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Elizabeth O'Bagy: On the Front Lines of Syria's Civil War

The conventional wisdom—that jihadists are running the rebellion—is not what I've witnessed on the ground.

By ELIZABETH O'BAGY August 30, 2013, 6:59 p.m. ET Comments (179)

With the U.S. poised to attack Syria, debate is raging over what that attack should look like, and what, if anything, the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. Those questions can't be answered without taking a very close look at the situation in Syria from ground level.

Since few journalists are reporting from inside the country, our understanding of the civil war is not only inadequate, but often dangerously inaccurate. Anyone who reads the paper or watches the news has been led to believe that a once peaceful, pro-democracy opposition has transformed over the past two years into a mob of violent extremists dominated by al Qaeda; that the forces of President Bashar Assad not only have the upper hand on the battlefield, but may be the only thing holding the country together; and that nowhere do U.S. interests align in Syria—not with the regime and not with the rebels. The word from many American politicians is that the best U.S. policy is to stay out. As Sarah Palin .. http://topics.wsj.com/person/P/Sarah-Palin/4347 .. put it: "Let Allah sort it out."


Free Syrian Army members man a checkpoint in the Aleppo countryside in June.

In the past year, I have made numerous trips to Syria, traveling throughout the northern provinces of Latakia, Idlib and Aleppo. I have spent hundreds of hours with Syrian opposition groups ranging from Free Syrian Army affiliates to the Ahrar al-Sham Brigade.

The conventional wisdom holds that the extremist elements are completely mixed in with the more moderate rebel groups. This isn't the case. Moderates and extremists wield control over distinct territory. Although these areas are often close to one another, checkpoints demarcate control. On my last trip into Syria earlier this month, we traveled freely through parts of Aleppo controlled by the Free Syrian Army, following roads that kept us at safe distance from the checkpoints marked by the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq. Please see the nearby map for more detail.

Contrary to many media accounts, the war in Syria is not being waged entirely, or even predominantly, by dangerous Islamists and al Qaeda die-hards. The jihadists pouring into Syria from countries like Iraq and Lebanon are not flocking to the front lines. Instead they are concentrating their efforts on consolidating control in the northern, rebel-held areas of the country.



Groups like Jabhat al Nusra, an al Qaeda affiliate, are all too happy to take credit for successes on the battlefield, and are quick to lay claim to opposition victories on social media. This has often led to the impression that these are spearheading the fight against the Syrian government. They are not.

These groups care less about defeating Assad than they do about establishing and holding their Islamic emirate in the north of the country. Many Jabhat al Nusra fighters left in the middle of ongoing rebel operations in Homs, Hama and Idlib to head for Raqqa province once the provincial capital fell in March 2013. During the battle for Qusayr in late May, Jabhat al Nusra units were noticeably absent. In early June, rebel reinforcements rallied to take the town of Talbiseh, north of Homs city, while Jabhat al Nusra fighters preferred to stay in the liberated areas to fill the vacuum that the Free Syrian Army affiliates had left behind.

Moderate opposition forces—a collection of groups known as the Free Syrian Army—continue to lead the fight against the Syrian regime. While traveling with some of these Free Syrian Army battalions, I've watched them defend Alawi and Christian villages from government forces and extremist groups. They've demonstrated a willingness to submit to civilian authority, working closely with local administrative councils. And they have struggled to ensure that their fight against Assad will pave the way for a flourishing civil society. One local council I visited in a part of Aleppo controlled by the Free Syrian Army was holding weekly forums in which citizens were able to speak freely, and have their concerns addressed directly by local authorities.

Moderate opposition groups make up the majority of actual fighting forces, and they have recently been empowered by the influx of arms and money from Saudi Arabia and other allied countries, such as Jordan and France. This is especially true in the south, where weapons provided by the Saudis have made a significant difference on the battlefield, and have helped fuel a number of recent rebel advances in Damascus.

Thanks to geographic separation from extremist strongholds and reliable support networks in the south, even outdated arms sent by the Saudis, like Croatian rocket-launchers and recoilless rifles, have allowed moderate rebel groups to make significant inroads into areas that had previously been easily defended by the regime, and to withstand the pressure of government forces in the capital. In recent months, the opposition has achieved major victories in Aleppo, Idlib, Deraa and Damascus—nearly reaching the heart of the capital—despite the regime's consolidation in Homs province.

At this stage in the conflict, barring a major bombing campaign by the U.S., sophisticated weaponry, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems, may be the opposition's best chance at sustaining its fight against Assad. This is something only foreign governments, not jihadists, can offer. Right now, Saudi sources that are providing the rebels critical support tell me that they haven't sent more effective weaponry because the U.S. has explicitly asked them not to.

There is no denying that groups like Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham have gained a foothold in the north of Syria, and that they have come to dominate local authorities there, including by imposing Shariah law. Such developments are more the result of al Qaeda affiliates having better resources than an indicator of local support. Where they have won over the local population, they have done so through the distribution of humanitarian aid.

Yet Syrians have pushed back against the hard-line measures imposed on them by some of these extremists groups. While I was last in northern Syria in early August, I witnessed nearly daily protests by thousands of citizens against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in areas of Aleppo.

Where does this leave the U.S. as the White House contemplates a possible strike? The Obama administration has emphasized that regime change is not its goal. But a punitive measure undertaken just to send a message would likely produce more harm than good. If the Syrian government is not significantly degraded, a U.S. strike could very well bolster Assad's position and highlight American weakness, paving the way for continued atrocities.

Instead, any U.S. action should be part of a larger, comprehensive strategy coordinated with our allies that has the ultimate goal of destroying Assad's military capability while simultaneously empowering the moderate opposition with robust support, including providing them with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. This should be combined with diplomatic and political efforts to first create an international coalition to put pressure on Assad and his supporters, and then working to encourage an intra-Syrian dialogue. Having such a strategy in place would help alleviate the concerns of key allies, like Britain, and ensure greater international support for U.S. action.

The U.S. must make a choice. It can address the problem now, while there is still a large moderate force with some shared U.S. interests, or wait until the conflict has engulfed the entire region. Iran and its proxies will be strengthened, as will al Qaeda and affiliated extremists. Neither of these outcomes serves U.S. strategic interests.

Ms. O'Bagy is a senior analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

A version of this article appeared August 31, 2013, on page A13 in the U.S. edition
of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: On the Front Lines of Syria's Civil War.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324463604579044642794711158.html

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Disorganized Like a Fox

Why it's a great thing that the Syrian opposition is fragmented.

BY ELIZABETH O'BAGY | JUNE 29, 2012



When asked to explain why they aren't providing greater support to the Syrian opposition, U.S. officials have repeatedly fallen back on the excuse that the rebels are deeply fragmented and leaderless. The opposition in Libya, by contrast, "had a face," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a House panel this March: "We could actually meet with them. We could eyeball them. We could ask them tough questions." In his own testimony, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta echoed Clinton's worries, saying, "There has been no single unifying military alternative that can be recognized, appointed, or contacted."
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These statements, however, get the dynamics of the Syrian uprising all wrong. It is not a "leaderless" revolution, as U.S. officials have claimed. And the United States and its international allies should no longer use such arguments as an excuse for inaction.

U.S. policymakers have failed to recognize the difference between a decentralized leadership and a fragmented -- or absent -- leadership. In travels to Lebanon, which many Syrian dissidents use as a base to organize, I have seen firsthand how the indigenous political opposition has produced strong leaders who have developed viable political structures on the ground. Despite their anonymity to international audiences, these leaders are well known inside Syria, are recognized by different opposition groups, and coordinate together to advance their shared goal of toppling President Bashar al-Assad's regime. They are decentralized out of necessity, to ensure the continuity of the uprising amid Assad's brutal crackdown.

The Assad regime's repression has actually made the opposition's political structures more resilient, as its leaders have been forced to create networks that will function beyond their life span. And because Assad's security forces retain significant control in many areas, it is unsurprising that the opposition has been reluctant to reveal the details of its leadership. Individual leaders have been forced to remain underground or risk being targeted by the Syrian government. When one leader is killed, as frequently occurs, another steps in to take his place. The grassroots political opposition has thus avoided becoming dependent on a single leader.

Homs is a powerful example of this system of leadership. During Assad's relentless shelling of the city in February, many of the Homs Revolutionary Council's leaders were killed. Yet the fluidity of leadership allowed the council to continue to function and provide invaluable services throughout the offensive. As one activist working in the council put it to me, "We are like the legendary hydra -- Assad kills one of us, and 10 more pop up in their place."

These local networks -- not the exiled opposition -- are truly guiding Syria's revolution. The network of nascent political structures begins in villages and city neighborhoods, where activists working in coordinating committees mobilize support for demonstrations. At the district and city levels, Revolutionary Councils and Revolution Command Councils coordinate the activities of the local committees and interface with armed opposition groups. These councils have largely coalesced behind three national organizations inside Syria -- namely, the Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC), the Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution (SCSR), and the Local Coordination Committees (LCCs). These organizations serve as the main media conduits for the grassroots opposition, and they coordinate the activities of the regional councils.

These three national coalitions serve different constituencies and are divided by the demands of those they represent. Each organization has espoused a different vision for the revolution and a post-Assad future. The SRGC has adopted an aggressive platform for Assad's removal, actively supporting armed rebels through provincial military councils. The organization refuses to cooperate with the Syrian National Council (SNC), an umbrella opposition group that operates from exile, due to disillusionment with the SNC's endless internal power squabbles. The more moderate LCCs favor a political solution, proposing a plan for a peaceful transition of power in order to avert a violent collapse of the government. To achieve this objective, they have opted to cooperate with the SNC and have participated in numerous national conferences with the council.

The SCSR, which caters to young protesters, falls between these two. It has set the outlines for a political solution while also recognizing the importance of armed struggle. Although it has sent representatives to SNC meetings, it is not formally a member. Local activist networks and revolutionary councils meet to decide which national platform best represents their outlook and then align with it. The three groups' visions and approaches to the revolution differ, but all adhere to a system that grants local groups representation in the national organizations.

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Syria's grassroots protest movement has thus organized itself into national coalitions with political platforms. Local activists have the ability to develop practices that work best within their local and regional environments. This decentralization has also ensured these organizations retain mass support from diverse demographics, as they are responsive to the needs of their specific constituencies, including Islamists, moderate Islamists, and secular figures.

This complex, opaque system has made it difficult for U.S. officials to conceive of ways to help the Syrian opposition as a whole. There is no mailbox to send correspondence to all of them, and there is no Istanbul hotel to meet them in. Although this has frustrated U.S. policymakers, it is actually a sign of political health in Syria. By adopting a decentralized leadership system, the Syrian opposition has succeeded in creating the foundations for greater political pluralism. For almost half a century, Syria suffered under the de facto one-party rule of the Baath Party. Ultimately, these organizations may reverse that destructive legacy, becoming fully functional political movements capable of creating the type of multiparty system necessary for a successful democratic transition.

That, of course, is a long way off, and in the meantime the positive influence of these grassroots movements is increasingly under threat. As the uprising drags on, activists have become increasingly desperate to receive direct aid and support. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and global jihadi networks linked to al Qaeda are manipulating this growing desperation, providing material support to those groups that promise to support their foreign agendas.

The proliferation of money and weapons may have accelerated the revolution, but it has not supported the development of political structures inside Syria. These foreign sponsors risk dividing and radicalizing the opposition. Rebel leaders have already reported that in some cases, receiving foreign aid comes with implicit conditions, forcing them to act in ways contrary to their desired direction. In a leaked email, rebel commander Abu Majd wrote, "The basis of the crisis in the city [Homs] today is groups receiving uneven amounts of money from direct sources in Saudi Arabia, some of whom are urging the targeting of loyalist neighborhoods and sectarian escalation." Moreover, in areas where Assad's crackdown has been harshest, including in the cities of Homs and Rastan, hard-line Salafi groups have gained a foothold within the opposition. In early April, following the regime's offensive against Homs, for instance, accusations emerged that the rebels' Farouq Battalion had begun collecting jizya, a tax on non-Muslims, in areas of Homs province.

To reverse this dangerous trend, the United States should take the lead in coordinating international support with the aim of reinforcing the grassroots political structures already operating inside Syria. U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged that they are vetting the flow of weapons to Syrian rebels to ensure they do not fall into the hands of al Qaeda militants. This policy is a step forward, but it comes with risks. Facilitating weapon transfers to certain groups could empower militias at the expense of the grassroots political opposition. One key condition for future arms transfers should be that groups receiving weapons agree to submit to civilian command structures.

The Syrian grassroots opposition has protested and fought the Assad regime for more than a year now, largely without tangible support from abroad. In areas that have effectively fallen from Assad's control, these local and provincial committees have already become the de facto government. These committee leaders could very well be Syria's future power brokers, and U.S. officials must get to know them now. If U.S. officials do not, they may find this promising new generation of Syrian leaders destroyed by both the Assad regime and radical Islamist movements, who will only carry Syria into a bloody and catastrophic civil war.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/29/disorganized_like_a_fox

.. the C-Span conversation involving O'Bagy and two other guests, being replayed now .. http://www.c-span.org/Live-Video/C-SPAN/ .. was/is interesting and informative .. O'Bagy's chief point has been that she sees the opposition becoming more nationally organized in reaction to influx of the most extreme jihadists, mostly all in the first article above, i guess .. other guests .. this must be the one ..

11pm (ET) Syrian Civil War and U.S. Military Strikes

Frederic Hof
Atlantic Council
Senior Middle East Fellow
Former State Department Special Adviser for Syria Transition

Barry Pavel
Atlantic Council
International Security Vice President & Director
Former White House Special Assistant & Senior
Defense Policy Director, 2008-10

Elizabeth O'Bagy
Institute for the Study of War
Senior Research Analyst & Syria Team Lead

Faysal Itani
Atlantic Council Middle East Fellow

Atlantic Council
From September 4, 2013.
http://www.c-span.org/Schedules/C-SPAN-Radio-Schedule/

talked much about deterrence .. one believed the leak and the time lapse has virtually wiped out the surprise element and the fact that Assad has had time to move his resources around has made any strikes creating a worthwhile deterrence as much more difficult .. one said he believes that a limited strike now would be more negative than positive because of those factors .. could have been Mr Itani .. that could give me reason to reconsider whether the time for a strike may not be now .. haven't thought about that, yet .. this bit was good to hear .. when he was asked whether or not this whole affair to this point could have actually acted as a deterrent in itself .. he conceded yes .. it could have .. he said the Assad's are a relatively cautious group, and that it could well be they do believe now they have actually overreached .. and will not use gas again unless they fight themselves in a tighter corner in the future .. the program just finished this instant ..