Replies to post #429810 on Tornado Alley (PROG)

[hookrider]

livefree_ordie: What the fuck are you running your mouth about now Mr/Mrs/Miss No Fucking Idea, Fucking republican!!!

[newmedman]

and here you are, posting on social media and complaining about it while blaming one man for a global crisis.

makes sense to me. Now tell us about the rabbits George.

[BOREALIS]

[Zorax]

You just proved you never read anything beyond rumble and extremely damaged far right wings puke. Moron. Who's stupider, shittypants or you believing this shit. ticTAC?
tic tac is an Italian company as well.

Trump on Tic Tac being on its being owned American Company, not Chinese owned. Ahead of his time maybe some on this board will catch up to reality someday, but I highly doubt it, you all live in the past and no looking forward.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TikTok

[blackhawks]

You are without a doubt the simplest minded conspiracy theorist still posting here.

And this shit?

....but hey humans are dumb and lazy and think the Commie Chinese Government are nice people and love us just like we lull ourselves to sleep thinking such nonsense about their Government that controls all facets of life in thier regime of China.

There has been nothing in The Biden administration's policy toward China that remotely suggests that they think of the Chinese government as 'nice people who love us'. That's a bullshit, ill-informed, narrative from you.

Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China

The U.S. president has committed to rapid decoupling, whatever the consequences.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/biden-china-semiconductor-chips-exports-decouple/

By Jon Bateman, a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

OCTOBER 12, 2022, 4:30 PM

The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more.

But Washington’s endgame for this conflict has always been hazy. Does it seek to compel specific changes in Beijing’s behavior, or challenge the Chinese system itself? To protect core security interests, or retain hegemony by any means? To strengthen America, or hobble its chief rival?

Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world. Joe Biden’s actions have been more systematic, but long-term U.S. goals have remained hidden beneath bureaucratic opacity and cautious platitudes.

Last Friday, however, a dense regulatory filing from a little-known federal agency gave the strongest hint yet of U.S. intentions.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new extraterritorial limits on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chip-making equipment, and supercomputer components. The controls, more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level.

Although framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington’s cited military and intelligence concerns. The U.S. government imposed the new rules after limited consultation with partner countries and companies, proving that its quest to hobble China ranks well above concerns about the diplomatic or economic repercussions.

In short, America’s restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration. More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China’s tech ties—have lost.

This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (like biotech, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic. The pace and details are uncertain, but the strategic objective and political commitment are now clearer than ever. China’s technological rise will be slowed at any price.

To understand the strategy behind these new controls, it helps to look at what preceded them. A multitude of U.S. measures have limited the flow of technology to and from China in recent years. Chief among these is the Entity List, which bars designated firms from importing U.S. goods without a license.

The number of unique Chinese companies on this list quadrupled, from 130 to 532, between 2018 and 2022. Leading Chinese chip companies, supercomputing organizations, and software and hardware vendors have all landed on the list. Even so, BIS exercised its discretion to license large amounts of nonsensitive exports to listed companies.

One Chinese company, Huawei, has faced a unique, supercharged version of the Entity List. BIS targeted Huawei with an expanded form of its “foreign direct product rule,” a powerful regulation that grants U.S. export controls greater extraterritorial reach. U.S. export controls primarily apply to U.S.-origin items, but the foreign direct product rule extends the scope to cover non-U.S. items that were made using U.S. technology.

By leveraging America’s centrality in the global chip supply chain, BIS forced semiconductor designers and manufacturers in third countries to limit sales to Huawei. Leading-edge chips were off limits, while less advanced chips were allowed. The controls grievously wounded Huawei.

These earlier restrictions were provocative in their time, but they reflected at least some sense of proportion. The new export controls, however, are different. They effectively bring all of China under the special rule formerly reserved for Huawei. Advanced semiconductors from any country will be presumptively denied to every Chinese company, even firms lacking direct ties to Beijing’s military or intelligence services.

Among other consequences, this will hamstring the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) throughout the country—hindering Chinese progress in e-commerce, autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity, medical imaging, drug discovery, climate modelling, and much else.

China’s own semiconductor sector is incapable of producing the leading-edge chips used in AI applications. And BIS aims to keep things that way: Its controls will block Chinese purchases of even years-old chip-making equipment and prevent American personnel from providing support or know-how.

To justify this dramatic escalation, BIS makes the same old national security arguments. Its filing takes pains to portray Chinese high-end computing as an urgent military threat. Nuclear weapons are invoked 16 times, on the grounds that top-tier processors facilitate their design and may be “inherently radiation hardened.”

Artificial intelligence is cited as a surveillance tool. It’s all factually true. Yet BIS never really deals with the fundamental fact that semiconductors and AI are both dual-use, general-purpose tools. Indeed, they are the basic building blocks for an advanced, globally competitive economy. Denying them to China is effectively a form of economic containment.

Granted, the new controls fall short of a total chip embargo. Chinese firms can still import lesser semiconductors for use in cars, toasters, and much else. Moreover, BIS has not yet imposed similarly stringent controls in other technology fields, such as biotech, which may be less amenable to decoupling for technological, economic, or political reasons.

But the U.S. government’s latest move reveals a strategic mindset that cannot help but influence future China tech policy. U.S. officials have focused intently on possible threats, imposed disproportionate measures, downplayed the complications, and strong-armed others into compliance.

This mindset all but guarantees a continued march toward broad-based technological decoupling. Even U.S. capital flows into China, which Trump worked hard to expand as he simultaneously cracked down on tech ties, are now facing new forms of federal pressure.

Many U.S. policymakers and analysts will cheer a further decoupling. They rightly argue that Beijing’s decades-long strategy of intellectual property theft, hidden subsidies, and stealthy regulatory discrimination has played a large part in Chinese technological advancement. They correctly note that China has used its growing prowess to crush dissenters and minorities, threaten neighbors, prop up foreign autocrats, carry out espionage and influence operations, entrench market dominance, and lay the groundwork for future digital sabotage or coercion. And they can fairly claim that most previous U.S. restrictions—though hardly all—were sensible and successful.

[brooklyn13]

I agree with you about Biden coddling China, this is one of the worse things he's done in that regard:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/09/22/ivankas-trademark-requests-were-fast-tracked-in-china-after-trump-was-elected/?sh=73a7da2a1d60

This incoherent rambling of your s that goes on forever is a dialogue killer. Also, maybe, get an adult relative to help with your grammar and spelling.

And, ff you're so anti-China, stop wearing the MAGA hats that are made there and stop shopping at WalMart, where just about everything is made there.

[sortagreen]

Inflation is worldwide. Are you blaming DeSantis for the inflation in Florida? Of course not.

It's stupid. Biden didn't create the drought or the chip shortage or the war or the fact that oil and almost everything in the grocery store is controlled by two or three companies. Fuck you.

You're fucking piece of shit traitor. A MAGAt by any other name.