12yearplan, No, is not the same thing. I said what i said about you losing me because, as in that case, you occasionally do. Nothing to do at all with not agreeing with you. How can i disagree if i didn't understand what you were referring to. And, my lacking something - my fault - as could very well be in any case in your losing me, or yours is not so important. Important thing is i didn't understand. And then you didn't clarify what it was at the time.
"Long time ago i said you lose me sometimes. Yes, that is a go to here: "word salad, what ever you are saying", etc,.. Just like when Chomsky says people that like to claim One is a Marxist or Conspiracy Theorist As an easy way of pigeon holing someone they disagree with."
By now i hope you understand i'm telling the truth. Exactly how it is. When i told you i didn't understand what you were referring to, all you had to do was tell me what it was that you were referring to. Only at that point then could i agree or disagree with you. Instead of telling me what it was i wasn't seeing you chose not to. You chose to say i was confusing or avoiding the issue. I wasn't. You did when you didn't clarify what you were referring to.
You could still tell me now. Never too late.
Aha, now i see you have told me. Good man, thanks -- Honestly i hadn't read ahead here.
Ok, i sort of get it now. You think we should just mention it more as money corruption is at the core of virtually every injustice around. We could i guess have it in our mind more, though it most always is with many of us. Could we concentrate on it and say it continually every day. Not sure if that might not become counter-productive. Something like that.
Chomsky is right when he says people label those they disagree with as Marxist or conspiracists. He means though i'd guess, some people. No doubt some people do, but other's don't. Some would take that take on Chomsky and use it to discredit all those who label another as a conspiracist or a Marxist, every time they do. So you must accept, and helpfully do, that so many points can be abused from more than one angle.
Many of us only label another as a conspiracist if we really believe they are one. If there belief is not supported by an overwhelming body of evidence. And the labeling is not always totally negative. One with a healthy amount of skepticism could say about some theory it's possible but unlikely. If another had 100% certainty about an issue when it they really had no good reason to that person could, i think, be validly labeled as a conspiracist.
So Chomsky's position on that as stated could be abused to by too easily saying i - for argument sake - was only doing the labeling because i disagreed with the person. Seems to me the reasons for the disagreement are the important thing. I hope you agree. Anyway, thanks for telling me what it was you thought i was confusing the issue about. Just picked this up on the way:
Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: the generic conspiracist beliefs scale
Robert Brotherton*, Christopher C. French and Alan D. Pickering
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths University of London, London, UK
The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation – individuals’ general tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the structure and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related, convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of conspiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world.
Introduction
A conspiracist belief can be described as “the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable” (Aaronovitch, 2009, p. 5). Substantial numbers of people endorse conspiracy theories proposing that the U.S. government orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et al., 2010), that the British government is covering up its own role in the 7/7 bombings (Soni, 2007), and that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was not the work of Lee Harvey Oswald alone (Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995), to name but a few popular conspiracy theories (see McConnachie and Tudge, 2008). Such beliefs are usually unsubstantiated and implausible, but are often regarded as harmless (e.g., Clarke, 2002). Yet some conspiracy theories are associated with negative outcomes; conspiracist beliefs about the origin and treatment of HIV/AIDS have been found to detrimentally affect attitudes toward preventative measures and adherence to treatment programs (Bogart et al., 2010), and conspiracist fears concerning the safety of childhood vaccinations have played a role in declining vaccination rates (Salmon et al., 2005; Kata, 2010; Offit, 2011). Other conspiracy theories can lead to social and political disengagement (Butler et al., 1995; Jolley and Douglas, 2013) and may help to foster political extremism (Bartlett and Miller, 2010).
To date only a small handful of studies have begun to investigate the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs, largely examining the role of individual differences in broad personality traits and cognitive styles (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Leman and Cinnirella, 2007; Douglas and Sutton, 2008, 2011; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami, 2012). The handful of available findings suggests that conspiracist beliefs are linked with traits such as low interpersonal trust, paranoia, and receptivity to other unusual beliefs. The relationships between conspiracy beliefs and more established psychological measures or general models of personality are largely unknown. Some research has examined correlations between conspiracist ideation and the Big-5. Weak but significant relationships have been reported with higher openness and lower agreeableness, however some studies have failed to replicate these relationships (see Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Swami and Furnham, 2012).
One robust finding to emerge from the limited existing literature is that individuals who endorse one conspiracy theory tend to endorse others, including unrelated theories (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), fictitious theories made up by psychological researchers (Swami et al., 2011), and even mutually contradictory theories (Wood et al., 2012 .. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279/full#B41 ). In total, these findings suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories is not exclusively a result of rational evaluation of the evidence relating to each specific conspiracist claim; rather it appears there are stable individual differences in the general tendency to engage with conspiracist explanations for events. This trait has been termed “conspiracist ideation” (Swami et al., 2011 .. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279/full#B36 ).
Much more research is required to illuminate the psychology of conspiracist ideation, and the number of recent publications on the topic (e.g., Leman and Cinnirella, 2007; Douglas and Sutton, 2008, 2011; Bogart et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012; Wood et al., 2012; Jolley and Douglas, 2013) suggests that research is gaining momentum. However, research is limited by the lack of a validated measure of individual differences in conspiracist ideation. To produce a coherent body of research it is necessary to devise a valid and psychometrically sound measure which can be used across a variety of empirical contexts.
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