most challenging of human environments and fought for their beliefs, their nations, and their brothers.”
The battle began in 1942, when allied reconnaissance aircraft discovered the Japanese constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. The location was strategically important to the U.S. for communication with Australia so the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered allied forces in the Pacific to mount an offensive.
“We got in a few hundred yards in from the beach and then the Japanese opened fire on us,” said Al "Duke" Dellaera, an 18-year-old Marine with 1st Marine Division at the time, recalling an attack in the early days of the invasion. “We were ambushed, really surprised. All I saw was debris falling all over the place.”
1st Marine Division was the main effort. This marked the first time the Marine Corps has fielded an entire Marine division, but they were aided by Marines of 2nd Division, Marine Raider Battalion, and air and naval forces from the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
After several engagements around the Solomon Islands, the Marines of 1st Marine Division were either dead, injured or sick, and were ordered to move to Australia to rest and refit.
The Marines stayed in Melbourne, Australia, which was the original headquarters for the allied military effort in the South-West Pacific and host to more than 30,000 U.S. Army soldiers.
Upon arrival, word spread that the Marines might have to wear U.S. Army uniforms because there were not Marine uniforms available to replace all that had been torn in battle. This meant the Marines would lose their identity.
Lt. Col. Merrill B. Twining, 1st Division’s operation officer at the time, came up with the idea of creating a patch to wear in order to identify themselves.
According to the 1st Marine Division home page, Twinning began drawing a diamond in his notebook and in the middle of it drew a “1” representing the division. Then, he drew the Southern Cross star constellation because the whole operation had been under it. This came to be the 1st Marine Division patch after he brought it to Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander at the time, for approval.
The 1st Marine Division patch remains the same since then and the U.S. Marine Corps has continued to maintain a positive relationship with their Australian allies. They have introduced a yearly rotation of Marines to Australia.
In November 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia, for approximately six months at a time, to conduct exercises and training on a rotational basis with the Australian Defence Force. This six-month deployment of Marines is now known as Marine Rotational Force – Darwin.
“The U.S. and Australian militaries have fought alongside each other in every major conflict in the past 100 years,” said Lt. Col. Steven M. Sutey, MRF-D Commanding Officer. “It is imperative that we train together and improve interoperability during times of peace in order to deter conflict and prepare to respond quickly and effectively in times of crisis that threaten the shared interest of our nations.”
MRF-D has participated in 11 major exercises during their 2016. According to Sutey, the most significant were:
• Exercise Hamel – the Australian Defence Force’s premier readiness exercise. • Exercise Koolendong – the largest multilateral combined arms live fire in the remote Australian Outback. • Exercise Kowari – a small unit survival skills training course with the ADF and People’s Republic of China. • Exercise Koa Moana – an afloat theater security cooperation exercise
The Marines not only participated in training exercises during the rotation, they also volunteered 3,246 total man hours throughout 104 community relations events and experienced Australian culture during Marine Corps Community Services trips.
"Being forward deployed as part of (MRF-D) is an incredible opportunity for Marines and sailors of all ranks,” said Sutey. “Over the course of six months, (MRF-D) has provided credible training to U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, improved readiness and effectiveness, and strengthened relationships with allied military in Australia and throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.”
Now, in 2016, and in years to come, U.S. and Australian military can look up at the Southern Cross as a constant reminder of the long history the two allies have working alongside each other.
Marines, Sailors Arrive in Australia for 6 Months of Training, Exercises March 28, 2024 | By Matthew Olay, DOD News |
Approximately 2,000 Marines and sailors deployed to Australia's Northern Territory this week to participate alongside their counterparts in the annual iteration of Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, the Pentagon announced today.
Your point is war, whose isn't? That has nothing to do with your sick sense of humor around 500 dying in a helicopter where in fact some did die. And it sure as hell doesn't excuse Israel's behavior these days. Or for the past 76 years. As far as your childishly silly
"I would guess no one was surprised— do you have a day once a year where you celebrate the US marines saving your AU asses from the Japs in 1942 — thought not — my point is war — it kills thousands of women and children— dam the japs — dam the Germans— dam the Islam fundelismatists — dam the Russians— dam, dam. Dam"
marines comment, Guadalcanal helped, and made up some for the two years Australia fought in the war before America finally entered. If you want to go that bs road.
And no, of course we don't celebrate the marines specifically as you don't celebrate the efforts of Australians against the enemy in WW11 long before Pearl Harbor. We do however of course have a number of commemorative days .. https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/commemoration/days .
hap0206, For you an update: The role of Australian industrial power in the defeat of Japan in World War II
"I would guess no one was surprised— do you have a day once a year where you celebrate the US marines saving your AU asses from the Japs in 1942 — thought not — my point is war — it kills thousands of women and children— dam the japs — dam the Germans— dam the Islam fundelismatists — dam the Russians— dam, dam. Dam"
Misperception, hap. Pushing nationalistic barrels normally isn't my thing, this to help you along re your wrong...
15 Aug 2020 | Andrew Ross
Today, on the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, questions remain about what stopped the Japanese from invading Australia, and how it was that many of our personnel came home alive and unwounded despite the dreadful conditions they faced.
The answers largely define an achievement of Australia’s World War II generation.
Although Australia had thousands of airmen serving Britain in Europe and the Middle East, and three infantry divisions in Egypt and Palestine, these contributions to the British war effort were a down-payment for British protection against Japan, the only nation with the capability and intent to directly threaten Australia.
The fall of Britain’s defence shield, Singapore, to Japanese forces in mid-February 1942 has convinced Australians that their nation was left defenceless, and was only saved from invasion because of American assistance and a Japanese agenda to finish the war in China.
In reality, the opportunity to secure the southern flank, of all their conquests, would have been irresistible to the Japanese, and good military strategy. The only aid that Britain and the US were able to send was General Douglas MacArthur. No significant American forces reached Australia until well past that critical phase of the war (February to June 1942).
Something was happening in Australia that caused Japan to reject invasion,as it did in late February 1942. The opportunity to invade a defenceless Australia would never have looked more viable.
Australia had just completed its industrialisation in 1939. From 1919, Australian governments had fought off the determined efforts of the great economic powers to prevent that happening. But by combining with industrial companies such as BHP, and Collins House, and using its own technical organisations such as the Munitions Supply Board of the Department of Defence, Australia created the key industries required.
By December 1941, the nation had been in a full war economy for 18 months, and by March 1942 had created enough armaments to fully equip six infantry divisions. These units were equipped to fight German panzer divisions, and were twice as powerful as Japanese divisions and much more mobile. Their artillery was twice the strength of Japanese field artillery and outranged it. The Australian 2-pounder anti-tank guns outranged all Japanese tanks in Southeast Asia and could penetrate their armour, making it disastrous for any tank force.
The scale of Australia’s armament program is recorded in the monthly reports of the director-general of munitions and backed up by similar monthly reports from the army on what it was receiving from the department. Both were war cabinet documents. By June 1942, Australian production had equipped eight infantry divisions with modern weapons.
Having had diplomatic representation in Australia until December 1941, Japan was most likely well informed, in general terms, about Australia’s burgeoning industrial war economy, which, apart from its own, was unique in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
In late February 1942, the Japanese army and navy discussed an invasion of Australia. Although the navy was enthusiastic, the army put forward a military appreciation which dismissed the idea as far too dangerous.
It recognised that Australian forces were likely to be better armed than the Japanese divisions, and more mobile. The appreciation said an invasion would require a minimum of 12 divisions. This force could not be provided from existing resources without weakening Japan’s hold on its conquests, and it might still be defeated by the aggressive Australians defending their homeland. The Japanese army rejected the navy’s suggestion. The idea was never considered seriously again by the Japanese.
Australian scientists, technocrats and industrialists had created so much equipment that Japan could not supply the volumes of its own materiel to overcome it. Japanese airpower could not redress this imbalance because it had not developed effective close air-to-ground support for its troops and had to face heavy Australian anti-aircraft defence. The Japanese were also aware that Australian strength in fighter aircraft was increasing steadily, and that radars were spread up the east and north coasts of Australia. Thus, Australia’s greatest strategic victory in World War II was achieved by science, technology and secondary industry.
The US naval victory at the battle of Midway, in early June 1942, removed the Japan’s capability to invade Australia by destroying its main aircraft carriers. This made it safe for Australia to begin to transfer military power to fight the Japanese in Australian Papua and New Guinea. Australia had to re-equip its army to cope with the corrosive jungle environment and extremely steep and rugged terrain. The battles took place in terrible conditions, which should have favoured the Japanese defenders. A stalemate was the most likely result, with heavy casualties on both sides, which the Japanese were willing to accept.
The early battles followed this pattern. But Australia had organised its scientific and technical resources far more efficiently than Japan. By mid-1943, Australia had become, for the allies, the centre of research into jungle organisms and jungle-proofing of all weapons and equipment. A flood of new equipment, specially treated clothing and food, and a vastly superior medical support system with Australian-made drugs and antibiotics swung the struggle in the jungle decisively in Australia’s favour.
Japanese battle casualties in the Southwest Pacific inflicted by the Australians were well over 50,000, whereas Australian battle casualties were 14,700. Japanese deaths from disease and starvation in the same area were over 100,000. Australian deaths from the same causes were about 1,000.
At this ratio of 1:3, Australian battle losses were the opposite of the classical ratio for an attacking force encountering a well-prepared defence, in rugged, well-covered terrain. The Australians reversed this loss ratio through better-designed weapons, better communications, better-quality ammunition and flexible battle tactics. Japanese weapons were poorly designed for jungle warfare in equatorial regions, their ammunition and communications were degraded by jungle organisms, and their battle tactics were often inappropriate for the conditions and terrain in which they fought.
The extraordinary imbalance in deaths caused by disease and starvation was a direct consequence of the Japanese army’s lack of logistic and medical support for its troops. Before World War II, Japan had conducted nearly all its campaigns in well-populated and productive environments such as China and Manchuria. These environments were not particularly unhealthy, so it could get away with a rudimentary medical system. Similarly, food could be taken from the local populations, so Japanese forces did not need an elaborate logistic support system.
When Japan began its Kokoda campaign, it needed to sweep away the opposition quickly, before disease took hold in Japanese troops and they exhausted their rudimentary food supplies. They could not rely on getting food from the sparse local population.
Although it took some time to organise, by early 1943 the Australian logistic system provided good medical support and increasing amounts of food.
The result was devastating, because nearly all of Japan’s post-Kokoda campaigns in Southeast Asia were conducted in jungle environments with sparse populations, which dramatically exposed logistic and medical deficiencies.
The impact of Australian science, technology and secondary industry on the survivability of Australian troops can be calculated roughly. Australian forces might have expected a minimum of around 45,000 casualties, given that they were trying to drive the Japanese out of very formidable defensive positions. If the Japanese had been able to prolong their resistance, this would have produced a situation like many World War I campaigns and caused Australian casualties as high as 80,000. The impact on Australia would have been enormous.
Australia’s war economy also provided vast amounts of clothing to hundreds of thousands of American service personnel in the Southwest Pacific. Huge quantities of basic materials for road and base building, as well as armaments, transport and signal equipment, were also supplied. In 1943, Australia supplied 95% of the food for 1,000,000 American servicemen. In commenting on this wartime support, President Harry Truman wrote in his 1946 report to the US Congress on the Lend-Lease Act, ‘On balance, the contribution made by Australia, a country having a population of about seven millions, approximately equalled that of the United States’.
This extraordinary result highlighted the monumental achievements of Australia’s World War II generation. Clearly, Australian governments of the 1930s regarded defence preparations as being more than the accumulation of armaments, which then rapidly became obsolete. They chose to put their effort into the development of secondary industry, which advanced national development and immigration, but also provided a huge amount of flexibility in what could be produced to arm the nation in an emergency.
They did this in a way that deserves much greater recognition.
Author
Andrew T. Ross is associated with UNSW Canberra and is the author of Armed and ready: The industrial development and defence of Australia, 1900–1945, published in 1995. His expanded, two-volume study is The great power struggle for Australia, 1900 to 1945, published on Amazon. Images: NSW State Archives and Australian War Memorial.
Market Data 
Markets 
AI
