Replies to post #6428 on Foreign Correspondence

[otraque]

That is quite significat. Motive? Turkey is death on the issue of an independent Kurdistan, as Kurds really want Kirkuk, Turkish Kurdistan and Iranian Kurdistan, all as one autonomous entity.
I believe both U.S. and Israel see Kurdistan as there firmest and easily most friendly foothold in this Turkey/Iraq/Iran sector, to base operations against Iran.
Turkey has zero tolerance on this issue, so we place another barrel of Nitroglycerine in are 2 trucks moving on a bumping desert road in the blazing sun:)
Reference back to "Wages of Fear" post. Max
p.s. history of Kurds is a fascinating, and a mysterious subject in its own right; but their vociferous claim that they were where they are before all the others seem true.
They take there hisory back beyond the Babylonian Empire regards the land that they say has always been our land.

i have to check, but Palestinians and Hebrews came from the north down to where they ended up, it that may have been Kurdistan---on verified by me--will look into.
But the irony is, there is possibility Hebrews ansd Palestinians were once of the same tribe--history is quite mad, you know:)

[Amaunet]

Three Killed by Bomb in Southeast Turkey
By Amberin Zaman
Ankara
09 March 2006



At least three people were killed and 19 others were injured after a bomb planted by suspected Kurdish rebels exploded in the city of Van in Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast region.


Bomb experts examine crime scene in Van, March 9, 2006
A police officer, a civilian and a suspected suicide bomber were killed in the blast that targeted a police vehicle as it drove past the local governor's office.

Turkish security officials say they believe the bomber had strapped the device to his body. Three of the injured are reported to be in critical condition.

The attack comes only days after rebels of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK killed four police officers in the southeastern town of Batman. The rebels have stepped up attacks in recent months in a bid to pressure the government to sit down at the negotiating table. Turkey says it will not talk with terrorists.

The PKK, which launched its armed campaign initially for Kurdish independence, then autonomy, has been labeled a terrorist group by the European Union and the United States as well as the Turkish government. The rebels, whose leaders are based in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq are demanding that Turkey end the solitary confinement of their leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is being held in an island prison off the coast of Istanbul. They also want an amnesty that would cover all PKK members including their leaders.

In a separate development, Turkey's main Kurdish party, the Democratic People's Party on Monday called on the government to introduce instruction in the Kurdish language as part of the national curriculum. Bowing to pressure from the European Union, which it hopes to join, Turkey has eased restrictions on the Kurdish language. The language can now be taught at private language instruction schools. Both state and private radio and television stations can now broadcast in Kurdish for limited periods. The contents of the broadcasts are strictly censored.

Analysts warn the escalation in rebel violence may discourage the government from making further concessions to the Kurds amid mounting nationalist sentiment across the country.

http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-03-09-voa24.cfm

[Amaunet]

Civil war and Kurds in Iraq
Onder Aytac & Emre Uslu



Last week's bombing of the revered Shiite al-Askari Mosque in Samara, Iraq has brought the country to the verge of a civil war. Al-Qaeda operatives' strategic terror attacks and complicated power relations with the sectarian elements of Iraq could make a possible civil war particularly bloody. As of now, although there appears to be a civil war looming between the Shiite and Sunni Arabs, unless it's prevented from happening the Kurds will be the target of a civil war as well within a couple of months.

Since the main motivation of the current conflict is to gain power, the most attractive targets are naturally the ethnic elements with the greatest power. From this perspective, a provocative al-Qaeda bombing in northern Iraq, such as the one of al-Askari Mosque, will come as no surprise to us.

Should there be a civil war, two key questions are deeply related to the Kurds' position in it: What would the U.S.' policy be if civil war erupted and how would the Kurds react to it? Would they declare their independence and take over the city of Kirkuk, or do they have any other options? What would the Arabs' attitude towards the Kurds be?

The answer to these questions, unfortunately, is not an optimistic one. The Pentagon's strategy for a possible civil war is based on the idea that U.S. troops won't intervene. Even withdrawing from Iraq until the civil war ended is among the options discussed by the Pentagon. Their plans indicate that in the case of a civil war either the U.S. army will be relocated to northern Iraq, the Kurdish region, or it will pull out of the country.

In either case it's very likely that the Kurds would declare their independence and try to incorporate the city of Kirkuk into their independent Kurdistan. Events over the last two years have shown that once the Kurds seized the city they would implement every possible policy, including ethnic cleansing, to get rid of the other ethnic elements in the city, namely the Arabs and the Turkmens. This would foster additional hostility among the Sunni and the Shiite Arabs towards the Kurds. As both the Sunnis and the Shiites see the Kurds as agents of the U.S., they don't trust them. Moreover, they see Kurdish independence as the establishment of a second Israel in the region, which, of course, isn't an idea welcomed by either side. We all know the Sunnis' position towards Kurdish independence. They won't accept it. Above all, if the Kurds push to take over the city of Kirkuk, the Arabs will fight for it.

The Shiites position, on the other hand, is very close to that of the Sunnis, as radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr stated on Feb. 18 on Aljazeera TV. When he was asked about Kirkuk, al-Sadr replied, "The Kurdistan confederacy was established in the north because of the then dictatorship. When the foreign occupation ends and a democratic state is established in Iraq with freedom of belief and freedom of peoples, there will be no reason to maintain a separate provincial confederacy. And it won't need to demand Kirkuk; the city belongs to all of Iraq and all must equally benefit from it." He further suggested "it be kept as a province and an example of communal harmony, rather than being partitioned by an ethnic group." This view is pretty much shared by all Arabs in Iraq.

Given this complicated situation, any Kurdish attempt towards independence or taking control of Kirkuk would blow up all of Iraq. However we should all recognize that the Kurds have no choice other than to declare independence.

It would be a total vicious circle for the Kurds to go through a civil war. It won't matter whether U.S. troops are relocated to northern Iraq or pulled out of Iraq completely. In any case, the Kurds would be targeted for their collaboration with the U.S. The U.S. presence in their region means that al-Qaeda would concentrate its attacks on this region. Without the U.S.' presence, al-Qaeda and other Arabs would drag an independent Kurdistan into a civil war.

In the event of a civil war, the only exit for the Kurds is the Turkish border, which has unfortunately, been blocked by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Kurdish leaders don't seem to understand the fact that they will eventually need Turkey and that the PKK's presence is destroying the bridge between the Iraqi Kurdish region and Turkey which is vitally important to the Kurds in Iraq. The Kurds should wake up to the fact that the U.S. support won't help them; it's only making the Kurds a second Israel, without a harbor, surrounded by hostile neighboring countries. The best option for the Kurds in Iraq is to prevent a civil war. All other options would be a dead end for them once a civil war erupted.
The New Anatolian
11 March 2006
2006-03-11 15:27:07

Updated 24/7 - 365 days
Journal of Turkish Weekly is an ISRO (USAK) publication
ISRO is an Ankara based NGO


http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=1961

[Amaunet]

Scheme to sour Turkey's relationship with their military

Erdogan: Let's find out who is behind this scheme

Background:

Turkey must reduce the influence of its military in order to join the EU.

In the case of Turkey, even a superficial knowledge of the post-World-War II political and military history suggests that the military has not only intervened when a political crisis occurred in the form of a political stalemate, but also when Kemalist principles, especially that of secularism, have been threatened.

In general, the Turkish military can be characterized as moderately conservative, because it tends to retain the existing order, but at the same time it does not hesitate to remedy the state's malfunctions.

The CFR, a powerful organization that runs the State Department, Bush and everyone else has recommended among other things a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
#msg-6403472

A Kurdish state is an idea long abhorred by Turkey and I would have to think be considered a 'state malfunction'.

Apparently there is a threat to Turkey’s ‘stability, trust, and peace’ which would have far reaching consequences for Iraq, the Eu, the US and the world.

-Am


Erdogan: Let's find out who is behind this scheme



The one hour Monday meeting between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and General Hilmi Ozkok of the Turkish Armed Forces included a call by Erdogan to find out which forces are behind a scheme to "disturb the stability, trust, and peace" of Turkey. With echoes still resounding through Ankara from a list of allegations against General Buyukanit of the Turkish Land Forces, allegations launched by Van Prosecutor Ferhat Sarikaya, Erdogan reportedly relayed to Ozkok his government's absolute determination to get to the bottom of the "baseless" accusations against Buyukanit.

Further muddying the case is the fact that this week it was revealed that an AKP MP in charge of the Turkish Parliament's Semdinli Commission was in fact the one who sent detailed lists of commission proceedings and testimonies to the Van Prosecutor, who then used these details in his list of allegations.

Speaking later this week at an AKP meeting, Erdogan was quoted as saying "There are those who wish for our (AKP) relation with the military to sour. There are those who wish the atmosphere to become angry between us. But they will not succeed. We will not let them."

Sources close to the government report that Erdogan's urgent meeting with Ozkok was enough to convince the general and thus the military not to come out sharply against the current administration in light of the recent happenings.

http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/4057490.asp?gid=74



References:

Turkey: National Security Council appointment indicates reform hesitations
5 August 2003
The decision of the Turkish parliament to pass the seventh package of reforms marks a significant step forward in Turkey's aspirations to join the European Union. However, while the measures to reduce the influence of the military in Turkish politics have been well received internationally, everything will depend upon whether Turkey presses ahead with implementing the changes. The recent meeting of the Supreme Military Council, during which a military official was appointed to the post of Secretary-General of the National Security Council, indicates that the there is still some hesitancy within the General Staff about relinquishing its power.

Seventh reform package reduces influence of military
The significant role of the Turkish military in politics has long been a source of friction between Turkey and the European Union. Quite apart from the three coups that have taken place since 1960 (four if one includes the intervention that forced out an Islamist-led government in 1997), the General Staff also exerts considerable influence over the day-to-day policies of the country. Every month the National Security Council (MGK), a constitutionally mandated body chaired by the president, brings senior government ministers before the heads of the various branches of the armed forces, giving the generals a chance to present their views on a whole range of issues - views that the government ignores at its peril.

While it has long been known that Turkey could not join the European Union as long as the military held such power, the generals had always been hesitant about allowing any changes to the system. However, the December 2002 decision of the European Union to review Turkey's application for membership in late 2004, with a view to starting formal membership negotiations by 2005, seems to have given the generals a spur to accept the need for reform. At the end of July, the parliament finally passed a series of reforms that will reduce the role of the military in Turkish life. From now on the MGK will cease to be an executive body, becoming purely advisory in nature, political representation on the Council will be increased and the administration of the body, the secretariat, will be handed over to civilian administration.

Military keeps control of National Security Council
While the passing of the seventh reform package is certainly welcomed, it is the implemented of the reforms that really matters. Already there are indications are that the military are hesitant about releasing their grip on politics. At the start of August every year the Higher Military Council (YAS) meets to decide on new appointments within the hierarchy of the armed forces. This year was special insofar as General Tuncer Kilinc, who controversially called for closer ties with Russia and Iran during his term of office, finally retired as Secretary-General of the National Security Council. In light of the reform package, many expected that the post would be handed over to a civilian. However, the General Staff instead opted to appoint another military figure to the post, General Sukru Sariisik - the former commander of the Fifth Army Corps and a former head of Turkish forces in Cyprus.

Already there have been justifications for the decision. Some have argued that it would have been too ambitious to replace the military dominated structure of the MGK with a new civilian-led hierarchy so quickly and that a civilian will be appointed to the post next year. Others have stressed that it is not important who holds the post. What is more important is the fact that according to the reform package the National Security Council will cease to have the powerful role that it has had in the past. The post of Secretary-General is now more symbolic than before. The problem is that symbolism is important. Apart from the fact that the European Union will want to see firm proof that the military have indeed stepped back from politics, they will also want to see the military give a clear signal to society that they have stepped back. The recent decision clearly falls short of this.

General Staff has one year to accept changes
This shortcoming is certainly not missed by the government. However, they will not press the issue at this stage. Although the reforms have passed the parliament they have yet to receive final approval from President Sezer, a close ally of the military. If the government presses too hard for implementation, the General Staff may be tempted to pressure the president to return the reform package back to the parliament for wider reconsideration. Already there have been hints that the generals are not happy about many of the provisions of the package and may be looking for alterations. If this were to happen it would cast an even greater cloud on the reform package than the appointment of another military secretary-general of the MGK.

It is perhaps for this reason that Ali Sahin, the deputy prime minister, appeared to step back from any confrontation with the military over the issue of the appointment. Countering the criticism that the decision to appoint General Sariishik amounted to blow to reform efforts Mr Sahin noted that it was not mandatory to have a civilian in the post. This is correct, but in reality the EU will expect to see a civilian appointed by the time it considers Turkey's request for the start of membership talks.


James Ker-Lindsay

http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:RfN2pvX40bMJ:www.civilitasresearch.org/publications/view_articl....




In the case of Turkey, even a superficial knowledge of the post-World-War II political and military history suggests that the military has not only intervened when a political crisis occurred in the form of a political stalemate, but also when Kemalist principles, especially that of secularism, have been threatened. In fact, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic in 1923, included in the country's constitution the military's role as the sole "defender and protector of the constitution and of republican and honest civilian rule," he basically legitimized the military's intervention in politics (Perlmutter, 1977, p.111).
Therefore, praetorianism in Turkey must be perceived as a state in which the military "specifically, exercises independent political power, either by using force or by threatening to do so" (Hale, 1994, p.305). Although the army's composition changes over time, it is possible to discern patterns in the way Turkey's military functions. In general, the Turkish military can be characterized as moderately conservative, because it tends to retain the existing order, but at the same time it does not hesitate to remedy the state's malfunctions.
The army that has assumed the role of the guardian is underpinned by two legacies: "that it is above politics and [that it should] prevent changes in the political system" (Huntington, 1991, p.232). These legacies pose a dilemma for the army's actions. The causes of military intervention cannot be disposed of only by exterminating people, since military intervention is not a "temporary and extraordinary disruption of the political system," but an almost inevitable part of the process of modernization. The army has to create such conditions and institutions that will not make it necessary for it to reintervene. It also has to minimize the retaliation prospect stemming from the party, whose administration the generals initially terminated. Therefore, the army has to remain in politics sometimes for longer than it wants and create viable or auxiliary administrative institutions, as the Turkish experience reveals, with the most prominent example being that of the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) after the 1960 coup.
In order to bring about a condition of political stability the army needs to engage in a process of transforming military intervention into "military participation" through the creation of political institutions and the gradual elimination of officers from civilian posts (Huntington, 1968, p.243). Such a process legitimizes the army's presence in the political arena, although in Turkey, Kemal legitimized their intervention in politics in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the generals after every coup have been worried about the legitimacy of their intervention.
http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:0ZAQOy8uYcYJ:jspc.library.wisc.edu/issues/1998-1999/article5.ht....