The Israeli Elections: A Recipe for Further Crisis
12 April 2006
With the sole exception of Kadima emerging as the single largest party, despite the removal of its founder Ariel Sharon from the political scene, the Knesset elections held on March 28 did not resolve the many problems facing Israel. Indeed, the fact that the next government will possibly be a left-right-center-religious one underscores the factionalized nature of the polity and highlights the deep internal divisions in the country.
In terms of bloc politics, this election is perhaps the most fractured in Israel's history. While no political party has ever secured the simple majority of 61 MKs, the fractionalization has been near complete. The left, comprising the Labor and Meretz parties, secured 24 seats while the right, consisting of Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, secured 23 seats. With 29 seats, Kadima occupies the center while the religious parties gained as many as 27 seats. While the Arab and communist parties received ten seats, the Pensioners Party acquired seven.
In short, Ehud Olmert, the new leader of Kadima, will require the support of more than one bloc to form a government and will have to cohabitate with the left-wing as well as the right-wing parties in addition to religious MKs. He will have to establish wider support in the Knesset if he is to survive the vagaries of coalition politics.
Fluctuating Fortunes
The success of Kadima in maintaining cohesion, even in the absence of Sharon, was remarkable. Lacking Sharon's charisma, leadership, popularity and warrior persona, Olmert managed to keep the flock together and presented a non-ideological, pragmatic and centrist image. His desire to visualize the demarcation of the final boundaries for Israel and his willingness to pursue Sharon's policy of unilateralism gave some confidence to the Israeli public who were devastated by the sudden illness, hospitalization and incapacitation of Sharon.
At the same time, however, unlike the previous elections, the social agenda and not the peace process dominated the campaign. This was partly because, with the sole exception of the Pensioners Party, none of the other parties were headed by people with military-security backgrounds. For the first time in Israel's history, most candidates, and definitely not the heads of various parties, did not have a military background. Partly because of this, all the parties, especially the Labor Party late last year under the leadership of Amir Peretz, the former trade union leader, sought to highlight the social agenda. This strategy was swiftly followed by others.
The renewed interest of the Labor Party in the social welfare agenda, however, did not ensure enough support for the party as it merely managed to retain 19 of the seats it had won in the 2003 elections. The only saving grace for the party was that the pre-election defection of Shimon Peres and his close confidants to Kadima did not erode Labor's final standing.
Within days after the elections, Peretz even toyed with the idea of forming a narrow coalition that would include Likud and other right-wing groups. The electoral arithmetic, however, prevented him from going further. Moreover, contrary to the pre-election focus on social issues, the Labor leader appears to be keen on becoming the next defense minister. Though lacking any military background or experience, Peretz wants to take control of this ministry since over the years it has become the second most powerful position after the prime minister.
The real loser in the election was the Likud, the parent party of Kadima. With just 12 seats, the party has suffered its worst electoral defeat since 1951 when its forerunner Herut secured eight seats. If the formation of Kadima signaled the exodus of leadership, the election marked the desertion of the rank and file. Party chief Benjamin Netanyahu has already been held responsible for the dismal failure and it will only be a matter of time before he resigns or is removed from leadership. Unfortunately, however, there are no viable candidates who can rejuvenate the party.
The election highlighted the resurgence of the religious parties. Contrary to fears weeks after Sharon floated Kadima, religious parties made significant gains. Shas and United Torah Judaism gained while the pre-election arrangement with the right-wing National Union enabled the National Religious Party to regain some of its lost ground. Now with 27 seats, the religious parties have cornered substantial political clout and can be expected to operate as a bloc at least during the coalition negotiations.
The real winner in this election was the Pensioners Party that secured seven seats. It indicated the popular disapproval of the current economic policies. While more people were pushed below the poverty line, the economic policies pursued by Netanyahu as finance minister severely hurt the senior citizens who depended upon meager pensions for their survival. Because of these policies, many Israelis -- cutting across age barriers -- opted to vote for the Pensioners who symbolized the suffering brought about by the economic liberalization and gradual withdrawal of the state from economic activities. This victory comes against the background of the complete disappearance of Shinui, which, in the past, rode on anti-Haredi sentiments.
Weaving a Working Coalition
Technically, Olmert does not need the support of the right, especially Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu. However, as a party of predominantly Russian immigrants, its inclusion will be essential if the government wants to reflect their support. In the past, Sharon periodically visited Moscow partly to consolidate his influence among the Russian voters who constitute nearly a fifth of the population. This explains Olmert's keenness to include Lieberman.
At the same time, Lieberman has been a controversial figure who often espouses not only an uncompromising position vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but also positions that are explicitly hostile to Israel's Arab citizens. Many liberal Israelis consider Yisrael Beiteinu to be a racist party. Indeed, during the election campaign, Labor leader Amir Peretz expressed his opposition to joining any government that includes Lieberman. Post-election realism, however, compelled Peretz to modify this stand and exhibit a willingness to participate in an Olmert-led government that would include Lieberman.
Nevertheless, this prospect is likely to send a strong negative message to Israel's Arab minorities who constitute more than a sixth of its population. Since the formation of the state, no Israeli government has ever admitted an Arab party as a legitimate member of the coalition. Six decades later, no Arab has ever been appointed as cabinet minister, even though a few years ago a Druze member briefly served in the cabinet. Olmert is unlikely to change this pattern and will probably not include any Arab party in his coalition, let alone in his cabinet.
Peace Process
Regarding the peace process, the results do not offer any clear choices. Olmert fought this election on his "convergence plan" whereby Israel would retain its Jewish majority by annexing some Jewish settlements while relinquishing most of the West Bank. This he was prepared to pursue even without any formal agreement with the Palestinian National Authority. In short, he offered to replicate Sharon's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the West Bank. If the electoral verdict is an indication, then this did not go well with the electorate. Media pundits have argued that the voters have overwhelmingly rejected Olmert's plan.
Likewise, the results also do not give any direction for the next government vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority. That the new Hamas-led government took office the day Israel went to the polls did not go unnoticed. While the majority still backs Israel's refusal to deal with Hamas and hence the Palestinian Authority, there are no meaningful alternatives.
In the short run, the policy of Hamas favors the current Israeli policy of political disengagement. For many Israelis, it reminds them of the infamous Khartoum resolution in the immediate aftermath of the June war of 1967, whereby the Arab League pronounced three NOs: no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. Such an uncompromising position of Hamas even after the Oslo process offers very little incentive for Israel to engage with the Hamas-led Palestinian leadership. For now, Israel has settled for minimum contacts and has suspended all financial aid and other dealings.
At the same time, as the Palestinians' immediate neighbor, Israel will not be able to ignore them for long. While geography allows the European Union and the U.S. to ignore, disengage and isolate themselves from Hamas, Israel does not have such a luxury.
Sooner or later, Israel will have to find a modus vivindi vis-à-vis the Palestinians. It will have to negotiate with Hamas in finding a lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Alternatively, in the absence of a negotiation process, it will have to opt for the Sharon model of unilateralism.
Indeed, unlike Gaza, the situation in the West Bank is much more complicated and evokes widespread religious and ideological passions and emotions. With Jewish settlements scattered all across the territories, ironically accelerated by Sharon, Olmert will face severe domestic opposition if he makes any move in the West Bank.
Conclusion
Olmert is no Sharon. Moreover, under his leadership, Kadima failed to secure a mandate that would enable him to pursue Sharon's unilateralism. Since some of his potential coalition partners endorse a negotiated settlement vis-à-vis the occupied territories, formal dealings with Hamas are necessary. Not many Israelis view Hamas as the pre-Oslo version of Fatah when it refused to deal with the Jewish State.
Seen within the context of reviving the peace process and bringing back the negotiations, the latest Knesset verdict is anything but decisive. An unwieldy left-right-center-religious coalition is a sure recipe for further troubles.
Report Drafted By:
P.R. Kumaraswamy
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
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