Let’s try to come up with an estimate. 2Q15 Glatopa sales—during a period of only 13 days—were about $70M (#msg-115576637). For the sake of discussion, let’s assume that $55M of the $70M in 2Q15 was for inventory stocking, leaving $15M, about $1.15M per day, for end-user demand.
If we extrapolate the $1.15M daily rate estimated above over a full quarter, we get $104M, which seems like a reasonable number in relation to Teva’s branded Copaxone sales of $870M during 2Q15.
In 2Q15, MNTA would have received $28.1M in Glatopa revenue from NVS if not for the $9M adjustment to reimburse NVS for pre-launch commercialization expenses. Thus, the operating margin on Glatopa appears to be roughly 80%, and MNTA’s cut is half of that, or 40%.
The $104M estimate for 3Q15 Glatopa sales (above) should therefore equate to approximately $41.5M in 3Q15 Glatopa revenue for MNTA.
p.s. One could estimate 3Q15 Glatopa sales by examining script data and making an assumption regarding average selling price. I haven’t done this, but I’m confident that such an approach would yield a result in the same ballpark as the method used in this post.