"US sanctions on Venezuelan oil could cut the output of refineries at home"
A billboard with an image of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro embracing his wife, Cilia Flores, and a legend reading "Indestructible Venezuela" appears near a slum in Caracas on March 28, 2019. Two Russian air force planes carrying troops recently arrived in Venezuela. (Yuri Cortez/Getty-AFP)
Steve Chapman ReporterChicago Tribune
One of the biggest fiascoes of Barack Obama’s presidency .. https://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics-government/government/barack-obama-PEPLT007408-topic.html .. occurred when he warned the Syrian government that any use of chemical weapons against rebels would breach a “red line.” It was a clear threat of a U.S. airstrike. But a year later, the regime carried out an attack with sarin gas — and the threat proved hollow.
Donald Trump .. https://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics-government/donald-trump-PEBSL000163-topic.html .. either learned from that mistake or he didn’t. [UMM]But last weekend, as the president was crowing about his attorney general’s summary of the special counsel’s report, Putin sent two Russian air force planes to Venezuela, carrying close to 100 Russian troops.
Vice President Mike Pence has said, “Maduro must go.” It was an unintended echo of what Obama said in 2011: “The time has come for President Assad to step aside.” But like Assad, Maduro is strangely unwilling to abide by American preferences.
On Wednesday, Trump complained, “Past administrations allowed this to happen,” as if controlling internal events in a sovereign nation were our prerogative. He also upped the ante. “Russia has to get out,” he declared. And if Russia doesn’t? “All options are open,” he warned.
But the options are dwindling. The administration imagined that economic chaos and popular discontent in Venezuela, combined with international sanctions and diplomatic pressure, would topple Maduro. But it hasn’t, and an attempt by the opposition to bring food and medicine over the border failed when security forces opened fire.
The Russians, who are used to being appeased by Trump, are in no mood to capitulate. In response to his demand that they leave, Kremlin officials likened the U.S. to “an elephant in a china shop” and invited him to pull U.S. forces out of Syria.
“We do not interfere in the domestic affairs of Venezuela,” a Putin spokesman said. “We count on these third countries to follow our example and allow Venezuelans to decide their own fate.” In other words, butt out.
So what choices are left? The international effort to squeeze Maduro until he surrenders hasn’t worked, and our experience with other rogue regimes — North Korea, Iran, Libya — suggest that economic and diplomatic penalties won’t suffice to break the regime’s hold on power. Huffing and puffing rarely blows a dictator’s house down.
In that case, Trump will be left with two unappetizing options. The first is to follow the Obama model — backing down from the demands and warnings he has issued to Putin and Maduro. That would mean the indignity of tolerating a neighboring enemy that, like Cuba, can revel in standing up to the Yankee imperialists, with help from Moscow.
The second is to take military action that could lead the U.S. into a dangerous war against Maduro’s army — or, in the worst case, direct combat with a nuclear-armed foe. Does anyone remember the Cuban missile crisis? Does anyone want to re-enact it to see if we’ll get lucky again?
The optimistic view is that Trump, being averse to costly foreign entanglements and eager to stay on good terms with Putin, will end up walking away in a fog of bluster or just drop his threat and pretend he never made it.
The pessimistic view is that just as he has been unwilling to look weak by getting out of Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, he will decide that preserving an image of toughness is worth whatever it costs in American lives and money.
The far better option is to stay out of international crises that we lack the responsibility or the ability to control. Maybe someday our presidents will learn that.
Steve Chapman, a member of the Tribune Editorial Board, blogs at www.chicagotribune.com/chapman.
Thoughtful U.S. policies could help restore Venezuela’s democracy.
By José R. Cárdenas | February 21, 2019, 2:05 PM
Supporters of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó gather at a rally in Caracas on Feb. 16. (Yuri Cortez/AFP/Getty Images)
The Trump administration has been lauded on both sides of the aisle for its approach to the crisis in Venezuela, leading a multilateral effort in backing the interim government of opposition legislator Juan Guaidó, offering substantial humanitarian assistance to the suffering Venezuelan people, while bringing maximum pressure on the government of Nicolás Maduro, which is widely perceived as illegitimate.
This week in Miami, U.S. President Donald Trump doubled down on his message to the military officers surrounding Maduro. “The eyes of the entire world are upon you today, every day, and every day in the future,” he said .. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IBYs1NWOp1Q . “You cannot hide from the choice that now confronts you.
“We want to restore Venezuelan democracy, and we believe that the Venezuelan military and its leadership have a vital role to play in this process,” he said. “I ask every member of the Maduro regime: End this nightmare of poverty, hunger, and death for your people. Let your people go. Set your country free.”
As coherent as the administration’s policy have been, however, it remains unclear how long Maduro can hold out. With the support of his Cuban backers, he remains defiant, hunkering down and countenancing absolutely no recognition of the popular demand for fundamental change in Venezuela.
To hasten his exit—and bring about the peaceful restoration of the constitution, rule of law, and new elections—the Trump administration would do well to follow these prescriptions:
Maintain a multilateral and bipartisan consensus. The formation of the Lima Group, gathering 14 regional governments, in response to the Venezuela crisis was a significant achievement in a hemisphere not known for this sort of multilateral action. It must remain at the center of the struggle for democracy in Venezuela. At the same, the European Union has been slowing developing a consensus behind the interim Guaidó government. The Lima Group and the EU cannot become window dressing for unilateral U.S. action. While the United States, of course, brings unmatched capabilities to the table, the administration must make every effort to maintain a broad front with its democratic partners on Venezuela.
What Maduro wants most of all is to turn the crisis into a bilateral confrontation with the United States and, more importantly, with Trump. He must not be allowed to accomplish that. Besides, a coalition of willing democracies defending democracy presents a much more appealing contrast to a club of dictators defending one of their own.
Closer to home, U.S. policy toward Venezuela has enjoyed a bipartisan consensus in Congress through successive administrations. Democrats such as Sen. Bob Menendez, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, have been active critics of the breakdown in Venezuelan democracy over the years. It is important that this bipartisanship remains, as it demonstrates to Maduro and his Cuban advisors—and to anyone else interested in perpetuating Maduro’s rule—Washington’s commitment and unity of purpose in helping to return constitutional rule to Venezuela.
Keep a close watch. Events on the surface in Venezuela do not necessarily represent what is happening behind the scenes. U.S. policymakers need to recognize that internal politics play out there on many different levels. For example, opportunists who became obscenely wealthy under the late President Hugo Chávez and under Maduro—alternately known as “boligarchs,” “bolichicos,” and “boliburgueses” (all a play on Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution)—are widely rumored to have been hedging their bets for years by quietly spreading money throughout the opposition, for just such a time as this one.
U.S. policymakers thus need to keep their eyes wide open. This is not to disqualify anyone or sow suspicion; it’s only to point out that U.S. interests and those of some in the opposition may not always be in alignment. The Trump administration should simply focus less on personalities than on remaining true to core U.S. interests: helping the Venezuelan people restore their constitution and democratic institutions while defending U.S. regional security interests. Forcing Maduro out is only part of the battle—the war to uproot the Venezuelan mafia state will continue.
Pursue an inclusive transition. Stalin González, a top opposition lawmaker, suggested earlier this month that a transitional government should include representatives of the ruling “chavismo” movement and military leadership to guarantee the political stability needed to hold new elections. “We need to give space to the chavismo that is not Maduro because we need political stability,” he said. It is important to remember that not all officials who follow Chávez are crooks or human rights abusers. Some of them truly believe in a more inclusive Venezuela—that is, incorporating the poor more into the life of the country.In fact, the neighborhoods surrounding the major urban areas were the base of chavismo, and honest chavistas need to know there is a role for them in a post-Maduro Venezuela. The United States cannot afford for them to believe a transition means a return to the status quo before Chávez. (Human rights abusers and drug traffickers will have to be dealt with in other ways, such as a transitional justice system that has yet to be developed.)
The Trump administration has been clear it sees Venezuela’s current path as “irreversible,” meaning that “there is not a single scenario” in which Maduro remains in power. Venezuela is no longer a problem to be managed—it is to be solved. The courage shown by Guaidó and Venezuelans in the streets confronting armed paramilitaries demands nothing less. No one can predict the timing of Maduro’s exit, but thoughtful and tactical Trump administration policies can likely hasten that day.
José R. Cárdenas was acting assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development in the George W. Bush administration.
The more atrocities Venezuela’s dictator commits, the less likely his regime is to survive him.
By Daniel Lansberg-Rodríguez | March 1, 2019, 2:33 AM
[...]
It is necessary to distinguish between the increasingly radical Maduro himself and the Chavista government he has led since 2013. The former is merely the most prominent malignancy of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, an ideological menace that has long ago spread across all levels of Venezuela’s bloated military and civilian bureaucracy. These powerful interests have always stood to outlive Maduro. Given the scant hope that Maduro’s leadership will ever recover, it’s always been likely that at some point—likely a matter of months rather than years—the Chavista party will attempt to distance itself from its present leader to protect its own interests and power.
Consider what has taken place in Ecuador, which under the leadership of Rafael Correa was once Venezuela’s most radical leftist ally. Today it has morphed into arguably the region’s most successful neoliberal reformer (and one of more than 60 countries that have declared Maduro illegitimate) despite the same cadre having remained in power throughout. Under President Lenín Moreno—Correa’s handpicked successor within his PAIS Alliance—the government has indicted the exiled Correa personally for a long list of crimes, while nonetheless preserving overall impunity for most of the party’s establishment.
Ecuador’s playbook for political rehabilitation would as such seem a natural one for Chavismo to attempt to follow in some not-too-distant Maduro-less future.
Step 1: Ditch Maduro and publicly scapegoat him for everything that’s gone wrong.
Step 2: Find a fresher face to run under a Hugo Chávez populist banner next election.
Step 3: Gauge the mood among voters, and if it seems disadvantageous to 21st century socialism, then drop that part and run as something completely different (mimicking Chávez’s winning populist style but eschewing the substance).
C'mon, you Chavistas. Ditch Maduro so Trump can go back to twitter and golf. You would be doing Putin and Trump, every American and the rest of the world a huge favor. And the sooner the better. Please.
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