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Amaunet

03/19/06 11:22 AM

#6715 RE: Amaunet #6714

Why Iran wants a bomb

Let me ask you a question: If you were running Iran, would you try to develop nuclear weapons?

If I were the leader of Iran I would go for the bomb knowing full well Iran has been targeted long before the recent invasion of Iraq as seen in "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," co-authored by Bush’s thinker Richard Perle.

On July 8, 1996, Richard Perle, now the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory group that reports to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, presented a written document to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, spelling out a new Israeli foreign policy, calling for a repudiation of the Oslo Accords and the underlying concept of "land for peace"; for the permanent annexation of the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip; and for the elimination of the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, as a first step towards overthrowing or destabilizing the governments of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The document was prepared for the Jerusalem and Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), a think tank financed by Richard Mellon-Scaife. The report, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," was co-authored by Perle; Douglas Feith, currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy; David Wurmser, currently special assistant to State Department chief arms control negotiator John Bolton; and Meyrav Wurmser, now director of Mideast Policy at the Hudson Institute.
http://www.yaledivestmentnews.org/worlddomination.html

Moreover Iran rather than Iraq is the real prize. Iran is the main obstacle to US plans to develop international oil and gas projects in the Caspian.#msg-10097910

As leader of Iran I would know that Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. ruling class architect of the New Great Game, the foreign policy blueprint being followed by the United States, in 1997 put in writing that Iran must be managed by the United States.

The Grand Chessboard – 1997

Brzezinski sets the tone for his strategy by describing Russia and China as the two most important countries - almost but not quite superpowers - whose interests that might threaten the U.S. in Central Asia. Of the two, Brzezinski considers Russia to be the more serious threat. Both nations border Central Asia. In a lesser context he describes the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Iran and Kazakhstan as essential "lesser" nations that must be managed by the U.S. as buffers or counterweights to Russian and Chinese moves to control the oil, gas and minerals of the Central Asian Republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan).
http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:wDuUmiut7n8J:www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/zbig.html+Brzezi....
#msg-9954422

And beyond this I would be looking at Israel’s threats and their nuclear arsenal. #msg-10113636

-Am


Why Iran wants a bomb
By Richard Reeves/ National View
Sunday, March 19, 2006

E-mail article View text version View most popular
LOS ANGELES -- Let me ask you a question: If you were running Iran, would you try to develop nuclear weapons? I would. Apparently the editors of the Los Angeles Times would also answer "Yes."

The lead editorial in Friday’s Times was comment on the release of the U.S. government’s latest "National Security Strategy." That’s the one in which President Bush’s introduction begins, "America is at war," and then goes on to specifically name Iran as an enemy of the United States. The document also reiterates the U.S. commitment to pre-emptive or preventive war.


The Times puts it this way: "In invading Iraq, Bush has created his own nightmare. Iraq is now a magnet for jihadists. And Iran is even more determined to develop nuclear weapons to forestall a fate similar to Iraq’s. ... A document that names as enemies Iran and North Korea ... provides all the justification those regimes need for a nuclear deterrent of their own. And it virtually guarantees a continuation of the very proliferation that Bush has identified as the greatest threat of all."

In plainer language, the bomb is the symbol of maturity in the world today. Nations that have the bomb are treated as grown-ups. Nations without the bomb get no respect. To many Iranians, not all of them fanatic clerics who dress funny, building a bomb is the only protection against Americans trying to take over their world. Non-proliferation would make more sense if you are not afraid of the Americans.

Again, what would you do? The United States says it is at war, you are the enemy, and it will strike first if it decides that is in its national interest. But that is not likely to happen if you have nuclear weapons. That is a lesson learned for many bad guys -- including Saddam Hussein. It seems that the reason the Iraqi tyrant was pretending to have weapons of mass destruction was not to scare the Americans, but to deter the Iranians.

According to the new book by Michael Gordon and retired general Bernard Trainor, "Cobra II," Saddam was afraid that if Iran knew that Iraq no longer had stocks of poison gas -- both sides used gas in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that ended in 1988 -- then Iran might not be deterred if it had visions of moving into southern Iraq.

President Bush, judging from the 49-page National Security Strategy, seems to have learned no lesson, including the fact that America is not really at war. The government and its volunteer military and the new brand of privatized paramilitary corporations are at war. But the whole thing is just television to most of the citizenry -- at least, those who do not have servicemen and women in the family, or do not have a financial stake in keeping this thing going.

Besides, this adventure is not going to be paid for by us, but by our children and grandchildren, who will be the ones paying the bills. In case you do not follow such things, the national debt has increased by 50 percent during this administration.

"War," to me, is not the most disturbing word in the strategy document. What scares me is the word "our." As in: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." It is not "our" world. It is "the" world, still a planet of nations wallowing in their own history, ambition, fantasies -- and self-interests. The American fantasy these days is that we are better than other people and they all want to be just like us.

What other people want is what we have, "things." Things like cars and iPods, clean water and good health. And they want us to leave them alone or treat them as grown-ups. We are drowning in our own hype. If God really made us so much better than other people, we would have been able to beat the South Koreans and Mexicans in the opening rounds of the World Baseball Classic last week.

http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/columnists/view.bg?articleid=124809









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otraque

03/19/06 12:06 PM

#6716 RE: Amaunet #6714

<<The Iranians are betting that this confrontation - what Graham Allison, a nuclear expert at Harvard University, calls a "slow-motion Cuban missile crisis" - has a good chance of coming out the same way. If so, the problem may go beyond Iran.>. Major mistake in this analogy.
One:Bush is NOT! Kennedy, he has no idea how to do the compromises Kennedy did to kill the crisis( A document declaring we would never invade Cuba, and an understanding we would dismantle the Nukes site in Turkey pointed at Russia--which was dismantled).
People keep analysizing on the basis we have a non-fascist rational regime in place.
Two: immense spin pouring out of the press is Iran must not have the bomb, they will then give it to Zarqawi and/or Al Queda or Iran WILL just commit suicide and launch attack from Iran.
Total rubbish, and an amazing example of how EASSSSSYYYY it is to manipulate people with BS fearmongering.
Iran SHI'ITE--- Al Queda Wannabe Sunni.
Man o man.
Exasperated to the Max.Max:)







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Amaunet

04/05/06 11:53 AM

#7048 RE: Amaunet #6714

Iran Nuclear Sanctions Would Affect Markets
Oxford Analytica 04.05.06, 6:00 AM ET


The United Nations Security Council called on Iran last week to suspend its uranium enrichment program within 30 days. The United States and the European Union, as the next step in their diplomatic offensive against Iran's nuclear program, are seeking to introduce a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, paving the way for some sort of sanctions.

While Russian and Chinese objections will render progress extremely slow, any measures that do emerge are likely to have a significant effect on oil markets:

Gasoline imports. One form of sanctions being touted is a ban on Iranian gasoline imports. Iran is dependent upon such imports for 40% of domestic consumption. However, the government is desperately seeking to reduce gasoline consumption.

In the short term, there would be economic pain. However, Tehran could significantly increase gasoline prices and curb consumption. Furthermore, Iran's porous borders would ensure that a ban on gasoline imports would be of limited effectiveness.

Oil services. Limitations on Iranian access to oil-services companies and technology might eventually produce results. However, the United States owns most of the companies and technology, so such sanctions have already been in place for a long time thanks to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. If the Europeans were to support a ban, this could cause problems, because it is largely through this route that Iran has gained access to such technology. However, such services and technology are increasingly available from China, India and other countries that might pay less heed to sanctions.


Foreign Direct Investment. Sanctions could also inhibit foreign direct investment into the Iranian upstream. Sanctions or U.S. efforts to impose ILSA more forcefully could again be undermined by the fact that much of the new investment is likely to come from Asian oil importers.


Asia is hungry for oil, and Iran is ideally located to supply it. In the last few months, Tehran has very actively wooed Asian oil importers with promises of favorable deals and access to both oil and gas. The eventual effectiveness of any sort of sanctions regime will depend on whether Asian countries rate their trade relations with Iran above concerns about a nuclear Iran and their desire for good U.S. relations.

Tehran has several options if it decides to respond:

Oil pricing. It could switch oil pricing from dollars to euros. The rationale is that, if oil were not priced in dollars, this would weaken the dollar and reduce the inflow of funds to cover the U.S. twin deficits. However, such a move would only have an effect if a lot more oil than the volume of Iranian exports were involved.


Oil exports cut. Tehran could make some sort of reduction in exports, whether overtly or citing "technical problems." Nonetheless, a small reduction in exports would not result in a physical shortage. The precise effect on prices would depend upon the reaction of the paper markets, but they would certainly rise.


Exports ban. The most extreme exports cut would be a complete cessation of crude oil exports. The International Energy Agency has indicated that existing stocks could replace Iranian exports for 18 months, but such claims are quite misleading. Therefore, the resulting physical shortage would push oil prices higher. In any case, regardless of the actual number of wet barrels, the paper markets would instantly raise prices.

Blockade. Iran could retaliate or reinforce its own embargo by closing the Straits of Hormuz, through which a quarter of global oil exports flow. However, such an act would certainly result in military action. A far more serious and realistic threat would be to stop all oil exports from southern Iraq.


The effects on both sides of an oil embargo would be very damaging. However, for Iran, there are mitigating factors. Iran could survive with zero oil exports for far longer than the industrialized oil consumers, particularly those in Asia, could survive without Iranian imports.

An escalation of the crisis to a complete loss of Iranian oil exports is highly unlikely. Less dramatic, but more plausible, are sanctions and responses to them, which are unlikely to have much of an effect on physical supply in the oil market. However, they would probably push prices higher, depending upon the paper markets' reactions. These measures would have less of an effect on the Iranian economy than on oil consumers, leaving the balance of harm in Tehran's favor.

To read an extended version of this article, log on to Oxford Analytica's Web site.

Oxford Analytica is an independent strategic-consulting firm drawing on a network of more than 1,000 scholar experts at Oxford and other leading universities and research institutions around the world. For more information, please visit www.oxan.com. To find out how to subscribe to the firm's Daily Brief Service, click here.




http://www.forbes.com/home/2006/04/04/iran-nuclear-oil-cx_0405oxford.html