Replies to post #6393 on Foreign Correspondence

[otraque]

<<What does this really mean, I wonder?>. The only hint we have is Chalabi said Jaafari "Should be given a chance"

Muqtada has been playing an aggressive chess strategy, one of which was to take in Chalabi when U.S. kicked him out--(Jaafari was kept in his position by a power play by al Sadr.)
This was, it now seems, a master stroke, because now U.S. wants Chalabi back!!
Problem? Yes, as Chalabi, exists now on the yeh or nay of al Sadr(who is tight with Iran given that Iran will accept a united Iraq if it is anti-U.S.)

Let's see what Chalabi and Sadr have in common or have over each other??
They both strongly are for a united Iraq in which Baathist will have NO power, zero power.

Chalabi will agree to sectarian government(or else)

Chalabi only hope for power is Sadr, he is dependent on Sadr; if Chalabi made a move to re-ally with U.S. his life span will become very short,imo

What has Sadr done here, he has brought in a master manipulator and put a chain on his ankle.

Sunni public, non-Baathist, regards Sadr as he is the ONLY Shi'ite they can trust.

Sadr has absolutely no tolerance for Allawist, Saddamist, foreign Jihadist.

What is Sadr's ambition???? To get the Sunni population to break with Baathist/Saddamist/Jihadist and he will give all his power to fighting side by side with the Sunni to get the U.S. out of Iraq.

What are the Iraqi religious Sunni's fear??? The Mahdi army is their fear. When Sadr was in Lebanon when the Dome matter happened, the Mahdi did attack Sunni mosques, they were brought under control once Sadr rushed back to Iraq.

Sadr must win trust of non-Baathist(or loyalist to Baathist)Sunnis that he is where to come to fight U.S.

so as to <<<<What does this really mean, I wonder?>.

It means Sadr himself is very confident about the game he is playing, and his game is AGAINST the U.S.

So, if can put acts behind his mouth, he is about to make some strong maneuver, what it is?? Yikes, Muqtada is ahead of me, for sure:)
I don't know what it really means.

But let's reduce Sadr to a bottomline bottomline, as simple as possible, he is non-secularist that does NOT want Civil War, but wants a united Islamic based Iraq that is absent the U.S.

Important to note also, Muqtada has none of al Queda's ambition to use global terrorism, he is quite anti-Al Queda.

[Amaunet]

Talabani Postpones Decision on Parliament

Updated 10:17 AM ET March 7, 2006

Listen to Audio Clip




By SINAN SALAHEDDIN

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Iraq's president postponed a decision Tuesday on when to call the new parliament into session after the dominant Shiite alliance requested a delay to resolve a deadlock over the composition of the government.

Meanwhile, a new video showing three of the four hostage Christian Peacemaker activists was broadcast on Arab television, although American Tom Fox was not depicted.

A surge of sectarian violence has complicated the already snarled negotiations to form a government reflecting Iraq's main ethnic and religious communities, which the United States and its allies hope will stabilize the country so they can start pulling out troops. Scattered bombings, mortar blasts and gunfire killed another 11 people.

The senior British general in Baghdad, Lt. Gen. Nick Houghton, told The Daily Telegraph that most of Britain's 8,000 troops could be withdrawn by the middle of 2008. Britain's Defense Ministry, however, described that as just one possible scenario.

Prime Minister Tony Blair and senior government officials have consistently refused to pin down dates for ending the troop presence in Iraq, and Blair's spokesman said there were "all sorts of possible scenarios" for pulling troops out of Iraq but all depended on the conditions on the ground.

President Jalal Talabani's failed bid to order parliament into session on March 12 _ the deadline set by the constitution _ raised questions about whether the political process can withstand the unrelenting violence or if Iraq will disintegrate into civil war.

A political committee representing the seven Shiite parties that make up the United Iraqi Alliance, the largest group in parliament, sent Talabani a letter Tuesday asking him to delay the first session until there is agreement on who should occupy top government positions, said Khaled al-Attiyah, an independent member of the Alliance. Parliament speaker Hajim al-Hassani told reporters a new date will be set Thursday.

"Talks are still under way between the main blocs in the coming parliament," he said. "We hope that during the coming days, we will be able to reach a basic level of agreement on when to call the Council of Representatives to convene."

The talks have deadlocked over the second-term candidacy of Shiite Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, whose most powerful supporter is the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The Sunni Arab minority blames al-Jaafari for failing to control Shiite militiamen _ including al-Sadr followers _ who attacked Sunni mosques and clerics after the Feb. 22 bombing of a sacred Shiite shrine in Samarra. Kurds are angry because they believe al-Jaafari is holding up resolution of their claims to control the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

In a bid to force a showdown in the dispute, Talabani, a Kurd, said Monday he would order parliament into session March 12 for the first time since the December elections and the Feb. 12 ratification of the results. Such a meeting would have started a 60-day countdown for lawmakers to elect a president, approve al-Jaafari's nomination as prime minister, and sign off on his Cabinet.

Talabani was mistakenly counting on the signature of Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite, who lost his own bid for the prime minister's nomination by one vote to al-Jaafari. Talabani had in hand a power of attorney from the other vice president, Ghazi al-Yawer, a Sunni, who was out of the country.

The Shiite bloc closed ranks and Abdul-Mahdi declined to sign, for now. In an emergency meeting Monday with Talabani, seven Shiite leaders rejected the president's demand for them to abandon al-Jaafari's nomination. Talabani planned to continue the meeting Tuesday evening to try to resolve the crisis.

The president first issued the challenge March 1 in concert with Sunni Arab and some secular politicians.

"We want a prime minister who can gather all the political blocs around him, so that the government would be one of national unity," Talabani told reporters in Baghdad on Monday.

Shiite leaders are themselves divided over al-Jaafari's bid to remain prime minister even though they managed to come together Monday night to reject the move to drop him.

There were reports that al-Sadr, the firebrand cleric whose backing had insured al-Jaafari's nomination at the Shiite caucus last month, had threatened to order parliamentarians loyal to him to boycott the March 12 session if Abdul-Mahdi, the Shiite vice president, had signed the order to convene the legislature.

The Chicago-based Christian Peacemaker Teams said it did not know what to make of Fox's absence from the silent, 25-second video broadcast by Al-Jazeera television.

The three other hostages shown on the tape dated Feb. 28 were James Loney, 41, and Harmeet Singh Sooden, 32, of Canada; and Norman Kember, 74, of London. Al-Jazeera said the exhausted-looking men appealed to their governments to work for their release.

The previously unknown Swords of Righteousness Brigades claimed responsibility for kidnapping Fox, 54, of Clear Brook, Va., and the other activists, who disappeared Nov. 26 in Baghdad. The group said in its Tuesday statement that 14,600 Iraqis are "currently detained illegally by the Multinational Forces in Iraq."

The activists were last seen together on a video broadcast by Al-Jazeera on Jan. 28 and dated seven days earlier. At that time, Al-Jazeera reported the captors said it was the "last chance" for U.S. and Iraqi authorities to release all Iraqi prisoners, or else the hostages would be killed.

Also still held hostage in Iraq is American reporter Jill Carroll, 28, who the Iraqi interior minister has said was being held by the Islamic Army in Iraq, the insurgent group that freed two French journalists in 2004 after four months in captivity. The freelance reporter for The Christian Science Monitor was still alive, although the deadline set by her captors for the U.S. to meet their demands expired late last month.

More than 250 foreigners have been taken hostage in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein, and at least 39 have been killed.

Iraq's political infighting has left a dangerous leadership vacuum in Iraq, underlined by the continuing violence.

Assailants attacked a Sunni mosque in the western Ghazaliyah neighborhood of Baghdad with guns and grenades Tuesday, killing a guard and torching two rooms, police said. The gunmen ambushed police when they responded, wounding five officers.

In the same neighborhood, a mortar shell wounded a worshipper leaving a Shiite mosque after dawn prayers _ one of several rounds that slammed into the city.

Two bombs targeting U.S. patrols in two other neighborhoods killed at least one civilian bystander and injured five others, police said. There were no reports of American casualties.

Police said four Iraqi officers were killed in two separate attacks on police patrols in Baqouba and Beiji, north of Baghdad. The assailants were not identified.

Two car bombs exploded almost simultaneously at separate sites in the mostly Shiite city of Hillah, south of Baghdad, wounding at least three people, police said.

Gunmen shot and killed a Baghdad International Airport employee as he drove through the city, and police found four more bullet-ridden bodies _ two of them with their eyes gouged out.

On Monday, snipers assassinated Maj. Gen. Mibder Hatim al-Dulaimi, the Sunni Arab in charge of Iraqi forces protecting the capital. A torrent of bombings and other shootings killed 25 other Iraqis.


http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pri&dt=060307&cat=news&st=newsd8g6q8c01&src=...

[Amaunet]

Blaming the victims as Iraq disintegrates
By Stephen Zunes

Mar 9, 2006

(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)

The sectarian violence which has swept across Iraq following last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite Golden Mosque in Samarra is yet another example of the tragic consequences of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Until the 2003 US invasion and occupation, Iraq had maintained a longstanding history of secularism and a strong national identity among its Arab population despite its sectarian differences.

Not only has the United States failed to bring a functional democracy to Iraq, neither US forces nor the US-backed Iraqi government in Baghdad have been able to provide the Iraqi people with basic security. This has led many ordinary citizens to turn to extremist sectarian groups for protection, further undermining the Bush administration's insistence that US forces must remain in Iraq in order to prevent a civil war.

Top analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department, as well as large numbers of Middle East experts, warned that a US invasion of Iraq could result in a violent ethnic and sectarian conflict. Even some of the war's intellectual architects acknowledged as much: in a 1997 paper, prior to becoming major figures in the Bush foreign policy team, David Wurmser, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith predicted that a post-Saddam Iraq would likely be "ripped apart" by sectarianism and other cleavages but called on the US to "expedite" such a collapse anyway.

As a result, the tendency in the US to blame "sectarian conflict" and "long-simmering hatreds" for the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq is, in effect, blaming the victim.

Fostering fragmentation
One of the longstanding goals of such neo-conservative intellectuals has been to see the Middle East broken up into smaller ethnic or sectarian mini-states, which would include not only large stateless nationalities like the Kurds, but Maronite Christians, Druze, Arab Shi'ites and others.

Such a policy comes not out of respect for the right of self-determination - indeed, the neo-cons have been steadfast opponents of the Palestinians' desire for statehood, even alongside a secure Israel - but out of an imperial quest for divide-and-rule.

The division of the Middle East has long been seen as a means of countering the threat of pan-Arab nationalism and, more recently, pan-Islamist movements. Given the mosaic of ethnicities and sects in the Middle East, with various groupings having mixed together within both urban and rural settings for many generations, the establishment of such ethnic or sectarian mini-states would almost certainly result in forced population transfers, ethnic cleansing and other human suffering.

The risk of Iraq breaking up into a Sunni Kurdish state, a Sunni Arab state and a Shi'ite Arab state is now very real. And, given the intermixing of these populations in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and scores of other cities, the potential exists for the most violent breakup of a country since the partition of India 60 years ago. Recent weeks have shown ominous signs of what may be yet to come on a massive scale, as scores of Shi'ite families were forced to flee what were once mixed neighborhoods in and around Baghdad.

Even barring a formal breakup of the country, the prospects of a stable, unified country look bleak. As the Los Angeles Times reported on February 26, "The outlines of a future Iraq are emerging: a nation where power is scattered among clerics turned warlords; control over schools, hospitals, railroads, and roads is divided along sectarian lines; graft and corruption subvert good governance; and foreign powers exert influence only over a weak central government."

Much of Iraq's current divisions can be traced to the decision of US occupation authorities immediately following the conquest to abolish the Iraqi army and purge the government bureaucracy - both bastions of secularism - thereby creating a vacuum which was soon filled by sectarian parties and militias.

In addition, the US occupation authorities - in an apparent effort of divide-and-rule - encouraged sectarianism by dividing up authority based not on technical skills or ideological affiliation but ethnic and religious identity. As with Lebanon, however, such efforts have actually exacerbated divisions, with virtually every political question debated not on its merits, but on which group it potentially benefits or harms. This has led to great instability, with political parties, parliamentary blocs and government ministries breaking down along sectarian lines.

Even army divisions are separated, with parts of western Baghdad being patrolled by army units dominated by Sunnis while eastern Baghdad is being patrolled by Shi'ite-dominated units. Without unifying national institutions, the breakup of the country remains a real possibility.

Sectarian conflicts
Theologically, there are fewer differences between Sunnis and Shi'ites than there are between Catholics and Protestants. In small Iraqi towns of mixed populations with only one mosque, Sunnis and Shi'ites worship together. Intermarriage is not uncommon. This harmony is now threatening to unravel.

Shi'ite Muslims, unlike the Sunni Muslims, have a clear hierarchy. (Ayatollahs, for example, are essentially the equivalent of Catholic cardinals.) As a result, the already-existing clerical-based social structures in the Shi'ite community were among the few organizations to survive Saddam's totalitarian regime and were therefore more easily capable of organizing themselves politically when US forces overthrew the government in Baghdad in 2003. Sunni and secular groupings, then, found themselves at a relative disadvantage when they suddenly found themselves free to organize.

As a result, the US initially insisted on indefinite rule by Iraqis picked directly or indirectly by Washington. However, when hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites took to the streets in January 2004 demanding the right to choose their country's leaders, the Bush administration reluctantly agreed to hold direct elections.

Having been dominated by Sunnis under the Ba'athists, the Hashemites and the Ottomans, the Shi'ite majority was eager to rule. Not surprisingly, elections have brought Shi'ite religious parties to power which have since marginalized other groups and imposed their repressive and misogynist version of Islamic law in parts of Iraq where they dominate, particularly in the south of the country.

Sunni opposition to Shi'ite dominance does not just stem from resentment at losing their privileged position in Iraqi political life under the former dictatorship. Indeed, Saddam suppressed his fellow Sunni Arabs along with Sunni Kurds and Shi'ite Arabs.

What US officials have failed to recognize is that Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, regardless of its feelings about Saddam's regime, has long identified with Arab nationalism. Not surprisingly, the armed resistance which emerged following Saddam's removal from power three years ago has come largely from the Sunni Arab community.

The insurgency has also targeted the US-backed Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government, which came to power as a result of the US invasion and which many see as being puppets of the US occupation. They also fear that the Iraqi government may identify more with their fellow Shi'ites of Iran than with other Arabs. More radical Sunni chauvinists, many of whom are foreign Salafi extremists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have engaged in widespread terrorist attacks again Shi'ite civilians and their holy places.

Despite its dependence on the US and ties to Iran, however, the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government has its own agenda. Culturally and linguistically, Iraq's Shi'ites are every bit as Arab as the Sunnis. Yet while the vast majority of the country's Shi'ite Arab majority has no desire to be pawns of either Iran or the US, the response by the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and Shi'ite militias has done little to lessen Sunni fears and hostility.

Seeing their government faced with a growing insurgency and their community falling victim to terrorist violence, the Shi'ites have responded with aggressive counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations against the Sunni community. Human rights abuses by Shi'ites against the Sunni minority have increased dramatically, polarizing the country still further.

Even before the latest upsurge in sectarian violence, the Baghdad morgue was reporting that dozens of bodies of Sunni men with gunshot wounds to the back of the head would arrive at the same time every week, including scores of corpses with wrists bound by police handcuffs.

Death squads
John Pace, the outgoing head of the United Nations' human rights monitoring group in Iraq, has reported that hundreds of Sunnis are being subjected to summary execution and death from torture every month by Iraqi government death squads, primarily controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.

High-ranking American officers have reported that radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's al-Mehdi Army maintains a strong presence in the regular police force, including up to 90% of the 35,000 officers currently working in the northeastern part of Baghdad. In addition, the Iranian-trained Badr Organization dominates police commando units. A police unit known as the Punishment Committee goes after civilians believed to be flouting Islamic laws or the authority of Shi'ite militia leaders, particularly Sunnis.

The Shi'ite government of Iran, long cited for its human rights abuses by both the Bush administration and reputable human rights organizations, has actively supported Shi'ite militias within the Iraqi government and security forces. (Despite this, the Bush administration and its supporters, including many prominent Democrats, have been putting forth the ludicrous theory that Iran is actually supporting the anti-Shi'ite and anti-American Sunni insurgency.)

Iraq's former interior minister Bayan Jabr was trained by Iran's infamous Revolutionary Guards and later served as a leader of the Badr Organization, the militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

Americans have also trained Interior Ministry police and commandos, though - unlike some notorious cases in recent Latin American history - there is little evidence to suggest that US trainers have actively encouraged death squad activity.

Still, there is little question that actions by US occupation troops over the past three years - such as the torture of detainees, the hair-trigger response at checkpoints, the liberal use of force in heavily-populated civilian neighborhoods and the targeted assassinations of suspected insurgent leaders - have contributed to the climate of impunity exhibited by forces of the Iraqi government.

Pace has also observed how US troops are making things worse by rounding up large numbers of innocent young Sunni men and detaining them for months. Noting how such "military intervention causes serious human rights and humanitarian problems to large numbers of innocent civilians", he lamented at the fact that many of these detainees, in reaction to their maltreatment, later joined Sunni terrorist groups following their release.

Despite last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite shrine and the tragic killings that followed, however, there were also impressive signs of unity. In cities throughout Iraq, Sunnis and Shi'ites mobilized to protect each other's mosques and neighborhoods.

Even the young firebrand Shi'ite cleric Muqtada emphasized to his followers, "It was not the Sunnis who attacked the shrine ... but rather the occupation [forces] and Ba'athists." He called on his followers not to attack Sunni mosques and ordered his Mehdi Army to "protect both Shi'ite and Sunni shrines". He went on to say, "My message to the Iraqi people is to stand united and bonded, and not to fall into the Western trap. The West is trying to divide the Iraqi people." In a later interview, Muqtada claimed, "We say that the occupiers are responsible for such crises [Golden Mosque bombing] ... there is only one enemy. The occupier."

Similarly, Sunnis were quick to express their solidarity with Shi'ites in a series of demonstrations in Samarra and elsewhere. Anti-American signs and slogans permeated these marches. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that it was the US, not fellow Muslims or Iraqis, which bears responsibility for the tragedy.

Even Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi claimed the US was responsible for the bombing of the Golden Mosque, "especially since occupation forces did not comply with curfew orders imposed by the Iraqi government". He added, "Evidence indicates that the occupation may be trying to undermine and weaken the Iraqi government."

Though charges of a US conspiracy are presumably groundless, it does underscore the growing opposition by both communities to the ongoing US military presence in their country and how the United States has little credibility left with either community as a mediator, peacekeeper, overseer or anything else.

And it underscores the urgency for the United States to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.

Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus. He is a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco and the author of Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).

(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus )

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC09Ak01.html