Replies to post #745154 on Fannie Mae-No Politics (FNMA)

[Robert from yahoo bd]

I'm pretty sure Bill Maloni knows more about this than me, but Elizabeth Warren and others in the US Congress wanted to make sure that ofheo (FHFA's much less powerful predecessor) didn't have to go through the US Congress Appropriations Oversight Process where Elizabeth Warren and other lawmakers may have perceived a problem where the 'evil mortgage banksters' lobbyists would be able to speak and possibly influence the peoples ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS.

Btw, Ed DeMarco was the former head of ofheo, I believe, and we know what he did to us!

"The 2010 Congress likewise tried to shield the
CFPB from oversight by itself and future Congresses.
According to the CFPB’s architects, it was
“absolutely essential” that the new regulator receive
funding through a mechanism “independent of the
Congressional appropriations process.” S. Rep. No.
111-176, at 163 (2010). They wanted the Bureau to
avoid “the difficulties faced by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),” which
faced “repeated Congressional pressure because it
was forced to go through the annual appropriations
process.” Id. In their view, OFHEO’s lack of “a
steady stream of independent funding outside the
appropriations process led to repeated interference”
with its activities. 156 Cong. Rec. 13,195 (2010)
(Sen. Dodd); accord id. (even the mere “threat of
congressional interference could very well have
served to circumscribe the actions OFHEO was
willing to take”). The CFPB’s creators “did not want
to repeat that mistake.” Id.
The 2010 Congress thus provided that the CFPB
would not have to “rely on the annual appropriations
process” and would “receive[] funding directly from
the Federal Reserve.” Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2193-
94. The CFPB can simply ask the Federal Reserve each year, in perpetuity, for an “amount determined
by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry
out the authorities of the Bureau.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 5497(a)(1). The Federal Reserve must grant the
request so long as it does not exceed $597.6 million,
adjusted for inflation. See id. § 5497(a)(2)(A)-(B);
Pet. 3-4. In fiscal year 2022, the Bureau took $641.5
million of the $734 million available. CFPB,
Financial Report of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Fiscal Year 2022, at 44-45 (Nov.
15, 2022), https://bit.ly/3WCVoke (2022 Report).
Any unused funds “shall remain available” to the
CFPB “until expended” in future years. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5497(c)(1). And the agency may use the Federal
Reserve to “invest[]” the portion “that is not, in the
judgment of the Bureau, required to meet [its]
current needs.” Id. § 5497(b)(3). As of September 30,
2022, the CFPB’s investments were worth nearly
$340 million. 2022 Report, at 86."

[Robert from yahoo bd]

"First, “vesting Congress with control over fiscal
matters” best “ensur[es] transparency and
accountability to the people.” Pet.App. 29a. The
Framers gave the “power over the purse” to the people’s “immediate representatives” in Congress.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 394 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(J. Madison). By making Congress “the guardian” of
“the common fund of all,” 2 Joseph Story,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1348 (3d ed. 1858), the Framers protected
“the right of the people” to be “consulted upon the
disposal of the money” that the government has
taken from them to pay “[a]ll [its] expences,” 1 St.
George Tucker, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES App.,
at 362 (1803). The Appropriations Clause thus
restricts “the disbursing authority of the Executive
department,” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937), “to secure regularity,
punctuality, and fidelity[] in the disbursements of
the public money,” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 427.
Second, “the separation of purse and sword” also
provides Congress, and in turn the people, with “an
indispensable check” on Executive action. Pet.App.
29a. The Framers recognized that giving the powers
of both “the sword and the purse” to a single Branch
“would furnish one body with all the means of
tyranny.” 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, at 348-49 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1891)
(A. Hamilton). To neutralize that threat, they vested
Congress with “the power over the purse,” so that it
would maintain “a controlling influence over the
executive power” by “hold[ing] at its own command
all the resources[] by which a chief magistrate could
make himself formidable.” 1 Story § 531. In short,
Congress could “unnerve the power of the sword by
striking down the arm which wields it.” Id. As
Madison emphasized, Congress’s power to deny “the supplies requisite for the support of government”
would be its “most compleat and effectual weapon”
for defeating “the overgrown prerogatives of the
other branches.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 394.
The Appropriations Clause thus is “a bulwark of the
Constitution’s separation of powers” that “is
particularly important as a restraint on Executive
Branch officers,” U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA,
665 F.3d 1339, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh,
J.), because “[a]ny exercise of a power” validly held
by the Executive remains “limited by a valid
reservation of congressional control over funds”
needed to carry it out, Richmond, 496 U.S. at 425."