Rambus (RMBS)

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`<font color=green>1:00-cv-00792 Micron v. Rambus
U.S. District Court
District of Delaware (Wilmington)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00-cv-00792-KAJ

03/03/2006 724 Letter to The Honorable Kent A. Jordan from Mary B. Graham regarding Motion for Expedited Consideration - re 721 MOTION to Expedite Consideration of Rambus's Motion to Enjoin Micron From Pursuing the Essentially Duplicative Action It Recently Filed Against Rambus in the Eastern District of Virginia, 723 Letter,. (Graham, Mary) (Entered: 03/03/2006)

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MORRIS , NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
1201 NORTH MARKET STREET
P.O. BOX 1347
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19899-1347
302 658 9200
302 658 3989 FAX

MARY B. GRAHAM
[phone]

March 3, 2006

VIA HAND DELIVERY AND ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Kent A. Jordan
United States District Court
Federal Building
844 King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: Micron Technologies, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., C.A. No. 00-792 (KAJ)

Dear Judge Jordan:

This letter responds to Micron’s letter of earlier today (D.I. 723) opposing Rambus’s motion for expedited consideration of Rambus’s Motion to Enjoin Micron From Pursuing the Essentially Duplicative Action It Recently Filed in the Eastern District of Virginia (“Motion to Enjoin”) (D.I. 718). Rambus has requested moderately expedited briefing that would require Micron to file its response to the Motion to Enjoin in eight days, rather than two weeks, with Rambus filing a reply five days later (D.I. 721). Ignoring both the consequences(not only to Rambus, but also this Court) of a duplicative action and its own obvious strategy to expedite the prejudicial duplication, Micron argues that faster briefing is not needed because Rambus has “not shown that it will suffer prejudice if the normal briefing schedule is followed.”

The prejudice to Rambus is the reason for the long-standing, fundamental tenant of federal jurisdiction that a party is not required to defend itself against the same claims, made by the same party, in two different federal courts. See Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941) By filing its duplicative action in the Virginia “rocket docket,” Micron plainly intends to take advantage of the accelerated procedures in that court, which will mean that Rambus will be simultaneously involved in pretrial and discovery matters for the very same issues in two different federal courts; and two courts simultaneously will be considering the same issues relating to discovery and the merits of the dispute. Rambus’s response to the complaint in the Virginia Action is due on March 28, and the parties will then be embroiled in discovery and other pre-trial matters, which would culminate in a Rule 16 conference that would most likely occur in early May. Of course, that estimate of timing assumes that Micron does not attempt to shorten the customary timeline, a commitment it has not made. At the same time, Rambus and Micron would be proceeding with essentially duplicative discovery here in preparation for a trial on the same issues, in early October 2006. This is precisely the prejudice that Crosley and the long standing rules against claim splitting seek to avoid, and is the only harm that Rambus need show for its Motion to Enjoin to be granted. Rambus is not required to show irreparable harm or prejudice; rather it must show only that Micron’s claims in Virginia are duplicative of claims it has made here. See Motion to Enjoin at 15 (citing Katz v. Siegler, 909 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). In its Motion to Enjoin, Rambus made such a showing. See D.I. 719 at 9-10 and Exh. A.

Micron would conflate Rambus’s Motion to Enjoin with its recently filed Motion to Transfer (“Motion to Transfer”) (D.I. 712). Ignoring that it was the one to have chosen both Delaware and Virginia to decide the same dispute, Micron characterizes the Motion to Enjoin as a mere disagreement about “where disputes between the parties should be heard.” (D.I. 723.) This is not the case. Through its Motion to Enjoin, Rambus seeks to prevent Micron from litigating the same claims in two different courts, regardless of whether this case is heard in Delaware or is eventually transferred California, as Rambus has requested. This is not a venue dispute; the issue is whether Rambus should be required to endure the “the vexation of subsequent litigation over the same subject matter.” Crosley, 122 F.2d at 930. That is the very vexation and prejudice that Rambus will endure if forced to answer the complaint in Virginia and proceed with discovery there.

In its letter to the Court, Micron showed no indication that it does not plan to proceed on an accelerated basis in the Virginia Action. Indeed, when Rambus requested a thirtyday extension to answer or otherwise plead in the Virginia Action, Micron agreed only to a twoweek extension, a schedule that requires Rambus to answer the Virginia complaint shortly after briefing on the Motion to Enjoin would be completed under the local rule schedule. A nonexpedited schedule might be appropriate if Micron agreed, with the Virginia court’s approval, to stay the Virginia Action until the Motion to Enjoin is resolved by this Court. But Micron has so
far refused to agree to such a proposal.

Rambus therefore respectfully requests that Micron be ordered to file a response to Rambus’s Motion to Enjoin by March 8, and that Rambus’s Motion for Expedited Consideration otherwise be granted.

Respectfully,
/s/ Mary B. Graham
Mary B. Graham (#2256)

MBG/dam
Enclosure
cc: Clerk of the Court (via electronic filing)
Frederick L. Cottrell, III, Esquire (via hand delivery)
Matthew D. Powers, Esquire (via facsimile)
Gregory P. Stone, Esquire
V. Bryan Medlock, Esquire
509624